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Abstract
This PhD analyses strategic health partnerships, focusing on Health Improvement
Programmes (HImPs) and Health Action Zones (HAZs). It is a case study of four
English health districts, based on 81 semi-structured interviews, and on partnership
documents and observations. Partnership - central to New Labour's modernisation
agenda for the NHS - was intended to improve the quality of health services and reduce
health inequalities. This thesis conceptualises three dimensions of partnership - co-
ordination, collaboration, participation. It uses three theoretical frameworks to interpret
the nature of partnership in the study sites.
Governance Theory - market, hierarchy and networks - provided a framework to
conceptualise the broader context in which partnership was developed but also to
explore the influence of central government on local statutory agencies. Over-use and
poor co-ordination of central command and control tools strengthened hierarchical
relations. Coupled with a shift towards healthcare delivery, this undermined the
development of autonomous, lateral relationships.
Resource Dependency Theory provided a framework to analyse the influences on
horizontal relationships between local partners. This theory sees actors as self-
interested, manipulating the environment to enhance their resources while reducing their
resource dependency on others. A model was developed to explain how resource
motivations and symmetry combined with local circumstances to shape partnerships.
Collaboration Theory provided a normative framework to assess the quality of the
partnership process. According to this theory, innovative and consensual solutions to
social problems emerge through inclusive processes - often involving conflict and
requiring impartial facilitation. In the study sites, these processes were constrained by
overbearing hierarchical relations and local influences, resulting in policy co-ordination,
not radical innovation.
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The thesis argues that government reforms resulted mainly in partnership as co-
ordination. Partnership as participation marginally increased while partnership as
collaboration was barely evident. The shift from market to networks was undermined
by the government's strengthening and (mis)management of hierarchical relations.
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my Supervisor, Dr Naomi Fulop, and members of my Advisory
Committee, Dr Judith Green and Professor Ewan Ferlie for their guidance and support. I
am also grateful to Leroy White for his advice, encouragement and enthusiasm, and to
North Thames Region Research and Development Research Fellowship for funding this
research. I would like to thank my family for being so supportive, tolerant and
understanding throughout the years of research. In particular, my heart felt thanks go to
my partner, Helen Collinson, whose loving support ensured I completed this thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank all the people in my study sites who kindly agreed to be
interviewed and let me observe their meetings. The research would not have been
possible without their willing co-operation.
4
Contents
CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW 7
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH METHODS 77
CHAPTER 3 - FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: THE INFLUENCE OF COMMAND AND
CONTROL MECHANISMS ON PARTNERSHIP 112
CHAPTER 4 - HORIZONTAL RELATIONS - BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
.......................................................................................................................... 150
CHAPTER 5 - DYNAMICS OF HORIZONTAL RELATIONS - A RESOURCE
DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVE 202
CHAPTER 6 - PARTNERSHIP PROCESS, JOINED-UP OPPORTUNISM AND JOINED-UP
THINKING 254
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 289
BIBLIOGRAPHY 325
APPENDICES A - 0 353
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 411
5
Figures
Figure 1.1. Difference between co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration 12
Figure 1.2. Structural models of interaction between managed care organisations and
public health agencies 14
Figure 1.3. Arnstein's ladderofparticipation 16
Figure 1.4. Systems model of hierarchical co-ordination and control.. 22
Figure 2.1. Analytical and theoretical framework of thesis 83
Figure 2.2. Case study selection matrix - urban and rural by types of health partnership
........................................................................................................................................ 86
Figure 3.1. Influence of command and control mechanisms on the development of
health partnership 116
Figure 4.1. Factors that shape actors' assessment of resource costs and benefits of
partnership, influencing their degree of involvement in partnership 160
Figure 5.1. Factors influencing Social Services' level of involvement in partnership in
Dalesville 213
Figure 5.2. Factors influencing Social Services' level of involvement in partnership in
Greenshire 214
Figure 5.3. Factors influencing Environmental Health's level of involvement in
partnership in District A, Greenshire 220
Figure 5.4. Factors influencing Environmental Health's level of involvement in
partnership in District B, Greenshire 221
Figure 6.1. The process of generating joined-up thinking and opportunism in partnership
...................................................................................................................................... 256
Tables
Table 1.1. The difference between co-operation and co-ordination 12
Table 1.2. The rationale for strategic health partnerships under New Labour 64
Table 3.1 Hierarchical command and control mechanisms used to co-ordinate
government reforms on partnership 114
Table 3.2. Examples of policy documents with their targets and standards 121
Table 3.3. Examples of different departmental Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) 122
Table 3.4. Quantity of health service directives and guidance by year 130
Table 4.1. Availability of additional resources in each case study site for 1999/2000 156
Table 4.2. Additional funding (£ million) for tackling health inequalities (HAZ funding
and special allocations) as a percentage of total budget by site for 2001102 164
Table 4.3. Size of resource base typical of organisations in health partnerships 191
Table 4.4. Specific adjustments for old long-stay patients moved into care into the
community for 1999/2000, by case study site (£ million) 195
Table 4.5. Summary of local resource dependency relations by organisation/department
across study sites 199
Table 5.1. Degree ofHA and SS integration in the management of Mental Health, Older
Peoples and Learning Disability services by study site 228
''1
6
Chapter 1 - Literature review
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is about the strategic health partnerships that were created to improve health
and reduce inequalities in the English National Health Service (NHS). It is based on
comparative case studies of partnership in four district health authorities (HAs).
It seeks to understand the nature of partnership between health authorities and other
statutory and non-statutory agencies, such as local authorities (LAs) and the voluntary
sector I, in the production of local health strategy. The following questions are
addressed: what factors influence the development and functioning of partnership? How
do these factors influence behaviour and interaction of partners, and what impact does
this have on the development and outcome of partnership? These questions are
considered in the context of the government's ambitions for strategic health
partnerships.
It uses Health Improvement Programme (HImPs) and Health Action Zone (HAZs)
partnerships as a focus for research. These were new strategic health partnerships
conceived and initiated by the New Labour government shortly after it came to power in
1997. As part of the agenda to modernise public services, their purpose was to
encourage greater collaboration and innovation between organisations in order to tackle
the wider health issues facing local communities and reduce the inequalities in health
between different population groups. Partnership was one of the key concepts that
underpinned New Labour's organisational reforms to the NHS. It was a major theme in
government policy as a whole, which in turn was rooted in their philosophy of the
'Third Way'. This argues that in order to meet the challenges posed by fundamental
changes in society such as inequality, government needs to become, amongst other
things, more democratic, transparent, participatory and efficient. Partnership was seen
lIn this thesis the term voluntary sector is used in its broadest sense in that it includes users/carers,
community groups and the public and not just voluntary organisations. Where greater precision is
required each individual term is used.
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as one means of addressing these needs and public health an appropriate area for its
application.
The thesis conceptualises three dimensions of partnership encapsulated in the
government's policy documentation and Third Way philosophy - co-ordination,
collaboration and participation. These dimensions are explored using three theoretical
perspectives from different academic disciplines, as there is no one comprehensive
theory of partnership.
Organisational Economics theories of governance conceptualise the co-ordination of
public (and private) services in terms of markets, hierarchy and networks. This
perspective provides an analytical framework for the thesis as a whole but also for
exploring the influence of central government on the development and outcome/ of
strategic health partnerships.
Resource Dependency Theory provides a framework to analyse and understand the
influences on relationships between local partners. This theory sees actors' as self-
interested, manipulating the environment to enhance their resources while reducing their
resource dependency on other organisations. A model is developed to explain how
resource motivations and resource symmetry combined with local circumstances to
shape partnership development.
Collaboration Theory provides a normative framework against which the quality of
interactive processes in partnership is assessed. According to this theory, innovative and
consensual solutions to difficult social problems emerge through negotiations involving
conflicting perspectives and requiring inclusive and impartial facilitation.
2In common with other case studies on partnership, this thesis uses the term outcome to signify the
process output of partnership i.e. involving communities, resource allocation, policy and initiative
development etc, rather than the impact on population health. The term 'health outcome' is used when the
latter sense is required.
lIn this thesis the term actor(s) is used to signify both organisation(s) and the individual(s) which are
located within them.
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These theoretical perspectives are reviewed in more detail in this chapter. Chapters 3, 4,
5 and 6 present the findings, with reference to the theoretical perspectives. Chapter 7
summarises the findings and discusses their implications with reference to each
theoretical perspective. The findings are contrasted with the model of partnership
outlined in government policy and the governance framework on which it draws. Policy
recommendations are made, areas of further research identified and the strengths and
weaknesses of the study discussed.
Chapter 1 begins by reviewing and defining the concept of partnership and its
dimensions. The three theoretical perspectives relevant to the study of partnership are
then explained and assumptions discussed. This is followed by a review of empirical
literature on health partnership and an analysis of its deficiencies in addressing
partnership. The context of health partnership in the UK is then outlined, first providing
a brief history of health partnership in the UK, then by examining the philosophy of the
Third Way, on which New Labour's impetus for partnership was predicated, and finally
giving an overview of reforms to the NHS (and other public services) structured around
two key themes - partnership and performance management. The distinguishing
characteristics of New Labour's health partnerships are outlined and some underlying
tensions and assumptions explored. Finally, the questions addressed in this thesis are set
out. The research methods and strategy used to study these questions, together with their
rationale and justification, are set out in Chapter 2.
1.2 Towards a definition of partnership
It is crucial to clarify exactly what is meant by the term 'partnership' before embarking
on any thesis to evaluate strategic health partnerships. This section explores the
language associated with partnership and some of the underlying concepts. A model of
partnership which encapsulates key aspects of the government's conceptualisation is
then outlined.
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1.2.1 Partnership - a clarification of terms
In the context of health policy, definitions of partnership are rare (Taket 1999); its
meaning is often left implicit, while a host of terms associated with partnership are
used, often interchangeably. These include 'inter-agency working', 'multi-professional',
'trans-sectoral', 'alliance', 'collaboration', 'co-operation' and 'networks'. This has led
to a terminological quagmire (Leathard 1994). Rawson has attempted to clarify matters
by separating the terms used into three concepts (Rawson 1994):
1. Problematic association: inter/multi/trans
2. Grouping: agency/sectoral/professional/occupational/alliances
3. Focus of operations: collaboration/co-operation/integration/teamwork/joint
working
In so doing, he unravels three important aspects of partnership.
1. Problematic association relates to the nature of linkages between those
participating in joint work. Different terms have different connotations. For
example, 'inter' denotes a relationship between and among partners and so
implies some notion of reciprocity; whereas 'trans' and 'multi' signify
relationships across and beyond partners without any indication of mutuality
(Leathard 1994; Rawson 1994).
2. Grouping relates to who is included in a partnership. Terms such as 'agency'
and 'sector' emphasise organisational features of relationships, perhaps to the
exclusion of community groups or individuals, whereas the terms 'professional'
or 'occupational' signify an ideological allegiance and perhaps more exclusive
membership (Rawson 1994).
3. Focus of operations draws attention to the way in which partners work together.
A variety of labels are used here such as networking, co-operation, co-
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ordination, collaboration, often indiscriminately in policy documents.
However, they have subtle but important differences in meaning which are
explored below.
Networking, for example, is an informal relationship between organisations, usually at
the level of the individual. Individuals exchange information and resources for benefit.
There is no formal linkage between organisations; commitment and risk-taking is low
and maintenance of organisational autonomy high.
Co-operation is a more formal form of working together without any commonly defined
mission, structure or planning effort. Organisations co-operate in order to achieve their
own goals (AI, BI) (see Figure 1.1). Authority is retained by each organisation,
reducing the risk as resources and rewards are kept separate (Mattessich and Monsey
1992). It is a more temporary type of interrelation.
Co-ordination, on the other hand, is broader in scope. It is a specific form of joint
working, directed towards the achievement of a common objective (C1 in Figure 1.1) in
a systematised and managed manner (Collins 1994). It is often based on formal,
contractual agreements in which joint goals and activities are set out with a clear
definition of task and structural linkages between agencies (Mulford and Rogers 1982).
The process of co-ordination involves more resources and, as a consequence, staff of
greater seniority (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Collins 1994). Interaction involves higher
organisational integration and, therefore, places greater restrictions on autonomy.
As some theorists use the terms co-operation and co-ordination conversely to those
above (see Himmelman 1996), Table 1.1 focuses on a number of underlying criteria to
distinguish between them.
In public administration, co-ordination can be similarly conceptualised although the
emphasis is generally more on enforced hierarchical control over local statutory
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Table 1.1. The difference between co-operation and co-ordination.
t;'t~;i:,,%'!fCriteria~ii' 'Cl*,-: > ~··~·co~operatioI1A·.J;
I: C()~rdlnation :f,;;j.;fl~
,'!' a
Rules and formality No formal rules
Formal rules
Goals and activities Individual organisations'
Joint goals and activities
emphasised goals and activities
Implications for vertical None, only domain
Vertical or horizontal linkages
and horizontal linkages agreement
can be affected
Personal resources Relatively few - lower
More resources involved -
involves ranking members
higher ranking members
Threat to autonomy Little threat
More threat to autonomy
Source: (Rogers 1982, pp.13 Table 2.1)
organisations (mediated co-ordination) than on voluntary interaction (unmediated co-
ordination) (Kiekert and Koppenjan 1997). Mediated co-ordination has two forms akin
to imperative and collaborative co-ordination (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988). Imperative
co-ordination involves the process of centralised rational planning to provide a coherent
framework to guide action at a lower level (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988). It is vertical and
obligatory (Kiekert and Koppenjan 1997).
Figure 1.1. Difference between co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration
co-operation outcomes Co-ordination outcome
Collaboration outcome
A 8
A 8 A 8
\/ \/
A1 81 C1
m
Source: adapted from (Rogers 1982)
Collaborative co-ordination, or collaboration by comparison, IS about local
organisations working with others towards common goals on a joint project or initiative
which is mutually beneficial (Mattessich and Monsey 1992; Huxham 1996; Means,
Brenton et al. 1997). It is an intense form of mutual attachment, involving exchanging
information and sharing resources, responsibilities and risks (Mattessich and Monsey
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1992). The degree of integration and formalisation can be high, with the establishment
of new structures and a commitment to a common mission. However, others frequently
do not specify the degree of linkage (Himmelman 1996), emphasising instead the
process of working together (Gray 1985). Managing the process of interaction in a way
that handles differences constructively can result in innovative solutions to joint
organisational problems that lone stakeholders could not have conceived (Cl in Figure
1.1) (Gray 1989; Gray 1996).
The terms used above to describe the focus of operations have three common elements
(Huxham 1996, pp.8):
I. Mode of organising - intensive and mutually beneficial. The benefit may not be
in society's interest; hence the sometimes pejorative use of 'collaboration' to
signify working traitorously with an enemy (Pratt, Plamping et al. 1998).
2. Structural form - with varying degrees of integration or closeness between
organisations or individuals. Figure 1.2 indicates how the degree of
organisational integration relates to the focus of operations.
3. Rationale - often not explicit.
Rationale is important because it defines the purpose or product of partnership
(financial, self interest in taking on a problem which cannot be tackled alone, moral
imperative) and how the partnership will proceed (the nature of relationships within a
partnership and how this is decided). Huxham (1996) identifies five dimensions of
rationales which interrelate to varying degrees in non-linear ways:
1. Empowerment andparticipation
2. Power relationships
3. Addressing conflict
4. Substantive change (advancing a shared task or vision)
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5. Ambitiousness (information exchange or joint agreements)
Dimensions are instrumental in that partnership is seen as a vehicle to achieving a
particular purpose or satisfying ideological needs.
Figure 1.2. Structural models of interaction between managed care organisations
and public health agencies
High
integration
Focus of operations
Single ownership .........\
I Shared ownership I I Parallel ownership
Joint venture
I,~>Collaboration
...... ,>" Co-ordination
Contractual agreement
Low
integration Independence II '-__ C_o_m_pe_t_iti_o_n_----l
.J .:::>.Co-operation
..•..... i.
········Ji:·~Networking
.'
I Informal co-operative group I
Source: adapted from Halverson (1997)
As will be shown later in the chapter, a number of these rationales clearly resonated
with the view of partnership expressed by New Labour.
The next section considers partnership as a mode of participation, as it is key to the
conceptualisation of partnership.
1.2.2 Partnership as a mode of participation
This perspective emphasises the nature of relationships between stakeholders, in
particular, the degree to which power and control is shared (Popay and Williams 1998).
Many of the models and concepts of participation were developed with voluntary sector
involvement in mind, where people and organisations were viewed as a resource for
innovation and change, not a source of problems (Cameron and Cranfield 1998, pp.Il).
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Cadbury defines partnership as 'an involved form of participation' in which power is
shared equally between all partners (Cadbury 1993). This definition is differentiated
from more passive degrees of participation, such as consultation, where views are
listened to but not necessarily heard when making a decision. The ability to influence
through consultation is therefore limited. Similarly, Wilcox identifies partnership as
mode of participation in which different interests, acting together, decide what is best
(1994). Unless decision-making is handed over to independent community interests to
decide how to allocate resources, there is a danger of manipulation, paternalism and
even coercion of this sector unless issues of participant power are addressed.
Arnstein (1969) explicitly recognises this issue in her classic model of participation.
Writing about community involvement in the War on Poverty programme in the USA,
she describes an eight-step ladder of participation (see Figure 1.3). Partnership
represents a level of participation where planning and decision-making responsibilities
are shared i.e. through joint committees. This implies a degree of equality amongst
partners. However, partnership represents the lowest level of citizen power. Higher
modes of participation involve greater voluntary sector representation to the point
(idealised) at which citizens control the entire decision-making process. Participation at
a level less than partnership is tantamount to tokenism or non-participation. In these
models, levels of participation appear linear, one-dimensional and static - implying that
different modes do not concur at the same time or shift with time. Although useful in
recognising the need to move the balance of power on resource decisions towards the
community, how this relates to innovation is not delineated. There is also a naive
assumption that increased representation and equality between partners will address
imbalances in power. However, there are other dimensions to power which can
influence decisions beyond the decision-making forum (Bachrach and Baratz 1962;
Lukes 1974). Furthermore, these models do not explicitly address empowerment. As
Oakley (1999) notes, there are two distinct interpretations of participation. The first one
is participation as empowerment. This relates to the acquisition of skills, knowledge,
experience and confidence that enable the community to take greater responsibility for
their development (i.e. involvement in and ability to influence decision-making).
15
Figure 1.3. Arnstein's ladder of participation
High
Low
Citizen control
Delegated power
Partnership
Placation
Consultation
Informing
Therapy
Manipulation
Degrees of
citizen power
Degrees of
tokenism
Non-
participation
Empowerment is not only seen as an instrument of change which can help to reverse
social exclusion but also one which can lend legitimacy to change (Bartunek, Foster-
Fishman et al. 1996; Croft and Beresford 1996; Oakley and Kahssay 1999). The second
interpretation isparticipation as collaboration, a means to ensure effective development
and implementation of initiatives to address complex problems, as discussed above.
These are not soluble by anyone organisation and are therefore not their sole property.
Individuals, organisations or communities that are directly affected by the problem also
have a stake and therefore can legitimately claim a right to influence the decision-
making process (Gray 1989).
Conceptualising partnership as a distinct mode of participation is useful as it draws
attention to the extent of voluntary sector involvement in, and influence over, the
decision-making process. This is not only dependent on the empowerment of
individuals, groups and communities but also requires a shift in power relations towards
the voluntary sector.
1.2.3 Partnership as co-ordination, collaboration and participation
For this thesis, I define partnership as:
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'a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into between two
or more stakeholders (individuals, groups or organisations) to achieve a
common goal.
It involves a commitment to: mutual relationships and goals, ajointly developed
structure and shared responsibility, mutual authority and accountability for
success and sharing of resource and rewards. '
(Adapted from Mattessich and Monsey 1992)
However, for greater analytical specificity I employ the notion of partnership as co-
ordination, collaboration and participation. This is because these three concepts were
identified either implicitly or explicitly in government thinking/policy on partnership, as
will be shown in Section 1.5.3. In this conceptualisation, partnership can be seen as a
way to improve co-ordination between the different parts of the state (national and
local) and their delivery of public services, reducing duplication and inefficiencies. It
can also be seen as a collaborative process whereby local stakeholders, through a
process of resolving conflicting perceptions and values, generate innovative solutions to
difficult social problems. Finally, partnership can be understood as a mode of
participation, with the voluntary sector actively engaged in, and having influence over
local decision-making and resources.
This conceptualisation fits well with a number of different theoretical perspectives
considered relevant to strategic health partnerships. These are explored next.
1.3 Theoretical frameworks
There is no single theory of partnership (Gray and Wood 1991). Instead, a variety of
perspectives have been employed to explore different aspects of partnership
(preconditions, processes and outcomes) or related concepts, Le. networks (Reitan 1998;
Ferlie and McGivern 2003). These include economic organisation theories, corporate
social performance theory, strategic management theory, institutional theory, leadership
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and organisation theory, organisational science, sociology of knowledge, policy
implementation theories; psychology and post-modern perspectives (Gray and Wood
1991; Bartunek, Foster-Fishman et al. 1996; Lichtenstein, Alexander et al. 1997; Reitan
1998; De Leeuw 1999; Lawrence, Phillips et al. 1999; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001a;
Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002). I draw on three theoretical perspectives to understand
health partnership:
1. Governance Theory/Organisational Economics
2. Policy networks/Resource Dependency Theory
3. Collaboration Theory
As will be shown, Governance Theory was chosen as it provides a useful framework to
conceptualise the broader context of change in social policy, including recent reforms to
the NHS and other public services (Barzelay 2001). It can also be used to analyse
partnership as an organisational form (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Policy
networkslResource Dependency Theory was chosen as it provides a link between
national and local context and behaviour in networks or inter-organisational relations,
helping to understand what factors drive or influence interaction. Collaboration Theory
was selected as it specifically focuses on the process of partnership and how relations
can be actively managed to achieve desired outcomes. Although the first two theories
relate to networks/inter-organisational relations, the ideas and concepts they contain can
be applied to partnerships, which, as noted in Section 1.2.1, are more formalised and
instrumentally structured than networks. In addition, each theory focuses on a different
aspect of partnership in a complementary way (context, interaction and outcome); they
can also accommodate the different conceptualisations of partnership (i.e. co-
ordination, collaboration and participation); and the literature on each is reasonably
developed with respect to health partnership. The three theories are therefore useful in
addressing one or more of my research questions.
Each theory is now outlined and its relevance to health partnership explored in the
context of government reforms.
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1.3.1 Governance Theory/Organisational Economics
This perspective focuses on how organisational life can be governed or 'steered' (Pierre
and Peters 2000). Co-ordination can be understood in terms of three idealised models -
markets/competition, hierarchieslbureaucracies and networks/associations/clans
(Bradach and Eccles 1991; Ouchi 1991; Thompson 1991a; 0vretveit 1993; Collins
1994; Flynn 1996) - each of which is explained in more detail below.
These models can be used to conceptualise how organisations such as the NHS co-
ordinate and allocate resources in the production of goods and services. This might
involve one or a combination of the three models. A central concern is which model or
mix of models is the most efficient for producing a service. In the public sector, this
question needs to go beyond considerations of technical efficiency, addressing whether
a service is also sensitive to peoples' needs and responsive to their demands.
i. Market or competition. Markets or competition is the simplest mechanism of co-
ordination and the easiest to sustain. It determines what to produce, how it should be
produced and for whom (Flynn 1996). It requires no agreement between competitors or
indeed communication (Pratt, Plamping et al. 1998), as exchange of goods or services
between individuals or organisations is mediated by means of price signals. Markets are
driven by self-interest. To be efficient there has to be genuine competition and
incentives between participants. Individuals or organisations must know their
preferences and interests and be able to act freely on them. Ideally, providers seek to
maximise their profits, purchasers are fully informed and knowledgeable, there are
several providers with no barriers for entry into the market place, and no external costs
to production that could influence the behaviour of the purchaser (Donaldson and
Gerard 1993; Lipsey and Chrystal 1995). If these conditions do not exist, as is often the
case in health care, markets will fail to co-ordinate efficiently.
In the public sector, co-ordination involves participants willingly exchanging resources
in order to attain higher levels of collective welfare. Exchange may involve a variety of
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'commodities', such as clients or information, and is not just limited to money and
contracts - although cash incentives may be used to ensure co-ordination (Nocon, Small
et al. 1993). Indeed, the creation of the internal market in the NHS in 1991, with the
separation of purchasers and providers of health care, was based on theoretical
assumptions of the market (Flynn 1996). The rationale for adopting this model was that
the market would achieve greater efficiency in allocation and co-ordination of
resources, whilst improving quality, innovation and responsiveness through consumer
choice. Contracts therefore replaced command as the prime mode of co-ordination
(Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996). However, the shift to a full market-based mechanism was
never completed (Exworthy, Powell et al. 1999).
ii. Hierarchy or bureaucracy. Co-ordination cannot always be left to the 'invisible
hand' of the market. Market failure can result in exchange activities having to be
consciously organised and co-ordinated in hierarchical organisations or bureaucracies
(Francis, Levacic et al. 1991).
Bureaucracy is 'a hierarchical organisation designed rationally to co-ordinate the work
of many individuals in the pursuit of large-scale administrative tasks and organisational
goals.' (Weber 1964). Bureaucracies have a high level of structural complexity and
formalisation (rules and regulations) but are decentralised (Hatch 1997a).
Organisational goals are achieved through the sub-divisions of tasks and use of
specialist skills. Activities are integrated and co-ordinated through command and
control mechanisms. Using rational management techniques, superior officers send
commands down the vertical structures for implementation by lower ranking officers
(Mitchell 1991; Collins 1994). The use of rules and regulations helps ensure that
distractions from achieving organisational goals - individual emotions and interests -
are minimised (Haralambos and Holborn 1990a; 0vretveit 1993). Co-ordination is
achieved by routinised activity (division of labour, operational rules etc) or through
government mandate (Webb 1991). Control is effective because it is founded on
rational-legal authority; commands are therefore considered legitimate (Haralambos and
Holborn 1990a).
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Critics of bureaucracy point to three issues which undermine its 'technical superiority':
efficiency, rationality and power (Morgan 1990a; Thompson and McHugh 1995). In
practice, its structure produces numerous inefficiencies or dysfunctions as it stultifies
initiative, slows down decision-making and makes officials inflexible and insensitive
(Greenwood and Wilson 1989; Jan-Erik Lane 2000). This is because officers' work
becomes 'ritualised', sometimes rigorously applying the rules as a means of work
avoidance (bureaucratic behaviour) (Hatch I997b). Alternatively, bureaucrats bend
rules to get work done more efficiently. Either way, the claim of bureaucrats working
rationally to achieve organisational goals is undermined. Nor are hierarchical structures
or specialisation necessarily functional to organisational goals, as both can encourage
groups to extend their own influence and discretion or power (Thompson and McHugh
1995). Critics claim that, over time, bureaucrats develop new goals to serve sectional
interests, displacing the formal objectives of the organisation. This adds to bureaucratic
inefficiency. Certainly the tension between the legitimate needs of individuals and the
demands of the formal organisation are not taken into consideration in the Weberian
model of bureaucracy (Jan-Erik Lane 2000). Indeed, many studies have identified an
'implementation gap' between the commands issued by hierarchy and the actions of
'street-level bureaucrats' (Elmore 1997; Hudson 1997; Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, neo-Weberians advocate alternative forms of bureaucracy (Thompson and
McHugh 1995). These models recognise that centralisation and hierarchical control are
less suited to the work of professionals, experts and managers which requires autonomy
(Thompson and McHugh 1995). They therefore recommend decentralisation of
operational work and greater discretion to lower-level sub-ordinates (Hoggett 1997). In
large, complex organisations, co-ordination is achieved through blending hierarchical
control and sub-ordinate discretion in decentralised sub-units - a process that is called
suboptimisation (Elmore 1997). Control is achieved by focusing on the performance of
sub-units rather than on the technical details of work practices or activities (Elmore
1997; Hoggett 1997). Optimal performance is managed through the use of output
controls. These focus on measuring task activity of individuals or teams (using targets
or indicators) and require outputs to be easily measurable (Hatch 1997b). When this is
not the case, hierarchies may prefer to employ behaviour controls (Hatch 1997b). These
rely on identifying behaviours linked with high performance, and become standards
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against which individuals can be evaluated. They may be development or procedural
(Hoggett 1997). Monitoring of performance, through audit or appraisal, for example, is
central to the use of controls, allowing activity or behaviour that deviates from
organisational goals to be identified and corrected.
Figure 1.4. Systems model of hierarchical co-ordination and control
Adjust incentives & sanctions
,-----------------------------------------, 'T :
Use of Audit :
incentives and
sanctions
Set targets,
standards &
behaviours
Monitor
Perfor:mance~
Goals of
. hierarchy
Adjust output & behavioural controls
(Adapted from Hatch 1997b)
One powerful tool for managing performance is the creation of incentives (additional
resources) and sanctions (financial penalties or termination of contract) in order to
encourage attainment of the goal desired by the hierarchy (Fleisher 1991; Hatch 1997b).
These harness the self-interested behaviour of actors. Figure 1.4 presents graphically
this rational-systems approach to co-ordination and control in hierarchy (Hoggett 1997).
The approach assumes that targets and standards used not only reflect hierarchical goals
but are measurable.
Some activities are extremely difficult to measure (ambiguity) (Hatch 1997b) and
therefore difficult to reward or sanction. Monitoring may produce a negative reaction,
leading to greater concern with satisfying the system rather than attaining a particular
goal (goal displacement). This may create a good but wrong impression or result in
cheating, as demonstrated by the use of output controls in the NHS (Gulland 2003;
Jackson 2003; Krnietowicz 2003). Furthermore, the 'enormous amount of time'
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involved in administering performance management (Hoggett 1997) may draw
resources away from achieving organisational goals, undermining its effectiveness
(Power 1997).
In the UK, government departments are organised according to the bureaucratic
characteristics outlined above, albeit with some variations (Greenwood and Wilson
1989). In the NHS, there is a central, controlling executive at its apex, taking strategic
decisions on policy making and resource allocations, and a decentralised structure, with
strict rules and procedures limiting autonomy at the periphery (Hatch 1997b; Exworthy,
Powell et al. 1999). The lines of authority and accountability for local health authorities
(now called Primary Care Trusts) are vertically integrated through regional offices. A
number of formal mechanisms are used co-ordinate activity. These include: legislation
(setting out legal activity), circulars (offering advice and guidance rather stipulating
practice), judicial control (limiting work to statutory duties), default powers (direct
ministerial intervention), inspection (of some services, usually educative rather than
coercive), appellate functions of ministers (submission of bids and adjudication of
disputes) and finance (regulating and scrutinising expenditure) (Greenwood and Wilson
1989; Leach and Percy-Smith 2001a).
Over the past two decades the government has increasingly relied on output and
behavioural controls to co-ordinate activity in addition to input controls. Increased
operational decentralisation and devolved management (i.e. Trusts) following the
creation of the internal market in the I990s, was accompanied by substantial
developments in performance management and monitoring (also linked to incentives
and sanctions). This innovation led to two new strategies for control: managed
competition and sub-optimisation. The former strategy represented a 'hands-off
approach to control, the latter, with its strong emphasis on output and behavioural
controls, was essentially a reassertion of a bureaucratic mechanism, albeit indirect
(Hoggett 1997; Ranade and Hudson 2003). New Labour's reforms sought to shift the
balance of control strategies again.
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iii. Network or association. Networks are an alternative approach to co-ordinating
people, agencies and transactions besides markets and hierarchy (0vretveit 1993).
These are non-formalised relationships between social actors with complementary
interests (Nohria and Eccles 1992a). Co-ordination is achieved by informal, more
egalitarian and co-operative means in order to pursue valued interests or objectives
(Thompson 1991b). It is based on friendship, kinship or ethnic relationships, within and
across organisational boundaries (Machado and Bums 1988; Collins 1994; Bogason and
Toonen 1998). Individuals and organisations are not self-interested utility maximisers
operating in isolation (as conceptualised in classical economics) but are embedded in
social relations characterised by mutuality, reciprocity and trust (Thompson 1991b;
Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). These are vital to developing and maintaining long-term
exchange relationships and deterring conflict and 'malfeasance' (Granovetter 1985;
Lomi and Prevezer).
Mutuality implies that network members have a common interest or gain benefit from
participation. Reciprocity implies members give resources with the expectation of
receiving something in exchange, either immediately or in the longer term. Resources
may be tangible such as financial, human or informational, or intangible where
membership of a network may enhance reputation or kudos. Trust is the relational bond
that allows members to work towards a mutually beneficial goal. It represents the
degree of certainty that other members will accomplish their contribution to that goal,
when there is no way of monitoring their action (Kirkpatrick 1999). Trust allows for a
more open and reliable exchange of information (Ebers 1997). When combined with
reciprocity it enables concerted action to continue (even when unspecified in contracts)
and the sharing of risks, encouraging innovation and change.
Control in networks is regulated through social and cultural means, such as losing the
right to expect things from others, loss of reputation, shame and exclusion from the
network (0vretveit 1993; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998).Members are, therefore, subject
to considerations of power (Powell 1991; Flynn 1996)
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Networks and other informal patterns of association have been identified as influential
features of the public policy arena for several decades (John 1998). On health issues,
informal policy networks have been identified in community care, alcohol and tobacco
policy (Harrison and Tether 1987; Hardy, Wistow et al. 1990; Read 1992). At a local
level, health promotion partnerships have been described as networks as stakeholders
have no formal authority and resources are exchanged through a process of negotiation
and bargaining (Delaney 1994). Formal networks arguably exist between health and
social services, through central government's creation of Joint Consultative Committees
(JCCs). HlmP and HAZ partnerships could therefore be considered as formalised
network structures to improve health and reduce inequalities.
iv. Integrating the three modes of co-ordination All three of the above modes of co-
ordination have been identified in public and private sector organisations. Lowndes
(1998) argues that all forms coexist, with different modes coming to the fore at key
stages of organisational development. However, there is no single, accepted view of
how these idealised organisational forms 'work' to produce co-ordination (Francis,
Levacic et al. 1991). And nor is there a coherent theoretical model which explains how
characteristics of mutuality, reciprocity, and trust interact and unfold over time m
different types of networks (Newell and Swan 2000; Vangen and Huxham 2003).
Transaction Cost Economics is one perspective which seeks to link two of the modes -
markets and hierarchy (Williamson 1975). This theory helps to explain the conditions
under which each mode is more efficient at producing a service or product. The driving
explanatory mechanism is related to a product's transaction cost - the informational
monitoring costs associated with the production of a good. The theory, however, has
little to say about mode of organisational operation or development, failing to take
account of more convincing and comprehensive accounts of human behaviour or
organisational theory (Morgan 1990b; Parsons 1995). Other theorists such as Powell
(1991) have adapted the theory to include networks, in response to a rapid growth of
small entrepreneurial, high tech firms linked by networks (Johnston and Lawrence
1991; Snow, Miles et al. 1993; Kirkpatrick 1999; Taket and White 2000a). Central to
Powell's explanatory mechanism is the presence of trusting relations in networks. These
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reduce the need to monitor behaviour and keep transaction costs low. However, there
are few analytical tools with which to investigate the role of trust in networks (Mannion
and Smith 1997, pp.l44; Zaheer, McEvily et al. 1998). This deficiency is confounded
by different disciplines characterising different types, quantities and bases of trust
(Saad, Rowe et al. 1999;Korcyzynski 2000; Vangen and Huxham 2003).
Although there is no one accepted theory of governance which unifies the three modes
of co-ordination, the broad concepts it contains are useful in understanding strategic
health partnerships in two ways: first, as an overarching contextual framework to
conceptualise the development of strategic health partnership. New Labour's Third Way
philosophy and their subsequent reforms were couched in terms of market, hierarchy
and networks. Partnership (formal networks) was preferred over managed competition
as its main mode of co-ordination. Second, government reforms stressed indirect
hierarchical controls to steer partnership (performance management).
I therefore use Governance Theory to understand the context in which health
partnerships were established. I also use hierarchy as a framework to explore the
influence of central-local relations on the development and functioning of local strategic
health partnerships. In particular, Chapter 3 uses this framework to explore the impact
of NHS command and control mechanisms on the structure and process of health
partnership, and on the achievement of the organisational goals of health improvement
and reduced inequalities.
Given that the governance perspective generally resorts to a characterisation of
networks rather than provides a substantive theory for their development and
functioning, this thesis draws upon the policy networks perspective, which, as an
explanatory model of inter-organisational relations, is better developed.
1.3.2 Policy Networks and Resource Dependency Theory (RDT)
This perspective focuses on how policy-making in the public sector is influenced by
policy networks. The structural nature of policy networks and the degree of integration
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into government is accredited with shaping policy outcome (Smith 1997). The existence
and influence of policy networks have been identified in political and policy science
literature for a long time (Klijn 1997; John 1998; Leach and Percy-Smith 2001b).
Indeed, it is argued that government is increasingly dependent on policy networks to
develop and co-ordinate policy and deliver public services, at the expense of formal
institutions (hierarchy). Throughout the 1980s, there has been a marked shift from line
bureaucracies to decentralised service delivery, incorporating voluntary and private
sectors in new networks (Rhodes 2000a). This has resulted in a 'hollowing-out of the
state' as internal fragmentation has limited the capacity of the core executive to steer,
resulting in greater dependence on indirect controls to manage and co-ordinate activity
(Pierre and Peters 2000, pp.4S; Leach and Percy-Smith 2001b; Ferlie and McGivern
2003).
In the UK, an explanatory model for policy networks has been developed by Rhodes
(1988a; 1992) and Marsh (1998). It draws heavily on Resource Dependency Theory
(RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and Benson's (1975; 1982) political economy
framework, rather than formalised methods for assessing networks (Pfeffer 1997,
pp.63).
This 'power-dependence' model analyses inter-organisational networks at three levels:
the micro level, focusing on bargaining tactics and negotiative behaviour of agents in
networks; the meso-level, exploring inter-organisational dependencies, resource
exchange and power relations; and the macro-level, focusing on the structure of power
and interests in society. The macro-level provides the context for the lower level
analysis (Sanderson 1990). RDT essentially provides the theoretical framework for the
micro and meso level analysis, explaining the impetus for the development of inter-
organisational relations (uncertainty) as well as their nature (power) (Pfeffer 1997,
pp.63).
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RDT starts with the assumption that no organisation is able to generate all the resources
it needs to achieve its goals, or is able to perform all the activities necessary to make it
self-sustaining. Organisations are therefore dependent on the environment for resources
(Hall 1996). At the micro level, organisations engage with other organisations,
accessing the scarce resources they need, including markets for their products or
services, through negotiation and exchange. This process reduces organisational
uncertainty and is undertaken as long as it does not threaten organisational interests
(Pfeffer 1997). Resources are considered in the broadest sense (financial, political,
informational, clients etc, including intangibles such as legitimacy, although ultimately
in human service agencies these boil down to money and authority) (Benson 1975). The
assumption is that actors are able to identify uncertainty, are aware of other potential
partners and are capable of assessing how their interests will be served (Gulati 1999).
According to RDT, organisations act as rational, utility maximisers, entering into
external relations when benefits of exchange are perceived to outweigh the costs. This
reckoning will include the transaction costs associated with exchange (Challis, Fuller et
al. 1988, pp.40).
Organisations therefore develop structures around access to resources (Burke 1995), and
attempt to manage the environment to their own advantage (Hall 1996), working with
better-resourced organisations to secure their interests while also trying to preserve their
relative autonomy (Hardy, Wistow et al. 1990; Oliver 1991; Wood and Gray 1991;
Parsons 1995). Since the control of resources is discretionary, different types of inter-
organisational relations can develop and a network of dependence and interdependence
emerges. The nature of dependencies is determined by the degree of need for a resource,
Le. its centrality to organisational survival, but also by access to alternative sources
(substitutability) (Scharpf 1978; David and Zakus 1998). When there is low need and
high substitutability, relations are independent. When an organisation has a high need
for a resource, with few or no alternatives, high dependence arises. Conversely, when
resources are of low importance but there is low substitutability, there is low
dependence. When similar levels of dependency relationships exist between
organisations, there is mutual dependency (symmetry). However, when there are
asymmetrical relations (high-low dependency) between organisations, unilateral
dependency arises. In RDT, power is a function of dependence (Cook 1982). The nature
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of symmetry in dependency relations, therefore, is an important driver of the dynamics
of inter-organisational interaction and has implications for co-ordination. Where
dependence is asymmetrical, co-operative exchange may occur on terms dictated by the
organisation which controls the critical resources. Lack of compliance may jeopardise
access to resources. Where relations are more symmetrical, with resources spread more
equally among the partners, power or influence is more balanced. Interaction is more
likely to be characterised by compromise, negotiation and sharing of resources (Phillips,
Lawrence et al. 2000). However, symmetrical dependence can also generate mutual
vulnerability where each party is concerned not to upset each other. This may lead to the
evolution of 'rules of the game' or a 'zone of legitimacy', limiting the range of
objectives and the means used in influencing strategies, and constraining co-ordination
(Scharpf 1978).
However, the resource climate in which dependencies form and develop is likely to
influence relations and behaviour, as it will not only affect supply and access to
resources but also perceptions of need. Organisations operating in a resource-scarce
environment or with a small or declining resource base are likely to have different
perceptions of need for resources and opportunities that exchange might bring. For
example, in asymmetrical relations, more powerful organisations may seek influence or
control over sought-after, scarce resources by exercising their dominance over less
powerful organisations (Oliver 1990), while weaker organisations may accordingly shy
away from interaction, seeking alternative resources (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988).On the
other hand, weaker organisations may seek to increase the reciprocal dependence of the
other partner, transforming the relationship into one of mutual dependence (Scharpf
1978).
The perception of the need for resources (and loss of autonomy), the nature of inter-
organisational relations (symmetry) and environmental context interact, resulting in a
complex network of dependency relations. The nature and dynamism of relations is a
result of actors' attempts, through power-gaining and power-balancing mechanisms to
alter the network and redistribute power (Cook 1982).
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In the provision of human services, provider networks become highly co-operative
when interaction between organisations is based on normative consensus and mutual
respect (Benson 1975). This is not only dependent on a positive evaluation of other
organisations' work (i.e. is it valued) and patterns of work co-ordination or co-operation
between organisations to provide a service (i.e. multi-agency team work and resource
dependencies and base) but also domain consensus (agreement about role and scope of
agencies) and ideological consensus (agreement of the nature of tasks and techniques of
intervention). The latter two are important because money flows into organisations
based on activities. However, for networks to co-ordinate effectively, all four
components need to be in balance, with improvements (or decline) in one dimension
bringing improvements (or decline) in others.
The relative power of an organisation in a co-operative network is dependent on its
access to and control over critical resources as well as its position (centrality) (Benson
1975). These in turn will be influenced by an organisation's links with different interest
and ideological groups in society. At a macro level, these relationships influence control
over the flow of resources into a network as well as organisational activities (Mulford
1984; Sanderson 1990). Networks are therefore shaped by the dominant political and
economic interests in society, whose systems of beliefs, values, assumptions and
ideologies (such as capitalism) limit the choice and behaviour of policy-makers and
ensure that some demands are excluded from the decision-making process (Parsons
1995). These also shape actors' cognitive patterns and social behaviour through a
process of institutionalisation (Klijn and Teisman 1997; Borzel 1998). In the UK, for
example, the medical profession is highly integrated with the Department of Health
(DoH), its curative model of medical practice exerting a strong hegemony over policy
development and resource allocation with regard to health and sickness (Challis, Fuller
et al. 1988; Hardy, Wistow et al. 1990; Wistow 1992). Nevertheless, there is scope for
government to manipulate networks by changing the rules (through legislation) and by
altering resource flows (and, therefore, resource dependencies and network position) in
order to achieve the desired co-operation or co-ordination between organisations.
30
The literature on RDT is large and long-established, its roots extending back into the
1960s with early work based on theories of resource exchange. Rogers (1982) and
Mulford (1984) have summarised this and more recent research on resource dependency
in the human services partnerships (mainly in the USA). In their view, resource
exchange is positively correlated with scarcity of resources, domain consensus, lack of
alternative resources, and goal similarity. Inter-organisational conflict is positively
related to scarcity of resources, lack of alternative resources, and goal similarity but is
negatively related to domain consensus. Mulford (1984) concludes that mutual
dependence, more than asymmetric dependence, is positively correlated with exchange.
Although he is generally supportive of the RDT, he asserts that only a small percentage
of the overall variance in these quantitative studies is explained by these independent
variables (Mulford 1984). A more recent retrospective study of the voluntary sector in
the USA found that loss of autonomy appeared to be less of a deterrent when entering
into partnership than RDT would predict (Oliver 1991). However, many of these studies
failed to consider wider environmental influences on inter-organisational ties. Nearly all
the studies were: cross-sectional, and therefore unable to assess the development of
inter-organisational relations with time; ahistorical; and quantitative, using measures of
poor or unknown validity or reliability (Rogers 1982;Hall 1984; Molnar 1984).
A review by Halpert (1982) of the antecedent factors facilitating co-ordination between
human service organisations, identified a host of interpretative factors broadly similar
to those identified by Benson (positive evaluation, domain consensus, recognition of
mutual independence etc). However, unlike previous studies Halpert correlates actors'
interpretation of the context with these factors (see Appendix A). Logsdon's (1991)
study of environmental collaborations identifies two interpretative prerequisites that are
essential: an interest or stake in the outcome of an inter-organisational relationship, and
interdependence on other organisations for either resources or in dealing with a
particular social problem. Similarly, Oliver's (1990) review identifies six critical
contingencies for inter-organisational relations which are interpretative: necessity,
stability, legitimacy, asymmetry, efficiency and reciprocity. The first four are primarily
shaped by external factors, efficiency by internal and transaction costs, and reciprocity
by the relative properties of organisations. Helling (1998), for example, shows that
representatives from different organisations or sectors (employer-sponsored and self-
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sponsored (voluntary)) have different perceptions of the value and costs associated with
inter-organisational relations.
Few studies, however, link interpretative determinants with contextual factors to explain
why organisations choose to enter into exchange relations with one another (Halpert
1982; Oliver 1990; Marsh 1998) or how the structure of the network in which an
organisation is embedded may influence relations (Fleisher 1991; Reed 1992, pp.78).
Consequently, the interface between the micro, meso and macro-levels of analysis is not
clearly distinguished or adequately explored (Rhodes and Marsh 1992, pp.12.). One
means of addressing this point is to use a dialectical approach in which structures and
interpersonal relations are seen to act and interact (Marsh 1998).
Challis's (1988) in-depth study of local collaboration in six health authority districts in
the UK is one of few that blends interpretative and contextual factors within a resource
dependency framework. It identifies eight factors in the primary co-ordinative
environment which form the context of interaction: five structural factors (resource
base, service stock (size), political factors, complexity of locale and planning and policy
issues) and three, less influential, behavioural factors (personalities, professional
outlook and planning philosophies). It also identifies a number of secondary level
environmental variables which relate to the costs and benefits of the process (rather than
structural conditions). These interpretative variables relate to the individual and
organisational (administration, resources and domain) and provide the dynamic force
driving the formation of relations. Challis (1988) argues that in the public sector,
medium-sized organisations, with a steady resource-base and in symmetrical
relationships are best placed to collaborate, as organisations see the possible benefits
while being able to withstand potential resource losses.
Despite being based on only a few simple premises concerning motivation, RDT is
useful in exploring the pre-conditions of inter-organisational relations and the factors
driving interaction (Wood and Gray 1991). Strategic health partnerships set up by New
Labour can be conceptualised as (formal) policy networks, not only for developing local
policy on health improvement and inequalities but also for influencing local resource
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allocation. Given that the new partnerships were to involve a wide range of stakeholders
of varying size and resource dependency relationships, RDT provided a useful
framework for understanding the nature and dynamics of horizontal relations in
partnerships.
I use RDT in two ways: First, as the framework to explore how external and
interpretative factors interact to influence involvement in health partnership in Chapter
4. Second, to investigate the nature of interaction and power differentials in these
developing partnerships in Chapter 5. What influence did partners have over resources
in health partnership? Were smaller, more resource-dependent organisations able to
exert any influence over the decision-making process? In this way, partnership as
participation could be assessed.
The weakness of RDT is that it is a functionalist perspective, assuming different parts of
an organisation work together harmoniously to achieve an organisation's aim. It is also
crudely deterministic in that organisations are considered 'victims' of their
environment, influenced and constrained by inter-organisational networks (Reed 1992).
Interaction is therefore driven by a focal organisation's perception of its environment.
There is little accounting for the active management of relations once links are
established (Fleisher 1991). RDT, therefore, does not adequately address the process of
partnership development (Wood and Gray 1991). It fails to recognise that actively
managing interaction can help ensure outcomes do not end in rivalry but in mutual
benefit (Jackson and Stainsby 2000).
Collaboration Theory provides a way of addressing this gap, linking the management of
partnership relations to the outcomes of the partnership, as discussed below.
1.3.3 Collaboration Theory
The third framework used to analyse and understand partnership is Collaboration
Theory (CT) (Gray 1989; Gray and Wood 1991; Gray 1996). This focuses on the active
structuring and management of interaction or process in partnership in order to address
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complex social problems. In contrast to the previous theoretical perspective, which
emphasised inter-organisational relations as a means of tackling organisational
uncertainty, the focus of CT is on achieving innovation or synergy - collaboration's
unique advantage (Huxham 1996; Lasker, Weiss et al. 2001).
CT is founded on Negotiated Order Theory (Strauss, Schatzman et al. 1963; Gray
1989). This views relationships as negotiated by stakeholders in a social context.
Working requires the co-ordinated participation of people, who have different levels of
training and competencies, values and interests (Hasenfeld 1992). Order is shaped
through this self-conscious interaction of participants who are embedded in their own
social worlds (Strauss, Schatzman et al. 1963; Gray 1989).Negotiation determines what
gets done and how, and this in tum depends on how actors perceive an issue and what
priority they give it. As new events occur or actors are encountered, order can be
renegotiated and reconstituted. This fluid process may result in more than a
modification of an old established order (Nathan and Mitroff 1991). Problems,
therefore, are socially constructed and their resolution through negotiation can lead to a
new negotiated order.
CT is concerned with the process of finding solutions to difficult social problems, such
as reducing inequalities in health. These meta problems are a result of rapid socio-
economic, cultural and political change in society and are characterised by uncertainty,
complexity and unclear boundaries (Taket and White 2000a). Their resolution is beyond
the capacity of single organisations to solve. They require organisations to pool their
expertise and resources in a process of collaborative decision-making (Trist 1983;Taket
and White 2000a). Addressing meta problems first requires organisations to perceive
the problem as mutual and to recognise that its resolution can come through collective
negotiation and action (Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2000).
Collaboration is a process of negotiation in which stakeholders explore their
preconceived conceptual understanding of the problem (Gray 1989), and in-so-doing
constructively reconstitute the'boundaries and understanding of that problem (Marcus,
Dorn et al. 1995). This process involves stakeholders sharing appraisals and perceptions
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of the problem, and of what is possible (activities, technology etc), redefining their
understanding to arrive at a new shared appreciation of the problem (Trist 1983). As a
consequence, new solutions emerge which are not only legitimate but unique in that no
single organisation could have arrived at it on its own (Trist 1983). Novel or innovative
solutions can be classified as incremental or radical (Roberts and Bradley 1991).
Incremental innovation results from first order change; the solution is only a refinement
or marginal improvement within the existing normative order. The exchange of
information and resources leads to better use of or increased access to resources
(financial, informational, technical) (Craig and Taylor 2000) or co-ordination. Radical
innovation or synergy (Lasker, Weiss et al. 2001), on the other hand, results from
second order change or qualitative alteration to the normative order. This results from a
shift in partners' underlying perception of the problem rather than solely from improved
co-ordination of information and resources (Roberts and Bradley 1991; Craig and
Taylor 2000).
Conflict is central to the process of generating radical innovation (Huxham 1996) as it
involves actors with different views and assumptions challenging each other as well as
themselves, and renegotiating a new frame of reference.
Managing and resolving conflict is therefore crucial to performance (Webb 1991;
Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997a; Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997b). Group interaction needs to be
structured and managed to ensure negotiations are productive. Gray (1989), identifies
three phases to structuring: problem-solving, direction setting and structuring (self
regulation), while Klijn (1997) identifies two elements: game management and network
constitution. In essence, these approaches focus on managing cognitive (information,
values, beliefs and ideas) and social (group interaction, politics/interests and
institutional arrangements) processes (Schuman 1996) - although in reality they are
inter-related.
Managing cognitive negotiations involves problem-solving and consensus-building.
Problem-solving involves the process of 'reframing', requiring actors to see what
hitherto they have not been able or willing to perceive (Schaap and van Twist 1997;
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Hoggett 2003). The melding together of judgements of reality and value in a search for
a solution that goes beyond any single stakeholder's vision of what is possible demands
adroit and sensitive management of conflicting cognitive processes (Trist 1983; Gray
1989, pp.S). For example, resolving conflicting perceptions might in part be due to the
lack of a common language (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997). It requires a focus on the
content of perceptions as well as the processes through which perceptions are arrived at.
Itmight include furthering a common language or encouraging self or critical reflection.
For partners with 'cognitive fixations', the introduction of new ideas and information or
an 'authoritative' third party voice can help to break the deadlock (Termeer and
Koppenjan 1997).
Cognitive structuring also requires consensus-building so that there is not just a shared
appreciation of the problem but joint ownership of the solution. Negotiating the way in
which the problem will be dealt with before tackling its content, i.e. the rules and roles
(normative framework) for the governance and management of the partnership, can be
helpful (Gray 1989; Termeer and Koppenjan 1997; Jackson and Stainsby 2000).
Social relations also need to be managed. Individuals come to collaborations with a
mixture of different interests or positions (individual, organisational and professional)
and in a context of competing internal and external managerial priorities and political
interests. Furthermore, established ways of working together and inter and intra-
organisational dependencies and institutional arrangements create a social order within
the group. Depending on the depth of feeling about a problem, these interests may be
openly voiced or hidden. Arriving at a new negotiated order entails renegotiating this
social order. As new solutions may prioritise some interests over others (Eden and
Ackerman 2001), tensions may arise between powerful (and less powerful) actors and
their competing interests. Careful management or social structuring is required, as
unresolved tension can undermine the goals of collective action, leading to indifference
and disengagement from the process or the vetoing of solutions (Hardy 1999; Jackson
and Stainsby 2000). Management also needs to consider how to develop partnership
structures which relate to the institutional arrangements (structures and resources) in
which actors are embedded and might seek to change (Klijn and Teisman 1997).
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Although no one structure is ideal for all tasks, 'tinkering' with existing structural
elements may be preferable to creating new structures as it builds on existing social
capital.
Management of cognitive and social negotiations needs to be facilitative, since
membership is voluntary and actors can walk away (Ranade and Hudson 2003). A key
element is ensuring just procedure (Eden and Ackerman 2001). Communicative
interaction - whether dialogue, discussion or debate - needs to be constructive, fair,
inclusive, transparent, and equal (Marcus, Dom et al. 1995; Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997b;
Taket and White 2000b; Eden and Ackerman 2001). Conducting collaboration in this
way can help reduce anxiety associated with conflict, encouraging all participants to
contribute, argue and challenge freely (Hoggett 2003). It can also help generate
commitment, ownership and trust between members, ensuring actions are followed
through (Cropper 1996). Without a just process, innovative outcomes are less likely
(Eden and Ackerman 2001). Indeed, imbalance in the negotiating process may lead to
compromise or coercion (Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2000), with the 'agreed' outcome
being imposed on others by a more powerful partner. Such interaction does not
represent negotiation, rather an exertion of the first dimension of power (Lukes 1974).
There is ample evidence that inter-organisational arrangements are often difficult to
manage (Huxham and Vangen 2000a). In response, a number of systems management
tools have been developed to assist with the structuring and management of
collaboration, focusing on improving group process (social) and the 'content' of
discussions (cognitive) (Huxham 1996; Taket and White 2000a; Eden and Ackerman
2001; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001b). The use of an external facilitator, with
collaborative management expertise but no authority or vested interest in the outcome,
can help steer collaboration towards the generation of synergy (Schuman 1996; Hoggett
2003).
However, achieving a negotiated consensus is also influenced by the size and diversity
of group membership. This presents a paradox: the very differences which enable a
group to 'think' in new ways (radical innovation) - a wide array of perspectives, values,
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views, skills and interests - also increase the likelihood of conflict and the task of
managing a new negotiated consensus more difficult (Turcotte and Pasquero 2001).
Large, diverse groups, together with changing membership and ambiguous and complex
structures can undermine the interactive process, creating inertia (Huxham and Vangen
2000a). Even with a well-facilitated process, achieving radical innovative solutions to
difficult social problems is a rare outcome of collaboration. Negotiations are more likely
to be characterised by compromise rather than a radical shifting of perspective.
Therefore, the outcome of partnership is likely to be incremental - albeit accompanied
by improved mutual understanding and working relations (Rosenhead and Mingers
2001a).
New Labour very much framed strategic health partnerships in terms of collaboration,
with their focus on tackling the difficult social problem of health improvement and
inequalities and their emphasis on stakeholder inclusion and innovation, as is shown in
Section 1.5.3. I use CT as a normative framework to evaluate HImP and HAZ
partnerships in Chapter 6. Key characteristics of the hypothesised process required to
generate radical innovation - good communication, conflict, procedural justice,
consensus - are used as evaluative benchmarks. This contributes to an assessment of
partnership as collaboration.
The weakness of CT is that it paints an over-optimistic, even altruistic picture of actors'
nature (their willingness and capacity to engage), their ability to see other perspectives
and reframe their mindset, and the role of conflict. In reality, actors are reported to be
rather more 'pessimistic' and self-interested in nature (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988).
Furthermore, too much emphasis is accorded to micro-level processes. This understates
the higher levels of organisation - organisational structures, enforced institutional
patterns of interaction and the environment - which can greatly limit the context and
nature of negotiations (Hasenfeld 1992). CT is based on conflicting perspectives and
interests but it fails to consider adequately power in its different guises and its influence
on the collaborative process (Hardy and Phillips 1998).Nevertheless, CT does provide a
complementary perspective to the two preceding theoretical frameworks.
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This section has reviewed three theoretical frameworks which have been used to
understand health partnership: Governance Theory, Resource Dependency Theory and
Collaborative Theory. Each perspective is based on different assumptions, focuses on
different aspects of the structure, process and outcome of partnership and applies at
different levels of analysis. Together they provide a powerful set of frameworks with
which to analyse and evaluate HImP and HAZ partnerships. The next section reviews
and synthesises the empirical evidence on health and other social welfare partnerships.
1.4 Empirical evidence on health partnerships
This section reviews the empirical literature on partnerships in health and health care
and social services, primarily in the UK. A summary of the evidence relating to
facilitators and barriers to health partnership is presented. The approach to the literature
search and some of the issues and difficulties faced are discussed in Appendix B on
page 356.
UK evidence on health partnerships
In general, the literature on health partnership in the human service and welfare field in
the UK is limited to descriptive empirical studies, reflective observations or to
anecdotes on how improvements to inter-organisational working could be made.
Research on the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of joint working appear to be
virtually non-existent (Douglas 1998).
The search strategy employed a variety of terms outlined in Section 1.2, focusing on
databases covering the health and social science literature to identify evaluative studies
on strategic health partnerships in the UK (see Appendix B). These mainly concerned
partnerships linked to the HImP and HAZ initiatives, the Health of the Nation strategy,
and the World Health Organization (WHO) Healthy Cities and Health for All 2000
initiatives.
Studies identified were predominantly based on case study methodology and used
qualitative data collection methods (Carruthers, Shapiro et al. 1999). A few studies used
cross-sectional survey as their data collection strategy (Rathwell 1992; LGA 2000',
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Geller 2001), while others used content or documentary analysis (Judge, Barnes et al.
1999; Barnes, Sullivan et al. 2001; Elston and Fulop 2002). One study used
observational and audit methods (Carlisle, Shickle et al. 2004). Only a handful of
studies used a theoretical perspective for their research on partnership. One pan-
European study on Healthy City partnerships (including a UK case study) was based on
three theoretical frameworks - Gray's Collaboration Theory, Gusfield's theory on the
culture of public problems and Kingdon's theory on process streams in policy (agenda,
alternatives and public polices) (De Leeuw, Abbema et al. 1998; De Leeuw 1999). One
study on pre-1997 health inequalities partnerships used Pettigrew's (1992a) theory of
receptive and non-receptive contexts for change (Evans and Killoran 2000), while
another used a framework which analysed the consequential and constitutive value of
partnership (Knight, Smith et al. 2001). One study of HlmP strategies also used
Kingdon's theory on process streams (Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002). The majority of
studies associated with the national HAZ evaluation used Realistic Evaluation (see
methods chapter) and Theories of Change (Bauld, Judge et al. 2000; Lawson,
Mackenzie et al. 2002). These methodologies advocate using theory to hypothesise
causal links between context, process and outcome, although the national evaluation did
not specify which theories might be appropriate. Furthermore, the focus of most of these
studies was on policy evaluation - what works, when and where - rather than on
understanding partnership per se or furthering its theoretical understanding. The
limitations of this methodological approach in evaluating complex social processes such
as partnership has subsequently been recognised (Sullivan, Barnes et al. 2002; Barnes,
Matka et al. 2003). A summary of the findings of these studies is presented in Appendix
C (Table Cl and C2) on pages 359 and 371.
In addition to studies on strategic health partnerships, several empirical studies on local
collaborations between health care and social services (such as the JCCs) were
identified. Most of these studies took an interpretative approach to understanding
partnership but few used a theoretical perspective or concepts in their analysis, with the
notable exception of Challis (1989). This was the most comprehensive study identified
and draws heavily on Resource Dependency Theory (see Policy Networks in Section
1.3). A summary of the findings of these studies is presented in Appendix C (Table C3).
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The review also identified a number of studies on partnerships established to improve
housing, the local economy or environment (i.e. City Challenge and SRB partnerships),
and involving similar organisations to health and welfare partnerships (Roberts, Russell
et al. 1995; Geddes 1997; Wilson and Charlton 1997; Arblaster, Conway et al. 1998;
Gregory, Crossley et a1. 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998).
Before summarising the research on health partnership, a brief overview of research on
HImP and HAZ partnerships is presented and its relevance discussed.
Evidence on HlmP and HAZ partnerships
The majority of HImP studies identified were undertaken during their first year and
focused on issues and difficulties partnerships faced in this formative period (Arora,
Davies et al. 1999; Carruthers, Shapiro et a1. 1999; NHS Executive London Regional
Office 1999; Arora, Davies et al. 2000), or analysed the content of HImP strategies in
relation to specific priority areas, such as CHD (National Heart Forum 1999), children's
health (National Heart Forum 1999; NSPCC and the Children's Society and the National
Children's Bureau 1999; Underdown and Sexty 2000), obesity (National Audit Office
2001), or against national guidance (Abbott and Gillam 2000), partnership structures
and processes (Elston and Fulop 2002). One study investigated the implementation of
the HIrnP strategies within health authority commissioning (Carlisle, Shickle et al.
2004). Although the limited research on HImPs has been summarised (Hamer 2000;
Marks and Hunter 2000) and reviewed by a group of parliamentarians (All Party
Parliamentary Group on Primary Care and Public Health 2000), no in-depth,
theoretically grounded studies of HImP partnerships were identified.
The majority of the research on HAZ partnerships was from the national evaluation
(Bauld, Judge et al. 2000; Lawson, Mackenzie et al. 2002). Using mainly interviews,
observation and documentary analysis, interim and on-going evaluation reports and
studies have analysed HAZ strategies and identified difficulties, issues and emerging
lessons on themes such as partnership working and voluntary sector involvement
(Judge, Barnes et a1. 1999; Amery 2000; Unwin and Westland 2000; Barnes, Sullivan et
al. 2001; Crawshaw, Bunton et al. 2003). Others have evaluated perceptions of local
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impact and success criteria of projects (Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004) or the impact of
projects on HAZ objectives such as partnership (Cole 2003).
The findings of the research on HlmP and HAZ partnerships, while based on sound
evaluative methodologies, do not draw on theories of collaboration, networking or inter-
organisational relations and are not set within explanatory frameworks. The findings
have therefore been incorporated with other empirical research on health partnership
below. However, where appropriate they have been used throughout this thesis to
support its conclusions and extend their generalisability to other locations.
The empirical evidence identified in the literature search reveals a growing consensus
about core factors considered to influence partnership, whether it is to improve health,
health and social care, the local economy or environment, or whether it involves a broad
range of statutory and non-governmental organisations (NOGs) or individuals. These
have been broadly summarised into two broad categories, although these should not be
considered mutually exclusive. They relate to the structural and environmental context
in which partnership operates and the process of partnership.
The structural context of the partnership can influence resource flow, decision-making
processes and co-ordination of activities, while environmental context sets the broader
constraints in which partnerships operate. Process relates to the management of
interaction between partners and the structuring of the content of the decision-making
process. Evidence relating to these two categories is discussed next.
1.4.1 Context
The structure of partnership and the environmental context in which it takes place can
also have a strong influence over the development of partnership.
Structure and structural context
The literature is not prescriptive about organisational structures required for successful
partnerships, although the influence of structure on interaction has been recognised by
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some researchers. Hardy (1992) identifies four types of structure in health and social
care provision that have been attributed to improving inter-agency co-ordination:
1. The creation of a single organisational framework by merging health, social care
and other services to provide a fully integrated, multi-disciplinary service located
in one body. There are few examples in the UK, although such a structure is
similar to the government's proposed 'Care Trusts'.
11. A dedicated project leader, funded co-ordinator or joint appointment to act as a
single point of contact. This can facilitate communication within a partnership. A
co-ordinator also needs to have considerable 'reticulist' skills in order to 'network'
between organisational and professional boundaries (Webb 1991). Likewise,
health strategy and health promotion partnerships have identified the important
contribution of a co-ordinator (Scriven 1995; Bloxham 1996; Green 1998).
lll. Decentralised control of resources. This can enable flexible deployment of
resources tailored to meet individual needs (Challis 1989).
IV. A common or joint budget to fund individual care packages. This approach can
allow greater flexibility in the deployment of resources at a local level, helping to
reduce areas of service overlap and duplication (Higgins, Oldman et al. 1994).
While formal joint planning structures can be useful in bringing parties together to
exchange views and explore the possibilities of joint work, structure alone is not
sufficient to ensure effective collaboration (Challis 1989; Nocon 1994). Strong political
and organisational opposition can create difficulties when trying to establish a common
care budget, even when a partnership has tacitly agreed to do so (Higgins, Oldman et al.
1994).
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Organisations' different timetables make integration of commissioning and planning
structures difficult (Hudson 1997). Commitment and leadership from senior staff
working on operational as well as strategic issues are therefore important (Delaney and
Moran 1991; Webb 1991). However, if progress is to be made, senior management must
have sufficient authority to be able to commit time, energy and resources to the
partnership (Davies and et al. 1993).
The number of partners and their geographical boundaries and responsibilities may also
make a difference to the ease with which participating organisations and individuals can
co-ordinate activities (Douglas 1998). Coterminosity between HAs and LAs may reduce
the number of statutory agencies involved in the partnership, but its absence certainly
does not preclude partnership (DoH 1998a).
Finally, ambiguity and complexity in partnership structure and changing membership
can lead to 'collaborative inertia' (Huxham and Vangen 2000a).
Environmental context
A number of studies identify the wider political environment as playing an important
role in encouraging and maintaining inter-organisational work (Davies and et al. 1993;
Scriven 1995; Bloxham 1996; DoH 1998a). Lack of government commitment can be a
major obstacle to securing effective partnerships at local level (Delaney and Moran
1991), while supportive central policy and resource streams can encourage their
development.
Central policy. Government public health and health promotion initiatives (i.e. on
sexual health) such as the Health of the Nation were reported as facilitators of
collaboration between HAs and LAs, whether located in schools or the wider
community (Scriven 1995; Bloxham 1996; LGA 2000). However, a lack of coherence
or direction from government can undermine joint work (Denman 1994). This was a
factor limiting LA involvement in the Health of the Nation strategy (Cornish, Chris et
al. 1997; DoH 1998a). Organisational, policy and financial fragmentation of central
government inevitably influences the degree of attainable cohesion at local levels
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(Hudson 1997). Different departments have different priorities and policy initiatives
which impact on health, directly or indirectly, but may not always emanate from the
DoH. Such fragmentation, then, can not only lead to a failure to focus on issues of
mutual concern, but can also result in the pursuit of diametrically opposed policies
(Hudson 1997). Unless synchronicity and co-ordination between central government
departments are good, there is scope for inconsistency. The complex and contradictory
legislative framework surrounding sex education in the UK as well as government
policy on smoking are cases in point (Denman 1994; Green and Delaney 1994; DoH
1998a). Conflict between the goals of these policies and the goals of the Health of the
Nation strategy undermined joint work. The failure of the Health of the Nation strategy
to influence policy in other departments, despite the then government establishing a
special co-ordinating committee to do so, demonstrates the need for effective structural
mechanisms to co-ordinate policy within the higher echelons of government. It also
demonstrates the importance of political will. New Labour's emphasis on partnership in
Saving Lives, the New NHS and in policy from other government departments, plus the
development of cross-departmental (HAZ) units, all encouraged the development of
HImP and HAZ partnerships. However, persisting policy incoherence also undermined
their development (Carruthers, Shapiro et al. 1999).
Mechanisms to monitor and evaluate implementation of policy at a local level can also
provide an important stimulus to statutory agencies to participate in partnerships (DoH
1998a; Carruthers, Shapiro et at. 1999). The lack of a performance management
framework was one of the factors that undermined the commitment of senior officers in
statutory agencies to implementing the Health of the Nation strategy (DoH 1998a).
Heavy, top-down performance management regimes (rather than locally derived
frameworks) with a differentiated, operational focus and inconsistent application created
tension in HImP partnerships and hindered the development of HAZ partnerships,
shifting their focus and undermining local ownership (Arora, Davies et at. 1999;
Carruthers, Shapiro et al. 1999; Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002).
Organisational and financial stability. An unstable external environment resulting in
changing financial circumstances and large-scale organisational restructuring at local
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level can shift the focus away from inter- to intra-organisational pre-occupations. For
example, in the 1990s NHS organisations prioritised the reduction of waiting lists and
faster hospital discharge procedures over calls for greater inter-agency working on
health policy (Hudson 1997). The scope and pace of centrally driven changes to
organisational structure, remit and boundaries made the forging of stable relationships
for strong partnerships difficult, creating organisational uncertainty (Le. for HAs, peGs,
CHCs) (NHS Executive London Regional Office 1999), reducing organisational
capacity for partnership (Davies and et al. 1993) and undermining it as a priority (Judge,
Barnes et al. 1999). These issues were reported in the early development of HImP and
HAZ partnerships (Arora, Davies et al. 1999; Carruthers, Shapiro et al. 1999)
Finance. Secure and stable funding to support inter-agency work, while not essential,
can go a long way to helping to facilitate partnership (Davies and et al. 1993).
Establishing a partnership takes time and requires human and financial resources.
Resources are not only useful for the development of innovative projects but also for
administering partnership. A number of studies report that the availability of funds to
support a partnership co-ordinator can facilitate joint work (Davies and et al. 1993;
Nocon 1994; Scriven 1995; Bloxham 1996; Green 1998). Central government funds are
not only helpful but can also signal the government's commitment to a policy,
especially in times of financial restraint. Earmarked funding can be helpful in
supporting the work of health alliances when pressure on resources is tight (Fulop,
Elston et al. 2000), although too much specification can work against developing local
priorities, as was identified in early studies on HImP and HAZ partnerships
Thus, the external environment in which partnerships are formed can have a profound
effect on relationships, structure and the aims of partnership. It can influence power
relationships, energy levels and morale; determine what formal structures and
mechanisms are set up; and influence resource provision and organisational priorities.
1.4.2 Process
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Managing interaction - developing the quality of relationships
Partners need to develop social relationships in partnership at the same time as they
focus their attention on the content of the partnership.
Values. Understanding and respecting the values that drive partner organisations can be
very important in judging how to plan and manage inter-organisational relationships
(Cameron and Cranfield 1998). Values affect not only initial motivation for joint
working but also the ability to sustain effort in times of difficulty (Loxley 1997).
However, values are often not homogeneous and may vary between organisations as
well as within them.
Douglas identifies two value bases, resulting in diverse cultural patterns that can
influence the nature of a partnership for health. Organisations may be people-change
focused, attempting, for example, to change or modify behaviour or beliefs. These
organisations tend to have strong outcome-orientated values and only value partnership
as a means to an end - if it can deliver improved health outcomes or social benefit.
When the outcomes of inter-organisational work are not measurable, this can be
unsettling to participants and may lead to difficulties. People-process organisations, by
contrast, hold output values and tend to be more service and organisational orientated,
viewing joint working as a reasonable end in itself (Douglas 1998). Discrepancies in
underlying value systems can be a major obstacle to joint working (Cornish, Chris et al.
1997).
Cultural differences. Culture is composed of values and beliefs and is expressed through
attitudes. These can be expressed explicitly in an organisation's mission statements or
implicitly in assumptions and behaviour with the particular culture (Loxley 1997).
Different cultures can result in group tension (Pickin, Popay et al. 2002).
There are clear cultural differences and modes of operation between different health and
social care organisations. One major difference between HAs and LAs, for example, is
the system of accountability. LAs are political institutions and accountability is
exercised through the presence of elected representatives (Higgins, Oldman et al. 1994),
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whereas accountability in health authorities is managerial - to the chief executive
officer (and, ultimately, to the NHS Executive) - or professional.
Differences in collective values and beliefs between these statutory agencies can be
identified in their respective documents. An analysis of Community Care Plans by
Schofield (1997) found HAs heavily biased towards medical and public health models
of needs assessment, while social services plans reflected a client-based perspective
with an emphasis on individual needs.
However, statutory organisations are not homogenous internally. Many have multiple
cultures (Higgins, Oldman et al. 1994), often stemming from the professional groups
from which they are constituted. Different professions socialise members through
education, training and practice. These reflect different value systems, knowledge bases,
codes of practice, language use and systems of accountability. Many professions do not
value partnership or community involvement, for example, valuing expertise over lay
experience (Pickin, Popay et al. 2002). Community, voluntary and private sectors value
entrepreneurial culture, which can conflict with public sector values of accountability
and the accompanying adversity to risk (Pickin, Popay et at. 2002).
The political perspective encompassing organisations or key individuals also reflects
different values and beliefs and therefore attitudes towards inter-organisational work.
Several studies note how different perspectives can hinder partnership development
(Davies and et at. 1993; Delaney 1994; DoH I998a).
Managing group differences. Unless different values and cultures are explored fully by
partnerships and differences resolved right from the start, misunderstanding and
misconceptions can arise (Loxley 1997). Partnerships that do not acknowledge these
internal differences are likely to be racked by tension and conflict, leading to separatism
and rivalry rather than integration and co-operation (Hudson 1997; Cameron and
Cranfield 1998)
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Overcoming differences and being able to compromise, however, does not happen
without the investment of time and effort in exploring different perceptions in an
atmosphere of openness, tolerance and trust (Davies and et al. 1993; Huxham and
Vangen 1996; Green 1998). Failure to address differences effectively can lead to
mistrust and suspicion across organisational and professional boundaries (Loxley 1997),
particularly when dealing with the voluntary sector (Taylor 1997). Creating and
maintaining trust requires perpetual maintenance and reinforcement by successful
outcomes (Webb 1991). Indeed, the level of trust to be developed needs to reflect the
ambition of the collaborative project. When the environment is hostile to collaboration,
modest, low risk ventures are the way forward (Webb 1991).
Structuring content (problem-solving and managing social relations)
Many empirical studies describe partnership as needing to go through a number of
important stages. Structuring the content of partnership and managing its content can
help deliver process outcomes, as noted earlier when discussing Collaboration Theory.
A number of normative frameworks were identified in the UK (and non-UK) empirical
literature derived from theoretical (Gray 1985; Gray 1989; Loxley 1997; Lowndes and
Skelcher 1998) and empirical-based studies (Delaney 1994; Thompson and Stachenko
1994; Scott and Thurston 1997; Douglas 1998). Despite small variations, the content of
most frameworks is similar and can be summarised into four stages (elaborated in
Appendix D):
1. An assessment of the need for partnership is the first step. Identifying
stakeholders and recognising common goals or developing shared goals
11. In the building phase, the partnership needs to clarify roles and construct
relationships (with trust, commitment, empowerment etc) and structures
lll. This requires the management of social relations, agreement and implementation
and delivery
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IV. Evaluation of partnership (nature of relations etc) and its impact (efficiency and
equity), feeding back and learning from the experience, and termination if
successful.
Progression through each stage tends to be presented in linear sequence (as above),
although some frameworks acknowledge the cyclical, iterative and messy nature of this
process (Scott and Thurston 1997; Arifio and Torre 1998).
Developing shared goals. Developing shared goals is frequently recognised as an
important factor in facilitating partnership (Hambleton, Essex et al. 1996). However, the
feasibility of diverse organisations sharing and agreeing goals is debatable and has been
challenged by critics of 'rational' models of policy development (Delaney 1994).
Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise differences while still sharing a broad
commitment to philosophical principles. Recognising that all parties have something to
gain and contribute will also help partnership (No con, Small et al. 1993; Bloxham 1996;
Cornish, Chris et al. 1997; Cameron and Cranfield 1998).
Objectives. on the other hand, do have to be compatible. This is also true of value-
systems, political principles and professional ideologies that serve to inform 'vision'
and operate at an affective level (Nocon 1994; Douglas 1998).
Building. Agreeing the terms of reference (roles, responsibilities and competencies) in
the formative stages of a collaborative project is considered crucial to its success
(Means, Brenton et al. 1997; Cameron and Cranfield 1998).
Managing relations. Skilled facilitation by a formal leader not only aids this process but
also helps ensure the terms are enacted. Working towards maintaining the health of the
partnership and ensuring its work is kept 'on course' are other important leadership
functions (Engel 1994). However, leadership can also hinder this process, especially
when the leaders are nominated by the government, and may even deter some sectors
from 'signing up'. Partnerships based on a 'top-down' approach to leadership are
50
unlikely to engage fully with or adapt to complex and rapidly changing situations. What
is important, however, is that ownership of the partnership remains open and equal,
whoever fills the leadership role (Cameron and Cranfield 1998). This is particularly
important when involving the voluntary sector as they are frequently excluded from key
decisions that are often taken within informal, exclusive networks (Taylor 1997). Joint
decision-making and shared agenda-setting requires a willingness to share power and
responsibilities (Davies and et al. 1993; DoH 1993; Delaney 1994; Taket 1999).
Useful skills or competencies of facilitators and members. The presence of individuals
who have vision, desire and commitment as well as the ability to take others with them
is considered important in partnership. Powell lists a whole host of useful negotiating
and planning skills as well as core attributes (openness, flexibility, vision) and attitudes
(positive, constructive and a willingness to listen and learn from others) that can
facilitate joint working (Powell 1992). Communication, political and strategic planning
skills, as well as the ability of individuals to network, are also considered useful
(Delaney 1994; Bloxham 1996; Costongs and Springett 1997). Good channels of
communication within the partnership and with the wider community are particularly
important for building good relationships (Huxham and Vangen 1996). Partnerships are
often concerned with getting their message across but not very good at listening to
others. Blocked or ineffective communications can quickly lead to feelings of
frustration, anger and a feeling of being excluded. Jargon is a notorious barrier to
mutual understanding and dialogue, and can generate or reinforce myths and
misunderstandings (Cameron and Cranfield 1998; Taket 1999).
Where there has been a long tradition of local inter-organisational working, people often
have the skills, experience, confidence and infrastructure to engage on their own terms
and to gear up for new opportunities. However where the history of joint working is
potted, the skills for effective personnel and professional relationships between
individuals and organisations may be absent and will have to be learnt (Delaney 1994;
Bloxham 1996). Developing such 'social capital' in the community and voluntary sector
is particularly important, as increasing the level of involvement in agenda-setting and in
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the practice of health promotion, will increase the impact on health outcomes (Taylor
1997;Gillies 1998).
Evaluation. Self-evaluation of partnership is part of the learning involved in developing
partnership. It can help identify weaknesses in the partnership structures, process,
relations and outputs while the act of undertaking a self evaluation can serve to
strengthen relations. A number of evaluation tools have been designed for use by
partnerships in order to assess their progress. These use various normative frameworks
which focus on aspects of partnership interaction, process and outcome that have been
identified as facilitators or barriers to partnership in the review of the theoretical and
empirical literature (Winer and Ray 1994; Funnell, Oldfield et al. 1995; McCabe 1997;
Means, Brenton et al.; Wilson and Charlton 1997).
1.4.3 Other evidence
A number of reviews of health and social care partnership (mainly empirically based)
were also identified in the non-UK literature. Mattessich (1992) identified 18 studies of
collaboration (as opposed to co-ordination or co-operation) primarily undertaken in the
USA but including several UK studies. A meta-analysis of these studies identified 19
influences, similar to those in UK studies:
• Environment (history of collaboration, perception of collaboration as a leader,
favourable political/social climate)
• Resources (sufficient resources, skilled convener/facilitator)
• Membership (mutual respect, appropriate member, view collaboration in self
interest and ability to compromise)
• Process/structure (members have stake in process and outcome, multiple layers
of decision-making, flexibility, development of clear roles and adaptability of
group)
• Communication (open and frequent, established informal and formal
communications)
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• Purpose (concrete goals/objectives, shared vision, unique purpose)
A more recent review of strategic health partnership by Roussos (2000), based on 34
empirical studies (primarily US based) of 2S2 partnerships, identified similar
requirements, including: having a clear vision and mission; action planning for
community and system change; developing and supporting leadership
(convenor/facilitator); documentation and ongoing feedback on progress (evaluation);
technical assistance, training and support for collaboration; securing resources; making
outcomes matter (ownership of domain) and to a lesser extent the context of
collaboration (history, characteristic of the location etc).
There was also a large literature on private sector partnerships, focusing on the
development of strategic alliances and networks or N-form organisations. A
comprehensive review of this literature was not undertaken as my main focus was on
strategic health partnerships in the public sector. Nevertheless, relevant theoretical
literature was drawn upon and incorporated at appropriate points in the thesis.
Some of the issues identified in the empirical literature resonate strongly with aspects of
the theoretical perspectives outlined in Section 1.3. For example, recognising and
addressing different values and cultures in partnership which could be accommodated in
the negotiated order perspective. However, the weakness of the empirical literature is
that much of it lacks conceptual clarity. Terms such as trust and power are frequently
used without definition or reference to a theoretical perspective. The lack of a
theoretical framework gives their findings limited explicative power and over-reliance
on platitudes when suggesting remedial action.
Nevertheless, drawn together, the theoretical and empirical literature point to three
broad areas that are crucial to the development and functioning of partnership:
1. The national and local context or structure of the environment In which
partnership operate
S3
2. The nature and management of interactions between partners
3. The structuring of the content of the decision-making process
The environmental context in which HImP and HAZ partnerships were conceived,
created and developed is outlined next.
1.5 The context of health partnership in the UK
This section presents a contextual overview of health partnership in the UK. It begins
with a brief overview of health partnership, then presents an outline of the government
reforms that spumed HImP and HAZ partnerships and of the philosophical genesis
behind New Labour's promotion of partnership. Finally it analyses how these
partnerships differed from previous attempts.
1.5.1 A brief history of health partnership
The election of the New Labour government in 1997 marked the beginning of a new
wave of reforms to the health service. A central theme running through the reforms was
partnership. The White Paper, The new NHS: Modern, Dependable (DoH 1997)
announced partnership as one of the six guiding principles for the new 'modem' NHS,
while the White Paper, Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (DoH 1999a) reaffirmed the
need to work in partnership at all levels of government in order to tackle the public
health agenda.
Partnership would lead to a system of 'integrated care', replacing the fragmented
service produced by the internal market, break down the 'Berlin walls' that existed
between the NHS and social services, and tackle 'wicked' issues such as poor
population health in socially deprived communities. The White Papers and key policy
documents (DETR 1998) embodied the social model of health, recognising the wider
determinants - employment, education, housing and poverty - and emphasising a
holistic or 'whole systems' approach to reducing inequalities in health. At the local
level, strategic health partnerships would deliver these aims.
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The idea of partnership was not new. Partnership, under the guise of co-operation, co-
ordination and collaboration, has been a recurring theme in UK health policy for the
past three decades, ifnot longer.
In public health, partnership was a key feature of England's first public health strategy,
Health of the Nation (DoH 1992). Healthy Alliances were created at a local level as a
strategic vehicle for improving health and reducing 'variations' in health. However, the
strategy's narrow bio-medical focus and down-playing of the wider determinants of
health diminished its appeal, especially in locations where agencies had been engaged in
voluntary health partnerships since the mid 1980s through the World Health
Organisation's (WHO) Healthy Cities programme or even earlier through its progenitor
Health for All 2000 (Ashton 1992). These partnerships were based on a social model of
health and explicitly recognised the need to reduce inequalities in health. However, they
did not become strategic partnerships until the Healthy Cities programme moved into its
third developmental phase between 1998-2003.
The emphasis on partnership to improve population health has continued. More recent
policy documents such as Tackling Health Inequalities: A Programme for Action (DoH
2003), the Chief Medical Officer's report on the public health function (DoH 200la),
the second Wanless Report Securing Good Health for the Whole Population (Wanless,
Jones et al. 2004) and the latest public health strategy, Choosing Health (DoH 2004a)
all stress this approach.
In health and social care, there have been numerous policy initiatives since the 1960s
that have sought to encourage partnership between NHS and LAs, particularly Social
Service (SS) departments, at strategic, commissioning and provider levels. Initiatives
have included the introduction of Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) in 1974, Joint
Care Planning Teams (JCPT) and Joint Finance (JF) initiatives in 1976 as well as
community mental health and learning disability teams (CMHT and CLOT) (Challis,
Fuller et al. 1988; Webb 1991; Nocon 1994; Loxley 1997; Robinson and Poxton 1998).
There have also been initiatives at a national level to improve co-ordination across
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government agencies (i.e. Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS)) (Challis, Fuller et al.
1988).
Since the 1970s, urban regeneration initiatives have adopted a partnership approach to
tackling inner city deprivation and poverty - major determinants of health. These have
included the Urban Programme, Community Development Programmes and Education
Priority Areas (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988, pp.19; Rhodes 1988b, pp.343-366). In the
early 1990s, the Conservative government developed City Challenge and the Single
Regeneration Budget (SRB). These local regeneration partnerships involved health and
LAs and the voluntary and private sector and were based on a social rather than an
economic model of regeneration predominant in the 1970s.
Indeed, since its inauguration in 1948 successive reorganisations of the NHS and related
services have invariably been justified by the need for improved co-ordination between
agencies (Delaney and Moran 1991; Bridgen 2003). However, at a local level, there has
been a long and troubled relationship between HAs, LAs and the voluntary sector
(Glendinning and Clarke 2000). Despite numerous efforts to encourage partnership, on
the whole they have been judged disappointing (Glendinning 2002).
As the literature review suggests, working in partnership is not easy. Barriers to health
and social care partnerships inter alia include: boundary disputes over organisational
responsibility (Audit Commission 1994; Ottewill, Wall et a1. 1996), lack of
commitment of participating organisations, perverse political incentives (Webb 1991;
Nocon 1994), power and informational differentials and clashing professional cultures
(Challis 1989; Webb 1991; Pettigrew, Ferlie et al. 1992a). In addition, partnership
requires resources and may involve the loss of autonomy or the blurring of
organisational boundaries (Davies and et a1. 1993). These can be categorised into five
barriers: structural, procedural, financial, professional and relational (status and
legitimacy) (Hardy cited in Bridgen 2003).
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What was the impetus for New Labour to place partnership at the centre of its reforms,
given the limited success of previous policy initiatives? This is explored next.
1.5.2 Partnership and the Third Way
A key element behind the Labour Party's electoral success in 1997 was its
metamorphosis from old to New Labour. New Labour was shaped by the political
philosophy of the Third Way, leading the party to drop many of its more Leftist
standpoints, such as Clause 4, which had committed the party to nationalisation. The
Third Way was also instrumental in shaping New Labour's policy programme and its
platform to modernise the public sector. This section outlines briefly the ideas behind
the Third Way before reviewing the reforms to the health service which it inspired.
The Third Way was so called because it formed a new path of political thinking that
straddled the 'false dichotomy between the politics of the Left and Right' (Finlayson
1999). Its roots lay in a post-Fordist analysis of society, which saw capitalism in
developed countries shifting from large, rigid, industrial-based economies, structured
around mass production, to knowledge-based economies founded on flexible,
specialised and integrated modes of production (Taket and White 2000a). It coincided
with increasing globalisation, the rise of individualism and consumerism, disaffection
with distant political institutions and with an increasing recognition of ecological issues.
All these trends had fundamental implications for contemporary society, particularly for
the role of government and the way that it managed itself and the economy (Giddens
1998). Society was too complex, fluid and diverse to be managed by a central state
(Finlayson 1999). In the new circumstances, the government's role was to enable
individual empowerment and opportunity and to harness the power of the market to
serve the public interest (Finlayson 1999).
The Third Way proposed moving beyond the old centralised command and control
systems of the 1970s that stifled innovation and responsibility (DoH 1997). It would
also raise the administrative efficiency and transparency of government, restoring its
legitimacy. This required more learning from the private sector which, unlike
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'bureaucracy', was able to respond rapidly to change, using practices such as target
controls, effective audit, flexible decision structures and increased participation to
reassert its effectiveness (Giddens 1998).
However, state governance was also to draw on civil society and its informal networks
and associations (Bennington 2000). New partnerships were to be forged with the
voluntary sector and civil society strengthened through active participation, contributing
to democratic renewal (Blair 1998; Giddens 1998).
Such reforms were to be accompanied by a strong commitment to social justice, as
inequality leads to disaffection and conflict, undermining social cohesion. Inequality
was defined in terms of social exclusion - physical exclusion in a spacial sense, and
cultural exclusion of certain communities. Government had an active role in addressing
inequalities (Giddens 1998), bringing people into the mainstream, enabling them to
engage in the knowledge economy, for example (Finlayson 1999), and limiting
meritocracy. Conventional poverty programmes needed to be replaced with community-
focussed approaches that permitted democratic participation but were also more
effective (Giddens 1998).
The Third Way focused on the ends (social justice) rather than the means of delivery,
exemplified in New Labour's dictum, 'what counts is what works' (Exworthy, Berney
et al. 2002). Instead of stressing bureaucracy over markets or vice versa to deliver a
socially just, knowledge-based economy, elements of both were to be harnessed. Key
themes in Third Way rhetoric emphasised community, opportunity, responsibility and
accountability (Le Grand 1998; Lowndes and Sullivan 2004; Sullivan, Barnes et al.
2004). Working in partnership was the modus operandi for achieving this vision.
Strengthening the range and quality of partnerships would produce public services that
were more accountable and transparent, more responsive to consumers'/users' needs
and more innovative in addressing society's problems (Ferlie, Ashburner et al. 1996).
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Public health was one area in which the state, voluntary sector and individuals could
work together (Blair 1998). How were these ideas expressed in government reforms?
1.5.3 The Third Way and NHS reforms
'There will be a 'Third Way' of running the NHS - a system based on
partnership and driven by performance.' (DoH 1997, pp.t 0)
Partnership and performance were two Third Way themes that encapsulated New
Labour's programme to modernise the public sector (Dixon 2001). These were
embodied in a number of organisational and structural changes to the NHS and other
public bodies. Those relating to strategic health partnerships are outlined below.
Partnership - organisational and structural reforms
Several new partnership structures were encouraged or created at the local level -
Health Improvement Programmes (HImPs), Health Action Zones (HAZs) and Primary
Care Groups (PCGs).
HImPs were three-year local health strategies which were to be drawn up by health
authorities in partnership with NHS Trusts, PCGs, local government, voluntary groups
and the private sector to provide strategic direction on how to reduce inequalities,
improve health and health care and deliver better integrated, user-centred health and
social care. HImPs were to provide an overarching framework for commissioning of
local services through Service and Financial Frameworks (SaFFs) and Joint
Implementation Plans (JlPs). They were the means of delivering the national targets set
out in the Saving lives: Our Healthier Nation White Paper (DoH 1999a) as well as
locally developed targets and milestones. Guidance on HImPs did not prescribe any
structural requirements; it only suggested membership and indicated how HImP
strategies should mesh with other planning processes (e.g. SaFFs and JIPs).
Shortly after New Labour was elected, HAs, LAs and other key partners in areas of
England with particularly poor health status were encouraged to bid for HAZ status.
Successful applications brought additional funds to innovate and 'freedoms and
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flexibilities' to overcome some of the legislative and administrative barriers to joint
working so that local inequalities in health and health and social care provision could be
redressed. Twenty-six bids were accepted in two waves; the first went 'live' in March
1998, the second in April 1999 (Bauld, Judge et al. 2000). HAZs were underpinned by
seven principles: achieving equity, engaging communities, working in partnership,
engaging operational staff, using an evidence-based approach, developing a person-
centred and whole systems approach (NHS Executive 1999a).
Other area-based initiatives (ABIs) or partnerships were also encouraged in these
deprived areas - Employment Action Zones (EAZ) and Education Action Zones
(EdAZ). Local regeneration partnerships were set up with health in their remit to spend
regeneration monies (New Deal for Communities).
PCGs were partnerships of GP practices (and other primary care professionals) formed
to plan and commission healthcare. Three categories of PCG were created, each
signalling a different degree of involvement in the commissioning process. Members
with more experience and capacity for commissioning, such as those involved in
fundholding, were assigned a higher status. A fourth category of Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs) would see PCGs become fully-fledged organisations with purchasing and
providing responsibilities and financial independence from HAs. The first wave of 17
PCTs became operational in April 2000 (DoH 2000a). Following the publication of
Shifting the Balance of Power (DoH 2001b), remaining PCGs became PCTs in April
2002 (DoH 2001b). Together these covered most of the roles and functions of HAs,
including work on developing and producing Health Improvement and Modernisation
Plans (HIMPs) - the successor to HImP strategies (DoH 200lc). HIMPs later
transmogrified into Local Strategic Partnership (LSPs). LSPs were created to bring
existing and overlapping partnerships and plans into a coherent framework (Social
Exclusion Unit 2000).
At the regional level, there was closer working between the NHS Executive and the
Social Services Inspectorate, while at the national level, partnership involved 'joined up
government' (Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002), with, for example, joint National Priorities
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Guidance for health and social care (DoH 1998b) and the establishment of the HAZ and
Social Exclusion Units to develop and co-ordinate policy across government
departments. A new post of Minister for Public Health, located in the Cabinet Office,
was created for this purpose, although this was subsequently down-graded to a Junior
Minster role in the DoH.
A duty to work in partnership was also placed on NHS organisations and LAs (DoH
1997), subsequently enacted in the Health Act (1999) and the Local Government Act
(2000). The Health Act (1999) (Sections 26-32) also included new 'freedoms and
flexibilities' aimed at improving partnership working between HAs, PCGslPCTs and
Social Services (SS) departments by 'removing barriers' (DoH 1998c). These new
measures were:
• Pooled or shared resources with the NHS and other bodies
• Lead commissioners from one organisation to oversee the allocation of pooled
funds
• Extension of the scope of services provided by SS and NHS Trusts to allow
greater provision of integrated services
Although initially intended for HAZ partnerships, they were later extended to HlmP
partnerships. Section 32 of the Health Act (1999) also removed the statutory
requirement for Joint Consultative Committees (K'Cs).
In addition, partnership with the private sector was encouraged to develop new markets
for infrastructure investment and service providers. In the NHS acute sector, this was
through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and, more recently in primary care, Local
Improvement Finance Trusts (LIFT).
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Performance - organisational and structural reforms
To drive partnership, a range of measures, initiatives and institutions was introduced to
monitor delivery and assess performance. In the NHS, A First Class Service outlined a
three-pronged strategy to achieve this (DoH 1998d): setting clear standards, promoting
effective delivery of high quality services locally, and ensuring strong external
monitoring mechanisms.
To ensure standards of care and quality of treatment, the government introduced a
combination of behavioural and output controls (NHS Executive 1999b). These were set
out in the NHS National Performance Assessment Framework, and included health
service process indicators (i.e. on waiting lists), measures of budgetary management and
productivity (i.e. number of hospital admissions) and quality standards. Health outcome
targets were also outlined in Saving Lives on CHD, cancer, accidents and mental health.
Behavioural outputs were set out in National Service Frameworks (NSFs) (Bennington
2000), setting standards of clinical care and service organisation for people with cancer,
CHD and mental health and care groups such as older people. In addition, they
emphasised working in partnership (DoH 1999b; DoH 2000b; DoH 2001d). By 2001,
there were in excess of 400 behaviour and output targets in the NHS, following a stream
of policy documents and guidance (DoH 2001e). Following criticisms from the media,
MP's and from within the NHS about the distorting impact of so many targets on
activity and patient outcome (Gulland 2003; Jackson 2003; Kmietowicz 2003), these
were radically reduced in 2003 and a more focused approach to indirect control was
introduced. Delivering the NHS Plan contained a smaller number of key targets that
simply set out the general direction of travel (DoH 2001e; DoH 2002a).
Two new institutions - the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) - were charged with recommending
effective treatment and care and monitoring progress in attaining the national targets
and standards respectively. Following several mergers, CHI's role was taken over by
the Healthcare Commission in March 2004 (DoH 2002a).
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The aim of these measures was to facilitate assessment of health improvement, fair
access (equity) and effectiveness and efficiency of treatment and care (Dixon 2001).
Following the publication of the NHS Plan in July 2000 (DoH 2000a), HAs, Trusts and
partnerships (i.e. HAZs) were inspected and graded by a traffic light system - red light
(failing), amber (borderline) and green (OK). This was later superseded by a three-star
rating system. Information collected on performance was used to allocate rewards or
apply sanctions. Organisations achieving a green light or three stars were eligible for
greater financial and organisational autonomy (Le. use of the new freedoms and
flexibilities). 'Earned autonomy' increased access to discretionary resources, resulted in
lighter monitoring by the Regional Office and less inspection by CHI (DoH 2000a).
Failing organisations were put on 'probation', with the spectre of Chief Executive
Officer 'resignations' and direct intervention for persistent offenders (Shifrin 2002).
The 'carrot' was somewhat smaller than the 'stick' (Watson 1999).
A similar performance management regime was introduced into LAs. 'Best Value'
required LAs to review all their services over five years, produce a plan that set out
local targets and consult the public. Reviews had to assess the competitiveness of
services, although competitive tendering (while encouraged) was not obligatory.
Performance was to be judged by new audit and inspection arrangements, with the
threat of intervention for failing authorities (DETR 1998).
Thus a range of partnerships was introduced to the NHS and local government at the
same time as a number of measures to monitor performance. The next section interprets
the nature of these reforms, with the aim of identifying the unique characteristics and
context of the new strategic health partnerships.
1.5.4 Analysing New Labour's approach to strategic health partnership
How can New Labour's local strategic health partnerships be characterised? Huxham's
(1996) schema, presented in Section 1.2, provides a useful framework to deconstruct the
government's model for HImP and HAZ partnerships.
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First, as a mode of organising, strategic health partnerships were intended to be
intensive and mutually beneficial. Located at the centre of decision-making on
mainstream activity, their aim was to improve efficiency through reducing
fragmentation, administration costs (high transaction costs) and bureaucracy caused by
the market (DoH 1997; Dixon 2001; Lowndes and Sullivan 2004). For HAZ
partnerships, additional funds were available to partners as an incentive.
Second, as a structural form, HlmP and HAZ partnerships emphasised process
(production of HlmP strategies, new initiatives etc), not structure. The new freedoms
and flexibilities also allowed for greater integration of management and finance
between organisations (Lowndes and Sullivan 2004).
Table 1.2. The rationale for strategic health partnerships under New Labour
w~:;iS~ationale
~li,' ~t1at~gic~ealthp~rtnershies !t:: 1'lllr(jWay:~;,"~:,..'
Substantive change - Innovative approaches to improving - Innovation,
health and reducing inequalities providing more
- Improve co-ordination of health and flexible and
social care
responsive services
- Improve quality and equity of services
Ambitiousness - Share information and knowledge to - Greater efficiency
develop HlmP and HAZ strategies and reduced
- Share financial information to develop duplication and
SaFFs and JIPs agreements sharing of resources
Empowerment and - Involve key stakeholders including the - Democratise and
participation voluntary organisations, community
increase
groups and the public in decision- accountability
making on local policy and resource
allocation
- Revitalise the democratic process and
improving local accountability
- Promote use of Compacts
Power relations - Voluntary sector and others to - Active civil society
influence local decision-making influencing
- Create greater equity in allocation and decisions
service provision
Addressing conflict - Reduce conflict and competition - Social stability and
fomented by the internal market cohesion
Third, the rationale, although not explicitly stated, was discernable from policy
documents and reforms. Table 1.2 shows how Huxham's five dimensions of rationale
relate to HlmP and HAZ partnerships as well as Third Way themes.
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How did this compare with the characteristics of previous government initiatives to
encourage partnership between health and SS? Since the 1960s, policies have argued
that partnership will improve efficiency (through rationalisation of resources, reduced
duplication and improved co-ordination of policies and services) and increase the
responsiveness of services (Nocon, Small et al. 1993; Loxley 1997). Early initiatives
presumed such reasoning would appeal to the presumed 'rational' and/or 'altruistic'
behaviour of public officials and professionals and lead to closer working (Le Grand
1997; Medd 2000). Exhorting the benefits of partnership fell on deaf ears as it did not
address more prescient interests of local actors or the social order in which they were
embedded. As a consequence, these 'optimistic' and 'naive' models of partnership
failed (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988).
The 1970s saw the advent of structures to encourage partnership (lCCs and JCPT),
albeit at the margins of organisations, and the introduction of coterminous boundaries.
With Joint Finance being used as an incentive to encourage partnership (Nocon 1994),
government policy began to recognise the 'pessimistic' nature of local actors (i.e. as
self-interested) (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988). However, structural and professional
differences continued to hinder partnership, limiting progress mainly to operational co-
operation. This was because initiatives failed to understand the subtleties of
power/resource dependency relations between agencies (Webb 1991). In particular, the
government failed to ensure domain consensus on the division of responsibilities for
health and social care. The structure of payments to move care into the community (out
of hospitals) was considered by LAs as biased because it did not recognise sufficiently
the shift in costs this entailed (Bridgen 2003). Small budgetary increases and
insufficient compensatory payments put increasing pressure on finances and added to
ill-feeling. This led to the whole process becoming 'stuck in a rut' (Bridgen 2003). The
1990s saw this model taken to its extreme; with the creation of the internal market, self-
interest became the driving force behind social policy co-ordination (Le Grand 1997).
This resulted in a greater number of actors and more fragmentation (Ranade and
Hudson 2003). Despite the continuing promotion of joint planning and an increase in
resource transfer to LAs, there was still confusion over the division of responsibilities,
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LA money was not ring-fenced and the role of JCCs and JCPTs was downplayed
(Bridgen 2003). Again, the result was a lack of progress.
New Labour had a number of distinctive elements to their programme, compared to
previous efforts at local strategic health partnership (see Appendix E on page 386 for a
comparison). Partnership was promoted across government as a mainstream issue.
Health partnerships were based on a social model of health and a whole systems stance
which implicitly recognised the need to involve a wider range of stakeholders in
decision-making over local policy and resource allocation. HAZ guidance emphasised
the need to manage a network of relations. A new duty was placed on statutory
organisations to work in partnership and new powers granted (freedoms and
flexibilities) to reduce potential financial and legal barriers. Guidance also helped
clarify domains in health and social care, and funds were available to HAZ partnerships
as an incentive. New Labour's approach appeared to go some way in addressing some
but not all of the failings of previous attempts at partnership.
New Labour's vision was certainly more ambitious than its predecessors. Its rationale
for partnerships went beyond the improvement of co-ordination and efficiency which
had characterised previous models. Strategic health partnerships were now to develop
innovative solutions and tackle intractable social problems such as health inequality.
Furthermore, they were also to be a vehicle for empowering citizens, increasing
accountability and participatory democracy (Powell and Moon 2001; Sullivan, Barnes et
al. 2004). Drawing in the socially excluded from disaffected communities, participation
was framed in a consensual way (Hoggett 2003).
The government's model, therefore, encompassed all three notions of partnership
outlined earlier in this chapter.
• Collaboration - due to its emphasis on innovation, a systems approach and
voluntary sector involvement
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• Co-ordination - due to its emphasis on information and resource-sharing and the
efficient organisation of services
• Participation - due to its emphasis on the voluntary sector as an
influential/equal partner in decision-making on policy and resource allocation
In addition, government reforms emphasised performance to steer partnership and
provide performance and financial accountability (Sullivan, Barnes et al. 2004).
Although significantly different from previous policy initiatives, this innovation could
be interpreted as part of a longer-term trend in public sector reforms in Anglo-Saxon
countries. In the UK, these have included the partial privatisation of productive state
functions (such as the utilities), the introduction of market mechanisms in the delivery
of public services (including the NHS), and the use of private sector management
approaches, responding to what was seen as an over-burgeoning and increasingly costly
public bureaucracy - a view promulgated by the New Right (Power 1997; Rhodes
2000a). These reforms, collectively termed the New Public Management (NPM) (Ferlie,
Ashburner et al. 1996), resulted in the decentralisation, down-sizing and de-layering of
government structures throughout the 1980s-1990s, and an 'explosion' in the use of
regulation, financial and management audit and performance indicators, as a means of
ensuring the co-ordination of policy and the accountability of local agencies and the
delivery of services (Power 1997). As noted in Section 1.3.1, in the NHS these reforms
can be characterised primarily by the development of managed competition and sub-
optimisation.
Characteristics of New Labour's reforms appeared to echo those of NPM. The
maintenance of the purchaser-provider split in the NHS, the emphasis on engaging the
private sector through PFI, LIFT and contracting out (i.e. in Best Value), the creation of
PCGs and PCTs, and more recently the passing of legislation to enable high performing
hospitals to become Foundation Trusts, with even greater organisational and financial
autonomy, all represented a commitment to the structure of the market and further
decentralisation and devolution of management and financial responsibilities
(Glendinning and Coleman 2003). Elements of the market mode of co-ordination
appeared to be embedded within the reforms.
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Similarly, the strong emphasis on indirect control mechanisms to drive performance at a
local level, through the creation of new institutions to review evidence and audit and
monitor activity, the setting of behavioural and output targets and the use of incentives
and sanctions, implied a strengthening of sub-optimisation. Targets represented
continuing bureaucratic control, albeit 'hands off' in nature (Rhodes 2000b). Indeed, the
rapid growth of performance management over the first few years of the reforms,
followed by a more focused but equally intense use of this mechanism, indicated that
New Labour was strongly wedded to hierarchy as a mode of co-ordination. Nonetheless,
the emphasis on partnership, community and active citizenship in New Labour's
reforms signalled either a new development or a challenge to the continuity of NPM
(Snape and Taylor 2003).
In sum, the reforms resulted in changes to all three modes of governance outlined in
Section 1.3.1 of this chapter. Although partnership moved centre stage in government
reforms, it did not replace one or other modes of co-ordination (markets and hierarchy).
On the contrary, the other two modes were also extended by government reforms.
It was in this context that New Labour's strategic health partnerships were established.
Closer scrutiny of the Third Way and its reforms reveals a number of inherent
contradictions in this model of partnership. These fall out of the tensions between these
modes of co-ordination and assumptions on which they and New Labour's vision for
partnership was founded. These are explored next.
1.6 Tensions and assumptions
Following the analysis of New Labour's strategic health partnership and reforms, and
with the theoretical and empirical literature on partnership in mind, three broad themes
can be identified which exemplify these contradictions.
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1.6.1 Central control, local autonomy conundrum
Strategic health partnerships were set up to act and respond to local issues and
priorities. A degree of local autonomy was required to allow organisations to be flexible
and creative; otherwise participation would be meaningless. While some local priorities
could resonate with national ones, inevitably there would be differences. However,
despite the rhetoric, government reforms actually strengthened sub-optimisation,
increasing hierarchical control over local agencies rather than relinquishing it, through
the use of indirect behavioural and output controls. Centrally determined priorities and
related performance measures which did not concur with local priorities, therefore, had
the potential to constrain a partnership's room for manoeuvre. The fear of failing to
meet performance criteria could stifle the risk-taking required for innovation
(Bennington 2000). No more so than when the success of new ventures lay outside the
control of those instigating them.
The empirical literature indicates that indirect control mechanisms used to co-ordinate
policy are influential on health partnership (see Section lA). Research on the Health of
the Nation strategy, for example, suggested that performance management, if applied
appropriately, can be supportive (DoH 1998a), while early research on HAZ
partnerships suggests that blunt application of performance management may be
detrimental. Were indirect, hierarchical control measures compatible with the formation
of innovative local partnerships?
To address this question, the other mechanisms of central government influence need to
be understood so that their impact can be untangled. Theoretical and empirical studies
point to multiple ways in which central government can influence local partnerships.
The focus and coherence of government policy commands, organisational and financial
stability and funding streams have all been shown to influence the formation and
development of health partnerships, whether through creating resource scarcity, inter-
organisational dependencies or creating self-effacement (see Section 1.4). However,
these studies rarely distinguish between command and control measures or reveal how
the orientation of each may influence the structure, interaction or process of partnership
or its outcome.
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This thesis explores the tensions created by central command and control mechanisms
and their impact on local health partnerships. Drawing on a framework for hierarchy
outlined in the section on governance, Chapter 3 charts the nature and influence of
central command and central control measures on the formation, processual
development and outcomes of HlmP and HAZ partnerships. This approach provides a
clearer assessment of the impact of indirect control mechanisms on partnership.
1.6.2 Understanding the local dynamics of partnership
The government's reforms developed not only partnership as a mode of co-ordination
but also elements of the market. Collaboration between organisations was being
encouraged at the same time as competition. Conflicting assumptions were also evident
in their approach to collaboration, reflecting different theoretical perspectives in Policy
Networks and Collaboration Theory. On the one hand, the government actively
promoted a social model of health, a whole systems perspective and network
management, emphasising broad stakeholder involvement (critically including the
voluntary sector) and innovation. This was redolent of collaboration/network theory,
which takes an 'optimistic' view of actors' nature, assuming they would voluntarily
engage in partnership for mutual benefit. On the other hand, the government used
incentives and sanctions to encourage local partnership, appealing to the self-interested
or 'pessimistic' nature of actors to motivate and steer behaviour (Jones, Thomas et al.
2004). It also removed some of the legal barriers between the NHS and LAs to
encourage resource exchange. Drawing on the policy networks perspective, actors were
assumed to negotiate and bargain over resources, rationally seeking to maximise the
utility of exchange through weighing up the costs and benefits.
Thus, local actors were assumed to be both 'knights', acting for the greater good, and
'knaves', acting in self-interest (Le Grand 1997), echoing the planned bargaining
framework advocated by Challis (1988).
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The literature suggests that it is not just the nature of actors that determines behaviour,
other factors are important. RDT, for example, identifies two main motivations to get
involved in partnership: access to resources and uncertainty. In this model, behaviour
and interaction are shaped by how actors interpret their environment. These
interpretations are considered to be strongly influenced by actors' ideology or values,
such as their professional background and/or organisational culture. This leads them to
value the costs and benefits of partnership and define their roles and responsibilities
within it (domain) in different ways. Empirical research on partnerships suggests such
perceptions are different between medical and local government professionals (Webb
1991) as well as between self-sponsored (voluntary) and employer-sponsored actors
(Helling 1998). CT, on the other hand, is less clear about the role of altruism and its
impact on partnership. What was the nature of local actors, how did this influence their
perception of partnership and their degree of involvement? This question is particularly
pertinent for the voluntary sector whose involvement was not mandatory and for whom
'voluntarism' might be expected to be a strong motive (Helling 1998).
Furthermore, the government's approach also saw partnership as a mechanism for
increasing local accountability and participatory democracy. This implies that the
voluntary sector is able to influence policy development and resource allocation in
health partnerships. However, RDT suggests that involvement, behaviour and control
over resources in partnership are also influenced by the structure of the macro and meso
level environment, whether through the structure of society and the groups and interests
it favours or the size and structure of resource dependencies between organisations
(Challis, Fuller et a1. 1988). Small, resource-dependent organisations, such as those
often found in the voluntary sector, might be expected to carry less influence or power
over resource decisions than larger organisations with more reliable resource bases
(such as health and local authorities). Thus, the government's Third Way rationale for
partnership (partnership as participation) could easily be undermined by the nature of
resource dependency relations. Interacti'on between large resource-based organisations
in symmetrical relations, on the other hand, might be defined by behaviour that does not
seek to upset current exchange arrangements, rather than developing innovative
activities. Was the government's structuring of resources and changes to the rules of
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exchange between health and social care sufficient to accomplish its aim? Such matters
were not considered in the government's reforms.
I use RDT in Chapter 4 and 5 as an organising framework to understand what was
driving local horizontal relations and the nature of relations in strategic health
partnerships. Although this perspective makes assumptions about the nature of actors, it
provides a framework to address the issues outlined above.
1.6.3 Managing partnership and assumptions about innovation
Finally, the government reforms assumed that strategic health partnerships would lead
not only to better co-ordination between local agencies but also to innovative local
solutions to the difficult problems of health inequalities and poor delivery of health and
social care (Powell and Moon 2001). HAZ guidance in particular stressed innovation as
one of their aims. However, policy documents and guidance did not distinguish between
these different types of outcome, nor recognise that the processes to achieve them might
be different.
In contrast to the government, theoretical models of partnerships do distinguish between
different types of outcome, and suggest fundamentally different processes are occurring.
The policy networks perspective sees actors as self-interested and engaged in a process
of negotiation and bargaining, as discussed above. Outcomes of this process are
described as either zero or positive-sum. The former implies some network members
profit at others' expense, due to imbalances in power (asymmetrical resource
dependencies), while the latter indicates all parties profit from interaction - it is of
mutual benefit. This does not imply that outcomes are innovative. Furthermore, this
perspective says little else about the process of interaction or recognise that it can be
actively managed.
Collaboration Theory, on the other hand, distinguishes between co-ordination and
(radical) innovation and the processes through which these outcomes are achieved. Co-
ordination results from the exchange of information and resources. Radical innovation ,
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however, is assumed to arise through a conflictual process of negotiation, where values
and assumptions are challenged and partners come to share a new joint appreciation of
the problem and how to address it. Unlike co-ordination, the process results in a
reframing of perspectives. To achieve collaboration, process needs to be carefully
managed. Crucially it needs to ensure procedural justice - fair, equal and open
interaction - otherwise power differentials may undermine the process, leading to the
imposition of solutions on partners. Actors involved in collaboration are nevertheless
assumed to be altruistic, hold a system-wide perspective and be able to reframe.
I therefore seek to explore how the government's approach to partnership influenced the
nature of interaction and outcomes in strategic partnership. Despite appealing to some
of the characteristics and assumptions behind Collaboration Theory, was this approach
sufficient to result in radical innovation, or were less ambitious outcomes the result?
Indeed, New Labour's partnerships, with their emphasis on participation and social
inclusion, emphasised consensus rather than conflictual re-negotiation of social
relations (Hoggett 2003). Chapter 6 uses Collaboration Theory as a normative
framework to explore the nature of interaction in health partnership and the degree of
conflict and consensus amongst partners. What type of outcomes were present and how
did these relate to the nature of interaction? In this way, the thesis seeks to make an
assessment of whether partnership as co-ordination or partnership as collaboration
was achieved, and if so where and how.
The next section takes these themes and issues and turns them into research questions.
1.7 Focus of thesis and research questions
This thesis focuses on two newly created strategic health partnerships, HlmPs and
HAZs partnerships set up by the New Labour government. Its focus is part exploratory
and part evaluatory.
It is exploratory in that it seeks to understand how these strategic health partnerships
developed and why, the nature of interaction and how this influenced partnership
outcomes. Lack of specific government guidance on the nature and structure of HlmPs
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and HAZs left considerable scope for interpreting what was meant by partnership, how
it should be structured, who should be involved and how.
Three notions of partnership could be identified within the government's model:
a. Partnership as co-ordination
b. Partnership as collaboration
c. Partnership as participation
Although the government's approach to partnership sought to build on the lessons of
earlier failed models, it was also accompanied by other measures. These appeared to
emulate those of the NPM, most notably the increasing reliance on indirect hierarchical
controls such as performance management to steer activity. As a consequence, there
were a number of conflicting assumptions and tensions underlying the government's
approach, as outlined in the previous section.
The impact of these contradictory elements on the development and functioning of
health partnership was likely to be complex and highly differentiated. Understanding
the similarities and differences between health partnerships in different local areas was
important if the influences and driving forces behind partnership and its outcomes were
to be uncovered and understood.
As no comprehensive theory of partnership has been developed, this thesis explores the
complexity of this situation by using three relevant theoretical frameworks:
a. Governance theory
b. Resource Dependency Theory
c. Collaboration Theory
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These theoretical perspectives operate at different levels of analysis, bridging the gap
between the macro, the meso and the micro level as well as between the context,
process and outcomes of partnership.
This thesis is also evaluatory. It seeks to assess the government's ambitious aims for
partnership, using the notion of partnership as co-ordination, participation and
collaboration. Drawing on the findings of the theoretical perspectives, it seeks to
identify which of these types of partnership were or were not evident and why, and
therefore expose any limitations of the government's approach to creating strategic
health partnerships.
1.7.1 Research questions
This thesis seeks to answer the following four research questions:
1. How did the central command and control measures of government influence the
development, interaction, process and outcome of health partnership?
2. What factors were perceived to be influential in driving and shaping involvement in
local health partnership and what was the nature of horizontal relations?
3. What was the nature of the process in partnership and how did this relate to the
outcomes of partnership?
4. Which notions of partnership (co-ordination, participation and collaboration) could
be identified in local health partnership and how did these relate to the government's
reforms?
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The research methods used to address these questions are outlined in more detail in
Chapter2.
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Chapter 2 - Research Methods
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the research methodology and methods used in the study, and
discusses the advantages and limitations of the study design. It also gives an account of
the process and experience of undertaking the research.
The design was developed not only with reference to the type of research questions to
be answered but also the type and context of the phenomena of interest - health
partnership. Questions were designed to understand the nature of strategic health
partnerships and tensions and issues that impacted on their development, and ultimately,
their performance. These were outlined at the end of Chapter I and, primarily centred
on exploring the influence of central government on local relations and partnership
development and process, the factors influencing the nature and dynamics of
relationships amongst local partners, and the nature and process of interaction and its
impact on partnership outcomes. The aim was to use three theoretical perspectives -
Governance, Policy NetworkslRDT and Collaboration Theory - to explore and better
understand the influence of structures, the interactional relationships and processes in
partnership, and how these dimensions influenced the output of partnership. Addressing
these questions would also allow a broader reflection on the government's policy
reforms to the NHS and on how well these appeared to deliver improved policy co-
ordination, participation and collaboration around initiatives designed to improve health
and reduce health inequalities at the local level. As the study was part exploratory in
nature and part confirmatory of theory, it had to be sufficiently flexible in design to
accomplish this task. The chapter begins by outlining the approach to studying
partnership, then outlines and justifies the methodology used in the study - the different
methods used to collect data, the approach to data analysis and the issues faced - before
reflecting on the ethics of the study and conclusions.
2.2 Paradigmic approach to evaluation of partnership
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that partnership is a complex process of social
interaction between individuals, organisations and wide structures in society. How
individuals and organisations behave will depend on the motivations, perceptions and
understanding of actors within the partnership, the meaning they attach or attribute to
others' behaviour and wider views or perceptions in society. The study of inter-
organisational relations or partnership can be described as falling into two broad
theoretical paradigms or philosophical approaches that underlie the nature of inquiry
(outlined below). Each paradigm or approach provides a general way of seeing the
world, dictating what kind of scientific work should be done and what kind of theory is
acceptable, and what kind of methodology and data collection methods should be used
(Abercrombie, Hill et al. 1994).
First, the positivistic or objectivist approach that is strongly rooted in the modernist
perspective of organisations. It advocates that organisational phenomena exist 'out
there'. Organisational or decision-making problems, for example, are essentially seen as
independent of individual participants' views and beliefs (Rosenhead and Mingers
2001a). Rather, organisations are considered to be an object with dimensions that can be
reliably measured by an independent observer (Hatch 1997a). By applying the
methodologies framed in the positivist paradigm, researchers attempt to identify how
organisational attributes (structure, processes, functions) and the roles of the individual
within them are associated with one another or an outcome of interest (i.e. co-
ordination). This approach might seek to gain an understanding of the 'law' that
operates when considering what types of organisational or inter-organisational structure
and function best suit working in partnership, using sophisticated statistical techniques
to test theories. One such approach, commonly employed in the study of partnership, is
structural functionalism. Resource Dependency Theory (ROT) is a good example of
structural functionalism. It views partnership as performing a function, an instrument
serving an end or purpose i.e. seeking resources for survival and reducing uncertainty.
The structure of the organisation and its environment (other organisations) determines
the nature of partnership, with little recognition of the role of actors within
organisations. Indeed, much research on partnership using ROT uses a positivistic
approach, correlating dependent and independent organisational and environmental
variables with an outcome (such as a type of partnership structure; a strategic alliance or
joint venture). However, it does not seek to study or understand the processes that
might connect or influence variables, let alone link them to outcomes. Chapter 1
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identifies a number of studies that have taken this approach and the limitations of doing
so.
Second is the interpretative or subjectivist approach to studying partnership. In contrast
to the approach above, the interpretative perspective makes no claim about whether or
not reality exists independent of the observer; it is assumed that this cannot be known
since all knowledge is mediated by experience. Thus, reality is defined by an
individual's subjective experience albeit under social and culture influences (Hatch
1997a). Subjective experience is at least as important as any objective measure of joint
working since it is the subjective impression that influences the behaviour of the
individual in collaborative working (Costongs and Springett 1997). This approach is
closely allied with the symbolic-interpretative perspective of organisations. It views life
as an unfolding process in which individuals interpret their environment and act on the
basis of that interpretation (Bryman 1988, pp.54). Bulmer identifies three premises of
symbolic interactionism, whereby individuals act on the basis of meaning; meaning
comes from social interaction; and meaning is handled through interpretative processes
by individuals (Bulmer 1969). Analysis from this perspective begins from the point of
view of the actor, that is the understanding that a participant in a social situation is
aware of what the situation is and what their place is within it (Cuff, Sharrock et al.
1990, pp.l42). Interaction is then seen to entail a continual process of mutual
interpretation of the situation by actors and how they believe they will be received
(Bryman 1988). Actors are constantly in a process of 'negotiation' with one another as
they reaffirm, revise and replace the social arrangements under which they act together
(Cuff, Sharrock et al. 1990). Thus, studies which take an interpretative perspective
examine the acts, activities, meaning, modes of participation, relationships and setting
of inter-organisational activity (Molnar 1984). They attempt to discover, explore and
convey the social-psychological paradigms that govern perceptions, conduct and
reaction in inter-organisational settings (Molnar 1984). The emphasis is on qualitative
data collection methods (rather than quantitative methods preferred by positivists) such
as unstructured or semi-structured interviews, participant observation, focus groups and
documents etc, which can reveal the interpretation, motivations, understanding and
meaning held by actors.
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An example of symbolic interactionism is Negotiated Order Theory (Strauss,
Schatzman et a1. 1963; Cuff, Sharrock et a1. 1990). This provides the foundation for
Collaboration Theory (Gray 1989), the third theoretical perspective on partnership,
outlined in Chapter 1. In this view, partnership is similarly construed as an interactive
process, where actors in a perpetual process negotiate the rules of engagement and
exchange. An individual's interpretation of a partnership or the behaviour of others
within it is considered to have a crucial bearing on how a partnership functions or
develops. Although it recognises actors as located within various structural and
organisational confines, this influence is secondary to the negotiation process.
As this study was partly exploratory and sought to address research questions about
complex issues concerning the nature of interaction, process and development of
partnership, an interpretative study design was considered more appropriate. Such an
approach enabled a better understanding of the motivation and behaviour of individuals
in partnership and the meaning attributed to their and others' action. Understanding
context of action and behaviour is important.
It could also accommodate the three theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 1, even
RDT (which for the most past has been developed using a positivistic approach). In a
positivistic sense, an interpretative approach could help fill in the gaps between
correlated variables such as organisational attributes and outcomes. Understanding the
behaviour and influences on individuals in partnership enables a more realistic
extrapolation of the findings of health policy than those of correlated variables.
The theoretical paradigm underlying the study has major implications for research
design and data collection methods, as already noted, with the interpretative approach
generally placing greater emphasis on observational methodologies and qualitative data
collection methods.
2.2.1 Methodological approach to evaluating partnership
As is evident from the discussion so far, partnership is a dynamic, evolving and
ephemeral organisation form. This study attempts to capture and understand the
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complex nature of relations and their drivers and the process of partnership, the
interplay of actions, reactions and interactions over time. However, these processes do
not occur in a vacuum but are influenced and shaped by the context in which they occur
and their content. It is useful to distinguish between outer and inner contexts, outer
referring to national economic, political and social context and inner to the ongoing
strategy, structure, culture, management and political process of each district (Pettigrew
1997). The content may be radical, incremental or technological (Pettigrew, Ferlie et al.
1992b). The content of HAZ and HImP partnerships was health improvement and
reducing health inequalities, arguably both radical and incremental. The approach of
focusing on context, process, content of changing organisations is called
'contextualism' (Pettigrew 1985) and has been used not only to evaluate health services
but also healthy alliances (Pettigrew, Ferlie et al. 1992a; Fulop, Elston et al. 2000).
More recently Pawson (1997) has argued for a greater understanding of causality in
health and social change processes, proposing an approach called 'realistic evaluation'.
This specifically tries to understand how Context (C) influences Mechanisms (M) (i.e.
social programmes with their new ideas, resources, ways of working etc) to produce
specific Outcomes (0) (Le. a change in behaviour). Outcomes, therefore, are explained
by the action of a particular mechanism in a particular context in what are called C-M-O
configurations. Given there are many contexts (Cl, C2, CJ ... ), mechanisms (MI, M2,
MJ ... ) and outcomes (0" 02, OJ ... ), the crucial point is to identify and articulate
possible C-M-O combinations (i.e. Cx-My-Oz), using theory and empirical evidence, and
then to test and refine them. A number of studies have used this approach in the
evaluation of partnership, including the national evaluation of HAZ partnerships (Evans
and Killoran 2000; Judge 2000) although not without difficulties (Sullivan, Barnes et al.
2002; Cole 2003). Others have used the ideas of context, process and outcomes
(including inputs and impacts) to form a framework to evaluate HAZ partnerships
(Asthana, Richardson et al. 2002). In order to reach a satisfactory understanding of the
development and functioning of health partnership, this study paid close attention to the
context, process and outcome of partnerships in order to identify causal links. The
analysis led to the development of the framework in Figure 2.1 for evaluating
partnership, and shows the theoretical frameworks which best explain causal links
across the many C-M-O configurations in sites. The use of theory is important;
otherwise slight but unique variations in context and mechanism may result in an
infinite number of C-M-O configurations. The framework in Figure 2.1 draws on the
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three theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 1. As each theory is based on different
assumptions and tends to focus on different elements of the casual links in the C-M-O
configurations i.e. C-M or M-O, the framework provides a useful way to understand the
nature and development of partnership and how this relates to different outcomes.
Figure 2.1 also shows how the framework relates to the structure of the thesis.
2.3 Research design - case study
A case study research strategy was selected as the most useful approach to investigating
health partnerships, given the range of issues to be investigated and the complex ways
in which the concepts related to one another.
A case study approach is particularly suited to evaluating organisations, roles,
interaction and events, when involving many actors. The strategy is particularly useful
for evaluating complex, real life interventions (such as organisational processes)(Keen
and Packwood 1995). It can provide a richly detailed 'portrait' of a particular social
phenomenon, capturing the different interpretations of events espoused by different
interest groups. An investigation to explore the issues and concepts outlined in Chapter
1 required a close and detailed study of a variety of aspects of partnership, such as those
relating to how organisations and individuals interact with one another, the influences or
constraints structures and environmental context place on their behaviour and
relationships, and the impact on the process of partnership development. The health
partnerships under investigation were still in the developmental stage at the time of the
study and the partnership agenda was still being implemented. For example, a number
of legislative measures and government proposals aimed at improving partnership were
out for consultation or being considered for parliamentary approval when the study
began (DoH 1997; DoH 1998b; DoH 1998c; DoH 1999a). A case study strategy was
able to cope with the distinctive, evolving situation in which health partnerships were
developing and in which there were many more variables of interest than data points
(Allen 2000). An experimental research design was rejected, as it was not considered
feasible or desirable. As noted already, the policy to introduce health
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partnership was universal and contemporary. Therefore, there was no scope for
developing control groups, as is required in the design of experimental research, nor
scope to exercise any control over the intervention or its context. Neither the researcher
nor the researched would be 'blind' to the intervention. Moreover, experimental
research is generally not well suited to addressing exploratory (how and why) questions
(Yin 1994), as was required by the study.
Nevertheless, there are a number of criticisms of the case study strategy. Some critics
argue that it is less rigorous when compared to strategies that employ the positivist
paradigm, as it does not provide experimental controls. Biased views may unduly
influence the direction of the findings (Yin 1994). However, such a criticism is not
unique to case studies. It is a problem that is linked to the data collection methods used,
a problem which besets all research strategies, experimental or otherwise. One of the
main criticisms of case studies is that the findings are based on a small number of cases;
thus there is little basis for generalising their results to other settings. A conscientious
collection of data about the case, its context, processes and outcomes, together with
adequate analysis may allay some of these concerns (Harrison 2001). However, the
'representativeness' or 'typicality of a case will get lost as the descriptive baselines
increase (Pawson and Tilley 1997), undermining attempts to generalise findings to other
sites.
Advocates of the case study approach are quick to point out that the strategy is not
founded on sampling logic, where a case typical of a given population is selected. A
single case study does not represent a sample of one, no matter how many variables are
recorded in its description. Focusing on the lack of generalisability misses the point.
Case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions rather than populations
(Hammersley 1992). Their aim is to develop and generalise theory (analytic
generalisation), not to aggregate or enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) in
a given population (Yin 1994; Harrison 2001). The real purpose of case studies is
particularisation not generalisation, the critical issue being the cogency of theoretical
reasoning (Hammersley 1992; Stake 2000).
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2.3.1 Type of case study - multiple
The study used an embedded multi-case study design (Yin 1994). This was considered
to be an appropriate design as the study was not testing a well-formulated theory on a
unique, critical or previously inaccessible case (HImPs were new, universal
partnerships). Multiple cases allow theoretical propositions to be tested across sites and
greater refinement of analytic generalisations. Replication of similar predictions in two
or more study sites adds confidence to the findings, strengthening their precision,
validity and stability (Miles and Huberman 1994; Keen and Packwood 1995), making
the evidence more compelling and the overall study more robust (Yin 1994; Ferlie
2001). A multiple case study of four sites was appropriate for this study, given the
human and financial resources available and the timescale. This provided a balance
between understanding the case studies in sufficient detail to allow the application of
theoretical perspectives together with enough case variety to test out theoretical
propositions in different contexts and identify any replication on which to make
analytical generalisations. This was considered important as the study was also seeking
to use its findings to address policy implications.
2.3.2 Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis for the study was the local health authority area, as HImP
partnerships were set up with these as their boundaries. The HImP and HAZ health
partnerships were the main sub-units of analysis, although the intersection and
interaction with other strategic health partnerships such as Healthy City and SRB
partnerships were also of interest. Fifty randomly selected health authority areas (of the
99 in England) formed the population from which the study sites were drawn. A
documentary analysis of HImP strategies from these 50 sites was undertaken prior to the
case study research in order to provide contextual information about the development of
local partnerships (see Section 2.6). Four study sites were then identified from this
population using the selection criteria outlined below.
2.3.3 Study sites and selection criteria
The process of selecting sites is central to the case study approach. As noted above, the
case study approach is not based on sampling logic. Study sites do not necessarily have
to be representative of the population under study. Given that the policy intervention
being evaluated was universally implemented, selection could only focus on different
contexts of implementation. However, there was little reason to structure comparison of
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sites around factors for which there is neither existing evidence nor plausible a priori
reasoning concerning an effect on the impact of the policy (Harrison 2001). Sites should
be selected using criteria that are able to confirm or refute a hypothesis (Keen and
Packwood 1995).
Two criteria were used to select potential study sites. Empirical evidence outlined in
Chapter 1 suggested that they might have a strong bearing on how partnerships would
develop. They were also relevant to the research questions (Miles and Huberman 1994).
The first criterion related to presence or absence of a HAZ and the second to location -
urban or rural. Unlike HlmPs, which were mandatory partnerships for statutory
organisations, HAZs were voluntary partnerships funded through a bidding process, and
granted to authorities where there was a strong history of joint working. Selection on
HAZ criteria gave a unique opportunity to assess the influence of short-term, additional
monies, 'flexibilities' and of the kudos attached to HAZ status on the development of
the HlmPs, and partnership relations in general.
Figure 2.2. Case study selection matrix - urban and rural by types of health
partnership
site
Metrocity
HlmP, HAZ, HC/HFA
(plus others partnerships*)
Oalesville
HlmP, HAZ, HC/HFA
(plus others partnersmos')
Middleton
HlmP
(plus other partnerships*)
Mixed urban Irural,
Rural
Greenshire
HlmP
(plus other partnerships*)
Urban
* These include JCCs, SRBs and City and Region-wide partnerships
The second criterion enabled me to draw comparisons between very different
geographical areas, with different local authority structures, political allegiances and
health problems. Rural areas were also potentially presented with a number of practical
difficulties around meeting and/or involving the public, because of the larger distances
involved and the number of organisations. These two criteria were combined to form a
2x2 matrix (see Figure 2.2) and used to select four sites from 99 health authorities in
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England. Identification of rural areas was made using the ONS area classification code
for health authorities (DoH 1996) and a map of the NHS in England. This led to an
inclusion of sites in the rural category that were mixed urban-rural, due to a lack of
appropriate sites (HAZs were mainly situated in urban areas).
2.3.4 Selection of study sites and access
Case study sites fulfilling the selection criteria were identified and allocated to a section
of the matrix. A case was randomly selected from each section of the matrix and a letter
sent to the Chief Executive Office (CEO) of the Health Authority explaining the study
and inviting the organisation to participate. It also assured confidentiality of
interviewees and sites. Three health authorities declined, prompting a subsequent
random selection of sites and further letters of invitation. Reasons for declining included
lack of time due to the large change agenda, the presence of other researchers at the site
and an impending local crisis.
Since full participation and co-operation of the local authority was also essential to the
study, letters of invitation were also sent to the CEO of the local authority(ies) within
the consenting health authority sites. All local authorities in the study sites agreed to
participate in the research. In addition, before commencing research within each study
site, assurance was sought from the person responsible for co-ordinating the HImP
(and/or the HAZ) that all members of the health partnerships were aware of the study,
understood what it was about and were happy to participate. Specific letters of
invitation were also sent to stakeholders when identified as important, or to key
participants in local partnerships. Overall, seeking consent was a lengthy process, taking
over four months to identify and recruit four sites and notify respective stakeholders.
The aim was to ensure that participants were aware of the research, understood its
purpose, were reassured about confidentiality, and had given written or verbal consent
to take part. The purpose was to reduce any untoward fears or anxieties that participants
might have had about the research and, in so doing, reduce the risk of behavioural
change, a phenomenon frequently referred to as the Hawthorne effect (Haralambos and
Holborn 1990b, pp.705).
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2.3.5 Brief description of site selected
A brief description of the case study sites is given below. Pseudonyms have been used
to ensure that the location of sites remains confidential, a commitment given to all
consenting organisations. These were chosen to facilitate memory of the type of site.
Middleton is a small city with a coterminous unitary local authority. It is a fairly poor
city due to the collapse of its manufacturing base during the 1980s and early 1990s. It
has a moderate ethnic minority population living predominantly in a few inner city
areas. The city has a history of partnership working and has developed a city plan with
input from the statutory, non-statutory and private sectors in response to its industrial
decline. When this study was undertaken, it was served by one large acute trust, one
community trust and three PCGs. There had been a recent change in the political party
governing the local authority, from Labour to Liberal Democrat.
Greenshire is a large rural area with a few small urban centres. It is coterminous with
the county council and contains a large number of districtlborough authorities. It has a
mix of areas of affluence and small pockets of deprivation. There is a low ethnic
minority population. At the time of the study, it was served by six NHS trusts (including
acute, community and mental) and seven peGs. It had a moderately good history of
joint working but the HFA 2000 partnership was disbanded with the establishment of
the HImP partnership. The political party in control of the district authorities at the time
was Conservative, although in some districts the Liberal Democrats had recently held
sway. In the main urban centre, the Liberal Democrats were in power.
Metrocity is a deprived inner city area with a large ethnic minority. When the study was
undertaken it was coterminous with two unitary authorities, one of which had recently
changed political leadership to Liberal Democrat while the other remained in control of
the Labour Party. It was served by at least three acute trusts and one community and
mental health trust and four PCGs. There was a history of joint working indicated by the
presence of a Healthy City and HFA 2000 partnerships."
4Tbe granting of Healthy City status requires local organisations to demonstrate strong partnership
working.
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Dalesville is a mixed urban and rural area. It contains a small number of district
councils but is not coterminous with the county council. In urban centres, these were in
the control of the Labour Party, while in more rural areas the Conservative Party held
sway. It is a moderately deprived area, whose industrial base has dwindled over the past
three decades, leaving just a few areas of affluence. It is predominantly white working
class, with a small ethnic minority population below the national average. Itwas served
by two NHS trusts and five PCGs. It has a mixed history of joint working but despite
these difficulties has established Healthy City and HFA 2000 projects.
A demographic profile of each study site is presented in Appendix F on page 387.
2.3.6 Data collection period
Data was collected between January and December 2000. A small number of interviews
were undertaken in each site over the first two months. These were mainly with the
HImP co-ordinator but also included HAZ and HC co-ordinators. The aim was to
establish contact with the sites and gain a preliminary understanding of the state of
development of the local HImP. The timetable for meetings and contact lists for local
HImP and HAZ partnerships were sought as well as relevant documentation. The most
intense period of data collection was from May to November 2000. Since different sites
were at different development stages, collection was not evenly spread between sites
over this period. The majority of interviews in each site were conducted over a two-
month period while observation work continued over a more prolonged period. During
the study period the government continued to develop policy in the area, for example,
the NHS plan which was published in June 2000, and the impact of these policies was
also monitored (DoH 2000a). In addition to the collection of data in study sites, I
attended two meetings at the Health Development Agency, London, to discuss HImP
development and progress in England. These provided a useful source of additional
material as representatives from local, regional and national offices of the NHS
attended. It also gave me an opportunity to sound out ideas and corroborate emerging
research findings with attendees from other health districts. Although data was collected
throughout the year, within sites it was collected in small bursts. Data collection in each
site, therefore, represented a slice of time. This enabled me to capture responses to the
changing policy environment and developments in the partnership structure.
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2.3.7 Data collection methods
Selection of appropriate data collection methods and management of collected data are
crucial to the case study strategy. Yin (1994, pp.94) argues for the need to use multiple
sources of evidence to develop converging lines of inquiry. Data sources can be from
both qualitative and quantitative collection methods (Keen and Packwood 1995). Use of
a variety of data sources can also help with concerns over validity (construct, internal
and external) and reliability of the findings of case studies, as data can be triangulated
(Miles and Huberman 1994, pp.266; Yin 1994, pp.94). Ultimately, the selection of data
collection methods depends on the objective(s) of the study, and which methods are best
suited to elucidating the issues under investigation. This study drew on three sources of
data: interviews, direct observation and documentary evidence. This combination was
thought necessary to understand the nature and dynamics of partnership and their
impact on partnership and policy development. These methods and how they were used
are discussed in more detail below.
2.4 Interviews
Working in partnership is about the action and interaction of people. In order to
understand why people act as they do, it is important to understand the meaning and
significance they give to their actions (Jones 1985). Interviewing is one way of
accessing an individual's motivations and perceptions, yielding rich insights into
people's experience, opinions, attitudes and feelings (May 1997) and their interpretation
of events and actions (Fontana and Frey 1998). Interviews were used to collect the
perceptions of actors as to how the partnership was developing, the nature of
relationships, the influences affecting the partnership and the development of local
health policy. These formed the primary source of data for the case study.
The interview format was semi-structured. This was preferred to in-depth interviews as
a high degree of structure provides for easier cross-case comparison of responses in the
analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994; May 1997). The semi-structured format enables
interviewees to elaborate on answers while also allowing the interviewer to clarify
responses and to probe where answers are superficial. Thus, the semi-structured
interview allows the researcher to enter into a dialogue with the interviewee (May
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1997), giving scope to pursue issues which were of concern for the interviewee as well
as for the researcher.
The interview schedule used pre-established categories of questions to guide and focus
data collection, ensuring all aspects of the complex behaviour and interaction of
individuals in health partnership, outlined in my literature review, were discussed.
Questions were also open-ended. This enabled respondents to answer at length and in
their own words. It also avoided the need to choose their response from an a priori
codified category, which could have limited the field of inquiry (Fontana and Frey
1998). Using a semi-structured interview enabled the time available for interview to be
managed to its full potential. This was important as many of the interviewees were
senior officers with little time to spare. The interview schedule is included in Appendix
G. Its contents were adjusted slightly according to the respondent's sector.
2.4.1 Developing the interview schedule
The content of the interview schedule was developed from the issues identified as
influential in the theoretical and empirical literature outlined in Chapter 1. Questions
were devised to explore these issues. These were grouped into four theme areas,
focusing on the structure (structure) and development of the partnership (process), the
nature of relationships (interaction) and process of policy development and
implementation (policy). This provided the basic template for all semi-structured
interviews, and was used to develop fuller, more detailed interview schedules for the
different categories of organisation/sector and type of respondent in the study (see
section below on the sample frame for more details). On the whole, schedules were
fairly similar in content, varying slightly in length and emphasis, depending on the
respondent. For example, questions to the statutory agencies relating to the role of
central government were worded differently to the questions in the voluntary sector
interview schedule, as the latter had no formal relationship with central government.
The basic interview schedule was piloted and refined during the first five interviews.
This involved identifying questions that were misinterpreted or that resulted in a
confused or questioning response. Modifications were then made to clarify words or
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meaning. Given that some of the issues under study were quite abstract, such as power
dependency relationships in the partnership, formulating questions to elicit empirical
discussion of these research topics required careful crafting (Kaufman 1994). A series
of questions was therefore developed around the hypothesised practical manifestations
of these conceptual issues. However, a balance was kept between pre-structuring the
direction of the enquiry and giving time and space for the respondents to emphasise and
elaborate on their own views on the topic (Jones 1985) in their own terms and frames of
reference (May 1997). The length of the schedule was also adjusted so that the
interview could be conducted within an hour. For the few interviewees that could not
commit to an hour, a more flexible approach was taken. A short interview guide
outlining the key areas of inquiry was used as a prompt sheet to direct questions.
The wording of questions was kept simple and straightforward. On a number of
occasions, the interview schedule was modified or supplemented with questions to
accommodate issues or context that had arisen out of what previous interviewees had
revealed to me. Discretion was crucial here in order to ensure any comments or inside
information could not be directly attributable to another interviewee. In several
interviews, the interviewee clearly had an agenda or issues they wanted to vent, such as
the conduct and influence of a particular person in a partnership. On these occasions the
issue was pursued until all relevant aspects had been examined. The interview was then
steered back towards my interview brief, foregoing any issues that had already been
covered.
2.4.2 Sample frame
The study population consisted of those people who were involved in strategic health
partnerships in each locality. The main focus was on members of the HlmP but it also
included members of HAZ, Healthy Cities, HFA 2000, SRB partnerships and Chief
Executive groups, particularly those individuals who were members of more than one
strategic partnership. The study population also included individuals who had been
actively involved in these partnerships but were no longer members or were lapsed
members. This ensured access to individuals who potentially had particular knowledge
or a view on the manner or conduct of the partnership and its historical development
that may have been different to that of its current members, i.e. they may have been
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dropped or sidelined from the partnership and therefore had a different view or story to
tell.
2.4.3 Sample selection
In qualitative research, sampling strategies are determined by the purpose of the
research project and not by statistical representativeness (Britten 1995). The aim of the
research was not only to capture a broad range of opinions and perspectives about how
the partnerships functioned but also to know how each participating organisation
viewed the partnership and its role in the development and implementation of health
strategy. Potential candidates for interviews were identified by key informants in each
locale (such as a HImP or HAZ Co-ordinators). Partnership membership lists and the
'snowballing technique' - where informants are asked to nominate other key
stakeholders for the study, and nominees subsequently asked to nominate others until no
new names arise - were also used (Scott 1991; May 1997). This helped identify
individuals besides those identified by partnership co-ordinators, particularly those
individuals no longer participating in the partnership. Individuals who were members of
more than one partnership were considered particularly important to interview as they
could reflect on their comparative experiences. This selection approach was combined
with purposive sampling - selecting informants for known characteristics (May 1997)
such as level of seniority (senior and operational staft) and organisational sector/type.
This ensured that a balanced cross section of health partnership membership was
represented in the interviews, not overly biased in one direction. Appendix H on page
394 shows the different categories and numbers of interviewees in each study site.
2.4.4 Sample size
In qualitative research, sample size is not determined by hard and fast statistical rules
but by other factors (Britten 1995). These relate to practicalities surrounding the
conduct of interviews as well as the content of respondents' answers. A balance was
struck between what was feasible for a single researcher to undertake within a limited
research budget and timeframe and the objectives of the study. Thus, the number of case
study sites, the number of individuals and agencies involved in the HImPIHAZ
partnerships and the depth and duration of interviews were counterpoised with the
collection of data sufficient to ensure that a good, broad-based knowledge and
understanding of the issues affecting the development of the HImP (and/or HAZ)
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partnerships in each site could be made. One way of making this assessment is to use
the strategy of 'sampling to redundancy'. Interviews were undertaken until no new
perspectives or issues emerged from the data. Given that the HImPIHAZ structures were
very large in all case study sites, this happened after about 20 interviews.
2.4.5 Conducting the interview
The study used the face-to-face, individual interview. Potential interviewees identified
through the selection process above were contacted by letter or telephone (where
previous contact had been established Le. at the observation of a partnership meeting) to
request an interview. Interviewees were assured confidentiality, and that all quotes and
site locations would be anonymous so as to render attribution of comments impossible
(Fontana and Frey 1998). All those individuals contacted agreed to an interview,
although on two occasions the practicalities of arranging a suitable time for interview
precluded the conduct of an interview within the data collection period. People were
interviewed in private in their place of work. Permission to record interviews was also
sought in the introductory letter and again before the interview commenced. Interviews
were tape recorded and transcribed as soon as possible after the event. In one interview,
the tape machine failed and written notes were taken. These were transcribed and
written up immediately after the interview. Additional field notes were made directly
after interviews about my thoughts and impressions of how the interview process had
gone and on interviewees and their answers (see Field notes in Section 2.5). For
example, comments were recorded on the context of the interview, on any non-verbal
communication that had taken place during the interview (Fontana and Frey 1998), and
my feeling about the genuineness of responses as well as any other relevant
observations. On several occasions informal conversations were held after the formal
interview had finished. These discussions, committed to memory, were written up as
soon as was practically possible.
In total, 81 interviews were conducted. The majority of these were between 45-70
minutes in length. On several occasions interviews had to be shortened due to
unforeseen circumstances. This was usually made explicit at the start of the interview
and the interview schedule was adjusted accordingly.
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Transcription was undertaken by an employee of the university on the proviso of
absolute confidentiality of the material being transcribed. Where comments or
statements in the transcription did not make sense, the original recording was referred to
in order to clarify matters.
2.4.6 Analysis of interviews
Transcripts of interviews were analysed with the aid of NUD*IST 4, a qualitative
computer software programme (Richards and Richards 1998a). This software
programme can be used to discover and manage unrecognised ideas and concepts and to
construct and explore explanatory links between data and emergent ideas (Richards and
Richards 1998b). It can also enhance the validity of research (Silverman 1998).
Interviewee, partnership, organisation and case study site details, together with date and
time were added to each transcript to facilitate identification and comparison. Interview
transcripts were read through carefully and coded broadly as to whether the material
related to the structure of partnership, the process of partnership development, the
interaction of individuals and policy development. The material was further coded using
categories developed on themes and issues arising from the theoretical frameworks
identified in Chapter 1 and the empirical literature. Additional categories were also
created for other themes or issues that emerged or reoccurred in the data. Thus,
transcripts became layered in codes. Coding was generally linked to several paragraphs
of text rather than to sentences to ensure the issue coded was in context. Many pieces of
text referred to several themes or issues and therefore contained multiple codes. Initially
many codes were descriptive with some interpretive codes identifying motives and
behaviours. As analysis progressed, and with greater familiarisation with the data,
pattern codes were also developed (Miles and Huberman 1994). These highlighted
emergent patterns in local events and relationships. Some codes also became redundant.
Textual material assigned to a code was printed off and was analysed closely, looking
for common themes, patterns and causal links. These were condensed down into note
form and grouped together. Similarities and discrepancies between study sites, type of
organisation and interviewee were investigated. Coded themes, issues and interaction
were then written up in a narrative form and interpreted where possible, using the
theoretical frameworks. This led to further refinement codes and some recoding. Codes
which contained the most material and which were considered a significant issue by
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informants were prioritised. Theoretical reflection on the outcomes of this writing
process led to further links, commonalities and patterns being identified. The results
were further refined and reframed, using the theoretical perspective outlined in Chapter
1. These were written up and formed the basis of findings in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
In qualitative research, analysis is an iterative process whereby the researcher is in a
continuous process of referring to the data and refining codes and reflecting on theory.
It is a cyclical rather than a linear process, with the research moving to a higher level of
abstraction through each cycle (Martin and Turner 1986) as insight is generated and
findings emerge. This was the experience in this study, with the interview material
being coded and interpreted through three iterative rounds.
2.4. 7 Comment on interviews
Relying on interviews as the sole source of data collection may produce biased results,
as interviewees might have wanted to present themselves in a good light, had poor or
selective recall (especially on matters they are unwilling or perhaps unable to talk
about), or been constrained or influenced by the role they occupy (Becker and Geer
1972; Mays and Pope 1995). However, in only a handful of interviews was there a
feeling that the interviewees were not being frank or sincere, or that they were being
disingenuous. Although there were one or two interviews where there was a sense that
the interviewee had a desire to gauge what was said by what they thought the researcher
wanted to hear, there were many more interviews in which it was felt that the
interviewees were being candid. For example, in the middle of a number of interviews,
respondents frequently double-checked about confidentiality before making a particular
comment, indicating a willingness to be open. This also re-emphasised the importance
of assuring confidentiality to participants. To help minimise such sources of bias, the
study sought to corroborate an interviewee's perception of events with other sources of
data besides that collected in other interviews. This is discussed next.
2.5 Observational methods
Observational methods can help to circumvent the bias inherent in the accounts people
give of their actions by observing them in context. This allows the researcher to identify
any discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do (Mays and Pope
1995). These are particularly well suited to the study of people in organisations, their
work and function. As a method, it has the advantage of uncovering behaviours or
routines of which the participants themselves may be unaware (Mays and Pope 1995).
Observational methods can also give useful insight into concepts such as organisational
culture, shared norms, values and symbols (Crompton and Jones 1988). They can also
enhance crosschecking or triangulation against data gathered by other means (Alder and
Alder 1998). For all these reasons, this study used qualitative observational methods.
A key issue in qualitative observation is the degree to which the researcher engages with
those being observed (Alder and Alder 1998). The balance between observation and
participation depends on the aims and history of the research, the kind of data sought
and the time available to undertake research (May 1997). This study was interested in
the process of interaction between individuals from different organisations and how
behaviour, assumptions and values of those involved in partnership influence its work
on health strategy. Observing as a participant would have given me a valuable insight to
the nature of these informal relations and the 'working' of partnership in each study site.
However, using this approach can make it considerably more difficult to negotiate
access to sites (Alder and Alder 1998). The observation work itself would also have
been very time consuming to undertake (especially if the presence of the researcher was
to be normalised to such an extent that the Hawthorne effect was negligible - another
benefit of this method). A further argument against collecting observational data as a
participant was that the interaction and input of the researcher may have changed the
nature of the very relationships under study. Given these difficulties, a non-participant
approach to observation was preferred. As the human resources available for the study
were limited, the observational work mainly centred on partnership meetings. These
were the main forums in which partners met regularly. Formal HImP and HAZ
meetings took place once every two to three months (depending on the site) and
provided an excellent opportunity to observe behaviours and the dynamic of relations in
a less obtrusive manner. This was supplemented by observation of several partnership
development days at some of the sites as well as observations when on site for
interviews.
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2.5. J Observational access
Access to meetings was sought in the initial letter of invitation. Further verbal clearance
for my observational work was sought from all participating organisations by the Chair
of the HImP group in advance of the observational work. This also helped to allay any
suspicions of my intentions, and in so doing minimise any possible change in the
behaviour by participants. In total, ten meetings were observed and three development
days (see Appendix H). Meetings were of the HImP/HAZ Boards or strategic groups, or
the programme management group. In two localities these groups merged and re-
organised into one group during the study period. By observing more than one meeting,
in various locations and contexts within a site, consistent behavioural patterns can be
identified, increasing the reliability of observations (Alder and Alder 1998). In one
study site, only one meeting was observed. This was because formal HImP structures
were not developed until half way through the study period.
2.5.2 Field notes
Detailed notes were made during meetings and written up as soon as possible
afterwards. Notes were also made of any informal discussions with partners that
happened before or after meetings (and also interviews). Notes were recorded in a
special book during observations, and tried to record verbatim the flow and content of
discussions. However, this was not always possible when the conversation was heated
or intense, in which case the essence of what was said and by whom was captured. A
cover sheet was also filled in directly after each meeting (see Appendix I). The sheet
recorded the date, time and location of the meeting (Burgess 1991; Silverman 1998) as
well as a number of other issues such as the main items addressed by the meeting, the
most contentious points, which partners were the most vociferous or did not contribute
to the discussion or debates and overall impressions of the meeting and the way it was
conducted. A note was also made of individual participants, their position and any
interactions, routines, rituals during the meeting (Alder and Alder 1998). This additional
material helped to build up a picture of the roles, rules and relationships between people
in the partnership (May 1997).
Data regarding meeting and seminars was considered in conjunction with the interview
data and in light of the theoretical framework outlined in the literature review. Events
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and perceptions which seemed particularly pertinent or relevant were typed up and
coded on NUD*IST 4. For example, comments and conversations with people during or
after seminars or meetings about their experiences of partnership were written up and
coded. Minutes and papers from the meeting were also sought, not only as a reminder of
the content of discussion but also as a record of the outcome of the decision-making
process.
2.5.3 Comment on observational work
Observation work was useful to the study in a number of ways. Perhaps the most
significant contribution was that it provided a valuable source of information about the
case study site, helping the researcher to stay abreast of events that were rapidly
changing. This included changes in the local and national environment as well as
structural developments and issues facing the partnership. It helped to contextualise and
understand the dynamics of each partnership and the issues that they were facing. One
of the main criticisms levelled against observational research lies in the area of validity,
since observers are forced to rely exclusively on their own perceptions (Alder and Alder
1998). However, a number of interviewees made reference to certain events or
comments in meetings which were observed. The version of events or actions portrayed
in these meetings was compared to the observations and reflections recorded in the field
notes. On several occasions the recorded interpretation of events was verified in the
field notes. For example, in one HlmP meeting when the group were considering how
the sub groups of the HlmP should approach the issue of increasing voluntary sector
participation, the local umbrella voluntary organisation's representative at the meeting
was effectively ignored in discussions, despite having produced a paper on the issues in
conjunction with the HImP co-ordinator. As recorded in the field notes, his wish to
ensure each sub group had voluntary sector representation was effectively sidelined in
favour of a more 'laissez faire' approach - each group deciding their own level of
voluntary sector representation. This version of events was recounted back to the
researcher unprompted, when the representative was interviewed several weeks later.
Conversely, it was often revealing and informative to the analysis when significant
events or behaviour perceived to have taken place in meetings, whether observed by the
researcher or other attendees, were not identified by other interviewees present at the
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meeting, indicating, perhaps, a lack of sensitivity or awareness of an issue or behaviour
and its impact.
Observing actors in their natural settings is not necessarily a better way of getting at the
'truth'. As already noted, the presence of an observer can not only lead to alteration of
actors' behaviour in settings, but, more importantly, it may lead to actors taking a
particular position in relations to each other, depending on their respective
organisational roles and the purpose of their interaction (Allen 2000, pp.135). In some
meetings there was definitely a feeling of formality, which seemed to disrupt the flow of
conversation and limit the topics discussed.
One approach to improving the validity of observational data is to use an analytical
inductive methodology. Here issues or propositions emerging from interview data are
either tested for negative cases or against observational (and other sources of) data.
Observational data can help verify or 'triangulate' these findings. The two examples
outlined in this section illustrate this point, when multiple independent measures
(interview and observation) of the same phenomenon concur Le. the researcher observes
the phenomenon and independently the informant makes the same claim (Huberman
and Miles 1998). The convergence of issues or propositions means any assertions about
the data are more likely to be perceived as 'grounded' and universal (Alder and Alder
1998).
2.6 Documentary evidence
Institutionally generated information can reveal a great deal about the cultures and
operation of institutions (Miller 1997). Documentary data allows previous processes and
events to be analysed in an unobtrusive manner. Unlike interviews or observational
methods, this kind of data collection is non-reactive, removing the possibility of bias
(Bryman 1989). Documents can act as a useful source for corroborating attributional
data (information relating to sites, organisations or individuals) and perceptions of
previous events. Analysis of documents can provide information on issues that cannot
readily be addressed through other methods (Bryman 1989) and is likely to be relevant
to every case study (Yin 1994). A number of studies of health partnership have used
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documentary analysis (Cooksey and Krieg 1996; Cornish, Chris et al. 1997; Costongs
and Springett 1997; DoH 1998a; Green 1998; Elston and Fulop 2002).
Documents can tell us a great deal about how events were constructed, the reasons
employed as well as providing material upon which to base further research (May
1997). They can also give access to data beyond the time spent in field and information
about individuals who are fairly inaccessible to other data collection methods, such as
senior executives (Bryman 1989).
Documents can be analysed in quantitative and qualitative ways, using a number of
different approaches (May 1997). Silverman (1993, pp.61-62) notes four: content
analysis, ethnographic analysis, semiotics and ethnomethodology. However,
documentary analysis is one of the least explained research techniques in the literature
(May 1997, pp.158). It has been criticised by some who argue that it does not constitute
method at all (Platt, 1981, pp.31 quoted in May 1997, pp.158) or those who point to its
misuse; researchers, for example, frequently fail to say how documents were used
(Silverman 1993; May 1997; Miller 1997; Manning and Cullum-Swan 1998).
Furthermore, inexperienced researchers are prone to the naive assumption that the
content of documents represents a reflection of social reality (Silverman 1993; May
1997; Miller 1997; Manning and Cullum-Swan 1998). However, what people decide to
record is often the product of carefully controlled or manipulated processes. What to
leave in or take out is informed by decisions that relate to the social, political and
economic environment of which they are part (May 1997; Miller 1997). Rather than
reflect a social reality, documents construct a version of events. Documents, therefore,
cannot be treated as neutral artefacts that independently report 'true' events, as a
positivist perspective would purport, but should be read 'as attempts at persuasion'. The
meanings contained within the text are important to achieving this purpose. According
to Scott, meanings codified can be inferred at three different levels: those intended by
the authors; those received by the audience; and those internal to the document (Scott
cited in May 1997). These need to be considered if a researcher is to grasp a document's
significance. While the intentions of documents and their authors need to be considered,
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May (1997, pp.165) argues that they also need to be linked to the social context in
which they are produced.
This study took the approach to documentary analysis suggested by (Atkinson and
Coffey 1997): that documents should be analysed for what they are and what they are
used to accomplish. A range of documentary material was collected from study sites.
This varied from site to site depending on availability (see below). Documents related to
the working of partnership and the partnership agenda were mainly produced over the
study period. However, additional material relating to the partnership prior to the study
period was also collected where available. Documents fell into the following categories:
• Partnership process documents: HImP strategies, action plans, evaluation
documents, communication documents (newsletters, consultation documents)
• Partnership functioning documents: HImPIHAZ minutes, constitutional
documents (i.e. terms of reference)
• Partner organisation documents: annual health reports, Healthy City reports,
community plans and Community Care Plans, Service and Financial
Frameworks (SaFFs) and Joint Implementation Plans (JIPs) (where available)
and health strategy/policy documents etc.
The study was also informed by the findings of an analysis of 50 randomly selected
HImP strategy documents (Elston and Fulop 2002) (see Appendix J). The analysis
sought to identify the different structures of partnership, their stages of development,
their membership and some assessment of the quality of interaction and processes that
had been used to achieve HImP strategies, with a number of qualifying caveats (Abbott,
Shawet al. 2004).
2.6.1 Comment on documentary analysis
Although documentary analysis can be a useful method for understanding and
interpreting events, it was important to be conscious of the limitations set out above.
When analysing documents, careful consideration was given to their place in
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organisational settings, the cultural values attached to them, and their distinctive types
and forms (Atkinson and Coffey 1997). Interpretative factors involved in their
construction were also borne in mind: who wrote them, for what purpose, who was the
audience, and what knowledge was required to understand the language used
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). The policies, procedures and structures outlined in
HImP strategies, for example, might not be a 'true' reflection of local partnership or
practice, or indicate that the policies contained within them were being implemented
(Abbott and Gillam 2000). Producing the HImP strategy was an integral part of a health
partnership's work, setting out its scope and direction. However, it was also a document
produced for external consumption (Atkinson and Coffey 1997), a legally required
document, endorsed with the signatures of partners. Consequently its contents were
likely to be shaped by what each of the constituent partners perceived to be important or
expected, and by differing organisational pressures acting at local and national levels
(Miller 1997), such as national guidance on HImPs. Thus, the content of HImP
strategies was scrutinised to identify what and how health problems were presented. In
particular, careful attention was paid to the rhetorical features of HImPs: the manner and
language in which problems were couched in order to persuade readers about their
claims (Atkinson and Coffey 1997). In so doing, an indication of the predominant
paradigms that belayed their construction was sought. However, analysis of the progress
on policy from working groups to document was not possible due to the
underdevelopment of sub-groups in all sites.
Analysis was also undertaken in conjunction with other documents (such as minutes of
meetings, needs assessments etc) since organisational texts are frequently cross-
referenced or inter-linked (Atkinson and Coffey 1997), as well as in conjunction with
my observational and interview data. Documents were analysed as to how they related
to themes uncovered in the study and to verify or corroborate evidence collected by
other methods. In addition, minutes of meetings were also used to identify who and how
frequently partners attended meetings as an indication of the importance attached and
commitment to HImP partnerships.
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Documents provided useful reference points to confirm or question people's accounts of
events as well as to check factual information such as attendance at meetings. The
content of partnership documents (i.e. terms of reference) and policies and assertions
could help corroborate events recounted in interviews. While documents can capture
events or thinking at a point in time, they can also become quickly outdated. Of the
three main methods of data collection from sites, documents were perhaps the least
helpful in the analysis of partnership process and development. The number of changes
in health service organisation made it difficult to get copies of some historical
documents. In some local authorities new unitary organisations had been created, so
historical documents related to other areas. There was also a very large number of
documents, held by many different gatekeepers or organisations. This was because there
were multiple partnership types, with large structures, groups and sub-groups, each with
large membership, and all at different stages of development. Although the study
focused on the strategic elements of partnership, the genesis of their policy work often
emanated from the lower tiers of partnership. Identifying and collecting all relevant
documents, let alone analysing them all was impracticable with the resources of the
study. It was therefore necessary to be judicial in selection. This usually meant
following up on key documents identified by respondents during the interview.
Relatively little time was spent on a more rhetorical analysis of contents, to unpick the
conceptual approaches and persuasive mechanisms used to convey internal and intended
meanings. This was perhaps appropriate, given the focus of the study on the
determinants and process of partnership. Studies focusing on the process and outcome
of partnership might be expected to put greater emphasis on these kinds of documents
(Lawrence, Phillips et al. 1999; Cloke, Milbourne et al. 2000).
2.7 Analysis of case studies
An overview of each case study site was written up in brief, providing first impressions
of key issues, factual information about the sites, partnership structures and relevant
historical events etc. Each synopsis was kept as an aide-memoire to sites.
As noted in Section 2.4, data (primarily interviews) was coded as themes, issues and
patterns electronically on NUD*IST 4. Coding and categorisation of data was refined as
analysis progressed. Study sites were analysed and written up for each theme and issue.
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Patterns in the empirical data were matched to those predicted by theory for each study
site (theoretical replication) as well as used for explanation building (Yin 1994).
Relevant and useful analytical frameworks began to emerge as familiarity with the data
increased and conceptual links made. The use of multiple theoretical frameworks has
often been used to study decision processes, mostly notably in Graham Allison's study
of the Cuban missile crisis (Allison 1971). In part, this has been because of the
difficulty of developing a unique theoretical model (Langley 1999). Many of the
theoretical perspectives used to analyse partnership focus on different elements of
partnership formation, development and outcomes (Gray and Wood 1991), each with a
slightly different coloured lens. Certainly, identifying influences and patterns of
behaviour was an iterative process and occurred after several rounds of reflective
writing, the level of analysis moving to a higher plain with each cycle. However, no one
theoretical framework seemed to capture comprehensively the experience of study sites
in their explanation of the nature and development of partnership. For this reason,
findings from study sites were re-written and woven into narratives, reflecting the most
appropriate theoretical frameworks. These three were outlined in Chapter 1.
The strength of themes, issues and patterns was assessed by data triangulation (e.g.
multiple correspondence between issues or themes identified using the same data
collection method i.e. interviewing). This was assessed quantitatively using the
computer software (i.e. counting the number of times an issue was identified) and
through a process of methodological triangulation, corroboration of data collected by
another method (Flick 1992; Silverman 1993; Keen and Packwood 1995). Using such
techniques on process data can help expose ex post rationalisation by actors - a process
whereby an actor might present a certain view of events or justify an action, perhaps
because the actor has an invested interest in doing so. The findings from each case study
site were then compared to identify similarities and differences. Comparisons were
made using the two dimensions used for site selection, facilitating an assessment of the
impact of these factors. These preliminary findings were sounded out with several
acquaintances based in health authorities outside the study areas and other individuals
encountered at national seminars. This gave some validity to the case study narratives
and their generalisability to other sites. However, validating process did not extend to
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the theoretical interpretation, as practitioners' degree of knowledge of these, let alone
their reflections, was not sufficient.
Similarities or patterns that existed between case study sites were explored and
theoretical generalisations developed and tested. This enabled some theoretical
assertions outlined in Chapter 1 to be tested (Yin 1994). Explanations were sought for
deviant cases and were used to refine my theoretical generalisations (Silverman 1998).
Analysis did not occur in a neatly defined timeframe but began with data collection,
gathered momentum as this proceeded, and finished sometime after all data was
collected (Mays and Pope 1995). In this way the analysis and results of the study were
firmly located or 'grounded' in the data collected (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Martin and
Turner 1986).
2. 7.1 Comment on case study analysis
A large quantity of rich, qualitative data was collected for this thesis using a variety of
methods, often complex and ambiguous in nature. Making sense of such 'messy' data
was not a straightforward process, let alone attempting to extrapolate theory (Langley
1999). Trying to understand the interaction and the processes at work in partnership and
their impact, in essence trying to unravel the cause and effect relationships at play, did
not just reveal themselves after one or two readings of the transcribed text.
Process theories attempt to explain in terms of a sequence of events leading to an
outcome (Langley 1999). But an outcome can arise from another process, event or
output. The sequence of events can be multiple and may feed back on one another.
Important events may not be known to the researcher. Barriers or boundaries between
processes, events and outcomes may not be well differentiated. At times it was difficult
to identify the chronological sequence or proximity of processes and events, or which
processes or events were distinguishing influences. Good causal arguments require
these (and other) characteristics to be carefully considered and clarified (Gerring 2001).
Furthermore, relevant thought processes and motivations inside actors' heads driving
their behaviour, may be fleeting, whimsical and neigh on impossible to capture -
recantations are open to many biases. Analysing the process data was therefore a
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difficult and protracted task, taking far longer than anticipated. It relied on a degree of
intuition and at times a creative leap of faith to fill small missing pieces in the process
JIgsaw.
Langley (1999) identifies seven distinct strategies in the literature (excluding critical
theory/discourse analysis approaches (Lawrence, Phillips et al. 1999)) to make sense of
organisational data, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses when it comes to
generating simple, accurate, generalisable theory - desirable characteristics of theory,
according to Weick (1999) (cited by Langley (1999)). The strategies are:
• Narrative (a story which captures richness and complexity but emphasises
salient aspects to create a sense of deja vu)
• Quantification (process data is systematically reduced to quantifiable variables,
amendable to statistical analysis)
• Alternative templates (use of multiple theoretical frameworks to analyse data)
• Grounded Theory (systematic development of categories from the data which
integrate core concepts into a coherent whole)
• Visual mapping (the visual presentation of multiple variables and processes,
with time but with less abstract theorising)
• Temporal bracketing (breaking process data in small brackets or periods of time,
allowing analysis of feed back mechanisms of structuration)
• Synthetic strategy (developing global measures for data to describe events which
are used to describe different process and identify regularities in order to form
theory)
As detailed in the preceding text, this study used a combination of these approaches at
different stages in the analysis to explore and make sense of the data. Essentially, it used
the alternative templates strategy, using three theoretical frameworks outlined in
Chapter 1 to examine different elements of partnership. This approach can be
categorised as a 'grounding strategy' as it provides concepts that can be used in the
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construction of narrative and visual maps. Several chapters use these strategies to
present and understand the data located within the broader context of the theoretical
framework being addressed. Unlike Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the
approach is heavily rooted in deductive reasoning, although this study used some
inductive reasoning. This was because the theoretical frameworks were not chosen a
priori (although the researcher had knowledge of potentially helpful theoretical
perspectives before data collection began); rather, as noted above, they were identified
as the analysis proceeded.
A critic of this approach might point to the different assumptions on which the
theoretical perspectives are based, which may be conflicting or ambiguous (Parsons
1995). Any attempt at melding theoretical perspectives may be regarded inappropriate
or misguided. Theoretical clarity must be maintained by keeping different lenses
separate (Langley 1999). However, this thesis seeks to use the different 'theoretical
lenses' to shed different perspectives on partnership, an approach others have taken
(Loxley 1997). Here theories or explanations are based on metaphors, which lead us to
see and understand organisations in distinctive yet partial ways. This can provide a
powerful means of deriving insight as similarities between the metaphor - organisations
as machines, living organisms, cultures etc - and the comparative object (partnership)
bring certain elements to the fore, while forcing other aspects into the background
(Morgan 1986). Confrontation between different theories or metaphors can identify
gaps and help generate insight (Langley 1999).
2.8 Ethical issues
Ethics concern the moral conduct of human beings; the principles and rules that guide
or govern our behaviour towards other individuals. Consideration of ethical issues
involves thinking about norms, values, rights and wrongs, being good or bad, and what
ought and ought not to be done (Gillon 1985). Although there are many divisions of
moral philosophy, this thesis is concerned with normative ethics in research - what type
of research should be conducted and how. In health services research, particularly
research concerned with medical or behavioural interventions, there are many ethics
issues or concerns. This is because the conduct of the research and/or the behaviour of
the researcher may have significant consequences for the health or well-being of those
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individuals being studied. Although in organisational research these may appear to be
less severe than the potential consequence posed to individuals by biomedical research,
there are still issues of power and control at play that may impact on human dignity
(Cassell 1980). This is because of the close links and interaction between the researcher
and the host case study (Pettigrew 1997) and the degree of trust engendered. A useful
and well-established framework for thinking through ethical issues in health services
research is that developed by the Americans Beauchamp and Childress (Gillon 1994).
This uses four, basic prima facie moral principles:
• Respecting autonomy (ensuring informed consent and confidentiality, and
avoiding deceit, all of which require good communication)
• Beneficence and non-maleficence (the intervention is to provide a net benefit,
and minimise harm, whilst being clear about how and to whom the risks are
apportioned)
• Justice (acting with equality and fairness, particularly when adjudicating
between competing claims over resources, people's rights and laws)
Prima facie means that the principle is binding unless it conflicts with another moral
principle - if it does then there is a need to choose between them. Application of these
principles also requires an assessment of their scope with respect to us as individuals,
healthcare workers, researchers/professionals. As this study was not evaluating a
medical intervention purporting to convey a direct health benefit to individuals but was
focused on the organisation of health services, respect for human dignity or autonomy
was perhaps the most important principle to heed (Cassell 1980). Ensuring informed
consent and confidentiality for all respondents was not only appropriate for the study
design but also reduced the possibility of harm arising from frank comments or
criticisms of colleagues or other organisations. If these were attributable in the public
sphere then there could be consequences that could affect the well-being of the person
concerned (i.e. difficult work relations or loss of job or funding). The benefits of
participating in the study were more likely to be indirect and general in scope, with
learning, through case study feedback and journal publications, potentially leading to
more effective partnership working, although the study made no claims about
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evaluating the effectiveness of partnership. Achieving this benefit implies that the study
was designed and conducted according to the methodological standards widely
recognised amongst social scientists. For these reasons, ethical approval for the study
design was sought from and granted by the university ethics committee.
In conducting the study, several minor ethical issues arose relating to autonomy and
beneficence. On a number of occasions respondents wanted to know either which other
individuals had been interviewed or what other case study sites were involved in the
study. Furthermore, several respondents were keen to know how their partnership was
doing in comparison with others. On these occasions, respondents were either reminded
of the anonymity and confidentiality that had been negotiated as part of the study, or, in
the latter instance, were given responses which were very general and did not imply
access to confidential material or knowledge that might have been attributable. This was
not always easy when interviewing senior figures, some of whom had granted access in
the first place, which meant there was a strong urge to reciprocate their generosity in
giving organisational time and information (Pettigrew 1997). Autonomy came into
conflict with the moral principle of beneficence - that the host organisation stands to
gain from the research arrangement. Furthermore, giving specific feedback to
individuals (in or after interviews/observational work or study site workshops) before
data collection had finished may have unduly influenced behaviour in case study sites.
This would have undermined the study design, not only contravening scientific norms
for conducting such research but possibly creating misleading conclusions, reducing the
study's benefit.
Fulfilling the moral obligation of beneficence also presented a challenge as the abolition
of health authorities (NHS Executive and Cl-lCs) and the development of all peGs to
peTs was announced shortly after data collection finished and enacted before I
completed the PhD. During this time, HlmP partnerships became HIMPs, and in the
most deprived areas were then absorbed into LSPs. Nevertheless, a four-page synopsis
of the research findings was sent to participating organisations or partnerships still in
existence (i.e. HAZs). Additional dissemination of the results not foreseen when the
research was originally conceived took place through the Public Health Continuing
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Professional Development Network in North London and other emerging forums for
sharing knowledge amongst professionals. This provided some compensatory benefit.
The study, therefore, presented some minor ethical issues that were addressed while
conducting and writing up the research.
2.9 Conclusion
A detailed comparative case study methodology was considered the most appropriate
way of investigating the complex social relationships involved in partnership. The use
of different methods of data collection in four sites over a year and data analysis
through an iterate process, drawing on three established theoretical frameworks, enabled
a full and rounded understanding of the nature and development of local strategic health
partnerships in case study sites and possibly further afield. In this way, the research
questions set out in Chapter I were appropriately addressed. The following four
chapters will now discuss the analysis of the data, each one using one of the three
theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapter 1 to explore and explain HImP and HAZ
partnerships.
111
Chapter 3 - From the outside in: the influence of command
and control mechanisms on partnership
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the context in which partnership (as co-ordination, collaboration
and participation) was trying to be achieved. It explores the impact of central
government vertical command and control mechanisms on the nature of relations and
the development and functioning of HImP and HAZ partnerships. It contrasts with
subsequent chapters which examine the nature and development of horizontal
relationships within these partnerships. These mechanisms of bureaucratic co-ordination
were the single most important influence on strategic health partnerships (identified by
respondents in all study sites). Their application and impact provide a contextual
background and framework of analysis for the remaining chapters of this thesis. It is
shown how the government's use of these mechanisms increased as health partnerships
developed, and how this impacted significantly on local horizontal structures, relations
and processes, and ultimately on partnership outcomes. It addresses the first research
question: how did the hierarchal command and control measures used by government
influence the development, interaction, process and outcome of health partnership? In
so doing, it begins to examine the inherent tension at the heart of the government's
reform of the NHS.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that government reforms of the NHS represented a shift
away from markets and competition towards co-ordinating activity through partnership
(Ferlie and McGivern 2003). Hierarchical commands created new decentralised
organisational forms (i.e. PCGs) and encouraged the formation of strategic health
partnerships (HAZs and HImPs). The rationale for these reforms was to create a more
responsive, innovative and democratic health service at the local level, reducing the
centralised control of NHS bureaucracy which had stifled innovation (Blair 1998).
Partnership was the mechanism for accomplishing these and other aims set out in the
Third Way philosophy. Policy was enacted through legislation, circulars and directives,
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default powers (ministerial intervention), appellate functions of ministers (HAZ bids)
and financial measures.
Hierarchical command, creating decentralised organisational forms and partnerships,
was accompanied by hierarchical control. Partnership was to be driven by performance
(DoH 1997). In keeping with broader trends in the management of public services
(Ferlie, Ashbumer et al. 1996; Rhodes 2000b; Klein 2001), the government created a
number of new national organisations to set quality standards and audit activity, and
employed a mixture of output and behavioural controls to monitor progress towards
achieving targets and minimum standards. These control mechanisms were
accompanied by various incentives and sanctions to encourage the appropriate
behaviour (Bennington 2000; Dixon 2001; Klein 2001; Leach and Percy-Smith 2001 b).
An inherent tension in government reforms therefore seemed to exist between its
emphasis on innovative, democratic partnerships at the local level, which required
flexibility and autonomy to tackle difficult local issues in an innovative and appropriate
manner, and the use of hierarchical co-ordination mechanisms which sought to impose
control over local activity. This chapter explores this tension.
Drawing on hierarchy as an analytical framework for the co-ordination of organisational
activity, this chapter charts the nature and influence of command and control measures
over the study period and their impact on the development and functioning of health
partnership, with respect to its structure, interaction, process and outcome. The
mechanisms of mandatory co-ordination employed by the government to implement its
reforms are shown in Appendix K on page 399.
However, hierarchical co-ordination is not considered in terms of static structures or
formal institutions but as a process (pierre and Peters 2000) in which commands and
controls are enacted by actors. Command mechanisms are included as they provide the
parameters and context for control mechanisms, and were identified as influential in the
empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 1.
113
Table 3.1 sets out the command and control mechanisms used by the government.
Control mechanisms are categorised as output and behavioural controls, although some
Table 3.1 Hierarchical command and control mechanisms used to co-ordinate
government reforms on partnership
• Policy documents •
(Le. NSFs, consultations) •
Control (tjirect
behavioural)
• Policy documents • Creation of HlmPs, HAZs and PCGs
(Le. NSFs, consultations) • Setting minimum behavioural/service
standards
• Policy instruments • Indicating types of behaviours and
(directives and roles of different organisations
documents) (including partnerships)
• Finance and resource • Regulating expenditure for HAs and
streams PCGs in line with changing
organisational roles
Control (indirect
behavioural)
• Incentives • Additional and conditional (ring-fenced) resource streams for
partnership
• Granting of 'freedoms and flexibilities'
• 'Earned autonomy' for organisations
based on performance
• Sanctions • Reduced access to resources• Reduced autonomy through executive
or ministerial interference in
partnerships/organisations
• Duty of partnership on health and
well-being
• Creation of PCGs as legal entities
• Amendment of previous health and
social care acts on management of
joint funding and provision
• Green and White Papers
and subsequent
parliamentary acts
mechanisms use both types of control. Behavioural controls are further categorised as
direct and indirect; controls which directly set out roles and tasks etc, and controls
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which indirectly seek to encourage the attainment of certain behaviours and outputs
through offering rewards or imposing sanctions.
The chapter also draws on the systems model of organisational control outlined in
Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1. This helps distinguish and separate out the influence of
command from control measures on the development of health partnership.
The chapter begins by examining the nature and influence of command mechanisms
employed by the government to promote partnership around health issues and convey
the new goals of the NHS hierarchy. It then moves to consider the nature and influence
of output and behavioural control mechanisms used by the government, such as
performance management and the use of incentive and sanctions. The influence of these
measures on the structure, interaction, process of partnership development as well as
outcome of partnership is identified. These issues are explored further in subsequent
chapters. A diagrammatical summary of the influence of command and control
mechanisms on partnership is outlined in Figure 3.1.
The chapter provides evidence that central command and control mechanisms restricted
the latitude of local organisations to form horizontal relations, and further, curbed the
autonomy of health partnerships to respond to the local issues. However, it was not the
intrinsic use of central command and control mechanisms that was detrimental to lateral
relations and autonomy, rather their structure and changing emphasis which undermined
their original intent.
3.2 The new hierarchical goals - a positive force for health and partnership
This section considers the influence of new hierarchical goals set by the government
and their influence on attitudes and perspectives of respondents at a local level. It then
considers the operational content of these goals which led to a multitude of policies
causing policy overload. Incoherence between operational content of goals was also
evident. Finally, it shows that hierarchical goals shifted, resulting in a change in policy
emphasis away from health towards health service issues.
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Within a year of taking office, New Labour set out its new hierarchical goals, using a
variety of command measures such as legislation, circulars and other formal co-
ordination mechanisms. These identified a plethora of organisational reforms, policy
initiatives and programmes detailing how these organisational goals were to be achieved
and the means of achieving them.
Common themes of these goals, as noted in Chapter 1, were partnership, improving
health and reducing inequalities. The emphasis was on taking a whole systems approach
(NHS Executive 1999a). In the policy arena, the White Papers The new NHS: Modern
and Dependable (DoH 1997) and Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (DoH 1999a)
strongly echoed these themes, as did a raft of other policies relating to health and health
service issues (DoH 1998e) such as smoking (DoH 1998f), drugs (DoH 1998g), teenage
pregnancy (DoH 1999c), quality (DoH 1998d) etc.
HImP and HAZ partnerships were to 'provide the means for health and local authorities
to work together with other independent bodies, as well as local communities and
individuals, to pursue [these] joint objectives' (DoH 1999d). The government also
created a number of other area-based partnerships or Area Based Initiatives (ABIs),
located in deprived communities, to achieve its aims.
These new organisational goals were widely recognised and welcomed by interviewees
in all sectors in case study sites. The clear, strong and consistent message from central
government on what it was trying to achieve was perceived as providing an important
stimulus for change, pushing partnership and health improvement and inequalities
higher up local agendas than they had hitherto been.
"The national lead does help in terms of it's high on everyone's agenda, and
all of the directives from government, that almost the first [... ] bullet point
of any new agenda that's coming out, is partnership, partnership,
partnership." Head of Health Promotion, HA
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The government's new policy goals were accompanied by a change in attitude by senior
officers within HA and LA towards existing partnerships which were working on the
health improvement and inequalities issues, such as Healthy City or Health For All
partnerships, taking them from the 'margins to the mainstream':
"[T]he work we used to do around inequalities, it wasn't recognised by
government as the way to go, really. The Health of Our Nation didn't sort of
comply very much with our programme. So we were working very much to
the WHO agenda. Now things have changed within central government in
their recognition of inequalities and all those sort of things, the HAZ
programme, social determinants of that, we're almost becoming
mainstream." HFA Co-ordinator
Membership was either changed to include senior officers or merged into the new HlmP
structures, moving the agenda from a programme to a strategic approach.
The structural reforms to the NHS, particularly the replacement of markets and
contracts with partnership and service agreements as a means of achieving the new
goals, also resulted in a perceived change to the nature of relations between HAs and
NHS Trusts. Attitudes were reported as less competitive and more co-operative and
trusting.
"[Previous internal reforms] militated against the notion of effective
collaboration and partnership, with an undue emphasis on competition and
on protectionism ... and also on a lack of preparedness to share information
and data. So we've had to unravel all those kind of cultural and behavioural
elements, and particularly bring Trusts, who actually have been very
receptive to coming in, once they've understood the agenda." CEO, HA
The policy goal of adopting a whole systems approach to the reform agenda (NHS
Executive 1999a) was also filtering down to local actors, with officers beginning to
perceive their organisations as part of a local health economy, interdependent on other
organisations to deliver health improvement.
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"No one part of this fabric of organisational partnership and all the rest of it
can be independent of all the other influences that occur [... ] Every part of
the NHS locally, in this sense, is interdependent. That's a big change from
the previous regime under the Conservative government, whereby whatever
the internal market, independence, or quasi-independence, was a positive
sort of goal." CEO, HA
The policy goals promulgated by other government departments such as the Department
of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in the White Paper Modern Local
Government: In touch with the people (DETR 1998), also promoted goals similar to
those of the DoH; partnership, health and well-being and social inequalities/exclusion.
On housing policy, the government was advocating a partnership approach, encouraging
LAs to work with HAs in placing people in supported housing. LA policy such as Best
Value (DETR 1998) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy (NRS) (Social Exclusion
Unit 1998) also emphasised working in partnership, particularly with the voluntary
sector.
As health became more 'fashionable', senior officers from Social Services (SS) and
other LA departments quickly got involved in health partnerships. The inclusion of
health in the criteria for SRB partnerships also helped switch LA officers and council
members on to health as a priority.
The policy agenda also encouraged working with the voluntary sector (DoH 1998e). For
its part, the voluntary sector could relate to the organisational goals of partnership,
inequalities and health improvement.
"[T]he role of the voluntary community sector is changing significantly in
the city anyway, and that's come out of some of the government initiatives
around Social Exclusion Unit papers and so on, highlighting the need for the
statutory sector to work more collaboratively with the voluntary community
sector." Director, Voluntary Sector
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The central government command mechanisms of legislation and policy documents,
pushed and promoted the new goals of the hierarchy and, along with the accompanying
structural reforms in the NHS, helped ensure the ideas were embedded in the lower tiers
of the hierarchy. For some organisations this was a novel agenda but for others, such as
some Community Trusts, it was 'nothing new'. Indeed, in several sites partnership
working was fairly well developed, albeit not at a strategic level.
Government policy helped motivate individuals to become involved in health
partnerships, particularly those actors who personally identified with the content of the
agenda and who had previously been working on similar agendas (such as the Healthy
City initiative). It not only provided legitimacy for the activity but also the agenda
which now recognised the determinants of health and health inequalities beyond the
health service. The new agenda, therefore, built on a small bedrock of existing
partnership work. The emphasis of the new national agenda also helped projects gain
support beyond their traditional home of health promotion (ea). Addressing health
inequalities through partnership was moving from health promotion into other HA
departments and into the LA. In Middleton, for example, the HA in conjunction with the
LA embarked on a community research project which trained and employed local
people to assess local health needs. This was reported as a noticeable change in
approach. As one LA director commented about the local HA, '[this was] a far cry from
where they were, which was appointing an external consultant [... ] to come in and
actually do that business.'
However, despite the apparent consistent messages on government goals across the
public sector, there were a number of issues relating to the enactment of these goals
which served to undermine the formation, functioning and outputs of partnership. These
are indicated by the three left-hand arrows in Figure 3.1 that fall under the command
element of the co-ordination mechanism. The influence of each is explored next.
3.2.1 Multiple commands and policy overload
While the government's goals were relatively few and clear, the sheer number of policy
commands emanating from central government to direct the implementation of these
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goals in the periphery created 'policy overload'. As part of the modernisation agenda,
government departments (DQH, DETR, DfEE etc) produced a deluge of new policy
documents and circulars, each of which detailed priorities and structural reforms for
statutory organisations at the local level. These set targets and standards, and employed
a range of output and behavioural controls. Table 3.2 gives some examples.
On top of this plethora of policy commands, many government departments sought to
promote partnership working by instigating their own ABIs. These are shown in Table
3.3. ABI status required the establishment of local partnership boards in order to
administer local funding. All case study sites were involved in a number of ABls.
Table 3.2. Examples of policy documents with their targets and standards
r,¥nt:?{ , , -,;; iW ~'}'Target$or starlli'ards\'i. ,f ~J.;,Fbcaf6r9i}ii8"aif1:j:IT:;;
.,;",~ ,'!olicy, docum~1Jt , . ';':, , 'I), -".f .",' 7>, ::l .' j,< '
Saving Lives Four health outcome targets HlmP partnerships
on mental health, accidents,
cancer and CHD
Mental health NSF Behavioural standards and NHS and Social Services
output targets
Older People NSF Behavioural standards and NHS and Social Services
output targets
Modern Local Government Behavioural standards Local government
NHS Plan Output targets NHS organisations
National Cancer Plan Behavioural standards and NHS organisations
output targets
There were also pilot schemes (such as Pathfinder, a regeneration partnership sponsored
by the Department of Trade Industry (DTI)) and 'trailblazing initiatives'.
Policy was introduced incrementally, in fragments, some of which did not refer to each
other and did not appear to be in any sequence or to relate to a bigger policy picture.
Together with the multitude of departmental policies, this created a 'complex',
'complicated' and 'confusing' web of policy initiatives and structural reforms in each
locale, which were difficult to map and whose links were in constant flux during the
study.
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Table 3.3. Examples of different departmental Area Based Initiatives (ABls)
• Health Action • Employment • Single Regeneration • Neighbourhood
Zones (HAZ) Zones (EAZ) Budget (SRB 1-6) Renewal Strategy
• New Start • New Deal for (NRS)
• Education Action Communities (NDC)
Zones (EdAZ) • New Commitment to
• Sure Start Regeneration (NCR)
The rate of production of policy commands left some partners reeling as they tried to
take on board new initiatives and programmes. It created a reactive atmosphere where
some partners (i.e. LAs trying to respond the array of ABIs) were struggling to keep up
with the agenda and therefore were unable to see the broader picture.
"[I]t's quite difficult to be able then, to step back and actually say, now let's
take stock of this because the speed at which things come at you in order to
deliver things now is much more intense that it was two or three years ago."
Director, LA
Statutory agencies became swamped with 'too many priorities' - so many that not all
could be accommodated at once. In this environment, HImP partnerships were one
priority but not the priority for HAs and their partner agencies. Furthermore,
government pressure to drive through the modernisation agenda resulted in individual
departments pressuring relevant statutory organisations to respond to their priorities.
For local statutory organisations, this created a tension between accomplishing intra-
organisational priorities, departmental priorities for their organisations, and inter-
organisational priorities relating to the numerous partnerships or ABIs, health or
otherwise. While striving to accommodate this tension, many statutory partners found
they did not have the organisational capacity to respond fully to all the demands placed
on them.
"[W]e want to engage with other agencies, I think we struggle because we,
you know, we have too many meetings and other commitments [... ] and our
colleagues do as well, and it's so difficult." DPH
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In deciding where to place their efforts, many organisations focused on those policy
agenda items for which they were directly accountable - those of their department - and
for which there were potential consequences if there was implementation failure. Thus,
greater efforts were placed on achieving departmental priorities rather than setting up
and agreeing local priorities through partnership for which they were not accountable,
even in sites where good links were already established between agencies. For the
newly created PCGs, there was the additional pressure of developing their own
organisational structures and processes. This further restricted their capacity to
participate fully in developing local heath strategy or partnership.
"[W]e're pretty small organisations, I've got five, six people working for
me. In reality, we could probably attend a partnership meeting every other
day, and in capacity terms, PCGs are not up to that level of commitment."
CEO, PCG
Nevertheless, statutory (and other) organisations did establish local health partnerships
despite having limited resources to do so, by 'relying on a lot of goodwill, and people
finding a bit of time to lead the process when they've got other day jobs', as one DPH
put it.
The government emphasis on partnership, (Le. HImPs) together with the profusion of
ABIs, created 'partnershipitis' - an acute condition of excess partnerships and
partnership activity. This resulted in much duplication of work, as key members of
statutory agencies were involved in numerous different partnership initiatives discussing
similar issues. With the capacity of statutory partners' organisations stretched, ABIs had
to compete with each other for partners' resources. These factors served to undermine
the formation of links between ABIs and created a degree of insularity between
partnerships. One HAZ co-ordinator commented:
"It's almost like we've moved from silos which are different organisations,
so health, local authorities, voluntary you know, from the old silos of
working to working in partnership silos." Co-ordinator, HAZ
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Thus, the large and demanding policy agenda served to undermine organisational
capacity to respond to the health partnership agenda, even though the government's
goals were readily understood and provided a positive impetus for partnership, and even
though the mechanisms now existed to work in partnership.
3.2.2 Incoherent policy commands
An inherent assumption in the systems management model of control is that goals are
not only clearly articulated and understood but that they are coherent and well co-
ordinated and are not contradictory or become ends in themselves. This assumption also
applies to the control mechanisms used to achieve these goals, i.e. the setting of targets
and standards and the mechanisms to measure progress. It is an assumption supported
by the literature on partnership which notes the importance of policy coherence and co-
ordination. The previous section has noted the large increase in policy directives and
guidance, but how coherent were these policy commands? And what about the
coherence of accompanying control mechanisms used by the government? These
questions are explored below.
While a number of policy themes or goals could be identified in policy documents
emanating from different government departments, many respondents from statutory
organisations across all sites argued that there were still areas of policy which were
incoherent. Despite the appointment of a Minister of Public Health to the cabinet to
improve cross-departmental working, plus improved links between departmental
executives at a regional level, the production of joint guidance and directives to HAs
and LAs, and the establishment of an inter-departmental HAZ team, nevertheless a
'silo' mentality together with differing priorities (Hudson 1997), inter-departmental
competitiveness (Challis, Fuller et at. 1988) or oversight still appeared to persist
between government departments, leading to poor co-ordination or a lack of joined up
thinking on partnership, health improvement and inequalities.
"[W]e had a meeting this week with [the UK anti-Drugs Co-ordination Unit]
and I raised that [incoherence on drugs policy] and they said 'With the best
will in the world' they're not going to get things working in partnership
across Whitehall. They raised it, they tried to have those discussions but
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things are still coming out separately from government departments."
Health Promotion Manager, HA
Incoherence at the top of the hierarchy filtered down through the command and control
mechanisms to the local level where it had a negative impact.
Incongruence in policy goals and the control delivery system confused local actors. For
some respondents, incoherence was at the heart of government policy thinking; the
government was encouraging innovation in local services in response to local need
through health partnerships, while identifying local variation in service provision as
unacceptable and laying down central priorities - a point also noted by some NHS
commentators (Klein 2001). As one DPH put it:
"[W]hy bother to set up a system which allows local determination,
[when] the whole thing is driven from the top?"
Moreover, the policy command to produce a HImP strategy was not reconciled against
existing statutory commands or requirements. HAs and LAs were already required to
produce a whole host of other joint strategies on a range of issues, many of which were
relevant to health or health service improvement, i.e. Community Care Plans,
Community Safety plans, DAT strategies, education strategies etc, to name a few.
Production of these documents already took up much officer time. The requirement to
produce another strategy placed a further burden on agencies and left them struggling to
link up documents and strategies in an effort to avoid duplication.
Respondents in all sites identified incoherence in co-ordination of command and control
mechanisms between government departments. In the realm of command mechanisms,
there was incoherence between various new health and partnership policy goals,
between new and existing goals and between existing formal structures of vertical co-
ordination (Le. planning cycles, boundaries). Incoherence was also identified in
elements of the control mechanism. whether it was differing departmental targets, "an
inconsistent approach to performance monitoring, different accountability mechanisms
or different incentive structures. Examples of incoherence are provided in Appendix L
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on page 400, showing where the locus on incoherence resided (command or control),
indicating the impact on partnership, and the sites in which respondents identified them.
Some of these examples only relate to sites where specific partnerships were present i.e.
HAZ, Healthy City or Pathfinder etc. While the lack of coherence between government
departments did not override the strong central messages to work in partnership and the
local willingness to do so, it did serve to place obstacles in the development of
partnership: the building of relations, the identification of aims and objectives,
allocation of resources and the management of plans. It also created much duplication of
effort and undermined the capacity of partners to participate in partnership. Unravelling
inconsistencies required resources, persistence and creativity.
Nevertheless, despite a degree of policy incoherence, which hindered the development
of partnership, many partners were still very motivated and committed to working in
partnership and sought to make the best of the new agenda.
The governrnent itself was aware of some policy incoherence. For example, some of the
issues around duplication of partnership structures and monitoring on inter-ABI projects
were highlighted by HAZ partnerships at regional conferences (Lannin 2002), while the
CABI team noted the need for better streamlining and co-ordination of policy in its
research for the DETR (DETR 2000a).
3.2.3 Shifting policy goals - from health to health services
In addition to the multiple policy commands and incoherent policy goals and control
measures, the focus of policy goals shifted during the study period. The original policy
goals outlined in the government's public health Green Paper in 1998 and the
subsequent White Paper in 1999 - although primarily organised around ill health
(cancer, CHD, and mental health) - explicitly recognised the wider determinants of
health. HlmP and HAZ partnerships were the vehicle for taking this agenda forward.
However, late 1999 saw the beginning of a marked shift in emphasis of policy from
health to health services, particularly to secondary care. This shift was a response to
increased scrutiny of the Labour government's record on delivering its electoral pledges
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on waiting lists and 'postcode rationing', and was fuelled by a succession of NHS
'horror stories' in the media, not least the public inquiry into child heart operations at
Bristol Royal Infirmary and the Harold Shipman case. An impression of failed delivery
led to Frank Dobson, the Secretary of State for Health, losing his post in a cabinet
reshuffle to the then Junior Minister and 'moderniser', Alan Milburn in October 1999
(Klein 2001; Webster 2002). The appointment of Alan Milburn prompted a move away
from a broader health agenda towards delivering NHS priorities (Asthana, Richardson
et al. 2002). An illustration of this shift was the passing of responsibility for HAZs to
the Minister for Social Care, John Hutton within two months of being in post. As one
health promotion (HP) manager noted:
"Alan Milburn coming in, he doesn't seem to like HAZs." HP manager
At the beginning of 2000, following the perceived failure by the NHS to cope with an
influenza outbreak, the Prime Minister unexpectedly announced an increase in funding
for the NHS (Klein 2001; Lannin 2002). New investment had to be linked to
modernisation and reform (Webster 2002), with a strong emphasis on reaching targets
or process outcomes. A dual agenda of service modernisation and performance
management emerged. This was marked by the introduction of the NHS Plan in June
2000 which reaffirmed the government's commitment to reducing waiting lists (a
maximum two-week wait for cancer patients) and included a number of other process
targets on cancer, CHD and MH (DoH 2000a). Although the Plan re-emphasised closer
working between HAs and SS, possibly through the creation of the Care Trusts (for
failing services), health partnerships were marginal to the document. HAZs were only
mentioned in two paragraphs although a few more were given over to Local Strategic
Partnerships (LSPs), another new local health partnership. At the same time a cabinet
reshufile saw the role of Minister of Public Health downgraded to Parliamentary
Undersecretary of State for Public Health, with the position passing from Tessa Jowell
to Yvette Cooper. Furthermore, the prevention and inequalities NHS modernisation
team created by the Prime Minister in April 2000 did not include the new
Undersecretary of State (Beecham 2000). Thus, the policy focus on long-term health
gain shifted markedly towards short-term health service issues, a change noted in all
case study sites in both HImP and HAZ partnerships.
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"[W]hen I think the notion of a health improvement programme was first
mooted, and the first draft guidance came out, it was very focused, it was
about developing health. It wasn't about health services [... ] It didn't include
things about estates, and PFI hospitals, and waiting lists, and emergency
admissions, you know, which is the business of the health service. It was
much more public health orientated, and that was what people thought it
was going to be." CEO, PCG
Following the publication of the NHS Plan in June 2000, HAZs were directed to spend
funds on cancer, CHD and improving MH. This was followed by a ministerial letter to
HAZ partnership boards expressing an expectation that HAZs direct £500,000 of their
funding towards addressing winter pressure and waiting list initiatives [Field notes].
Thus, a more health-servicefocused agenda was imposedcentrally on HAZs, representinga
shift away from examining the broad determinants of health, altering the original 'bottom
up' philosophy of HAZswhich aimed to develop local solutions to locally defined problems
(Bauld, Judge et al. 2000).
"[T]hat has led to some difficult discussions as people have seen their
ambitions thwarted because of the way the funding streams have been put
together. So instead of it being like a process, which was a lot of the
language of it, it's actually being driven. You can have a HAZ but you've
got to spend the money this way." Director, SS
For the new Secretary of State, HAZ partnerships were less important to the delivery of
the NHS Plan, and therefore, no longer a national priority (Bauld, Judge et al. 2000). As
a consequence of the hierarchy's shift in policy, HImP and HAZ partnerships had to
refocus on delivering a more health service-orientated agenda. This was accompanied
by a number of changes to funding arrangements which were made to reflect and
encourage action to support this new direction.
In November and December 2000, late in the planning process, HAs were notified of
the Modernisation Funds for the coming year (2000/01). The lion's share (69%) of the
additional £466 million was directed at waiting lists, mental health and Cancer (£276
million, £36.9 million, £9 million) (DoH 199ge). An additional £30 million was also
made available to HAZ sites, although partnerships were also expected to spend this
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extra money on the 'core priority areas of CHD, cancer, and mental health as part of
their effort to tackle inequalities'. Funding was also 'ring-fenced' to prevent its use for
other purposes. One of the HAs in the study sites also gained a small increase in
revenue as a result of the weighted capitation formula being changed to better reflect
local health needs (DoH 2000c). However, these additional funds were relatively small
in comparison to the size of the mainstream budgets. Thus, financial resources to invest
in a programme to improve health beyond the government's priorities had to come from
partners' core budgets. In reality, this meant that investment in a programme beyond an
illness or health service perspective was less likely to happen.
"[T]he role of health [authorities] is to deliver the health agenda and if our
key priority is to reduce waiting lists and to deliver health services then any
funding that might be required to go into other partnerships, if they're not
delivering that health agenda, will not be the highest priority for us. And
that will be the same for education, for social services." HP Manager, HA
Even in the site where additional funds were received, following the 'health inequalities
adjustment' to resource allocation, the HA steered a proportion of these monies into
reducing the local acute trusts' financial deficit and waiting lists.
This section has looked at the nature and influence of hierarchical commands used by
government. The next section considers the use and influence of both behavioural and
output controls on the development of local partnership.
3.3 The influence of control mechanisms
In a systems model of hierarchical co-ordination, a variety of control mechanisms can
be used to achieve the desired activity. By employing output and behavioural controls
and monitoring performance, activity can be adjusted when it deviates from the goals
set by the hierarchy. Incentives and sanctions can be used to harness the self-interested
nature of actors, rewarding desired activity or punishing inappropriate pursuits. It
assumes that the mechanisms of control not only reflect hierarchical goals and are
measurable but that the imposition of the system itself is not detrimental to achieving
those goals.
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In this next section, the nature and influence of behavioural and output control
mechanisms used by the government to achieve health partnership are explored. It
begins by focusing on the nature of directives and guidance from central government,
then the influence of its performance management system and, finally, the use of
incentives and sanctions.
3.3.1 Directives and guidance
The DoH used both behavioural and output controls to direct activity In health
partnerships. These were conveyed through the use of directives and guidance,
instructing or directing health partnerships on matters of behaviour and output: on who
to involve in partnership, the timetable for producing the HImP strategy, where to focus
local policy and spend money, and service standards and targets to be achieved. HAs
and their partners were influenced by the constant flow of directives and guidance
emanating from the DoH. These not only shaped the way HImP and HAZ partnerships
developed but also their outputs.
Instructions or directions for health partnership were communicated by the DoH,
primarily through Health Service Circulars (HSCs) and Guidance (HSG). As New
Labour sought to implement its programme of health service reform during 1998-99, the
level of NHS guidance massively increased. Table 3.4 shows that guidance reached a
level of nearly one circular per working day, a rate 5-10 times higher than that before or
after this period. This guidance not only concerned the changing role of HAs and the
establishment of PCGs but also the work of HlmP and HAZ partnerships.
Table 3.4. Quantity of health service directives and guidance by year
60*
* Formerly called Health Service Guidance (HSG)
Source: http://www.info. doh .gov. ukldoh/coin4. nsf/Circulars?ReadForm
Acute and Community Trusts were also subject to reams of guidance and directives on
issues such as managing care, the development of intermediate care and rehabilitation
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and accountability as well as on funding. LAs did not escape the deluge, with
commands issued in relation to the modernisation agenda and the work of ABIs.
Early guidance reflected the priorities of cancer, CHD and MH outlined in the White
Paper Saving Lives. However, respondents from all sites asserted that the guidance did
not give a clear steer on inequalities, despite this being a hierarchical goal. Indeed, there
was no requirement to include this issue in second-round HImP strategies. Respondents
also noted that guidance was not always clear about how different departments within
organisations (i.e. the LA) should relate to one another.
Others noted that the level of detail 'restricted' the approach of health partnerships. For
statutory partners beyond the HA, the large number of directives made participation in
HImP partnerships less of a priority.
Following the appointment of the new health secretary and the shift in policy goals, the
content of guidance also shifted to an emphasis on health service outputs such as
waiting lists, financial balance of trusts and waiting times in A&E (June 2000). Health
improvement and inequalities were accorded de facto a lower priority. As several
respondents noted, 90% of priorities were set nationally. Funding was directed toward
these priorities.
"In terms of spending, the NHS Executive is the most important [... ] So at
the moment they are saying spend it on waiting lists, that's what is most
important to us and nothing else but that, so we spend a lot of money on
waiting lists" OPH
In this way HImP partnerships were beginning to be perceived as a vehicle for meeting
government priorities rather than a forum to tackle local health need innovatively.
Other forms of guidance which acted as control mechanisms of partnership were the
MH and CHO NSFs, published just before and during the study period respectively.
These set out a number of national standards, detailing which areas local partnerships
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should focus their work on to improve the quality of care (DoH 1999b; DoH 2000b).
They were specific about what local services should be provided and to what standards,
leaving little scope for groups to identify and develop local priorities. The role of local
health partnerships was to figure out how to deliver these priorities.
Time-tabling and timing
A key issue with respect to guidance and directives was its time-tabling and timing.
This had a significant influence on the development of health partnerships across all
sites, an issue recognised by nearly all interviewees (52/60 coded). HAs were locked
into a centrally derived timetable to deliver the HImP strategy or spend HAZ resources -
a timetable that was set by the DoH.
The late arrival of the timetable for the first HImP strategy only allowed three months
for its development (the second HImP was longer at nine months). This was a short
time-scale in which to negotiate and produce a multi-agency strategy. As a
consequence, many respondents thought that too much time was being put into
delivering the annual HImP strategy for the DoH rather than focusing on developing the
partnerships themselves and delivering the agenda. As one DPH put it, it would be
preferable for the HImP 'to be every three or four years and for the time in between to
be filled by how NHS organisations are making progress in meeting those standards.'
Timetables were not only short but also not particularly well co-ordinated with other
government departments. This placed further obstacles to working in partnership, for
example, when trying to join up planning cycles, as noted above, thereby limiting the
ability of the HlmP to influence other relevant local strategies and resource allocation.
"Because of the different time scales that we're in in terms of our resource
allocation decisions, like in the health authority, those decisions are
finalised in March, whereas in the local authority, they're being finalised
now [January], and we are at this point in the year still identifying what
those priorities are for the health service, then clearly, you know, you've
missed the boat in terms of this year's PPR process" HlmP Co-ordinator
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The timing and timescale issues were compounded by the large policy agenda, each
stream of which had its own time line for implementation. This drew officer time away
from working on health partnership, making it more difficult to accomplish tasks within
a centrally driven timescale. How actors in study sites coped with short timescales in an
environment of increased time pressure on staff is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
Similarly, HAZ partnerships were undermined by the timing and timetables laid down
by central government directives. Principally, HAZs had a short 'lead-in time'. Once
bids were accepted, work programmes had to be developed and funds spent within a
relatively short period of time. However, the large policy agenda meant that many
partners were preoccupied with other reform activities. It took half of the first year or
longer (8 months) to appoint a HAZ co-ordinator in case study sites. Only then did the
partnerships begin to take shape and the voluntary sector partners begin to become
engaged. By this time there was increasing pressure to spend HAZ funds. As a number
of HAZ actors commented, the 'cart was before the horse'. Instead of the government
'front loading' partnerships (providing funds on approval of bids), the timetable should
have been structured to allow partnerships to engage fully with the voluntary sector and
develop appropriate partnership structures and planning mechanisms before having to
manage and dispense funds. This did not happen, impacting negatively on partnership
outcomes.
Acceptance of guidance
The space in which HAs could lead or develop the HImP and HAZ partnerships became
increasingly restrictive as guidance and directives 'rained down ever more frequently'
from the centre. These were considered by statutory staff as 'imperative', 'must do's',
although some complained about the 'ludicrous', excessive demands, and 'unrealistic
expectations', given the short deadlines. One respondent noted that the large number of
policy documents meant they were not read properly. Occasionally central guidance was
reported as being subverted. For example, part of the guidance on JIPs was 'ignored' in
Metrocity. On the whole, however, the statutory agencies appeared to accept central
guidance and directives without much dissent, even if its content was considered
questionable. Bureaucratic deference appeared to be a strong cultural norm.
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"[T]hese days people accept the fact that whatever the value in terms of the
public good that you get from ministerial directives, that they will happen
anyway and there is not much point in fighting them. You just get on and
make the best of them." DPH
By contrast, the voluntary sector (and some LA actors) was more questioning of the
need to adhere to such guidance, especially around the HAl, and could not understand
why the statutory agencies did not stand up to central government. For example, the
voluntary sector in Metrocity questioned the wording of a ministerial letter which
suggested that HAZs should allocate £500,000 of their funds to tackle waiting lists.
After a discussion instigated by the voluntary sector, the board agreed to a compromise:
the money would he used for waiting lists hut it would address inequalities at the same
time [Field notes].
Thus, hierarchical guidance and directives were a mechanism used to control and direct
the behaviour and activities of local partnerships (policy and finance). Although specific
guidance on the structure of health partnership was not given, the process and direction
of partnership was actively influenced by central guidance and directives and largely
accepted by statutory actors, particularly those in HAs.
3.3.2 Performance Management
The government's reform programme was not only based on partnership but also
performance. Partnership between health service agencies, LAs, the voluntary sector
and others with an influence on or an interest in health were to be driven by
performance management (DoH 1997). To make the process more transparent, the DoH
developed and consulted on a framework to evaluate performance in the NHS in six
areas (DoH 1998h; Webster 2002), although none of these related to evaluating
partnership per se and health inequalities were primarily typecast as 'fair access'.
Performance management requires the setting of output and behavioural controls - such
as targets and indicators and standards or behaviours - and the monitoring of progress
using audit. In the health service, long-term national health outcome targets were set for
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cancer, CHD, MH and accidents. HImP partnerships were tasked with identifying
appropriate targets and milestones in each of the six assessment areas for health
improvement and health care. These, together with targets relating to emergency
pressures, financial balance, waiting lists, primary care and mental health objectives,
were quantified in Service and Financial Frameworks (SaFFs) (NHS Executive 1999b).
Similarly, LAs were also subject to performance reviews by the DoH and Audit
Commission, and at the local level, performance management of services was achieved
through the Best Value regime (DETR 1998). Output and behavioural standards for the
NHS and LA were also set out in MH and Older People NSF.
HAs were performance-managed by the NHS Executive through the Regional Offices
(ROs) (DoH 1999t). Local Performance Agreements (LPAs) negotiated between HAs
and ROs focused on key issues in the National Priorities Guidance, and HAs were
required to submit quarterly reports to the RO. The RO was also responsible for
allocating specific grants from central government to HAs.
HAs also met with RO staff, although less frequently (i.e. twice a year), to review the
HlmP and other related issues. HImP and HAZ programmes both required RO approval
or 'sign off.
HA accountability to the centre, through the RO, was strong, right down to the work of
the HImP sub-groups, which, in key areas such as MH, were required to report quarterly
on progress in implementing the NSF (DoH I999b ). HAZ were also required to submit
quarterly financial returns and twice yearly self assessments (Judge, Barnes et al. 1999).
Close central monitoring was the driving force of their work with the result that
'nothing could drop off the agenda'.
Performance management actually increased over the study period both for HImP and
HAZ partnerships, as the direction of the government's health policy shifted toward
health services and short-term outcomes, i.e. waiting lists and A&E. These were
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deemed to be more important issues by ROs, almost to the neglect of HAs' performance
on health improvement.
Indeed, following the NHS Plan, performance assessment was refined and applied at the
level of Trusts. The need to implement the standards set out in the NSFs was also
stressed. A system of 'traffic lights' (green, amber, red) was introduced to indicate
whether NHS Trusts were achieving centrally designated standards (such as cleanliness)
(Webster 2002). Performance management became tightly linked to the Plan's priorities
(DoH 2002b).
As a result, delivering the health service agenda and achieving the associated targets
became an imperative for HAs and other NHS organisations. This pressure was
expressed by CEOs across study sites, as one noted:
"[T]here are three things that get me the sack: not delivering on waiting
lists, not reducing emergencies and not balancing the books ...everything else
is not important." CEO, Acute Trust
Organisations had to tackle the 'non-negotiables', even if an issue was not a priority for
HAs. Furthermore, for CEOs their jobs were potentially on the line.
Performance management was, therefore, a motivator and director of organisational
action, resulting, for example, in a shift to more operational issues linked to key targets,
such as bed blocking. As Geller (2001) notes, meeting health improvement targets
carried no direct rewards, nor failure sanctions for CEDs; working in partnership on the
HImP was perceived by organisations like Acute Trusts as a lesser priority to intra-
organisational issues. Health improvement and investing in communities, therefore,
came 'second best' to health service priorities.
"[W]e can understand the waiting lists and waiting times agenda, but it does
seem to be a gross distortion of what we are actually doing. Because
(Dalesville Health Authority) has missed its target, well potentially for the
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third year running, it really is a big focus of the agenda. It takes a
considerable amount of time and I think that has distorted, it's distorting the
agenda away from some ofthe health issues." CEO, PCG
This pressure to refocus work was also felt in HAZ partnerships.
"[T]he HAZ has had to change, [so] instead of just talking about poverty,
inclusion, and equality in community development, it is also talking about
coronary heart disease, cancer, mental health, winter pressures." Director,
Voluntary Organisation
Scrutiny of HImP partnerships by the RO reached such a level that one regional officer
complained that meetings with HAs originally focused on both performance
management and organisational development issues had got 'so big that performance
management had to be dealt with separately in another meeting.' [Field notes - HDA
meeting]. Heavy performance management did not make it easy for organisations to
apply flexibility or to adapt to a changing and chaotic environment. The level of
performance management was such that some began to question the ability of the HlmP
to respond to local health agendas, seeing it more as an instrument of state. As one DPH
commented:
"[T]he health authority has come to a view about whether it wants to take a
leading role in [... ] shaping things, or whether it's going to see it [the HImP]
mostly as a performance monitoring tool."
Indeed, delivering the HImP strategy to time was increasingly seen as a performance
target in itself, rather than a process.
HAZ partnerships were also subject to 'very stringent' performance management by
ROs, even though they were still in their early, formative stage of partnership
development. This was partly due to their high profile and, in the face of ministerial
scepticism, to a need to show they were having an impact. Assessment involved
submitting a self-assessment of progress and a high-level statement on each work
stream (Bauld, Judge et al. 2000). The disbursement of funds was one measure used to
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assess progress by ROs, with clear reasons expected for not spending money.
Monitoring became so intense that case studies reported that it had become far greater
than for core budgets.
"[P]eople have got very obsessed with how are we spending five million
pounds, when each of the partner organisations is spending billions of
pounds and they have less performance management on the billions than we
have on five million." Co-ordinator, HAZ
With the shift in government policy toward delivering short-term outcomes, and HAZ
partnerships out of favour with the new minister, HAZs were informed at the end of the
first year that they were to be 'rain checked' at three years to review whether funding
would be continued. This served to undermine longer term planning around health
inequalities. Indeed, in Dalesville, after a negative performance review by the RO to
ministers, criticising the partnership for failing to spend its resources, it was advised to
revise its structure and investment streams to better reflect government priorities - to
the detriment of locally determined priorities.
But performance management was not unified across different government departments
and therefore not across statutory agencies at a local level either, as noted earlier in
Appendix L. Different performance indicators and measures were used by different
government departments to monitor their respective health partnerships CHImPs and
HAZs) or ABIs. Consequently, reporting to central government agencies on joint
working or partnership initiatives that were co-funded resulted in duplication rather than
a shared effort.
"[T]he DETR will run New Deal for Communities, the DfEE will run an
Education Action Zone, expect all our organizations like health and the
council and others to get involved and then run two independent monitoring
and appraisal systems on both activities, both of which are running in the
same area of the city. Which again spawns two lots of groups, two lots of
monitoring mechanisms, two lots of accountability systems and two lots of
civil servants coming at you." Director, LA
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At the local level, several HImP partnerships strived to rationalise the large and diverse
range of targets on which members were required to report, identifying links and areas
of overlap [Field notes]. Nevertheless, organisations beyond the NHS (in particular
LAs) still performance managed their work using a separate process. Only in one site,
Greenville, with well developed relations between agencies at strategic level between
the HA and SS were officers making significant steps to synchronise the monitoring of
joint financing and contracting systems.
Performance management by its very nature is more suited to short-term outputs or
process outcomes, as these are more amenable to measurement and more directly
attributable to the work of partnerships. Targets to improve health and reduce
inequalities in health, on the other hand, are more ambiguous as these are inevitably
long-term in nature and their achievement is difficult to directly attribute to partnership
because of the influence of external factors beyond the partnership's control or
knowledge. While some long-term national targets for 'health' were set in order to
stimulate activity in key areas, nevertheless the focus was on health service
modernisation - on waiting list targets and financial statements, with their apparently
'precise' figures (Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002). The greater suitability of these targets
to a performance management system further downgraded the priority given to the
health agenda.
Indeed, the pressure to identify short-term outcomes or 'early wins' and attribute them
to the work of partnerships created some scepticism about government motives and
some resentment.
"We shouldn't be giving into this push from government for a figure on
something to say what we've done, because health improvement is a long
term project." Manager, Community Trust
Performance management was reported to have a positive role in the development of
partnership in a few instances. In Greenshire, it was reported that the performance
management by RO had ensured that the HA and SS had included the MH trust in its
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planning process. Previously, as a provider, it had been excluded. A similar view was
expressed about the inclusion of the voluntary sector in Dalesville.
Perversely, heavy performance management had galvanised HAZ partners in Dalesville,
following a critical report by the RO to ministers about its development. While helpful
in addressing some of the partnership's problems, the report's conclusions were
perceived to be inadequate and unjust. Indignant about the accuracy and quality of the
report (which was written without visiting the site), partners rallied around a sense of
communal injustice. This resulted in an invigoration of group bonds and relations and
purpose.
Overall, as a mechanism of control, performance management was influential on the
structure, development, process and outcome of health partnership. Its increasingly
heavy application, shifting focus and incoherent application across partner organisations
undermined the original agenda of health partnerships and interfered with the
development and processes of partnership. However, performance management had a
few positive consequences in sites which helped ensure greater inclusiveness in
partnerships.
3.3.3 Incentives and sanctions
Achieving the desired outputs set by the hierarchy in a systems model of control
primarily relies on actors recognising and responding to organisational interests,
adjusting their activity or behaviour in response to poor performance. However, as
noted in Chapter 1, empirical evidence suggests actors in bureaucracies are motivated
by a range of interests, some of which may not be commensurate with those of the
organisation. One common approach to addressing this problem is through the use of
incentives and sanctions. These seek to align organisational interests with those of
actors and, in-so-doing, increase the likelihood of achieving the desired behaviours or
making appropriate adjustments when performance is not achieved. In trying to direct
local health partnerships, the government employed the use of incentives and sanctions.
These were primarily tied into the system of performance management but not
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exclusively. This section explores their use and impact on the development of health
partnerships.
Incentives
The government introduced several incentives to encourage partnership and manipulate
behaviour. These took two main forms: greater access to resources and greater legal
freedoms to act beyond existing roles.
HAZs were supported by a specific government funding stream that provided additional
resources to more or less a level specified in funding bids. The funds were to allow
partnerships to develop new, innovative initiatives on health and inequalities which
might then be subsumed into mainstream budgets. In particular, the granting of HAZ
status provided access to resources to tackle health inequalities, and successful bids had
to show evidence of partnership working. HAZ status also included £100,000 for
partnership development, and allowed partnerships to bid or access other sources of
funding (Innovations Fund, drugs and smoking cessation monies, NOF)(Judge, Barnes
et al. 1999).
The opportunity to access additional funds came at a time when resources in the NHS
were scarce. Despite New Labour's ambitious programme of reform, spending in the
NHS only rose by 2% per annum in its first two years of office, as the government, for
political reasons, stuck to the former Conservative government's spending plans (Klein
2001; Webster 2002). This rise was barely sufficient to cover the cost of the existing
levels of service (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001b, pp.136). Furthermore, HAs and Trusts
were put under greater financial pressure (Ham 1998) as the government pushed to
ensure that local trusts were not in the red. In several case study sites, HAs were
pressured to underwrite Acute Trust debt.
LAs were also under financial pressure, with additional funding to SS and Education
departments little more than the rate of inflation (less so than for the NHS (Chancellor
of the Exchequer 1998». Increases to other LA departments were lower still, leaving
district councils, in particular, feeling the pinch. As with the NHS, much of the funding
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from the centre was dedicated, preventing it from being directed into other activities.
As a consequence, many LA departments found themselves struggling to fulfil their
duty to act in partnership. As one district council CEO complained:
"[A]ll governments are much the same, giving you all sorts of additional
responsibilities and functions, and giving you no money. So [...] we're
strapped for cash and we're having to make economies."
In the general climate of resource scarcity, access to non 'ring-fenced' funds, such as
those provided by HAl (and other ABI) status, provided an opportunity for HAs and
LAs to develop new projects without jeopardising mainstream budgets. Funds could
also be used to support the development of the partnership itself (i.e. funding staff and
development work).
"HAl money is important as it pump primes peoples' interest and
engagement in addressing policies." HAl Chair
Flexible additional funds were, therefore, an important motivator for partnership.
Indeed, over 40% of all HAs in England (41/99) applied for HAl status in the first
wave, of which eleven were accepted. Many of the failed bids applied again in the
second round, including two of the case study sites.
By contrast, HImP partnerships initially received no direct funding to support their
programme of work. Nor was there central funding to support the HImP process or the
development of the partnership. All the government did was to change the rules
governing Joint Finance, allowing sites to direct funds into this kind of activity (i.e.
funding of partnership co-ordinators). On the face of it, there were no additional
incentives to encourage involvement in HImP partnerships. On the other hand, HImP
strategies did provide a framework to guide local commissioning and direct mainstream
funding. In a resource-scarce environment, this provided an opportunity to influence
local resource allocation. Although involvement was mandatory for key NHS
organisations, for the LA and voluntary sector there was potentially an incentive of
increased access to local resources. (The influence of additional funds and resource
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allocation in motivating organisations to become involved In health partnership is
considered in depth in Chapters 4 and 5.)
However, resource incentives to encourage and support health partnerships kept
'chopping and changing', particularly those relating to HAZ partnerships. During 1999
and 2000, the rules governing HAZ funding changed several times (see Sanctions
section for details). Furthermore, additional resource streams were created and core
budgets were cut in the first two years of second-wave HAZs. Cuts followed shortly
after the appointment of a new Secretary of State, ostensibly in response to a £23
million under-spend in the first year (Hansard 2000) but widely associated with the
change in minister and his emphasis on ensuring health services delivery. And yet an
additional £30 million was allocated to HAZs for 1999/2000, again directed towards the
national priorities:
"HAs are expected to spend this extra money in the core priority areas of
CHD, cancer and mental health as part of their effort to tackle health
inequalities." DoH (199ge)
Additional funds linked to the HImPs were also announced, besides the Modernisation
Fund. The NHS Performance Fund was set up in 2000/01 (£100 million rising to £500
million in 2003/04) (DoH 2000c), and the HlmP Performance Scheme established (£10
million rising to £30 million in 2003/04) (DoH 1999t). The latter rewarded those
partnerships that could demonstrate the most progress on achieving national priorities
(Le. a competitive process).
In addition to financial incentives, the government introduced legislation through the
Health Act 1999 to allow local organisations greater freedom and flexibility to achieve
health gain in areas of joint work (Bauld, Judge et al. 2000). This incentive allowed the
HAs and SS to remove legislative barriers to joint working, enabling them to pool
budgets and exchange resources (information, staff and service provision)(DETR 1998;
DoH 1998c). Initially an incentive for HAZ partnerships, Sections 26-32 of the Health
Act (1999) allowed all HAs to use these freedoms and flexibilities as long as they were
in accordance with HImP strategies (DoH 2000d).
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However, experimentation with local freedoms and flexibilities was little used in HAZ
sites, including those in this study. Despite early promises from central government,
HAZ partnerships themselves chose not to request or exploit opportunities for
manoeuvre, often because of a lack of (or slow) response from the centre (Judge, Barnes
et a1. 1999; Bauld, Judge et a1. 2000). Nevertheless, there was progress on integrated or
joint management in all sites between some MH service providers and some exploratory
discussions on older peoples' services, perhaps encouraged by the NSFs in which closer
integration was identified as priority. Progress on pooled budgets was slow and
identified as an issue on the agenda, still being discussed. Only in Greenshire had a joint
lead commissioner between HAs and SS been appointed and proposals to exchange
information with 'safe' organisations submitted to the NHS Executive. Even then, there
were 'months of delays' as the plans had to be sanctioned by a national NHS board with
a remit for security and confidentiality.
A third related incentive was outlined in the NHS Plan: 'earned autonomy' was
available for high performing NHS Trusts (Robinson 2002). This offered both financial
recognition and non-financial rewards (i.e. a relaxing of statutory requirements) to
organisations and frontline staff for overall excellence and improved performance (DoH
2000a).
In addition to the incentives outlined above, the government used a number of sanctions
which, combined with the performance management system, had a significant impact on
health partnerships, particularly HAZ partnerships.
Sanctions
Sanctions are another means of exercising control in hierarchies, discouraging certain
behaviours or punishing poor outputs monitored through performance management. A
number of sanctions were outlined in the government's policy agenda. In the health
service these included the threat of direct NHS Executive involvement in the running of
failing organisations. Sanctions were made more explicit during the study period as the
health agenda shifted towards health service delivery. The NHS Plan, for example,
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outlined the imposition of Care Trusts for HAs and SS that 'failed to establish effective
joint partnerships or where inspection or joint reviews have shown that services are
failing' (DoH 2000a)5. NHS trusts not reaching the 'floor' level of acceptable
performance (i.e. red) were to be put under 'special measures', receiving expert external
advice, support and, where necessary, intervention. Additional funds (such as the
Performance Fund) came with strings attached for poor performing organisations (DoH
2000a).
With regard to health partnership, one of the most significant sanctions operated by the
government was the control of additional funding, particularly funding of HAZ
partnerships (HImP partnerships received little, if any, additional funding). This
sanction was not explicit at the outset but imposed on HAZ partnerships at the end of
their first year, following the appointment of a new Secretary of State for Health and the
subsequent shift in government policy.
"[W]e've got central government breathing down our necks saying, you
have to spend the money, slippage isn't acceptable, you've got to have early
results. We're under so much pressure to spend this money." Director,
Voluntary Sector
The increased pressure on HAZs to deliver was accompanied by a change in funding
rules and priorities for HAZs. These effectively operated as sanctions in two ways.
First, rules were changed to prevent funds allocated by central government from being
carried over into the following financial year. Nearly all HAZs had 'slippage' in the first
year, and initially the government agreed for funds to be carried over. In the second
year, however, the new Secretary of State reneged on the former's promise and changed
the rules so funds could no longer be carried over. Any funds not spent within the
financial year would be lost. HAZ partnerships were pressured to spend their money or
face the sanction of losing it.
SThe NHS Plan also noted that HAs and SS with particularly close relationships could opt to become Care
Trusts, if they so wished Le. they were also an incentive.
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"The people who didn't spend quite fast enough last time round, as you
know were punished for it, so there are now big incentives to spend." Non
Executi ve Director, HA
HAZs duly obliged, and, as a consequence, there was a significant impact on the
development of partnership, interaction between partners and the quality of output, as
will be shown later.
Second, the funding horizon of HAZs was halved from five/seven to three years.
Funding after this period would depend on performance. HAZs deemed not to have
performed or not to have been 'effective' would face the 'axe'. The shortened and
uncertain funding horizon meant HAZs could only plan 18 months ahead, undermining
the sustainability of newly established projects, and resulting in some being 'truncated'
(Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004) as illustrated by the comment below:
"[I] don't know what position that leaves projects in who receive three year
funding initially, what are they supposed to do, go back to them and say you
can't have three year funding." HP Manager
These changes were also accompanied by a realignment of funding in line with the new
priorities.
"[T]he emphasis now from the centre [is on] what are seen as health service
priorities, I think that has to be our priority, otherwise the HAZ is in danger
of being axed." HImP co-ordinator
Thus, there was a strong pressure to comply with the government's new expectations,
delivering 'quick wins' on the health service agenda. The alternative was to lose longer-
term funding.
The uncertainty surrounding funding beyond three years, and the reluctance of
organisations to commit their own resources beyond this period, resulted in new
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projects only securing funding for two years. This further eroded the long-term aims of
HAZ partnerships, to improve health and reduce health inequalities.
Fear of losing funding placed enormous pressure on HAZ partnerships to spend their
allocations before the end of the first financial year. The delays in appointing HAZ co-
ordinators, partly as result of the central imposition of a large policy agenda,
exacerbated the pressure as HAZ partnerships struggled to take on the enormous
amount of work to achieve this objective. This pressure skewed the focus of HAZ
partnerships towards spending funds rather than focusing on the important processes of
partnership such as developing group relationships or strategies to tackle health
inequalities. The result was 'projectitis' as HAZs 'dashed' to set up projects. In one site,
with approximately £4 million to spend before the funding deadline, 87 projects were
set up in five months, a 'massive amount of work'. This pressure was exacerbated by
partnership being performance managed at the same time as HAZs were trying to agree
projects. As one HAZ Co-ordinator commented:
"[W]e've had to do just an incredible amount of process to get that off the
ground. So if you are doing that sort of process, how are you looking after
your partners, how are you nurturing partnerships, how are you getting into
the mainstream? It's made life really difficult."
It also undermined the quality of projects funded, as there was less time to select
projects and less time to consult with partners. In the hurry to fund projects, some were
selected that would have otherwise been deemed inappropriate if there had been more
time to make judgements.
"[E]verybody panics about slippage and the money being taken away, so the
money gets thrown at everything." Manager, Community Trust
It was difficult to link the rationale for projects, therefore, to HAZ strategies (Sullivan,
Judge et al. 2004).
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The structure and changing nature of incentives and sanction had a significant impact on
health partnerships, impacting on their developmental process and their outcomes.
Chapter 6 explores the nature of outcomes in more detail.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the nature and influence of hierarchical command and control
mechanisms used by central government on the development and output of health
partnerships.
The government used a number of formal command mechanisms to enact its new goals
for NHS reform. These were successful in creating a variety of local strategic
partnerships to improve health and reduce inequalities, building on local interest and
shifting a formerly marginalised issue onto the mainstream agenda. However,
undertaking such large-scale reform of the public sector resulted in a huge increase in
central commands, each demanding action and diluting efforts directed towards
developing partnerships. The commands (and controls) deployed also showed a lack of
coherence, suggesting government was not as joined up as its message of 'joined up
government' and whole systems thinking implied. Incoherence caused confusion and
duplication, consuming resources which otherwise could have been used to develop
health partnerships. Furthermore, the goals of hierarchy shifted towards health services.
The command mechanisms also provided the context in which the levers of control
were operated. These levers were performance management and the use of incentives
and sanctions. Their intention was to drive the performance of health partnership but
their application, unduly influenced by the policy shift towards health service,
undermined the processes and outputs of partnership. The shift in policy resulted in a
heavy application of performance management to ensure progress on achieving the new
health service goals. Performance management also lacked consistency across sectors,
with different partners working to different targets and requirements. These factors drew
resources away from the development of partnership. Incentives, on the other hand,
particularly financial ones, appeared to encourage partnership and activity on
inequalities, their influence being enhanced by the general lack of resources. Changes to
the rules and arrangements governing incentives, however, served to undermine the
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development and quality of outcomes of partnership, particularly when linked with
sanctions. Although the threat of sanctions was effective at directing activity and
finance towards meeting national priorities in the health service, it drew attention away
from the original purpose of health partnership of health improvement and reduction in
inequalities.
Thus, health partnerships were developed in an environment of multiple, incoherent and
shifting command and control mechanisms. These mechanisms interacted with one
another in positive and negative ways to influence the development and function of
health partnership. This influence was recorded on the structure, interaction, process and
outcomes of health partnership, in general undermining their original purpose.
However, this negative influence was not inherently due to the nature of the co-
ordinating mechanisms (although performance management did place a resource burden
on partnership), rather it was a result of their magnitude and changing structure. In
particular, bureaucratic commands increased over the study period and were highly
influential. They coupled negatively with the performance management system. This
begs the question of whether in a less turbulent command environment, performance
management, incentives and sanctions could have had a more positive effect on
promoting partnership to improve health and reduce inequalities, a question that is
considered in more depth in the conclusion of this thesis.
This chapter has shown the importance of the national or outer context on all aspects of
health partnership. While this was a significant factor in all study sites, there were other
horizontal influences at play which shaped relations and interactions in health
partnership at a local level. These are explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 - Horizontal relations - balancing the costs and
benefits
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the factors influencing the formation and maintenance of
horizontal relations in health partnership. It focuses on the influence of the inner or
local context in which HImP and HAZ partnerships were created. It draws on Resource
Dependency Theory (RDT) as a framework to explore the motivational factors driving
relationships and to explain the degree of involvement of local organisations in HImP
and HAZ partnerships. In so doing, it seeks to address my second research question:
what was the nature of local horizontal relations and what factors were perceived to be
influential in driving and shaping local health partnership? This chapter begins to build
the foundation of an assessment of partnership as co-ordination, collaboration or
participation.
RDT is primarily focused around inter-organisational resources exchange. As HImP and
HAZ partnerships were set up either to manage additional resources or influence the
direction of local resource allocation in favour of health and reduction in inequalities, it
was an appropriate theory to explore horizontal relations. It can also accommodate the
influence of vertical relations (although these are covered in more detail in the
preceding chapter).
RDT assumes that no organisation is able to generate all the resources it needs to
achieve its goals (Hall 1996). Organisations, therefore, seek resources possessed by
other organisations and will exchange resources to obtain those which they require as
long as this does not threaten their interests or autonomy (Oliver 1991). The degree of
interaction with the other organisations depends on the degree of need and the lack of
alternative resources (Scharpf 1978; David and Zakus 1998). Through interaction and
exchange, organisations form dependencies on one another for resources. The symmetry
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or asymmetry of these dependencies, in part related to an organisation's resource base,
is theorised as important in determining the degree of involvement and nature of
relationships in partnership (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988). RDT assumes that actors are
motivated by self-interest and are making an assessment of the value of inter-
organisational interaction.
This chapter shows that respondents were making cost-benefit calculations and that
these were influenced by the availability of resources and the perceived impact of
partnership on organisational/actor's interests. Respondents from all sites and sectors
identified a number of different issues that shaped and influenced the perceived costs
and benefits. The relative weight of these 'factors' in their cost-benefit calculation
appeared to be dependent on each actor's own perceptions about the relevance of the
health partnership agenda to them, in turn dependent on whether they held a broad,
systems view of health or a narrow 'biomedical' view. Calculations were also sensitive
to the resource environment of respective organisations and the size of their resource
base. Thus, actors appeared to make a complex assessment of cost-benefit of
involvement in partnership.
Part I of this chapter begins by examining the perceived resource costs of partnership as
well as the perceived potential benefits. It shows that actors were very aware of the
costs and benefits of participating in, as well as of developing the structure and of
managing the process of partnership. Part II focuses on the factors that influence actors'
assessment of the potential costs of partnership, in terms of resources or threats to
organisational interests, or benefits of involvement. Four factors are considered: the
national agenda; local boundaries and politics; professional perspectives and
organisational practices; and resource base and dependencies. The role of key
individuals is also explored. These findings are then considered in relation to the
assumptions of RDT, although the dynamic interaction of factors is explored in the next
chapter.
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In RDT no organisation is considered to have all the resources it needs. Organisations
enter into exchange relations with other organisations in order to survive. This assumes
actors are mindful of the resources available through exchange as well as costs
associated with inter-organisational relations. Rational, self-interested actors will
voluntarily establish relations where benefits are perceived to exceed costs.
The government policy agenda, through the use of command and control mechanisms,
actively developed HImP partnerships. Although it placed a duty on some statutory
organisations to be involved, it did not specify the structure or degree of involvement.
Involvement of other organisations, like that for all partners in HAZ partnerships, was
voluntary. The degree of involvement, according to RDT, is dependent on their
assessment of resource costs and benefits associated with health partnership. Were such
considerations on the minds of actors, including those with a duty to be involved? And
what resources were being considered? This Part of Chapter 4 begins by noting that
respondents were almost universally aware of resources involved in partnership. It then
identifies some of the commonly identified costs associated with partnership as well as
the potential benefits of involvement. Finally, it reflects on the assumptions ofRDT.
4.2 Resource implications of partnership
There was almost universal recognition amongst interviewees from all sectors and study
sites that engaging in partnership had resource implications for their organisation.
Resources were required not only to get involved or manage partnership but in some
instances for exchange or use in accomplishing the partnership's agenda. Types of
resource included human (such as officer time), finance and information. Partnership
needed resources to develop. Aside from those required to set up the structural systems
and governance mechanisms (such as monitoring and evaluation structures), it required
considerable resources for involving or consulting the voluntary sector or community.
The next sections consider the costs in more detail.
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4.2. J Resource costs of participating in partnership
Many of the resources used, especially time, and more intangible resources such as
energy and effort, were hidden, and organisations with small resource bases were
particularly sensitive to these, as we shall see later. One of the greatest burdens was
officer time and officer numbers involved.
Partnership is a time consuming process
Respondents from all sites and sectors acknowledged that partnership required an
enormous amount of time to make progress, both in its cross-sectional and longitudinal
development. Working in partnership was a slow developmental process. The
investment of time was particularly intense in the beginning when the partnership was
being set up and partners were trying to understand the agenda, exploring what to do,
putting together and negotiating plans, but also when it was up and running. Getting
people together, talking about the concept of the HImP, assessing health problems and
finding solutions took a lot of time. Time also had to be dedicated to maintaining the
process of partnership, to building good relations between partners.
"[P]artnerships take time to develop and put in place and you have to allow
that time and that period to let that happen, otherwise you actually do breed
distrust later on." Director, V0
Time was needed to engage partners, to ensure they were listened to and heard, to create
enthusiasm and maintain a vision. Changing peoples' behaviour or approach to work
took time.
This was often under-estimated, the process taking 'longer than you think'. Indeed,
lack of investment of time was considered to undermine the process of partnership and
the quality of decision-making.
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Human resources
Partnership also had significant human resource cost not only in terms of officer time
(used up in the longitudinal development of partnership) but also officer numbers (for
its cross-sectional development)
Sending organisational representatives to attend partnership meetings was time
consuming for officers, especially as the process of decision-making tended to be
slower and more drawn out than conventional mechanisms. Accomplishing the
partnership agenda could also greatly increase the workload of already busy officers.
Strategic health partnerships, such as HAZ and HImPs, specifically involved managers
with wide-ranging roles and commitments, and therefore with very little additional time
to give.
Partnership had the potential to involve a large number of staff. This was a consequence
of the broad health agenda that HAZ and HImP partnerships were set up to tackle - the
large number of programme groups, reflecting the large number of health and social
care priorities set by government. Many partnerships had between 10-20 priority areas,
with up to 60 sub-groups. The sheer number of groups meant that a large number of
staff was involved, although some key individuals were involved in more than one
group. Indeed, as we shall see later, many organisations were struggling to place staff
on appropriate groups.
Staff time and other resources were also required to administer and manage the
partnership, especially those organisations involved in co-ordinating or leading the
process. This included the cost of staff time in writing up minutes and sending out
papers but also more hidden resource costs such as telephone and e-mail costs, faxing,
photocopying of papers, travel costs for partners (especially an issue for the voluntary
sector) and host costs. The large size of the health partnerships magnified this cost
considerably.
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Thus, it was widely recognised across all sites and sectors that not only was the initial
resource cost of establishing partnership high and immediate but there was also a heavy
resource cost associated with on-going engagement in health partnership.
"[I]t's a big process, and for it to work, there needs to be that commitment
of resources so that it, you know, works in a good way." CEO, CHC
Partnership could have direct financial implications for participating organisations, with
money being used to support the process of partnership or its programmes. These
potential costs could have a significant impact on involvement and relations in
partnership, as will be seen later.
However, partnership also had the potential to deliver resource benefit, the term
'resource' being considered in its widest sense.
4.2.2 Resource benefits of participating in partnership
The benefits of health partnership not only included potential tangible benefits such as
access or influence over resources (additional or core) but also less tangible benefits.
Additional resources were primarily available for HAZ partnerships in terms of HAZ
funds. Partnerships could use these to develop creative and innovative projects and
services as well as to support the partnership itself. Meanwhile, there were no specific
funds to support HImP partnerships, except small, ad hoc additional monies ring-fenced
for specific health service developments (see Chapter 3). One site, however, did allocate
former JF monies to its HImP partnership, despite no obligation.
Additional money was perceived to be about adding value, allowing organisations to
develop projects or services in new ways. In Greenshire, for example, additional monies
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to the HlmP were reported to have enabled the MH and OP partnership groups to take a
broader and more preventative perspective.
Financial resources were also provided by central government via SS through the carers,
partnership or prevention grants. The availability of additional resources is outlined in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Availability of additional resources in each case study site for
1999/2000
Middleton N/A £0.97million (Joint Finance")
£1.3 million (Health Inequality adjustment)
ures for 1999/00 from HSC. ance allocations were incorporated
into the unified resource allocation and not distinguished as a separate item.
2HAZfunding. Overall there was £30 million for HAZ for 1999/2000 (HSC 205198). In December
1999, an extra £60 million for HAZs was announced (HSC 243/99).
N/A £2.1 million (Joint Finance'}Greenshire
Metrocity £0.802 million (part of £6.1 £1.7 million (joint Finance")
million over 3 years)
Dalesville £0.922 million (£5.3 million £1.4million (Joint Finance1) plus other
over 3 years) monies
Furthermore, resources were seen as a facilitator for accessing more money like
European funds, even though putting together such bids was resource-intensive in itself.
Working with new sectors (such as the voluntary sector) also increased knowledge and
awareness about the availability of resources in the wider system.
Respondents also identified a number of benefits that related to relationships between
partners, the process of partnership and process outcomes (even though some
respondents found these more abstract benefits of partnership more difficult to assess).
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Partnership did not only result in improved relations between organisations but also
increased awareness of other organisations in the wider environment. Partnership,
through its structure, had brought together and developed relations between
organisations that hitherto were unaware of each other's existence, raising an
organisation's profile.
Partnership increased mutual understanding of partners, their approaches to work and
the constraints they faced. It helped individuals appreciate what was driving people in
other organisations and, in some cases, had opened their HA' s eyes as to what could be
done in terms of the poverty agenda in other organisations. Increased awareness of how
different systems worked was important when tackling 'hard issues', enabling partners
to be clear about each other's role and responsibilities and helping to avoid
misunderstanding.
In Greenshire, partners developed a project to increase their access to NHS information.
The development of joint planning structures also facilitated partners' access to
sensitive financial information. This in tum, through the process of partnership, had
brought changes in attitudes and understanding of other actors and organisations,
changing perspectives and scope of work, enabling new solutions to traditional
problems. Similarly, organisations working in partnership were forced to think about
winter pressures and intermediate care in wider terms than just service provision,
leading to better services.
Partnership improved co-ordination of services between agencies and created
efficiencies. It also enabled organisations to identify issues in common, referring
contacts with similar interests to one another. Pulling work together into one place,
despite having the potential to increase officer workload, could reduce the number of
meetings, saving work. Indeed, some respondents argued that using partnership to
allocate resources was more efficient than deploying resources in isolation. In this way,
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it could build on existing HA and SS services rather than duplicating or developing new
ones in isolation.
Generally, there was an expectation that the work of health partnerships would be
translated into activity at a strategic level beyond talk of policy ideas or theoretical
issues. However, there was widespread recognition amongst respondents that many of
the benefits of partnership would take at least 2 to 3 years to be realised.
"You accept that partnership working is difficult at first, takes time, but
eventually will have pay-offs for your organisation, and more importantly,
the people that you're serving." Manager, peG
For some officers, benefits were also contingent on the early investment of resources
(time, money and effort) in partnership. For partnership to enter a productive phase,
partners had to invest time talking to one another and sharing ideas. Several
interviewees commented, therefore, that it was still too early to assess whether
partnership was delivering benefits.
However, not everyone saw value in partnership. It was a challenge for some officers to
recognise that letting go of their 'old role' and working collectively could bring
benefits. Others were unsure whether the benefits would filter down into the
organisation. Thus, although there were some direct, tangible benefits available for
participation in health partnerships in terms of access to resources, other resource
benefits were more abstract and dependent on the process of partnership.
4.2.3 Summary of resource costs and benefits of partnership
Establishing, maintaining and developing partnership was very resource-consuming. An
array of resource costs were mentioned by almost all interviewees, from all sites and
sectors and recognised as immediate and on-going. The resource benefits of partnership
could be concrete where additional funds were available or less tangible where they
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related to improved inter-organisational relationships, awareness and perspective and
potential outcomes. There was differing awareness of the more intangible benefits.
Furthermore, there was widespread recognition that the benefits of partnership were
contingent on some initial resource investment and would also take time to realise. In
HImP partnerships at least, the more abstract resource benefits of partnership were
easily overshadowed by the immediate and direct costs of involvement.
RDT argues that organisations seek resources they need from other organisations as
long as it does not threaten their interests. Actors are assumed to calculate whether entry
into partnership will increase access to resources or threaten their interests. The
potential benefits of partnership have to be weighed up against the costs of involvement,
the implication being that where benefits are perceived to outweigh costs, actors will
engage in partnership, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, this trade-off was not
straightforward. Respondents from all sectors and sites identified a number of factors
that impinged on their assessment of the potential resource benefits of health
partnership as well as potential costs or threats to organisational interests. This part of
the chapter explores how these factors influenced perceptions of benefits and costs of
partnership. It identifies five factors that appear to be influential: national policy agenda,
local structures and organisational boundaries, professional and organisational culture,
key individuals, and resource base and dependencies. These factors are presented in
Figure 4.1, which also shows how they combined to influence an actor's decision over
whether or not to get involved in partnership. How factors combined is explored in
depth in Chapter 5.
4.3 National policy agenda and reforms, structures and boundaries
This section explores how the national agenda and national structures were influential in
shaping actors' perceptions about the resource costs or their interest in participating in
health partnership.
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Figure 4.1. Factors that shape actors' assessment of resource costs and benefits of
partnership, influencing their degree of involvement in partnership.
Combined assessment of
resource benefits and cost
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Mandatory participation
The government's reforms not only promoted health partnership but also placed a duty
on NHS organisations to work in partnership. The Health Act 1999 mandated HAs,
Trusts and PCGs to work in partnership, primarily in the HImP, a strategic health
partnership. However, although the government signalled in policy documents that it
intended to place a duty of partnership on LAs, it did not become a legal requirement
until the Local Government Act was approved by parliament in July 2000. The
involvement of statutory organisations such as CHCs, probation, universities etc and the
voluntary sector was not obligatory. With the exception of HAs, the government did not
specify how and where partners should be involved in HImP partnerships. Thus, there
was wide scope for variation in terms of the level and degree of engagement by
organisations in HlmP partnerships. Involvement in HAZ partnerships, meanwhile, was
voluntary for all organisations.
Resource benefits of participation
The national policy agenda also determined some of the potential benefits of engaging
in partnership. In HImP partnerships, there were no additional resources to support their
development and, initially at least, no funds to support their programme of work. In the
third year, 'new' Modernisation and Performance Funds monies were identified for
programmes but solely for health service priorities. Availability was through a bidding
process. However, the HlmP strategy was conceived by government as a framework to
drive commissioning towards improving health and reducing inequalities. In theory at
least, HImPs provided an opportunity to influence resource allocation in the health
service, if not in other organisations or sectors. The flexibilities and freedoms in the
Health Act 2000 even allowed for partners to pool budgets or hand over budgetary
control of commissioning or management of funds to other organisations in areas of
joint work.
However, as the HImP partnerships developed into their second year, it became clear
that resource allocation was not linked to HImP strategies in study sites or beyond
[Field Notes - HDA]. The SaFF and JIP work were outside or on the margins of HlmP
partnerships.
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The influence of HlmP partnerships over partner organisations' resources was also
diminished by the lack of synchronicity between the SaFF and HlmP planning
processes as well as with other organisational process, as noted in Chapter 3. Thus, the
HImP provided limited opportunity to access extra resources or influence allocation of
health service resources or those of other organisations.
While engagement in HImP partnerships had the potential to consume organisational
resources, as noted in Part I, there were no additional resources to support these
partnerships. Although moving JF into mainstream budgets enabled these monies to be
used to support voluntary sector involvement in HImP partnerships and, in some sites,
fund a co-ordinator, these were not 'new' resources. Furthermore, they were considered
insufficient by some HAs, which resorted to asking HImP partners for more money.
By contrast, HAZ partnerships were a source of additional resources. Funds were
available to support the partnership process and fund creative and innovative projects
and services. They could not only help offset some of the cost of developing and
maintaining partnership but could also provide access to flexible (non ring-fenced)
resources. In a resource-scarce environment, this could be considered a significant
incentive to participate. Indeed, it was sufficient for some partners to come together in
the first place to prepare joint bids to access these funds, mainly HAs and LAs.
However, the resource costs of participating in partnership still had to be borne by
participating organisations.
Access to additional resources - an incentive to engage?
The availability of additional resources did provide an incentive for respondents from
all sectors to engage in HAZ and HImP partnerships.
"If we hadn't have had money then I don't know, it's hard to know how
attractive we [HAZ and the health agenda] might have been seen by the
local authority." Assistant Director, Older People's Service, HA
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Additional monies were attractive to partners because they allowed organisations to
'pump prime' or develop new, innovative projects, change programme delivery or fast-
track existing policy initiatives.
"[W]hat the HAZ has done is it helps keep it [health partnership/joint
working] on the agenda and it brings some resources to assist us." Assistant
Director, LA
Flexible additional resources were particularly attractive (Le. non ring-fenced). Not only
could they be used to employ a partnership co-ordinator and support the involvement of
the voluntary sector but they could also act as a 'liberator', enabling organisations to
address issues in new ways, without worrying about financial boundaries (i.e. between
health or social services). Indeed, the infusion of HAZ money into the CHD group in
Metrocity, it was reported, had provided impetus to a flagging NSF group.
On the other hand, some organisations did not see the point of engaging in partnership
that did not have additional resources attached.
"If we don't have a small amount of money to do things in partnership,
people quite easily get disenchanted and see it as just a talking shop. Very
cynical, 'what impact are we making?' ... 'we never get to change
anything?'" Head ofHP, LA
For some actors, however, the additional funds (including HAZ monies), although
welcome, were considered too small to impact significantly on the public health (PH)
agenda.
"[T]his is a huge agenda and it needs proper resourcing at a corporate
strategic level in order to make it happen." Assistant Director, LA
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Funds were 'small beer', representing only a tiny fraction of large statutory
organisations' budgets (see Table 4.2). The relatively small funding contributed to the
partnerships repackaging and recycling old initiatives rather than taking more radical
approaches.
Table 4.2. Additional funding (£ million) for tackling health inequalities (HAZ
funding and special allocations) as a percentage of total budget by site for
2001102.
Budget (with adjustments) 239 365 464 391
Health Inequalities allocations 1.11 3.42 0 3.22
(HAZlspecific allocations)
HAs % of budget 0.4% 0.9% 0 0.8%
Non HAl adjustment for deprived areas
2HAl funding
Furthermore, additional funds were short-term (approximately 3 years). This
undermined the use of funds supporting VS involvement or service developments
(beyond capital purchases) as the lack of continuity in funding posed a threat to the
stability of mainstream budgets.
"[S]ome of it's not all that useful because it's not recurrent money and very
difficult to spend without considering the revenue implications in the long
term, and that's a real difficulty." Assistant DPH
Additional resources could also come with 'red tape' attached. As noted in Chapter 3,
HAZ monies generated additional bureaucracy as partnerships were required to submit
detailed monitoring and evaluation statements on resource expenditure to the centre.
Heavy central control requirements could also undermine the quality of decisions as
partnerships were under pressure to spend funds. Under such pressure, decisions about
allocation could disproportionately occupy the agenda as agencies vied to secure their
preferences, distracting the partnership away from its purpose. Thus, the attractiveness
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of additional resources could be reduced by the size and recurrence of funds and the
conditions and degree of central control attached to them.
Cost of partnership in a resource-scarce environment
As noted in Chapter 3, by adhering to the previous administration's spending plans, the
government maintained a resource-scarce environment for statutory agencies (and for
organisations financially dependent on them). Furthermore, government pressure on the
NHS and LAs to correct outstanding financial deficits increased pressure on budgets.
HAs and LAs were operating within tight financial limits or with 'massive budget
problems'.
"[W]e [the HA] were working in a period where we were facing significant
financial constraints, and so the message was, 'well there is no development
at all', and we may even have to cut back existing services." Director of
Strategy and Performance Management, HA
The government also set the level of management and administration resources
available to support the development of peGs. These were widely regarded as
insufficient (Wright 2001). NHS Trusts had also seen resources to support management
cut by government. Thus, human resources were also under pressure in these
organisations.
However, at the same time as creating a resource-scarce environment, the government
was pushing the implementation of its large policy reforms. It set tight deadlines for
implementation and put pressure on the NHS and LAs to deliver the modernisation
agenda, including meeting health service process targets.
"The principal problem has been the capacity of the organisation to support
the process in the timescale that's available." ADPH
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Organisations were not only expected to implement reforms in their own organisations
but also to work in partnership to deliver a local health strategy. This was also in
addition to existing duties required of statutory organisations.
There were conflicting resource demands and pressures on HA, LA, Trusts and PCGs,
between those required for partnership and those required to achieve wider
organisational reforms. As a consequence, partners were forced not only to prioritise
how much human resource they gave to partnership (officer numbers and time) but also
which activities they were to focus on in partnership.
"I'd like to be able to be more involved. But there's only so many hours in a
day, and there's only so many things you can actually fit." Manager, CHC
Officers, for example, had to weigh up the time and resource costs of attending
meetings against the benefits of participating.
The lack of resources also impacted on the ability of organisations to exchange funds.
"[T]he budgetary constraints that we've got [LA], partly of our own making
and partly of government's making, doesn't allow easy movement of money
from one organisation to another, and where it happens is quite unusual."
Neighbourhood Director, LA
Influence of performance management and must dos
To ensure delivery of its agenda, the government imposed a performance management
regime on statutory organisations. Poor performance carried the threat of loss of
resources or organisational autonomy.
As noted in Chapter 3, performance management was initially focused on the whole
reform agenda. However at the beginning of the study the focus in the NHS began to
shift towards emphasising the delivery of health service priorities and modernisation
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agenda. Close monitoring and tight control over additional resources created insularity
in statutory organisations. They became increasingly inward looking, concerned with
getting on with their own agenda, rather than accomplishing an inter-organisational
agenda.
For the NHS, health service priorities were around waiting lists, winter pressures and
A&E, particularly for Trusts, while LAs were 'dancing to a different tune'. Besides their
duties to produce various community plans, LAs were being pressured by the DETR to
implement the Best Value regime and other modernisation reforms.
Under such pressures, different organisations had different perceptions about the
importance of the health partnership agenda. Furthermore, as the nature of the agenda
was about long-term health improvement, individuals tended to respond to more
immediate concerns such as the reforms related to modernisation. With the exception of
PH departments, health partnership was beginning to play second fiddle to other
organisational reforms.
"[W]hen resources are tight, people move back into meeting their own
bottom lines, and the HImP is only a bottom line really for the Health
Authority." DPH
In striving to fulfil these reforms, limited human and financial resources were directed
into other activities besides health partnerships, undermining their development. As the
Head of Planning in an Acute Trust noted:
"HlmP-related matters [...] I have to say, that it is not at the top of my list of
priorities [...] and some of the softer stuff around developing relationships
probably suffers because we view that we've got other priorities that are
more pressing."
Thus, HlmP partnerships were bound by a 'cost-time quality', in which time and human
resource considerations were driving the level of involvement.
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Internal re-organisation
Another factor that made organisations very internally focused was internal re-
organisation. Such reforms distracted some organisations' attention and further limited
the resources available for partnership.
A number of LA departments in all sites were undergoing or had just undergone re-
organisation, primarily SS and housing. These were either as a direct consequence of
the on-going resource-scarce environment, or national and local (political) pressures for
financial propriety, poor service performance (children's services, Middleton) or
government policy (i.e. on devolving housing services).
"[S]ocial services is overspent and it has to save money." Non-Executive
Director, V0
"We've actually, because of financial problems, reorganised this section."
Director of SS
This section has shown how the national context set the parameters in which the
resource implications of engaging in partnership were assessed. National policy set the
resources that were available for those entering into partnership as well as influencing
the environment in which the costs of engaging in partnership were weighed up. Some
flexible funding was available as an incentive to get involved in partnership, although
this became less flexible as the government shifted towards a health service-orientated
agenda. The creation of strategic health partnerships also presented a potential
opportunity to influence local resource allocation. However, the government also
created a policy agenda in which statutory organisations faced significant, multiple
reforms, with limited resources to undertake the reforms. This placed competing
demands on resources. The government also used performance management to drive
change, with potentially serious sanctions for poor performing organisations. This
combination of national constraints significantly influenced actors' interpretation of the
costs associated with engaging in partnership in comparison with the costs of not
fulfilling other pressing demands. As it will be shown in Chapter 5, the degree of
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organisational involvement in partnership (and behaviour) appeared to reflect these
calculative assessments of the benefits and costs of partnership. However, there were
other factors at play that appeared to impinge on actors' assessment of the resource
implications of partnership. These were related to the local rather than national context.
4.3.1 Local structures, organisational boundaries and local polities
This section reviews the influence of local organisational structures and boundaries and
local politics on the degree of engagement in health partnership. It explores how these
factors influenced the assessment of the potential costs and benefits of partnership and
the impact on organisational involvement in health partnership, particularly for local
authorities, where politics, politicians and resources have a key role.
First this section considers how local structures and boundaries define or influence
organisational interests. Then it considers how these interests mayor may not be
represented in strategic health partnership. Finally, it explores how political interests or
resources may be threatened by partnership, as it often requires some loss of
organisational autonomy and control over resources.
Local structural and boundaries shape organisational interests
Interviewees from all four sites recognised that communities or locations within each
site had different identities. These identities reflected different socio-economic and
demographic characteristics and were particularly diverse in rural sites. Rural sites (and
urban sites) had a mixture of rural and urban communities with varying degrees of
affluence and poverty. Some were based on traditional but declining manufacturing
industries (Dalesville) whilst others were based around market towns or agriculture
(Greenshire). Different areas also had shrinking or stable populations, and different
ethnic or age structures. As a consequence, there were very different social and
economic problems within short distances and correspondingly different issues or
problems which impacted on health within districts (such as bad housing stock, poor
educational attainment, low wages).
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"What the problems are in [Greenshire Town] a fairly compact urban area
are totally different from out in the rural areas." CEO, LA
Thus, within a health district there could be different health problems located within a
particular organisational boundary. Organisations could have very different approaches
to their work and consequently very different agendas or interests.
"What we had was in effect four different local authority situations, if you
like, and significantly different communities, the interests of [these
authorities] are very different." CEO, HA
The most common organisational boundary to create difficulty or tension was local
government, although differing PCG, Trust, Police and the voluntary sector boundaries
could all be significant. In rural sites in particular, organisations were more likely to
represent divergent interests as the LA structure and the communities represented were
more fragmented (rural study sites contained a mixture of unitary, district and county
councils) while the number of NHS organisations tended to be greater to ensure access
over larger areas. By contrast, coterminous authorities could unite the interests of
heterogeneous communities under one organisational roof.
"We've got coterminosity between the two organisations [HA and LA].
That's a huge advantage compared to those where health authorities try to
deal with five different councils, all with their own separate agendas and
political leanings." Manager, Environmental Health
However, as will be shown later, differing organisational interests could be overcome
by key individuals or by strong political leadership.
Strategic and local priorities
Strategic health partnerships such as the HImP were set up to take a district, even
regional, view of health issues or problems. However, apart from some coterminous
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locations, health partnerships inevitably involved more than one LA and many NHS and
voluntary sector organisations, each with their own local priorities or issues.
While some issues or problems were suited to consideration at an area-wide level (such
as learning and physical disabilities services and some acute services, where numbers
were relatively small), others were better considered at a local level (i.e. older peoples'
services). Furthermore, some issues were specific to a locale and not identified in an
area-wide strategy. Indeed, the more LA and peG boundaries, the more divergent local
and strategic agendas became.
Dealing with many different vested interests influenced the structural design of
partnership (especially HImPs) and the approach to the health agenda. How different
local and area-wide or strategic priorities were identified and accommodated in health
partnership, particularly in rural sites where organisations were representing very
different agendas, also had important implications for the degree of organisational
involvement in partnership. Organisations whose local interests were not represented on
the strategic agenda found it more difficult to justify their involvement to constituents.
The benefit of involvement was less easy to justify while the costs of involvement were
still present.
In Dalesville, for example, a pan-LA health and social care partnership was set to
improve cross boundary working and moderate the influence of multiple interests. To
tackle the wider determinants, separate health partnerships were established in each of
the three LA areas so as to enable a greater locality focus and encourage greater senior
officer engagement.
Local politics and politicians
For some organisations, representing the issues and interests of their local populations
or communities was particularly important. This was the case for local authorities (and
to a lesser degree voluntary organisations). Unlike HAs and other NHS partners, LAs
are not just organisational but political systems. LA members are elected to represent
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the interests of their communities and have the power to set policy and sanction activity
and resource allocation in their organisation. Members are also accountable to their
communities for the LA's actions.
There was widespread recognition by interviewees that local politics and politicians
were an important element when considering LA involvement in partnership. The
support of councillors was considered crucial by many LA officers, if a partnership was
to make decisions on strategic development of services or decisions with financial
implications.
"[S]witching mainstream resources into health inequalities work ... there
needs to be a political will to make that happen within the council because
it's the councillors quite rightly who decide where the money goes."
Neighbourhood Director, LA
The commitment of politicians to the health partnership agenda was important In
ensuring organisational commitment and, therefore, officer involvement.
"[T]he members have to sign up to be in a HlmP and, if they've decided
they didn't want to be in a HlmP, you know, we're not essentially a
partner." Policy Officer, LA
This was recognised in all case study sites and, although councillors were only directly
involved in one HAZ partnership (Metrocity), their indirect involvement was the subject
of discussions in other sites.
The political commitment of councillors was in part dependent on either their or their
party's views on health and partnership. The political 'colour' of a LA and their
sympathy or antipathy towards the national government and its policies could influence
the degree of involvement in and commitment to the health partnership agenda,
although these affiliations did not always follow party lines.
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Changing political fortunes could also be disruptive to officer involvement as an
incoming party's manifesto may have different views on or significant implications for
involvement in health partnership. This was the case in three of the study sites.
"[W]e've now got a leader of the council, who is no friend of ours, or hasn't
been in the past, he's been leader of the council since the beginning of May,
and every message he's given out is very positive about wanting to build
links, and working in partnership with the [voluntary] sector. And that's an
incredible sea change from him, and probably an incredible sea change from
a lot of other councillors who are now involved in [the] management of the
city councils" Director, VO
In Metrocity, for example, a pledge to reduce council tax by the incoming party not only
had resource implications for the LA but also for organisations dependent on its largesse
(i.e. the voluntary sector). This increased both sectors' sensitivity to the costs of
involvement. Conversely, a party or politician in favour of partnership could increase
tolerance of the costs.
Since rural study sites had a greater number of LAs, they were more likely to have
differing political perspectives as well as to undergo political change. Where
perspectives were antagonistic, this could create tension as differences in interests had
to be resolved for partnership to progress. Moreover, it was not just whether councillors
were in favour of health partnership that influenced their involvement. Councillors had
different priorities and pressures, apart from committing their organisations to engage in
health partnership. These included ensuring the LA fulfilled its statutory duties but also
responding to the concerns of their constituents.
Organisational engagement in health partnership could threaten local political interests
(individual or organisational) in a number of ways. Three in particular emerged from the
analysis of interviews. These relate to the loss of organisational autonomy; political
'bottom lines' or manifesto commitments, democratic role and control over resources.
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Bottom lines
First, it was in the interests of all councillors to get re-elected. Anything that threatened
this 'bottom line' could be politically difficult to support. Unfulfilled pledges or activity
that diverted organisational resources away from manifesto commitments could be
untenable.
"[There's more votes in dustbins than in elderly people services, and even
less in the HlmP. There's no votes in it for city councillors ... the new leader
of the council got in on the promise to clean up the city.]" CEO, Acute Trust
Furthermore, the issues tackled in health partnership could be politically unpopular,
such as the opening of a new mental health facility or the repositioning or re-
organisation of an Acute Trust or its services, as witnessed in two of the case study
sites.
"[The] policy agenda is set by our members, which may be at variance with
partner members' agenda...working through that obviously creates major
problems. [The] community hospitals issue, over the past two or three years,
I think has been a major problem." Director, SS
Democratic role
Second, the presence of a health partnership which actively engaged the voluntary
sector threatened some councillors who feared it might undermine their democratic role
as representatives of the community. Indeed, in two sites councillors had obstructed
voluntary sector or community development projects, believing it was the role of
members to be the voice of local people. In Dalesville:
"W]e had begun to do some work around community development. As it got
started there was a big hoo-ha by the councillors in that area, because they
felt that the [... ] community development work was beginning to take over
the job of a councillor in that patch. What that actually meant was that we
couldn't get that piece of work off the ground at all." DPH
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In Metrocity there was tension between the councillors and the community
representatives group on the HAZ partnership and the legitimacy of both parties to
represent the community was debated.
"[I]f there's a sticking point and this happened in the earliest days of the
[community representative's] group more so, it would be local councillors
saying, we represent the community, where's your democratic
accountability?" Director, VO
Resource control - autonomy and opportunity costs
Third, engaging in partnership was an opportunity resource cost. Involvement required
the use and commitment of resources such as officer time and administration costs (at a
minimum). However, some councillors had different priorities for the core budgets,
which did not necessarily relate to the health agenda. If councillors were not 'signed up'
to health partnership, it could be difficult for them to commit organisational resources
away from other areas to support its development.
Even in LAs where councillors were on the whole supportive of the health partnership,
financial concerns about the resources required for active participation (officer time) or
overall levels of budgets could compromise the degree of their engagement.
"[W]e've actually now got a local authority that is in some considerable
financial issues, so we're in those sorts of situations, they won't easily be
coming to their table to pool budgets, because they've got to manage their
own financial problems through." DPH
Involvement in partnership was also hindered by fears about the loss of control over
resources, even though it might improve the strategic planning across organisations and
reduce duplication. Councillors found it difficult to work in partnership, particularly if it
involved sharing budgets and using new freedoms.
"[Y]ou're not likely to lose the Community Care Plan, because councillors
aren't going to want to relinquish the power and control they have over
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spending within social services, and so, to sort of put all that into the HImP,
which appears to be a health authority-owned strategy, is probably a step too
far for many councillors." Director, va
In LAs under financial pressure (in most sites), councillors were more prone to
prioritise work on core activities rather than those of partnership, even if they were
supportive of the health partnership agenda and could see its benefits. A number of
officers noted that the cost of involvement had become an increasing concern; too many
resources were going into meetings without evidence of any outcome.
This section has shown how local structures and boundaries as well as local politics can
sensitise officers or councillors to the costs of health partnership, especially when
involvement is not perceived to be in their or their organisation's interest. In rural sites,
many strategic issues were not considered to be relevant to local organisations and their
constituents. In this scenario, the benefits of engaging in partnership are less obvious.
LAs in particular were sensitive to the cost of partnership, as these organisations were at
the behest of local politicians and their interests. Health partnership could involve the
loss of financial autonomy, their role as elected representatives and, ultimately, of their
power. This was a price too high to bear for some politicians. For other politicians with
a sympathetic view toward health partnership, this was less of a concern as the benefits
were more readily understood. The role of an actor's attitude to, or understanding of
health and partnership when making an assessment of the costs and benefits of health
partnership is considered next.
4.3.2 Attitude to health andpartnership
This section examines the attitudes and perspectives of individuals and organisations
towards health and partnership. It explores how an actor's perception of health and
partnership was fundamental to the calculus of resource benefits or costs/threats to
interests posed by health partnership. An individual's attitude framed how the other
factors identified in Figure 4.1 were interpreted or weighted and, therefore, could alter
the balance of the calculation in favour or against involvement.
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Attitudes to health and partnership could be loosely categorised into two camps. The
broad, systems view of health and partnership and the narrow, biomedical self-
interested perspective.
Systems versus a narrow view of health
The systems view recognised health in its broadest sense as physical, mental and social
well-being and not just the absence of disease. In this model, health was determined by
a multitude of interconnected social factors that went beyond the health system.
"[The] major determinants of health actually aren't to do with medicine, but
are to do with other things." Director, VO
As such the task of improving health requires actors to recognise the contribution other
organisations can make and that actions by other organisations can have positive or
negative consequences for health.
"[P]eople often have complex needs and they transcend organisational
boundaries and how are we going to address that, because we're [... ] trying
to improve the health of those individuals, and we have to have a
perspective that enables us to do that." HlmP Co-ordinator
Actors with this perspective see solutions to health problems as beyond their own
organisation and in relation to the population. They are also more likely to be
considered as altruistic - acting beyond the call of duty, for the general good. This view
sits naturally with partnership as a way of working. Partnership can be considered a
mechanism for bringing different actors or stakeholders together to tackle difficult,
complex and inter-related social problems (Gray 1989).
Indeed, government literature on partnership emphasised this perspective through the
promotion of 'Whole Systems Thinking' as a tool to implement its policy agenda.
Health partnership guidance also emphasised the need to ensure that 'all stakeholders
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are actively engaged at key stages in the annual planning, monitoring and delivery
processes' (DoH 1999f).
By contrast, the narrow or 'biomedical model' sees health as the presence of disease or
illness. Social factors are not considered as relevant or as important as those relating to
the individual, and, therefore, the interdependence of factors is not recognised. Actors
considering how to improve health look to organisations delivering health care for
solutions. Improvement of an individual's health comes through the patronage of
medical clinicians.
While the majority of interviewees in all sites directly echoed the systems view of
health, many gave reports of colleagues from their own or other organisations who held
a more narrow, biomedical perspective. Indeed, differing views of health and
partnership appeared to closely parallel the different professional make-up or cultural
perspectives of different sectors and organisations. This is explored in the next section.
Differing professional views of health
There were a number of professions that were brought together in HImP and HAZ
partnerships. Actors from the health service could represent a number of professional
groups (medics, nursing, health visitors, PH and health promotion (HP» at both
management or operational level. Similarly, there were a number of professional groups
operating in local government within the different departments such as SS, education,
housing and environmental health (EH). Different professional groups held different
qualifications and had different career paths and structures which recognised and
validated different ways of working. Although professionalism provided specialist
knowledge, it also led to people reproducing their own worlds, preventing them from
seeing beyond these or relating to work outside their own area of interest or expertise.
As a consequence, different professions had different perceptions, values and
experiences which shaped their understanding of health and the need for partnership
(Hudson 2002).
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In statutory organisations, for example, many professionals focused on service-based
issues rather than incorporating user/carer perspectives or considering how an issue
might relate to the wider determinants of health, prevention or the local community.
"We operate in boxes, and we operate without thinking of the way, of how
delivering services affects local communities." Director, Community Trust
Some professional training, for example, often did not consider how to work m
partnership with other agencies.
"[It] you've trained as a housing officer [... ] you don't necessarily know
how to work in partnership with people from other organisations, and you
certainly don't necessarily know how to involve the community in your
work." HP officer, HA
In the health service, the medical profession was widely perceived to be the dominant
profession with high status, particularly in Acute Trusts, Mental Health Trusts and
PCGs.
"I think the acute service is quite peculiar in a way, because of the
dominance of the medical profession in the acute sector. It's even more
dominant than elsewhere in the health service." Director, SS
The medical profession tended to view health within the biomedical framework, and
prevention was secondary to their thinking. This perspective also permeated some HA
departments.
However, lower status groups working in HAs, such as PH and HP professionals,
tended to hold a broader, systems based, 'social' model of health in which a population
perspective and community involvement were considered important. Most individuals
in PH and HP departments considered the partnership approach as central to their work,
although some were slow to recognise this.
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In LAs, there was a mixture of perspectives on health and partnership which varied
between and within departments. The social care profession was dominant, particularly
when considering issues relating to health. The social model of health resonated with
their professional perspective (non-paternalistic and socially constructed). This group
had higher status than other professions such as housing and EH, which also tended
towards social models of health, although less than public health professionals (Hudson
2002). There was more of a culture of working with the voluntary sector than health
service organisations, which were more closed and less likely to share information. In
SS in particular, boundaries to working in partnership with the voluntary sector had
started to come down. Education, however, was still resistant to working in partnership.
In the voluntary sector, although no one professional grouping was identifiable, the
dominant perspective was a systems view of health and partnership. However, working
in partnership was considered more a cultural facet of being generally small
organisations with limited resources.
"[W]e've always had to work in partnership otherwise we wouldn't have
survived." Director, VD
Indeed, some in the voluntary sector saw themselves as the embodiment of partnership
in that they were often constituted by networks of organisations and worked in a co-
operative and consensus-orientated fashion, as did some other small organisations such
CHCs. This contrasted markedly with large statutory organisations which were more
hierarchical. However, even in the voluntary sector elements of the narrow biomedical
perspective could permeate organisational thinking.
"The medical model of care is [... ] a paternalistic model of care i.e. the
professional knows best. It's not something that is just part of health service
mentality, it can also be part of the voluntary sector." Director of PCC,
Community Trust
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These differing perspectives on health and partnership were not static in each sector but
changing and evolving, partly in response to the national agenda but also as a result of
the educational efforts of HAs in all sites.
How did these different perspectives of health and partnership, propagated by different
professional groups, influence the degree of engagement or involvement in partnership?
This is considered next.
Professions' views of health, partnership and involvement
Different professional perspectives could lead individuals to categorise the work of
health partnership as relevant or not to their work, and therefore influence their
willingness to get involved. Thus, involvement appeared weak from departments,
organisations or individuals that did not identify with or see the relevance of the health
partnership to their work or organisational agenda (i.e. those with a more narrow,
biomedical model of health), especially if no additional money was available (as in
HImPs).
"[The] initial problem [was] why should we give up our time and resources
to help you achieve your objectives. So it was... 'oh but the health authority
should be doing that', whereas in fact the health authority does very little to
promote health and prevent disease." Manager, HP
In LAs, those individuals or departments who understood the health partnership agenda
through a history of working on health or in health and social care partnerships (Le.
joint commissioning or Healthy City partnerships) such as SS and EH could identify
with the agenda and were keen to be involved.
However, even in these departments where health was a more recognisable concern,
partnership was still a lower priority than for PH or HP departments in the HA.
Achieving the government's modernisation agenda was a greater preoccupation. and
one for which SS were accountable, unlike the health agenda.
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With the exception of PH or HP departments, HAs and Trusts held a narrower view of
health and officers were less keen on getting involved. Trusts, for example, did not see
their role in the wider systems view of population health and were widely reported to be
introverted (focused on accomplishing NHS priorities). Officers struggled to see their
contribution to health partnership.
"[W]here you get the wider determinants of what is health, 1 think [... ] the
medical clinical staff struggle a little bit on what their role is to that."
Manager, PCG
Acute Trusts in particular did not consider the HlmP or HAZ partnerships as important
to their agenda or thought they only had a small role to play. Convincing colleagues of
the relevance of the health agenda was considered an important step in improving
engagement in partnership.
"[H]earts and minds have still to be won, 1 think. People don't see us [in the
HlmP] as a pivotal part of what we're trying to do." Head of Service
Planning, Acute Trust
However, for many from this sector, the opportunity costs of participating were
considered too high.
"[I]f you come especially from a straight medical background, 1 think it's
really hard especially if it's life and death stuff, to be thinking why the devil
am 1 going to a meeting talking about welfare benefits when this person
needs a heart by-pass, this is a waste of my clinical expertise." Assistant
Director of Older People's Services, HA
Similarly, in LA departments besides SS (such as housing and education) many officers
and members saw health as a health service issue. Although this attitude was less
prevalent among senior managers, there were still many members who could not see the
need. Lack of appreciation of their contribution to the health agenda due to a narrow
perspective left some actors confused as to why they had been invited to attend HlmP
partnership meetings.
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"[O]ne representative from housing couldn't work out why he was there at
all, I had to spell that out but I still don't think he quite understands."
Director of Strategy and Performance Management, HA
Even where there was an initial willingness to be involved in partnership, nagging
doubts about the benefits would emerge, particularly when much of the agenda was
perceived to be of little relevance. This was contrasted with the resources (time)
invested.
"Colleagues sometimes from housing and education have found it difficult
to sit through whole meetings when they can only perceive perhaps 2% of it
that they're involved in." Assistant DPH
Even in LA departments with a history of working on health or partnership (i.e. EH)
there were still mixed attitudes, with many officers seeing health only in terms of
enforcement, hygiene and environmental standards. Issues beyond this were a matter for
the health service or ss.
Education departments were particularly reluctant to get involved, considering health as
ss's territory. Although education professionals were not schooled in a particular
perspective on health, historically, education policy was reported to be more interested
in educational standards than inequalities in educational achievement. Many officers
therefore could not see how the health and inequalities agenda was relevant to them.
In the voluntary sector too, there was some lack of understanding about their role in
improving health, even if many voluntary organisations were familiar with the agenda,
and the need to work in partnership. However, as we shall see later, this did not stop
them from trying to engage. A summary of the different health and partnership
perspectives/attitudes generally held by organisations/sectors is presented in Appendix
M on page 402.
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Professional concerns for delivery or action
Understanding the agenda and recognising its relevance to organisational interests was
an important factor in ensuring involvement. However, even if respondents had a
systems view of health partnership, many were still concerned about the practical
outcomes of partnership as well as the costs of participating.
Involvement in partnership could also be undermined by individual scepticism about
whether a partnership could deliver a joint agenda, or its perceived lack of action or
influence over partner organisations. If a partnership was perceived as a 'talking shop'
not delivering action, then the cost of engaging in partnership might be thought to
outweigh the benefits.
Having to work in strategic health partnership was a 'culture shock' for many
individuals in the statutory sector i.e. GPs and LA departments other than SS. Some
service managers saw the portfolio approach to tackling service issues in partnership as
an attack on their profession.
"[It] causes some people great problems because some people see this as
killing off their professionalism." Director, LA
Even when there was verbal agreement over an issue, achieving change to service
provision was difficult. A fixed mindset, cautiousness about changing work boundaries,
fear of losing control or lack of clarity over future roles were reasons cited.
Indeed, taking a broader health perspective could actually threaten a professional's
resource base, particularly for those in the health service.
"If we're going to invest in health, you know, in group [population] health,
we don't invest in the health service." Manager, peG
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On the other hand, there was an acknowledgement that the engagement of professionals
in partnership was a resource in itself, bringing access to different information and
expertise. This could be used to improve services or identify areas of duplication.
"[We] all pulled people together from the NHS, then social services and
housing, and said, how do you view people in other organisations in care of
the elderly [... ] and we found through doing that, that there's a great deal of
similar core work [... ], and we're now looking at can we develop core
competencies for support workers, can we look at common areas of training
for NVQs." Assistant DPH
Partnership could also provide a forum to challenge professional assumptions.
Exploring differences could provide a creative force in tackling difficult issues in ways
that might not have been envisaged before. Indeed, in Collaboration Theory, such
innovation usually forms part of the rationale used to justify the partnership approach
(see Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of this ideal).
"[W]hat the HImP does is make us think about other, slightly less obvious
things that we might not have, you know, been quite so worried about, if it
hadn't been drawn to our attention." Head of Service Planning, Acute Trust
In sum, professional perspectives were a significant factor shaping perceptions of the
value of partnership.
4.3.3 Key individuals or actors
This section examines briefly the role of key individuals in partnership. Although key
individuals did not appear to influence directly other actors' perceptions of health and
partnership, it is through individuals that the balance of the costs and benefits are made,
and consequently, on which their resultant behaviour is based. Individuals who are
charismatic or in a position of authority could, therefore, exert an influence which
shaped the degree of involvement of their organisations in partnership or how the
partnership itself might develop. Indeed, the role of key individuals in partnership was
recognised by nearly two-thirds of (39/60) coded interviewees. One key individual may
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have an undue influence on involvement in partnership. This could be either positive or
negative and could affect the structure, process and outcomes of partnership.
The attributes of key individuals
There were a number of factors that made individuals key: an individual's ability to
effect change either due to an inherent or learned skill, their position/power within a
partnership or organisation, or their personality.
Key individuals were therefore either tacticians (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988), 'wheeler
dealers' or 'fixers' who knew how to 'get things done', and had the inter-personal skills
to pull it off. In this way, they were able to push or keep the partnership agenda afloat in
their own organisations. Alternatively, key individuals were senior figures, such as
directors or CEOs. Seniority, although 'symbolically' important as a sign of
organisational commitment to partnership, was not sufficient on its own. Individuals
had to have credibility with other partners if they were to carry influence or 'clout' and
be capable of effecting change to their own organisations. Finally, individuals with
strong or forceful personalities or with charisma could, for example, either drive change
through imposition of their views or enthuse or inspire others to work in partnership, by
providing drive, vision and leadership.
The impact of key individuals with one or more of these attributes on organisational
involvement in partnership or on the development of partnership would depend, in part,
on the individual's attitudes towards health and partnership.
Thus, key individuals who had a broad perspective on health understood the agenda and
could recognise the potential benefits it could bring. Such individuals were described as
forward thinking and flexible, 'passionate' or 'enthusiastic' and appreciative of the need
for voluntary sector involvement. As such, they were willing to commit time and energy
to the partnership process, even champion the cause to others.
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"Injury I suppose is quite well embedded in the HAZ and in the HImP
programme, and that is partly to do with charismatic personalities. There is
a chap at the institute [... ] when [he] comes along he talks in quite a
charismatic way, he makes what he is talking about quite interesting, and so
people remember what he is saying. Unfortunately there aren't very many
people like that around." Non-Executive Director, HA
The activity and behaviours of these key individuals showed elements of collaborative
leadership and social entrepreneurship (De Leeuw 1999;Huxham and Vangen 2000b).
On the other hand, key individuals with their own agenda, who were not prepared to
compromise or able to shift their perspective, or were of 'fixed mind', could be
disruptive, even detrimental to partnership. This was especially the case when the key
individual had a strong, forceful personality. This could lead to a personality clash,
disagreement and confrontation more based on character than substance.
If key senior officers were advocates of partnership, this could provide a powerful
combination of political and organisational resources to influence their and other
organisations' involvement in partnership, especially if the individual had a pivotal role
in the partnership.
"[H]aving [the Assistant CEO] as chair has made an enormous difference.
And it's both his position and him as a person. But he will go to the point at
which he's responsible for his authority." HC Co-ordinator
The role of key individuals appeared particularly influential in two study sites. In
Greenshire, the CEO of the HA was a strong advocate of partnership and was the only
CEO in the study sites to actively chair the HlmP partnership. As a former employee of
SS she understood the agenda and had cultivated good relations with local government
officers, particularly SS but also education. This had led to the establishment of a joint
commissioning unit within the HA, 'perhaps the first in England' headed up by the
Assistant Director of SS who was jointly employed by the HA and LA.
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By contrast, in Dalesville the HA CEO was the chair of the HAZ. While she recognised
the value of the health partnership, she still saw control of the HAZ as very much the
domain of the health service. Her strong personality imposed itself on the HAZ, HlmP
and other local health partnerships, influencing the structural arrangements and the
nature of relations between partners.
Her transparency and motives were questioned and she operated in an inconsistent
manner. This made it very difficult for other partners to work with her, resulting in
tension with key senior officers in the LA (and the HA).
"[T]here's a track record of bad feeling, it's personal but between [the CEO]
and most of the other partners, she's managed to piss most of them off at
some point." HAZ co-ordinator
She strongly influenced the structure and membership of HAZ and HlmP partnerships
as well as HAZ priorities, forcing it to take a project rather than a strategic approach.
"We would have preferred to have gone with a HAZ bid that was not tied
down to too many projects, far less projects than we actually had with more
monies against broad headings that you can then take a more kind of
commissioning approach to, to try and generate new sorts of ways of doing
things. But we were forced really by [the CEO] saying no I want projects."
Director, VS
In summary, the perceptions of the relative benefits and drawbacks of engaging in
partnership appeared to influence actors' decisions about their degree of active
involvement (Lasker, Weiss et al. 2001). Perceptions appeared to be influenced by
attitudes to health and partnership which, in turn, were largely shaped by professional
perspectives. The orientation of that perspective could shape how organisations or
individuals viewed partnership. In particular, whether they saw participation as
beneficial to their work, bringing access to financial or informational resources,
generating new ways to tackle different problems, reducing waste through identifying
duplication of activities, or, as an irrelevance to their agenda, an activity which they had
little to contribute to or gain from and which could threaten to undermine their
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professional interests. These attitudes varied by profession and position across and
within organisations, and, therefore, the propensity to engage in partnership varied as
the perception of costs and benefits of participating in partnership varied. Across case
study sites, similar patterns of involvement appeared to emerge with respect to
perspectives on health partnership. Professional perspectives also shaped the
perceptions of resource costs and benefits of involvement in partnership, with reference
to the national policy agenda and reform and local structure, and organisational
boundaries. How these combined or were enacted determined the degree of engagement
in partnership.
This was in part dependent on key individuals - actors able to influence others because
of a combination of their tactical skills, personality or formal authority. Key individuals
could push the degree of organisational involvement in partnership according to their
views and perspectives on it and the perceived costs and benefits of doing so. The
impact of individuals could have a dramatically different impact on levels of
involvement. However, actors' judgements about degree of involvement in partnership
also appeared to be influenced by the size of the resource base of an organisation as well
as its resource dependencies with partner organisations. These are considered next.
4.3.4 Resource base and resource dependencies
Size of resource base and nature of local resource dependencies are the final factors
outlined in Figure 4.1 that appeared to be very influential on how actors assessed the
costs and benefits of partnership, and, to some degree, how actors behaved in
partnership. Both these factors help determine the nature of relations, and whether they
are symmetric or asymmetric. In Resource Dependency Theory, the symmetry of
relations is hypothesised as not only important in determining behaviour and
involvement in partnership (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988) but also the degree of influence
or power one party has over another. This section describes how the size of an
organisation's resource base appeared to influence actors' assessment of the resource
costs and benefits of involvement in partnership. It then goes on to describe the general
nature of resource dependencies in HImP and HAZ partnership. However, it does not
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consider the dynamics of resource dependencies. This is left to Chapter 5 where it is
shown how the factors in Figure 4.1 combined to give a general pattern of involvement
in partnership, whilst explaining particular behaviour in each study site.
Size of resource base
The size of resource base appeared to be influential on an organisation's involvement in
partnership, particularly in HlmP partnerships where there were less additional
resources available to partners. Local organisations could be considered as falling into
two categories - large and small resource base.
Those organisations with a large resource base were mainly statutory organisations.
These included HAs, LAs and NHS Trusts (as well as the Police and Fire Service).
Typically, these employed several hundred staff and had budgets of several hundred
million pounds. However, not all statutory agencies had such large resource bases.
PCGs, CHCs, Probation, RECs had relatively small resource bases as did non-statutory
organisations (i.e. voluntary sector organisations). Staffing for these organisations was
in the order of tens. (The private sector was not involved in local health partnerships
and its resource base is not considered.) Table 4.3 crudely locates participating
organisations into these two categories based on human and financial resources. The
figures are approximate, as exact figures varied within and between organisations,
sectors and sites.
The size of resource base appeared to be influential on the assessment of organisational
costs of involvement. The relative cost implications of involvement in partnership per
person for organisations with a large resource base was less than those with a small
resource base. In large statutory organisations, staff time and administration and support
costs could be subsumed with relative ease.
The relative costs to organisations with a smaller resource base such as PCGs, CHC and
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Table 4.3. Size of resource base typical of organisations in health partnerships
260 £217 - Middleton
£328 - Dalesville
£349 - Metrocity
£426 - Greenshire (baseline)
LA- Overall 16,000 (eg. Middleton) £342 - smallest study site (Middleton)
£755 - Unitary
£782 - County & districts (Greenshire)
LA - Education2 £295
2
•
6
1,3005 (excl 3,500 school staff)
LA - Housing2 £145
£8
LA - Leisure2 £31
Trusts (acute) 1500-7000
Trust (community) 400
Trust (MH) 400
Small resource base
PCGs 4-10 £3-£20
7
CHC 18-243
Voluntary sector" 10 £0.04
7
1Figures for 2000/01 (DoH 199ge)
2Figure for a typical UC 2000-01 (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001 b, p137)
3Figure for a typical CHC (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999)
4Many voluntary organisations worked on health issues or some related issue (Le. in Greenshire
this was estimated as 70 out of 80 local organisations and in Middleton it was approximately 70
out of 220) although many were not involved directly in health partnership.
5Figures taken from an average-sized metropolitan authority with a population of approximately
220,000. EH and Leisure have a combined staff of 600.
6Greenshire Health Authority (1999)
7Dalesville Health Authority (1999)
the voluntary sector groups was larger and these organisations struggled to provide the
organisational resources for partnership.
"We got no slack whereas a lot of the other chairs are chief execs of sort of
huge organisations and they can swallow up their secretarial time and
everything else." Director, VO
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This was, of course, ultimately dependent on how many members of staff organisations
fielded in partnerships (and this proportion in relation to the total number of staff).
But while administrative and computer resources were considered helpful in supporting
voluntary sector staff to sit on partnership groups, they were considered less helpful in
developing organisational links with a wider constituency. Some smaller organisations
with an area-wide brief found it particularly difficult to attend all the relevant
partnership meetings in each locality, either for financial reasons or lack of
organisational capacity.
Indeed, those in the voluntary sector perceived HAs and LAs as more willing to supply
human or IT resources than financial support, but it was the latter the voluntary sector
required. As one middle manager noted:
"People seem to find it easier to give of their human resource time or their
IT time or their admin time than actually physical money." Manager, HA
Committing monetary resources to health partnership, whether to support the process of
partnership or the programme of work, presented difficulties for all organisations, even
for large statutory organisations (preferring to use JF rather than mainstream funds).
As it will be shown in Chapter 5, this was partly related to the resource scarce
environment in which many organisations found themselves - a condition imposed on
statutory organisations by central government.
Nevertheless, while a small resource base posed a significant barrier to engagement in
partnership, it did not prevent small organisations getting involved in partnership.
Rather, it just limited the extent of their involvement. Indeed, many small organisations
appeared overly willing to bear these costs, as will be shown in Chapter 5. The nature of
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their resource dependency relations (with the HA, for example) appeared to be an
influential factor in this decision.
4.3.5 Resource dependency
The nature of resource dependency relations between organisations appeared to be an
important factor in determining the nature and level of engagement in partnership. In all
sites, there was a complex array of horizontal and vertical resource dependencies
amongst statutory and non-statutory agencies in health partnerships. The single most
important resource for all public authorities and the voluntary sector is money (Leach
and Percy-Smith 2001 b). Most statutory agencies are vertically dependent on central
government for financial resources, either directly or indirectly. However, as resource
dependency theorists point out, dependencies are not just about obtaining finance but
about providing services and information etc in exchange, thereby creating reciprocal
relationships or interdependencies. This section describes the nature of resource
dependencies in greater detail.
Vertical dependencies
Although central government was dependent on statutory agencies to enact its policy
agenda and preferences, local statutory agencies were by-and-large dependent on the
centre for resources. Thus, there was a strong resource (inter)dependency relationship
between statutory agencies and central government. HAs in particular had strong
vertical dependencies for financial resources. LAs were slightly less dependent on the
centre with just under half (48%) their revenue from government grants, the rest coming
horizontally from local taxation (council tax (25%) and business rates (25%» (Leach
and Percy-Smith 2001b, pp.139; DoH 2002b). Other small statutory agencies such as
CHCs are very dependent on central government for funding. CHCs for example, were
funded from a national budget held by the NHS Executive but were independent of the
NHS management structure (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999).
NHS Trusts and PCGs, on the other hand, had indirect vertical dependencies, their
resourcing being negotiated and managed horizontally by HAs. The strong vertical
dependency of HAs and LAs on the centre for resources was demonstrated in Chapter 3.
193
In the health service, In particular, there was strong compliance with the centre's
wishes, facilitated by linking additional funding (such as Modernisation Funds, HAZ
etc) to its policies and priorities, supplemented with specific conditions and close
monitoring of performance. This created strong vertical dependencies.
Horizontal dependencies
There were horizontal dependencies between HA and SS, particularly in services where
there was joint health and social care provision - the care of older people, or people
with mental health problems, learning or physical disabilities. This interdependency has
been growing since the 1970s, when many individuals in long-stay hospitals were
moved out into the community, in response to a succession of government policies
emphasising independent living and supported, community care (DoH 2001f). Other
government policies have resulted in the length of stay and number of acute beds falling
(DoH 1987-2001). As a result there was growth in community based services, coupled
with a relative increase in SS spending on social care when compared to HAs and Trusts
(DoH 2001f). The management of this transition reinforced the interdependence of
HAs, Trusts and SS through the negotiation of associated resource transfers to assist
with the cost of community care. Furthermore, there were a number of different funding
streams and sources, such as Section 28A payments and JF, with different purposes and
requirements", In response, many HAs and SS negotiated local arrangements (Forsyth
and Winterbottom 2002). However, what constituted social care (as opposed to health
care) was not clearly defined and the level of payments flow between agencies was
often disputed (Nocon 1994). The result was a complex arrangement of care provision
and, therefore, resource dependencies between HAs and SS.
In Dalesville, this dependency relationship became particularly important when the HA
tried to change the resource flow in an existing exchange relationship. This came about
6Section 28A funding is a dowry given to HAs for those people living in old long-stay hospitals and
includes an element for social care. The 1992 guidance (HSG(2)43) on HA payments states that 'if local
authorities assume prime responsibility for arranging care for particular groups any transfer of
responsibility should be reflected in a transfer of funds.' However, as government officials recognise, the
social care element is only to assist in the cost of community care and may not be sufficient to meet the
full cost (Ellis 2000). In many areas, this has placed an increased financial burden on LAs, as noted in
Chapter 1.
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when the HA proposed to reduce its large supply of long-stay care beds in community
hospitals in order to re-locate patients in the community, with potentially large resource
implications for SS. Table 4.4 shows the size of old long-stay specific adjustments to
HA resource allocation by the DoH for 1999/00 - the sum of money that is used to
support individuals being cared for in old long-stay beds. For an HA of similar
budgetary size to Dalesville (Metrocity) but with no long-stay beds, the difference in
resource allocation was approx. £5 million. This included an element for social care.
Although only a proportion of this would be transferred to SS, there was likely to be
knock-on costs for SS as funding from the DoH did not cover the full cost of care in the
community". Such a move, therefore, was likely to increase the financial burden on an
already cash-strapped SS. This threatened change to the resource dependency had a
profound impact on the development of the HlmP and other health partnership
arrangements in this site. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, this was less
important in other sites where the number of long-stay beds had been significantly
reduced during the 1990s (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4. Specific adjustments for old long-stay patients moved into care into
the community for 1999/2000, by case study site (£ million)
SpecifiCadjustments - old long-stay 0.9
2 -4.4 -4.1 ·2.1
(£million)1
Average number of adults with 27 0 0
0
learning disabilities in long-stay
occupied beds3
Figures as of 11/1998 (DoH 1998i). The HlmP shows Section 28a payments as £4.248.000
(Oalesville Health Authority 1999)
2The approx difference for a similar budgetary-sized HA such as Metrocity is - £5 million (£0.9
minus -£4.1).
30ata from Forsyth (2002). This does not include mental health beds or people in hospital or
prison. KH03 data from the DoH (1999-02) shows no residential beds for MH patients in
Oalesville (DoH 1987-2001)
NHS Trusts were indirectly dependent on the centre for resources, which it received via
the HA. However, exact allocations were negotiated bi-laterally with HAs outside or on
the margins of the HlmP in the SaFF. Trusts were therefore horizontally dependent on
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HAs for their funding while Trusts provided a specified level and quality of services in
return for financial resources. However, some Trusts had a lower dependency on HA
funding, especially in more urban areas where teaching hospitals received perhaps as
'little as 15% of their funding' from this source, the rest coming from alternative
sources such as neighbouring HAs, research grants and private income. Thus, for some
Trusts HAs' resources were less important, with a degree of substitutability. This was
the case in at least one of my case study sites. Acute Trusts also had organisational
dependencies on SS, particular in the area of intermediate care and hospital discharge.
Patients could become 'bed blockers' if the Trust was unable to move them into
accommodation funded by SS, undermining a Trust's performance in achieving
government targets. Thus, rates of discharge had potential financial consequences for
Trusts (and SS) and, therefore, both vertical and horizontal dependencies.
Community Trusts were also heavily horizontally dependent on HAs for resources
(although indirectly to DoH). The level and type of service provided by Community
Trusts were negotiated bilaterally with HAs, outside or on the margins of the HlmP.
Areas of joint service provision with SS (and the voluntary sector) were also decided
outside the HlmP in the JIP. An additional source of funding available to Community
Trusts was JF money (renamed Innovation Funds), created specifically to encourage
inter-agency working. Although the level of joint finance was set by central government
(DoH), allocation of funds was decided locally by the JCC.
Similarly, PCGs had a heavy horizontal dependency on HAs for their funds. Most PCGs
in the study sites were Level 2 and did not have direct control over budgets to
commission services. Spending plans were agreed bi-laterally with the HA in the PCIP.
Thus, peGs were dependent on HAs for human and administrative resources rather than
funds for purchasing services. In the first year of HImPs, PCGs were being set up and
established, effectively operating as 'shadow organisations'. Existing health
partnerships (such as HCIHFA) also had heavy horizontal dependency relations,
primarily being funded by both HAs and SS.
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The voluntary sector was also fairly heavily dependent on both HAs and LAs for
funding, either through JF or grants allocated to SS or other LA departments by central
government. These funds were mainly to support the delivery of services but some went
towards organisations' work as advocates. A report commissioned by the HA in
Middleton, for example, identified the resources of the voluntary sector as at least £10
million, 60% of which was provided by statutory agencies. However, this dependency
relationship was often based on short-term grants (i.e. specific grants and JF monies),
usually up to three years. Indeed, the arrangements by which the voluntary sector could
access these funds appeared to be very influential on their involvement in health
partnerships. The literature on inter-organisational relations recognises stability as a
predictor of partnership formation, reducing environmental uncertainty such as resource
scarcity, availability of exchange partners etc (Oliver 1990). Two issues in particular,
which relate to the sector's resource dependency relationship, were highlighted by
interviewees (independent of site and sector): the level of funding and the funding
arrangements (continuity and structure).
Level of funding
The level of funding was often influenced by the level of external monies available to
the statutory sector and therefore in the main relatively small. These resources went to
support voluntary sector networks or partnerships, or health workers, usually based in
umbrella organisations such as VSCs as well as a number of community development
workers and community forums and panels. The result was that the voluntary sector's
resource base or infrastructure was mixed within sites and between sites, and in general,
small. Funds were considered insufficient to actively participate in partnership and fulfil
a representative role. Lack of support was also taken as a sign by the voluntary sector
that its involvement was 'not a high priority' for the statutory sector or that the statutory
sector fundamentally misunderstood what was required to involve it in partnership.
"[W]illingness is couched in a lack of real understanding of what it means,
what has to be delivered by the agencies, to actually take the black
communities on board, and their needs. And you know, the notion that one
worker can do that, just obviously, I think, highlights that. that is a very
limited understanding of the complex nature of involving communities, and
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accessing their views, and getting them involved in partnerships." Officer,
REC
Funding arrangements
The lack of continuity of funding by the HA or LA could also disrupt the voluntary
sector's involvement in health partnership. This was in part a direct consequence of the
nature of voluntary sector funding which was contractually based rather than core
funded. This created a bureaucratic and uncertain process whereby funds often stopped
after three years, whether the funded project was considered effective or not. A break in
funding could result in good projects falling 'flat' or unnecessary loss of staff together
with the skills and knowledge they had acquired.
Finally, the structure of funding arrangements for the voluntary sector could also create
barriers to the voluntary sector working in partnership with itself. Bidding processes, for
example, could be divisive as organisations were forced to compete for resources. This
process could consume significant resources without any guarantee of financial return.
Furthermore, the new organisational structures fragmented funding, particularly in rural
areas, resulting in the voluntary sector submitting multiple bids, one for each locality.
This duplication resulted in higher transaction costs and greater uncertainty.
The most notable exception to this was in Greenshire where one voluntary organisation,
after 10 years of fruitful interaction with the HA and SS, had negotiated a Compact.
This helped stabilise dependency relations by formally setting out funding arrangements
and commitments and processes for their change. As will be shown in Chapter 5, the
size of resource base and stability around funding appeared to influence the behaviour
of organisations.
However, voluntary groups had access to other sources of funding beyond the statutory
sector, such as external grants (i.e. NOF), public donations and membership fees. A
summary of horizontal and vertical financial resource dependencies is given in Table
4.5.
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Thus, study sites had an array of vertical and horizontal resource dependency
relationships in place before and after HImP and HAZ partnerships were established.
The behaviour of organisations appeared to be strongly influenced by the degree of
horizontal resource dependency, particularly when coupled with resource base. The
cost-benefit calculations of organisations with high horizontal (or in some cases
vertical) dependencies but a weak resource base appeared to be markedly different to
organisations with either a strong resource base or weak horizontal dependencies.
However, the other factors set out in Figure 4.1 also interplayed with actors'
assessments of involvement in HImPs or HAZs, combining in each site to explain
general patterns of involvement whilst still allowing for local discrepancies. For this
reason, the engagement and behaviour of HAs, LAs and Trusts in health partnership is
considered separately to organisations with a small resource base in the next chapter.
Table 4.5. Summary of local resource dependency relations by
organisation/department across study sites.
Home Office
HA
LA
LA-SS HA, Local taxation DoH,DETR,EU
LA-EH Local taxation DETR
LA- Leisure Local taxation DETR
LA - Education Local taxation DfEE
LA- Housing Local taxation DETR
Police, Fire, Probation1
Trusts HAs, peGs. other (research funds) DoH (indirect), capital (PFI)
peGs HA
eHe HA DoH
Other statutory organisations LA eRElHome Office
(Le. REe)
VS HA, LA, other (NOF) Specific grants (indirect)
1Fireand Probation are now under the Office of the Deputy Prime Minster (ODPM)
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the influences shaping horizontal relations between
individuals and organisations in case study sites. It used Resource Dependency Theory
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as a framework to explain the degree of involvement and the nature of engagement
between individuals, organisations and different sectors.
Part I of the chapter showed that actors were acutely aware of the resource implications
of partnership, either positively or negatively. Establishing, maintaining and developing
partnership was identified as consuming human, administrative and financial resources
by almost all interviewees, from all sites and sectors and recognised as immediate and
ongoing. Benefits could be concrete where additional funds were available, or less
tangible where they related to improved inter-organisational relationships, awareness,
perspective and potential outcomes. Not all actors recognised these. However, there was
widespread recognition that the benefits of partnership would take time to realise and
was contingent on resource investment, which was particularly heavy during the start up
phase. Part II showed that actors were making cost-benefit calculations and that these
were influenced by the availability of resources and the perceived impact of partnership
on an organisation's or individual's interests. Respondents from all sites and sectors
identified a number of different issues that shaped and influenced the perceived costs
and benefits; national policy, structure and boundary changes; local structures,
organisational boundaries and local politics; and organisational culture & professional
training.
The relative weight of these factors in their cost-benefit calculation appeared to be
dependent on each actor's own perceptions about the relevance of the health partnership
agenda to them, influenced to a large degree by their professional background.
Calculations were also very sensitive to the resource environment of respective
organisations which, in general, was resource-scarce. These factors were bipolar and
summative in that they could have a positive or negative influence on actors'
perceptions of the costs and benefits. A schematic representation of how an actor's
perception of these factors contribute to the assessment of costs and benefits was
presented in Figure 4.1. The role of key individuals was also considered briefly, as it is
through actors that these calculations are made and on which their resultant behaviour is
drawn.
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The results of this chapter appear to support some of the basic assumptions behind
RDT, namely that actors assess the resource costs and benefits of inter-organisational
interaction, whether financial, political or informational. The national and local context
shaped the assessment of these resources. However, self-interested motivation appears
to be tempered by perspectives on health and partnership, in that those with a broader
perspective were more tolerant of the costs and more optimistic about the benefits of
partnership. In its extreme, this might be interpreted as altruism. However, while this
chapter shows how actors make an assessment of the costs and benefits of partnership, it
does not relate this to the degree of involvement in partnership. The driving force
behind Resource Dependency Theory is not only the opportunity to seek needed
resources, but also the symmetry of resource dependency relations and the availability
of alternative resources. How these factors interact dynamically to explain different
patterns of organisational involvement across and within study sites is considered in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 5 - Dynamics of horizontal relations - a resource
dependency perspective
5.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the nature of horizontal relations between organisations in health
partnership in greater depth. It uses Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) as a model to
help explain the level of engagement of different organisations in health partnership. It
builds on the previous chapter in which it was shown how individuals and actors make
an assessment of the costs and benefits of being involved in partnership. It shows how
the differing patterns of organisational involvement in health partnership across sites
and within sites can be explained by the dynamic interaction of the factors identified in
Figure 4.1 in the previous chapter. The behaviour of actors and the nature of relations
within partnership is also examined using RDT as a framework. Consideration of the
symmetry of resource dependencies between organisations allows an exploration of
power relations in partnership. The chapter, therefore, contributes to my second research
question: what was the nature of local horizontal relations and what factors were
perceived to be influential in driving and shaping local health partnership? In so doing,
it seeks to address whether this health partnership could be considered partnership as
participation, as conceptualised in Chapter 1.
As noted in Chapter 4, RDT assumes that voluntary interaction and resource exchange
between organisations is driven by self-interest, with actors making calculative
assessments of inter-organisational relationships in order to enhance their access to
resources without compromising their interests or autonomy. Analysis of interviews
identified a number of factors that appeared to influence actors' assessment or
perception of interests, and a schematic representation of how these combine and
interact was presented in Figure 4.1. However, interaction within an RDT framework is
not as straightforward as the diagram might suggest. Two factors in particular appeared
to strongly influence the behaviour of actors and the nature of relations in partnerships
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in all study sites - the size of resource base and the symmetry of resource dependency
relations.
RDT argues that inter-organisational dynamics are not just dependent on actors'
calculative assessment of the need for resources but also on the substitutability of
resources; whether alternative sources are available. Access to alternative resources
creates different levels of dependency between organisations. It is the nature of this
dependency - whether it is balanced (symmetrical) or skewed (asymmetrical) - that has
significant implications for the behaviour and the nature of relations between
organisations, as noted in Chapter 1.
Organisations with a high, symmetrical need for each other's resources (mutual
dependence), in part due to the lack of alternative sources, have a high interest in
maintaining exchange relationships (Scharpf 1978). However, this situation can also
generate mutual vulnerability where each party is concerned not to disrupt the balance.
This may constrain the work of partnership as each party sticks to legitimate zones of
work so as not to upset the other partner (Scharpf 1978).
In intra-organisational relationships with a high, asymmetrical need for resources
(unilateral dependence), on the other hand, resource exchange may occur on the terms
dictated by the organisation which controls the critical resources. As lack of compliance
with these terms risks jeopardising access to resources, power and influence are
unequal. Consequently, less powerful organisations may try to change the underlying
nature of the dependency relationship and seek greater influence over resource
exchange.
The nature of dependency relations is linked to the size of an organisation's resource
base, as larger organisations, for example, will tend to have relatively less need for a
resource than smaller organisations, as noted in Chapter 4. A resource-scarce
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environment may also impact on dependency relations, by limiting access to needed
resources.
This chapter is structured around the size of resource base and the symmetry of resource
dependency relations, as these two factors appeared to carry significant influence in
relation to the behaviour and influence of actors in health partnerships. As organisations
in all sites reported resource-scarce environments, this factor could not be considered as
a separate variable.
The chapter is structured in two parts. Part 1 considers the degree of involvement in,
and nature of relations between organisations in health partnership with a large, fairly
symmetrical resource base, such as HAs, LA departments and some NHS organisations
(Trusts). Part II focuses on the behaviour and nature of relations of organisations in
health partnership with small, asymmetrical resource-bases, namely the voluntary sector
and PCGs but also other small statutory organisations (Le. CHCs). Since influence over
decision-making and resource exchange in asymmetrical dependencies is more likely to
be the product of power relations, this part addresses whether the partnership as
participation was evident. Finally, a summary of both parts is presented and interpreted
in terms ofRDT.
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Involvement of large, symmetrical resource-based organisations (HAs, LAs and Trusts)
This part focuses on large statutory agencies such HAs, LAs and Trusts in health
partnership, in particular the degree of involvement in health partnerships and the nature
of relations between these organisations. All had large resource bases and varying
degrees of horizontal dependency between themselves and vertical dependency on
central government. However, horizontal dependencies between organisations were
fairly symmetrical - there was mutual dependence, while vertical dependencies with
government tended to be more asymmetrical; local organisations were dependent on the
resources of large government institutions (and the centrally imposed rules attached to
funds), but these institutions were also dependent on local organisations to deliver.
In a resource-scarce environment, RDT would predict that these organisations would
seek to develop horizontal relations to increase access to resources as long as interests
were not threatened. Indeed, Chapter 4 indicated that some organisations were
motivated by access to resources, albeit vertical ones (i.e. HAZ funds). How did these
organisations respond? Was there interest in developing exchange relations or did
mutual vulnerability result in organisations identifying legitimate areas of work which
did not threaten existing dependency relationships? In this part it will be argued that
large resource-based organisations did not want to fundamentally change resource
exchange relationships through health partnerships. Indeed, health partnerships (HImPs
and HAZs) appeared to have little influence over mainstream resources, with allocations
occurring outside the structure. However, statutory organisations had an obligation to
participate regardless of the development of exchange relations. Thus, organisations
remained sensitive to the resource and autonomy implications of partnership, especially
in a resource-scarce atmosphere.
Part 1 begins by examining how actors in different large resource-based organisations
and their departments perceived the resource implications of involvement in partnership
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for each of the factors identified in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4. It shows how these factors
combined dynamically to explain the differing patterns of involvement in health
partnership across and within sites. It then moves to focus on the nature of relations
between these organisations in health partnerships and the extent to which resource
exchange resulted in changes in policy or resource allocations or interaction was
confined to small areas of work which did not upset the existing symmetrical
dependency relationship.
5.2 Health partnership as an opportunity to access or exchange resources?
5.2.1 Health Authorities (HAs)
HAs in all sites were actively engaged in health partnership but to varying degrees and
in different ways. The health partnership agenda was widely welcomed by all. HA staff
interviewees - both junior and senior - saw it as an opportunity to improve health and
reduce inequalities. Indeed, in all sites, HAs were already involved in health
partnerships and had already committed human and financial resources (mainly JF
monies) to them prior to the New Labour administration. Two sites, Metrocity and
Dalesville, had achieved HC status from WHO with some of their partners which
involved joint funding of co-ordinators. However, only in one site, Middleton, was there
a more strategic partnership, the others mainly involving less senior or junior officers
and centred around projects.
Nevertheless, HAs' involvement was strongly influenced by the national agenda as
evidenced in Chapter 3, not least because the policy agenda and supporting legislation
placed a duty of partnership to oversee the development of HImPs. Involvement was
therefore expected by the centre. However, the degree of engagement in partnership was
less easy for the centre to determine. The lack of additional resources to support HlmPs
from the centre did not provide a financial incentive to engage. This contrasted with the
availability of HAZ funds, which did appear to be an incentive to form voluntary
partnerships in the two case study sites that qualified. On the other hand, the national
206
agenda helped legitimise actors in HAs who believed in a broad systems perspective on
health, moving health partnership out of public health departments and into the
mainstream. On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 3, the national agenda also
undermined HAs' efforts to support the development of partnership: the resource-scarce
environment, lack of additional resources to support partnership, the large change
agenda (policy and organisational), tight deadlines imposed by the centre, pressure to
achieve financial balance, squeezing organisational resources (human, financial). HAs
were committed to engaging in partnership but central pressure to deliver the health
service agenda, linked with resource and autonomy sanctions, left organisations
considering the opportunity cost of involvement. This cost was exacerbated by the fact
that all sites had maintained their joint commissioning structure with a view to
dismantling them when the new partnership arrangements had developed. In rural HA
districts where there were more organisational boundaries, the costs of involvement
were slightly higher as there were more administrative costs associated with a large
number of members.
Thus, the resource cost of engaging in partnership was balanced against the potential
costs of not achieving the national priorities. Given that the benefits of the HImP were
not immediate or financial in nature, the balance swung more in favour of dedicating
resources to achieving the national agenda, with the HImP partnership coming second.
"[T]he health authority sees as its primary purpose, as balancing the books,
and only after that is it interested in improving health." DPH
Nevertheless, HAs did commit resources to health partnership. This was mainly human
and administrative resources, costs that were easier to bear for an organisation with a
large resource base.
"[W]e've put dedicated resource into the HImP process [... ] I don't know
how much, might be £50,000 which is not a small amount of money for a
health authority doing all the sort of management cost coshes that they are
under." DPH
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Human resources included actively involving senior as well as junior staff, such as the
Director of Public Health, Health Planning or Commissioning, even the HA CEO (in
Greenshire HlmP and Dalesville HAZ), and funding or providing a HlmP lead. Senior
officer involvement also increased in HC and HFA partnerships as HAs sought to
develop them into strategic partnerships (Dalesville and Metrocity). Their funding was
maintained in all but one site (Greenshire) where it was reallocated to support the
HlmP. The extra workload of partnership was on top of staff's regular job.
Former JF monies (and HAZ funds) were also used to support the development of
health partnership in sites, going towards employing a co-ordinator, a number of
development days and educational seminars, and providing limited financial support to
the voluntary sector (secretarial/financial) and also development funds. The allocation
of core HA funds to support the process of partnership was not evident in any sites.
Resources came from a re-organisation of existing additional funds (i.e. JF) and by
increasing staff workload.
The resources committed to partnership could be considered relatively small compared
to the size of the HA's overall budget and staff base. However, some senior officers did
not consider it small, given the financial pressures to reduce management costs and
redirect every 'spare penny' towards PCGs. On the other hand, some HA respondents
with a broader view felt that the resources available were insufficient to meet the
proactive vision and not enough had been invested in its development to reap the
benefits.
5.2.2 Local Authorities (LAs)
LAs were the second most involved organisations in health partnerships across all sites,
both in HImP and HAZ partnerships. However, the degree of involvement of different
LA departments showed a common pattern of variation across sites. There was also
some department variation within sites.
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In all sites, LAs had some prior degree of involvement in health partnership or health
issues, either through the presence of health units or officers in environmental health
departments or through participation in HFAlHC or HOTN-type partnerships.
However, LA involvement was widely reported to have increased since the introduction
of the partnership agenda. As a consequence, LA resources dedicated to inter-
organisational working had increased significantly, mainly composed of non-financial
resources (administration and human resources). CEOs and Directors were particularly
involved at the more strategic level in partnership boards. Most LAs also established
(where not present) a number of internal corporate management groups or units to work
on health or the HImP. SS departments were the most involved. This was followed by
housing, leisure and some other community services (transport, refuse), with education
generally the least involved. The degree of involvement of different departments could,
however, be explained by the interplay of the different factors that shaped actors'
perception of the resource costs or benefits of participation.
National agenda influences all LA departments
The national policy agenda provided the context for LA departments as it did for HAs.
The large change agenda introduced a plethora of new policy initiatives and a series of
re-organisational and devolutionary changes (i.e. in SS and housing). It also promoted
partnership as a way to tackle health issues and social exclusion. Similar to HAs, it
placed a duty on LAs to participate in HlmPs, although this was not formally enacted
through parliament until half-way through the study period. LAs, therefore, had to
respond to a number of competing pressures, which impacted on their organisational
resources. Despite some additional resources for modernisation, adherence to the
previous government's spending plans meant that LAs were operating in a resource-
scarce environment and many had organisational deficits. Thus, there were no core
financial resources to dedicate to partnership. However, the large organisational base of
LAs meant that human and administrative resource costs could be borne.
Moreover, health partnership provided an opportunity for LAs to access new resources
or influence the allocation of existing resources in their favour. HAZ partnerships, in
particular, offered the opportunity for additional resources for LAs. Access to additional
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resources was an incentive to form partnership even though funds only amounted to 1-
2% of the core budget (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). The HlmP did not offer additional
resources (at least initially), although potentially it offered the opportunity to influence
local resource allocation. Meanwhile, involvement in HlmP was not voluntary; there
was a duty on LAs to participate. Thus, there was strong central pressure to re-organise
and meet government targets while simultaneously developing lateral relations with
other organisations. How did different LA departments respond to this environment?
Social Services(SS)
SS were the department most engaged in health partnerships across all sites, both
HlmPs and HAZ, albeit to varying degrees. Indeed, guidance at the end of December
1999 explicitly recognised the role of SS in the HlmP and SaFF (DoH 1999f).
The history of working on joint issues of health and social care meant that many senior
officers were familiar with the health partnership agenda. The wider health perspective
encouraged by partnership resonated with their professional social model of care. Their
receptiveness was helped by their experience of working with the voluntary sector.
Furthermore, as there tended to be only one or two SS departments per HA district,
strategic issues in the HlmP were fairly congruent with their interests.
Nevertheless, the horizontal resource dependency between HA and SS meant that
organisational resource interests were potentially at stake. This provided an additional
incentive to engage. Countervailing the perceived benefits of engaging in partnership
were the resource costs of doing so. Although the large size of SS departments meant
that the administrative and human costs were easier to bear, pressure to modernise and
meet government targets placed an opportunity cost on these limited resources;' could
they be better used to fulfil the national agenda, reducing the risk of government
sanction, than for engaging in partnership? Senior SS staff were busy at the best of
times, let alone when trying to implement the modernisation agenda. As a result, they
were having to weigh up the costs and benefits of undertaking competing agendas.
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In departments that were undergoing re-organisation or in financial deficit (3 sites), the
greater focus on internal issues resulted in staff becoming more inward looking. As a
consequence the balance of costs and benefits of participating tipped, leading some
senior officers and their departments to pull back from engagement.
However, while the interplay of national policy, local structure boundaries and
professional culture was influential on involvement in two sites, the nature of the
underlying resource dependency relationship between HA and SS, coupled with the
influence of key individuals, resulted in two very different scenarios between case study
sites.
ss - two very different scenarios
In two sites - Dalesville and Greenshire - the degree of engagement of SS varied
dramatically. In Dalesville, SS did not enter into a formal HImP partnership structure
until late in the second year, although it was actively involved in the HAZ partnership
and had been informally involved in the first HlmP round. By contrast, SS in
Greenshire was actively involved in the HImP and partnership relations were so strong
between the HA and SS that a special joint commissioning unit was set up, 'perhaps the
first in England'. This discrepancy in involvement between sites can be explained by a
combined influence of the underlying horizontal dependency relations and the influence
of key individuals, which was unique to both sites. This is illustrated by the 'resource
base and dependencies' box in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 leaning in different directions
and is discussed next.
Dalesville
In Dalesville, the horizontal resource dependency between the HA and SS appeared
particularly important to SS engagement. The HA tried to engage SS, the Trusts and
others in discussions over a formal structure for the HImP partnership. However, its
effort was severely hindered by its attempts to concurrently change the underlying
resource dependence relationship between the HA and SS. The HA was under central
pressure to close its long-stay care beds for older people, create some intermediate care
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beds and move people into community care, for which SS had responsibility. Unlike
other study sites, the number of care beds in Dalesville was around 400, more than 'the
rest of the world put together'. Moving patients into the community would reduce
resource costs for the HA but impose a resource burden on SS and Community Trusts.
The resources at stake for SS were significant, especially as the organisation was in
financial crisis and operating in a resource-scarce environment. As the Director of SS
noted:
"[There's] a lot of complex issues which arrive out of that, like, how do you
share risks, or do you share risk, or do we say no, the risk is all yours
funding agency? How do the health authorities cap their financial liability,
how do we deal with issues like the replacement population?"
Indeed, SS had recently undergone a restructuring to address its financial deficit. Table
4.6 in Chapter 4 shows the NHS Executive's recurrent allocation adjustment for old
long-stay placements paid to HAs, some of which could be used to support the transfer
of older people into the community. The difference between Dalesville and other HA
districts of similar budgetary magnitude was -£5 million pounds. It took the HA over
18 months to negotiate with SS the criteria for funding placements in the community.
During this period there was a reported lack of transparency over financial issues
between the HA and SS at both county and unitary levels, and the HA was actively
monitoring the minutes of council meetings so as to identify any financial manoeuvres
which might have had implications for the HA. Tension between the HA and SS was
heightened by the presence of a key individual, the HA CEO, with a strong, forceful
personality who was difficult to work with. Furthermore, the LA was perceived as
'traditional Labour' and 'backward' with many members wedded to old ideas on care
for older people. Councillors echoed the concerns of a few vociferous members of the
public. This tipped the 'resource base and dependencies' box in Figure 5.1 to the right,
overriding the weight of the left-leaning 'local structural/organisational boundaries' and
'professional/organisational culture' boxes.
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Figure 5.1. Factors influencing Social Services' level of involvement in
partnership in Dalesville
Combined assessment of
resource benefits and
cost
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Figure 5.2. Factors influencing Social Services' level of involvement in
partnership in Greenshire
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The issue was finally resolved when the HA had sufficient funding to compromise with
a one-off payment to SS. Over the negotiation period SS engagement in developing the
formal HlmP structure stalled. SS expressed fears that the HA might opportunistically
exploit its position when SS faced financial hardship. SS also showed a general caution
towards pooling mainstream funding. It failed to implement a joint HA and SS
continuing care strategy. Final agreement on the HlmP's structure was reached in April
2000. Changes to resource dependencies in a resource-scarce environment, without
sensitivity, created a 'flashpoint' which led to considerable deterioration in partnership
and a lack of trust between agencies. Transactional costs rose as the HA felt obliged to
monitor SS's finances more closely. Nevertheless, partners resolved the issue which
interviewees claimed would not have happened 'under the former regime and
arrangements'. The right-leaning 'resource base and dependencies' box returned to a
more even keel and the overall balance swung down to the left in favour partnership.
Greenshire
In Greenshire (like Middleton and Metrocity), the resource dependency relationship
between the HA and SS was smaller and more stable. There were far fewer long-stay
care beds, the issue of moving patients from hospitals into the community having been
tackled years earlier. Furthermore, HA CEO was a key individual taking an active role
in the HlmP partnership (unlike Middleton and Metrocity). A former senior officer in
SS, the HA CEO had a good knowledge and understanding of the professional and
organisational culture of SS, and good relations with SS staff. There were fairly good
relations between HA and SS prior to the HlmP. This provided a platform on which to
build and develop working relationships in line with the national agenda. This is
illustrated in Figure 5.2 by the 'resource base and dependencies' box leaning to the left
in favour of partnership.
At the same time as the first HlmP strategy was being put together, the HA and SS set
about establishing a Joint Commissioning Team (JCT) to improve service co-ordination
between the agencies and resolve some of the difficulties previously encountered when
trying to develop joint services. The aim was to decouple planning and commissioning
from operational work, reducing day-to-day pressures and enabling a more strategic
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view to be taken. On 1 April 2000, after 12 months of 'complex negotiations', the JCT
came into operation. Based in the HA, it brought care teams from each agency under
one system of accountability, with 'responsibilities that transcend SS and the health
boundary' enabling joint planning but without pooled budgets. Headed up by the
Assistant Director of SS (a joint appointment) and an Executive Director of the HA, it
was accountable to the Joint Partnership Team (JPT), an informal body of LA members
and HA non-executive directors outside the formal HImP structure. The JCT led to
'very much closer co-ordination between HA and SS' and to franker exchange of
sensitive financial information and development work to share information on
individuals. Its development required a 'good deal of trust' between senior officers and
members, as it shifted the management of joint planning away from the SS (who were
previously primarily responsible) towards the HA. The HA CEO noted that even against
a backcloth of comparatively good partnership relations, there was a need 'to win
people over [... J to demonstrate, really, by examples, [... J the value of partnership.'
While the JCT did involve a small loss of autonomy over allocation, primarily for SS
with its larger budget, closer integration presented an opportunity to improve the co-
ordination and quality of social care services.
However, in developing the JCT, the HA and SS did not involve other agencies such as
housing, education or the voluntary sector, showing some degree of 'narrow thinking'.
Furthermore, closer working between the HA and SS in the JPT made other partners
feel more excluded from decisions over financial resources in relation to joint care
groups, particularly as some partners (such as Probation, CHCs and the voluntary
sector) moved from the former JCC structures on to HImP partnership groups where
decisions about financial allocations were not made.
Community services (Environmental Health, Housing and Leisure departments)
Community service departments such as environment, housing, leisure (often grouped
together in study sites) were significantly less involved in HImPs than SS. These
departments were located in district or unitary councils. There was limited involvement
in the upper tiers of HImP and HAZ structures, particularly in HAZ sites, and on the
whole these departments were more active at the operational or policy development
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level. Despite all sites having LAs with a tradition of working on health issues, usually
through health units based in environmental health, these departments had a historically
lower base of involvement in health partnership, with only middle ranking officers
attending HFAlHC partnerships who took an operational rather than strategic focus.
Some officers still saw their role in terms of enforcement, and health as an NHS issue.
However, over the two years, in all but Metrocity these departments became more
involved in strategic planning, either through the HlmP board, or the beefed-up HFA
structures. The commitment of the housing department to joint working was the weakest
of these departments in all sites, and in two sites, they were reported to be taking less of
an interest than in previous partnerships. Housing officers tended to hold a narrow,
medical view of health.
How can the difference in engagement be explained? Again a different combination and
weight of factors outlined in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 can help explain a general pattern
of involvement but also the pattern within study sites.
As with HAs and SS, the large national policy agenda placed pressure on resources.
Departments were expected to respond to the intra-organisational agenda on
modernisation while engaging in the inter-organisational agenda on health. There was
only a moral obligation on LA departments to do the latter as the legal duty had not
received parliamentary approval. Furthermore, DoH guidance on Planning for health
and health care did not explicitly recognise the role of LA departments besides SS in
HImPs and SaFFs (DoH 1999t). However, these departments were also operating in
resource-scarce environments. Thus, community service departments were also under
human and financial resource pressures. Staff were busy with the national agenda while
simultaneously under pressure to get involved in resource-consuming partnerships. The
cost-benefit analysis therefore worked against their involvement. As one DC CEO
commented:
"I've got a duty to look at health partnerships, a duty to look at community
safety partnerships, a duty to look at you know, any number of things, but
there are only so many hours in the week. And I'm not one to tum my back
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on any of these things, but you've got to prioritise, and you go to any of the
district councils up and down (Greenshire Health Authority), and you'd find
very different views on how committed they are to this."
In contrast to SS departments, officers in community services were generally less able
to identify with the national agenda on health partnership and could not appreciate the
relevance of the agenda, or see how their organisation would contribute or benefit.
However, this could vary within and between sites.
As the HImP did not offer access to additional resources, the cost of involvement was
heavy on officers' minds, and was being weighed against other priorities. The slightly
smaller resource base of DCs meant they were more sensitive to human resource
commitments than larger departments.
Even in DCs that understood and were committed to the agenda, departments were
having to 'draw back' on their commitment of human resource to partnership. Some
were not attending as many meetings or groups as they have would have liked and were
forced to prioritise their efforts to attend what they perceived as key meetings, when an
agenda item was particularly relevant. EHO involvement in Home Safety and health
inequalities groups, for example, suffered as a consequence. In general, less senior
representatives were sent to meetings with less authority to make decisions.
Organisational boundaries could also influence the way in which individuals perceived
the relevance of a HImP strategy to local interests. In rural sites, there were more DCs,
each with divergent interests. Where local issues were not addressed by the HlmP
strategy, this could reduce the perceived benefits of involvement, tipping the cost
benefit calculation in favour of withdrawal.
The cost-benefit calculation was further complicated by local organisational structures,
local politics and the influence of key individuals, as discussed in Chapter 4.
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Two different scenarios within a district
These factors could also combine within sites to give very different levels of
engagement. A good example of this was in Greenshire, where the level of DC
involvement varied dramatically. One centrally located DC was actively engaged in the
HImP partnership, leading a HImP sub-group on inequalities. This was in marked
contrast to a DC in another area, which was on the verge of disengaging from the HImP
process. How the combined weight of these factors influenced involvement is illustrated
in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
District A had a key individual, the CEO, who had a systems view of health and could
relate to the agenda. There was also some degree of political support for involvement.
The DC was 'champing at the bit' to get involved and willing to contribute resources to
support the process. This is depicted by the 'local structural/organisational boundaries'
and 'professional/organisational culture' boxes leaning to the left. However, District B
was at the margins of the county boundary and could not see the relevance of the
strategy agenda to local issues. Furthermore, there was no political support. In Figure
5.4 the equivalent boxes leaned to the right. With a weak resource dependency
relationship between DCs and HAs, there was little compulsion on District B to engage
in the HImP (indicated in Figure 5.4 by the scales tipping to the right) as the costs
outweighed the benefits. District B withdrew.
Nevertheless, even District A was very conscious of the costs of involvement. An
impending financial crisis and pressure from LA members made the CEO re-consider
his commitment to the partnership. Despite being aware of the benefits of partnership,
the costs of involvement were considered too immediate and high, especially when
opportunity costs were about limiting staff redundancies. Self-interested organisational
priorities took precedent. As the DC CEO commented:
"[There are] 44 posts. The proposal is to reduce those by 14, with voluntary
redundancies. I mean pressures like that, you have to look at what's the
knock-on effect on things like partnership working. How much time can you
give?"
219
Figure 5.3. Factors influencing Environmental Health's level of involvement in
partnership in District A, Greenshire
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Figure 5.4. Factors influencing Environmental Health's level of involvement in
partnership in District B, Greenshire
Combined assessment of
resource benefits and
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A number of members and senior officers expressed similar sentiments, even those who
understood the health partnership agenda. There was increasing concern as time
progressed that too much resource was going into meetings without evidence of any
outcome. Moving to this more tentative position is illustrated by the arrows in Figure
5.3.
Key individuals in housing and other departments, as noted in Chapter 4, generally had
a narrower perspective of health and were less tolerant to the slow delivery of outcomes,
and more likely to withdraw from partnership.
Education
Education departments were generally the least involved LA department in health
partnerships (HImPs and HAZs), particularly at the strategic level. Only in Greenshire
was the education department represented at the HImP Board by senior management
(Assistant Director), although there was some representation in more operational groups
elsewhere. Senior educational officers could not see the relevance of the health agenda
to their work, which was about educational attainment. The link between poor health
and poor educational achievement had not been made. Health was very much a health
service matter, and any participation was considered a distraction from achieving the
national agenda. Priorities from their respective government departments tended to take
preference, as indicated by this extract from a reported conversation between a Director
of SS and a Director of Education.
"[I]f there is a potential conflict between allocating resources which have
direct educational impact and allocating the same resources so that they
have a health impact but lower educational impact, then I'm more likely to
give priority to the educational impact than I am to the health impact. That
may then be perceived as not being committed to the health agenda and,
therefore, we need to have a more sophisticated way of judging the activities
of other organisations by whether or not those organisations are able to give
the same level of priority to what health organisations would see as being
the key activities and tasks."
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5.2.3 Trusts
Acute and Community Trusts were generally less involved in HImP and HAZ
partnerships than most LA departments. Involvement in partnerships was at strategic
and programme groups and included senior managers, directors or consultants but rarely
CEOs. Community Trusts tended to be more involved in health partnerships than Acute
Trusts and many had direct links to LAs or had been involved in HCIHFA partnerships.
This contrasted with Acute Trusts, which as providers in an internal market, had
generally been excluded from the joint planning machinery during the 1990s.
Despite a statutory duty on Trusts to be involved in HImPs, individual Trusts likewise
seemed to be making similar cost-benefit calculations of involvement.
HImPs did not have a budget; the allocation of resources to Trusts was discussed in the
SaFF group, in some cases loosely linked to the HImP structure. Involvement in the
HImP, unlike the SaFF, therefore did not have any resource-related implications for
Trusts, besides those attached to participating in the process.
In some study sites, the potential influence of the HImP on Acute Trust resources
appeared to be weakened further by the nature of the underlying horizontal resource
dependency relation between the HA and the Trust. Some urban Trusts, for example,
had access to additional resource streams through their research programmes and
contracts with neighbouring HAs, reducing their dependency on their local HA, and
therefore, reducing any potential threat to their interests from involvement in
partnership.
Furthermore, the dominance of a narrow, medical perspective on health, particularly in
Acute Trusts, meant actors had difficulty in appreciating the relevance of health
partnership to the Trust's agenda or understanding the benefits of participation. A
number of respondents reflected this view, considering their contribution small. The
overall impression was that:
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"[Within] Trusts, there is very much a [... J defensive attitude to [... ]
protecting your own corner and protecting your own resources." Assistant
Director, HA
The shift in policy towards a health service agenda (waiting lists, A&E etc) coupled
with the strong central pressure to deliver, played to this narrow, self-interested
perspective. Busy senior staff had to weigh up the opportunity costs of involvement in
partnership against delivering this agenda, and the potential consequences of failing to
do so. The latter threatened organisational autonomy and resources. Furthermore,
government pressure on Trusts to reduce outstanding debts also increased their
sensitivity to the resource implications of participation. This sensitivity to costs was
typified by one Director of an MH Trust who expressed indignation that the HImP Co-
ordinator had asked the partnership board for more administrative support [Field notes]
when they and other partners such as the voluntary sector had to bear the costs.
While these factors combined to deter actors from engaging in the HlmP partnerships,
in the two HAZ sites, Trusts were voluntarily involved in HAZ partnerships, despite the
pressures on organisational resources. However, involvement in HAZ partnerships
appeared to be driven by the need to access extra resources rather than a commitment to,
or understanding of the health partnership agenda. Trusts were perceived to be more
engaged in the agenda when financial issues were being discussed. As one DPH
commented:
"Trusts will sit there and doodle, and say really, this hasn't got a whole load
to do with me, until we get onto money for coronary artery bypass grafting,
and then they wake up and say give it to me."
5.2.4 Health partnership and control over financial resources
Resource Dependency Theory argues that organisations in partnership manipulate
exchange relations in their favour, seeking to increase access to resources whilst
limiting losses to autonomy. However, behaviour is also dependent on the symmetry of
dependency relations. Mutual dependence can either provide conditions ripe for
resource exchange and activity co-ordination, or it can result in mutual vulnerability,
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where organisations limit their areas of resource exchange so as not to upset each other
(Scharpf 1978). This section considers the nature of resource exchange between large,
symmetrical resource-based organisations in health partnership in order to identify
whether organisations were seeking to increase exchanges or whether they were content
remaining with existing dependency relations.
While HAZ and to a lesser degree HlmP partnerships provided organisations with the
opportunity to access additional financial resources - an incentive to participate when
resources were tight - in none of the study sites did these partnerships acquire control
over mainstream budgets. In HlmPs, control was not even ceded over additional ring-
fenced monies.
Allocating mainstream organisational budgets to HImP or HAZ partnerships was either
rejected by partners or considered as inappropriate at this stage in the partnership's
development.
To do so would have required the statutory bodies to untangle the elaborate lines of
accountability and the close involvement of LA members and non-executive directors in
developing the partnership structure, as these individuals may have resisted such
developments.
Although such individuals were involved in the joint planning structures (accountable
for JF monies), only in Metrocity did they get more involved in the health partnership
(HAZ). This was not only to provide a coherent link with the joint planning structure
but also to help ensure successful HAZ projects were mainstreamed. Nevertheless, in
three sites (Greenshire, Dalesville and Metrocity), the HA was working on notional
resource assumptions for the HlmP, based around care or illness groups rather than
organisational provision, with a view to aligning service and financial planning under
one framework, in line with HlmP guidance on Long Term Service Agreements
(LTSAs) (DoH 1999f). One HlmP Co-ordinator put it:
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"[L]inking resources to agreed priorities, yes I mean I think that's what we
know that we haven't done. I mean the excuse would be that we've been
busy putting the system together. The reality is that we don't want to trust
the partnership too soon before it really got going, we would want, I guess,
to have it a bit firmer and stronger and more robust that it can handle some
of these difficult issues."
Therefore, organisations retained responsibilities as sovereign bodies for their own core
resources. Although discussed and debated, formal joint accountability for mainstream
organisational resources was not on the cards. Rather, it was widely accepted by
respondents from all sectors that HImP and HAZ partnerships were about influencing
organisations. HImP partnerships were advisory bodies which, through development of
the HImP strategy, aimed to influence how partners developed their services and
allocated resources. Compliance with the strategy was to be through group pressure.
However, the mechanisms to undertake monitoring were barely developed in all sites.
Local control over HAZ resources was reduced by government ring-fencing of funds
and its changes to the requirements of its performance management regime, as shown in
Chapter 3. Commitment to mainstreaming successful HAZ projects was undermined by
the nervousness amongst SS departments about their resource deficits [Field notes].
Small additional monies received by some HAs were allocated by HlmP partnerships.
However, former JF monies and specific grant funds were placed in the control of
Health Social Care Boards which operated in parallel structures to the HlmP, and
initially at least, gave few if any voting rights to the voluntary sector.
Indeed, control over health care resources allocated through horizontal dependencies
from the HA to Trusts or SS resided in the SaFF and JIP. These agreements/plans were
negotiated in groups which, on the whole, had restricted membership (mainly to HA,
Trusts, peGs and SS) and were located at the margins of the HlmP structure or beyond
it. Although government policy and guidance identified the HlmP strategy as driving
the direction of resource allocation in these groups, in reality this was not the case.
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SaFF
On the contrary, the SaFF drove the whole expenditure plan in all sites, despite the
desire by NHS regional offices for SaFFs to be developed within the context of HImP.
The tight timetable imposed by central government meant that the Director of Finances
from member organisations was largely responsible for decisions. The close time-
tabling of HImP and SaFF planning cycles, as specified in guidance (DoH 1999f), also
weakened the ability of the HImP to influence the SaFF. As a consequence, the
direction of investment in health services was effectively determined by national
priorities like waiting lists, cancer waiting times and financial balance, and availability
of cash in the HAs. Trusts were given money but it was 'badged' to deliver these
priorities. Discussions focussed on resources and activity rather than broader issues
around health promotion or transport etc. After national priorities, the SaFF allocated
resources to services that were desperate for investment or 'falling over'. Finally, if
there were residual resources, these were allocated for planning on a rational basis (i.e.
based on local needs assessment) and might include health improvement. Only the late
unannounced injection of government money at the end of the second HImP allowed
room for manoeuvre in this allocation hierarchy.
JIP
Similarly, JIPs were introduced to get HAs, SS and other stakeholders to jointly agree
the allocation of resources for developing health and social care service (DoH 1999f).
JIPs were initially required for OP and MH (adults) services. A third was proposed for
LD. However, JIPs did not immediately link with the HImP agenda as envisaged in
government policy and guidance. Indeed some partners saw the JIP in isolation from
MH NSF implementation. Pooled budgets were discussed and debated, but in no study
sites had the HA or LA established 'pooled budgets'.
"[P]eople always talk about the necessity for an identified pooled budget,
people are always very keen on that, very supportive of it, in reality it hasn't
tended to happen yet." Manager, HA
Even in Greenshire where HA/SS relations were very good, pooled budgets were not
developed. As the HlmP co-ordinator noted:
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"If we can't do that [here] then who will be able to?"
In other sites, despite some talking up of pooled budgets and use of freedoms, there was
perceived to be reticence and suspicion from SS, with officers being 'unambitious' and
'holding what they have'. In some sites, resistance was attributed more to councillors.
As one Director for a Community Trust noted:
"[I] think it basically seems too radical to pass over control in that sort of
way."
Table 5.1. Degree of HA and SS integration in the management of Mental Health,
Older Peoples and Learning Disability services by study site
stu,tiy-site . ~, ':M'ental Hei'tif'~tJ':ImE1aerpi()Rfi.;;l~~a~'iI~[(ellrnin9 DiiabmtY?i1
Dalesville Working on integrated Working on integrated Working on integrated
provision and provision and provision and
commissioning through commissioning through commissioning
SDGs linked to HSCB SDGs linked to HSCB.
Greenshire Integrated (strategic Integrated (strategic
Integrated (strategic
(JCT) and some (JCT) and some (JCT) and some
operational (drugs operational level) operational level)
team»
Metrocity Some areas/service Initial discussions afoot.
Based in SS
CMHS Le. joint locality Some co-ordination of
managers & teams, with resources on specific
joint accountable to the pieces of work Le. crisis
CT and SS Outreach Teams. Talks
on integrated
management in
intermediate care
Middleton Working on integrated Expressed commitment.
Integrated
management and multi- Work on single
disciplinary teams assessment and care
CMHS management
National 42% (jolnt provision & 22% Uoint provision &
33% Uoint provision &
survey' commissioning) commissioning)
commissioning)
'Local Government Association (2000)
Key
SDG - Service Development Groups
HSCB - Health and Social Care Board
CMHS - Community Mental Health Services
CT - Community Trust
JCT - Joint Commissioning Team
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Nevertheless, between the HA and LA, and in line with the government's modernisation
agenda, there were some moves to integrate management of MH, OP and LD services,
albeit to different degrees across all sites. This showed a willingness to work together
more closely in well-defined areas, as indicated in Table 5.1. A survey by the Local
Government Association (2000) suggested a similar picture around the country, with
nearly three-quarters of LAs (excluding DCs) having joint commissioning or
management arrangements but few sites extending these flexibilities to pooled funding.
Some links between the HImP and SaFF and lIP were reported by Carruther (1999)
although the degree of HImP influence over SaFF and lIP was not discussed.
5.2.5 Summary of section
In Part 1 of this chapter it has been shown how the factors identified in Chapter 4
combine in positive and negative ways to shape general patterns of engagement in
health partnership in three types of organisation: HAs, LAs and Trusts. It was shown
how these factors combined in unique ways within sites resulting in varying degrees of
involvement, for example, of SS and DCs. Recognition of the need to take a partnership
approach and the perceived benefits of doing so were countered by concerns about the
organisational resources required for engagement in a resource-scarce environment in
which government spending plans and policy initiatives demanded organisational
resources elsewhere. In line with the assumptions of RDT, actors appeared to be making
cost-benefit calculations over involvement in partnership.
The provision of additional funding appeared to provide an incentive even for
organisations, which, in general, held a very narrow, medical view of health, such as
Acute Trusts. However, involvement did not mean that such organisations were attuned
to tackling the health agenda. Involvement seemed to be driven by self-interest rather
than 'mutual benefit'.
Aside the availability of relatively small sums of additional monies which attracted HA,
Trusts and SS into HAZ partnerships, these organisations did not appear to be
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manoeuvring to increase their access to other organisations' financial resources or
reducing their resource dependencies on other organisations, as a crude interpretation of
Resource Dependency Theory might predict. There also appeared to be a reticence to
relinquish control or autonomy over mainstream budgets by placing it in the control of
HImP partnerships. Pressure to reduce resource deficits in a resource-scarce
environment resulted in a degree of caution amongst partners (SSIHAs) about
jeopardising organisational finances. Essentially, the partnership arrangements in all
sites maintained existing resource exchange relations, even where partnership
arrangements and relationships were well developed, as in Greenshire. However, there
was some willingness to move to closer working and integration of human resources,
through joint management, the sharing of informational resources and co-ordination of
budgets, even if accountability, and therefore control, over financial resources was not
relinquished. In exchange for access to these non-financial resources, they accepted a
small loss of autonomy over service provision.
The exception to this was in Dalesville, where the HA, under pressure from central
government, attempted to change the underlying exchange relationship with SS by
relinquishing much of its control over a care group and some of the resources attached
with it. However, SS were concerned that such a change might unfairly shift costs onto
their organisation, costs which it could not afford to bear. Thus, although such a move
would have increased organisational resources (service provision), it also threatened its
financial interests. The consequence of disturbing the underlying resource dependency
relationship and endangering SS's core resource base was to stall the development of
the formal HImP structure.
In general, a situation of mutual vulnerability appeared to exist, in which partners
appeared willing to work in areas or 'zones' which were accepted as legitimate (Scharpf
1978). The development of integrated management and, in one case, a joint planning
unit could be construed as such a 'zone'.
While HlmP partnerships did not result in a loss of control over organisational
resources, involvement did have resource implications for organisations or carry a
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potential threat. The degree of involvement seemed to be functionally dependent on the
balance of these perceived costs and benefits. Given their vertical demands,
organisations appeared to be particularly concerned with minimising the resource cost
of involvement.
However, the degree of involvement of organisations with a smaller resource base and
more asymmetrical dependency relations appeared to be guided by slightly different
considerations, as Resource Dependency Theory would predict. These are discussed in
Part II of this chapter.
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This part of Chapter 5 considers the nature of horizontal relations between organisations
with a small resource base, namely the voluntary sector, PCGs and other small statutory
organisations (i.e. CHCs). At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that the degree
of involvement and engagement of small resource-based organisations appeared to
differ from that of large statutory organisations. How and why it differed will be
explored in the remainder of this chapter. Indeed, it will be shown that although
involvement in partnership for these organisations was either voluntary or mandatory
(i.e. for PCGs) depending on the organisation, motivation to get involved in partnership
appeared to be similar. While actors appeared to be weighing up the costs and benefits
along the different dimensions in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, two dimensions in particular
appeared to influence the behaviour of actors and the nature of inter-organisational
relations: small resource-base and asymmetric resource dependencies. Organisations
with a small resource-base and moderate to high dependency on HA and LA resources
or unilateral dependence (Scharpf 1978) appeared to enter into partnership, despite not
having the organisational capacity to do so. In accordance with RDT, actors appeared to
be motivated by the need to seek or stabilise resources or fear of jeopardising
underlying exchange relationships. However, despite a high degree of involvement, the
voluntary sector felt that it had little influence and this related to its weak financial
resource base.
Part II begins by considering the motivation of the voluntary sector, PCGs and other
small resource-based organisation for getting involved in partnership, and then moves to
consider the degree of influence these organisations had over policy development and
resource allocation in health partnerships.
5.3 Health partnership as an opportunity to access or exchange resources?
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5.3.1 Voluntary sector involvement - actively seeking resources?
The voluntary sector was actively involved in both HlmP and HAZ partnerships in all
sites, although there were variations within and between each site. Most notably, there
was an increase in voluntary sector involvement in health partnership across sites,
particularly in the HlmP and HAZ partnerships as their structures were developed.
At the strategic level of HlmP and HAZ partnerships, umbrella voluntary organisations
were primarily involved. By contrast, single-issue voluntary organisations and user and
carer groups tended to be involved at the tactical or operational level as well as in
JSG/JCC structures where these still existed. A community representatives group was
established in one site (Metrocity) but its membership mainly consisted of voluntary
organisations and area-based organisations, not community groups. While community-
type area-based groups such as neighbourhood forums, some with health action groups,
were present in most sites, these groups did not have a direct link into the HlmP and
HAZ partnerships. Broader public engagement was not well developed in sites, and
with the exception of one site where the LA had developed citizen panels, views were
sought with surveys/questionnaires.
Moreover, despite significant voluntary sector involvement and an expressed desire by
statutory sector respondents to include the voluntary sector in line with DoH guidance,
there was no evidence of a systematic or strategic attempt to involve the sector in health
partnerships, a finding reported in other HAZ sites (Barnes, Sullivan et al. 2001).
Arrangements were often left to partnership sub-groups to determine ad hoc. Thus,
voluntary sector involvement tended to follow set historical patterns whereby groups
already in contact with HAs and LAs were often those with which new arrangements
were made. Although several HAs (in non HAZ sites) had commissioned mapping
studies to establish where the voluntary sector was involved with HAs and LAs locally
and how its representation could be increased, this was not part of a wider strategy. The
surveys themselves suggested that HAs and LAs were only engaging a small fraction of
voluntary sector organisations working on health issues (if a broad definition was used)
[Field documents].
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Nevertheless, the voluntary sector seemed fairly involved even though, unlike the
statutory sector, involvement in HImP partnerships was voluntary. Similar to the
statutory agencies, resource issues lay at the heart of the voluntary sector's involvement
in health partnerships.
National agenda
Although the national agenda did not apply directly to the voluntary sector, indirectly
through guidance (DoH 1998j) it did encourage statutory agencies to include the
voluntary sector in HImP and HAZ partnerships. Indeed, HA and LA guidance for
HImPs, SaFFs, JIPs and PCIPs (DoH 1999f) (and area-based initiatives) stated that the
voluntary sector should be involved to reflect the health needs of the local community
(DoH I999f). Following the Health Act (1999) further guidance explicitly recognised
that HAs could transfer funds from HAs to the voluntary sector via LAs in order to
provide or commission services which supported the objectives of the HImP (DoH
2000d). Such service transfers would be subject to Best Value review (DoH 2000e). The
national agenda also influenced the voluntary sector simply because it was moderately
resource dependent on statutory agencies. Most of the resources received by the
voluntary sector were from the statutory sector, particularly from the HAs and SS
departments. However, as noted already, statutory agencies were operating in a
resource-scarce environment with many under pressure to reduce outstanding financial
deficits. Consequently the resources they could provide for the voluntary sector were
also tight.
In the study sites, the voluntary sector was largely funded for the provision of specific
services. Funding did not cover core organisational activities. Furthermore, funding
levels were generally low and resources tight. Many groups were operating on a 'hand
to mouth' existence. This was exacerbated by funding structures based on short-term
contracts which often led to uncertainty (as continuity between contracts was poor and
fragmented), and inefficiency (as multiple organisations competed for small sums of
money, expending much effort in the process). This was in direct contrast to resource
dependency structures for the large statutory agencies which were fairly stable. As a
consequence, there was little resource available to support the voluntary sector's
involvement in partnership. Releasing staff to work in health partnerships, an activity
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for which many voluntary organisations were not paid, was difficult. There simply was
not the organisational capacity to do so.
The tight timetable for health partnership set by the government further increased the
amount of resources required for the process. However, the level of organisational
capacity was not homogenous within or between study sites. Capacity, for example,
seemed to depend on the history of partnership working in the area. The resources
available to the voluntary sector could also be influenced by local politics and
politicians. In Metrocity, the political programme of the newly elected party was to cut
costs, and financial support to the voluntary sector was a prime target. This further
undermined the sector's resource stability and base.
How did the voluntary sector respond to HAs' requests to engage in partnership?
Despite the lack of resources, many in the voluntary sector were eager and willing to
take up the invitation, even though capacity limited their ability to get involved in as
many partnership sub-groups as they would have liked. Indeed, in all sites the voluntary
sector was pressing for greater representation in health partnerships:
"The voluntary sector pushed at an early stage to double their
representation, and that's where there's been more disagreement than
agreement." Assistant Director ofSS
Many in the voluntary sector actors recognised their contribution to partnership in
positive terms - providing 'expertise and knowledge', information on 'hard-to-reach'
clients, picking up cut statutory services or presenting ulterior perspectives - but still
did not consider they were receiving sufficient funding to fulfil this role adequately.
Nevertheless, involvement in partnership provided a potential source of new resources
(especially HAZ partnerships).
The statutory sector, for its part, was motivated to involve the voluntary sector in
partnership because of its expertise and information (although such benefits were 'not
appreciated at times') but also because voluntary sector involvement was required by
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central government. As statutory agencies were heavily dependent on central
government for resources, particularly HAs (and to a lesser degree LAs) there was a
strong obligation to comply with central demands, as shown in Chapter 3. Not to do so
risked jeopardising their financial position.
In all sites, HAs or health partnerships had made resources available to support
involvement (using former JF or HAZ monies) although they were not available to all
voluntary sector organisations which were or wanted to get involved.
Many voluntary organisations with a well-developed resource base and a strong
relationship with the statutory agencies, for example, through the establishment of
Compacts, had negotiated resources for attending partnership meetings. These
organisations tended to be those relating to the joint planning care groups (i.e. MH or
Physical Disabilities) or umbrella groups which had received long-term financial
support through JF, for example, and had therefore been able to develop good networks.
In general, the voluntary sector in all sites did appear to be acting to maintain or
increase its resource base, or gain other advantages, as long as it did not threaten its
interests as predicted by RDT.
"I've discussed it [involvement in HAZ] with the trustees of my agency and
my senior staff because, obviously, as the director, I've got lots of other
things I should be doing too. But the agency has made the decision that as
the agent it's not our altruism after all that the agency will gain by taking a
slightly higher profile for a couple of years." Director, VS
Involvement in partnership also offered the opportunity to influence local strategy and
policy towards the voluntary sector viewpoint.
Others seemed to be motivated by a perceived threat to their interests if they did not
participate. Government changes to Joint Finance - a major source of voluntary sector
funding - together with the potential demise of the JCC, no longer a statutory
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requirement, created anxiety amongst some organisations. Confusion over the new
health partnership arrangements fuelled this apprehension. Furthermore, the lCC was
where the voluntary sector traditionally had a link with councillors and therefore some
influence.
"I think there's been a sort of worry, within the voluntary sector, about
potential loss of influence [... ] we still have a Joint Consultative Committee
in Greenshire, but there's a sort of wondering about where it's going to go,
what's its future going to be?" Assistant Director of SS
Confusion and concern was also heightened by the creation and development of the
PCGs, which potentially changed the arrangement for planning and commissioning and
the location of grants.
Across all sites, there was a perception that the driving force behind voluntary sector
involvement was a fear of loss of resources, as the following comment indicates:
"I think the only reason that they [the VS] got involved was because they
were very threatened by it. They also perceive the health alliance as a multi-
agency thing that was going to set up projects, and they felt that that was
what their role was [... ] because they felt that if they didn't get involved it
might run away with their jobs." Manager, HP
And, yet, conversely, involvement in partnership came at a cost for the voluntary sector.
Even with additional funding from statutory agencies to support engagement, many
organisations still complained that they did not have sufficient capacity to support the
demands of partnership and pushed for more resources to support the sector.
"I've got a number of disabled people who are chairing those groups who
have no admin support, and who are floundering a little bit and not
particularly happy chaps ... but they are struggling to keep it going, whilst I
continue to talk with the Joint Commissioning Team and so on, about how
this admin support is going to be provided to them." Director, VS
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In Middleton, for example, a long-established voluntary organisation had to weigh up
the value of partnership against the cost of involvement. As the Director noted:
"I get very active if there's something in it and it can help our clients [... J
but it's also the time commitment to things like that [the HImPJ."
Indeed, in Greenshire, one organisation which had developed a Compact with the HA
and SS, refused to take on a lead role in the HImP unless the HA gave resources to
support the director's involvement, which it did. Weighing up the costs and benefits of
engaging in partnership, he was well aware of the conundrum of short-term financial
gain at the expense of long-term stability [Field notes]. Nevertheless he was still willing
to commit some organisational resources to the partnership.
What was striking was the degree of involvement of the voluntary sector in health
partnership. In spite of the little spare resource capacity, many were entering into large
partnerships and stretching organisational resources to the limit with potentially
destabilising consequences. This might appear to be altruistic in the extreme.
However, as demonstrated, from a resource dependency perspective, such actions could
be considered as self-interested manoeuvres either to reduce a threat to organisational
resources or to maintain or increase access to additional resources. Partnership also
provided an opportunity to influence the direction of service policy or development to
their preference. The dominance of a systems-based view of health and partnership in
the voluntary sector, as noted in Chapter 4, appeared to make it more tolerant of the
immediate, potentially destabilising costs of involvement. Organisations with a larger,
perhaps more secure resource base and more developed dependency relationships with
the HA and SS (i.e. less asymmetric relations, as they were providing services and had
negotiated a Compact showing a degree of statutory agency dependency) were better
able to negotiate resources from the statutory sector to ameliorate the resource costs of
engaging in the partnership process. Voluntary sector organisations or groups with the
weakest resource base and capacity were the least involved, although nevertheless were
striving to increase their involvement. Thus, some voluntary agencies appeared to have
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transformed their position of asymmetrical dependency to one of greater mutual
dependence.
Other small resource-based organisations in a similar, resource-unstable and scarce
environment to the voluntary sector (i.e. peGs, Cl-lCs) appeared to be behaving in a
similar manner. These are discussed in the next two sections.
5.3.2 reo,
There was generally low to moderate involvement of peGs in the HlmPIHAZ
partnerships at the strategic or operational levels of partnership during the first year. By
the second and third years peGs had become increasingly involved in HImPs at a
strategic level. However, although some peGs were on the HImP Steering Groups, no
peGs were in a position to chair HlmP programme groups. Nevertheless, PCGs were
pushing to increase their representation on health partnerships. This pattern was
observed across sites, albeit with some variation, depending on the perspective of key
individuals of the peG.
National policy was influential on peGs' involvement in health partnership. Indeed,
PflGs were created as a direct result of the national policy agenda. However, this meant
they had to respond to partnership while also developing organisationally. There was a
duty on them to participate in HImPs and yet the notion of peGs was barely in the
public domain when local partners applied for HAZ status - thus, they were not
involved in the process.
Guidance on organisational size and funding levels for management and administration
costs, received from HAs, were set nationally for each level of PCG. peGs, therefore,
had a high horizontal dependency on HAs for financial resources, which were
themselves operating in a resource-scarce environment. Given that there were 4-7 peGs
for each study site (rural sites tended to have more), the human resource base for each
Pf'G was small compared to the HAs from which they were hewn. Thus, national policy
set up an asymmetric resource dependency relationship with HAs in which peGs,
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particularly those at level one and two status (as was the case in the study sites), had a
small resource base. Furthermore, the creation of peGs set up a new resource
dependency relationship with HAs which, by default, reduced or threatened HAs'
resource base.
From their inception, PCGs were under similar pressures to other statutory
organisations in the NHS - to deliver the national agenda/priorities to tight deadlines
while simultaneously being required to develop lateral links with health partnerships.
However, peGs were also developing organisationally in contrast to some large
statutory organisations. Thus, peGs faced a lot of competing pressures on their
organisational resources. With their small resource base, peGs had insufficient
resources to meet all these demands. The size and structure of HImP and HAZ
partnerships, in part a result of government policy and guidance, made it practically
impossible to place staff on all HImP groups, particularly in rural areas where the
number of organisations involved in partnership was greater and the proportional share
of HA resources for Pf'Gs less.
How did peGs respond in this context? Unlike large statutory agencies, peGs, on the
whole, did not appear to try and limit the costs of participating in partnership. On the
contrary, like the voluntary sector, peGs sought to actually increase their involvement
in health partnership structures and in three sites were pushing for greater representation
on partnership groups, mainly the Boards. As one MH Trust Director noted:
"Initially every PCG Chief Executive wanted to be on it, well that would
have been seven straight away."
With limited resources, the peGs' desire to field representatives on partnership groups
could be considered as altruistic. However, from a resource dependency perspective, the
motives for such destabilising action would be considered self-interested, with increased
representation bringing potentially increased access to resources and greater autonomy.
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The data from interviewees from all sites tended to support the latter perspective. peGs
were very much fledgling organisations, still trying to find their role and establish their
organisations.
In the first year of HImPs, peGs were very internally focused and did not have the
organisational capacity to get involved in partnerships. As one HImP Co-ordinator
commented:
"[Q]uite a few of the PCGs have only got one staff and a dog."
However, as their resource base grew, peGs sought to increase their influence by
extending their representation on HlmPs and HAZ partnerships. In general, peGs
perceived HAs as having released very few resources for them to fulfil their statutory
functions, including health improvement. peGs were 'crying out for every spare penny'
that they could get, pressurising the HA for more. But as noted already, the HAs were
working to a 'tight cost envelope' and claimed not to have any spare cash.
Indeed, some peGs were suspicious that the HA was actively tying up resources with
SS and not giving them to the peGs - for example, in Greenshire, with the creation of a
joint planning unit. For its part, the HA appeared to be resisting loss of control and
autonomy over resources to peGs.
"[T]he health authority's still retaining quite a lot of responsibility for
certain things, [it] hasn't completely devolved to the Pf'Gs." Director,
Probation
This was despite DoH guidance (DoH 1999f) which indicated that HAs should support
further delegation of financial responsibilities and commissioning to peGs and agree
with each the distribution of management resources to meet commitments in the HlmP
and SaFF.
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Local context
However, within sites the degree of peG involvement in HlmP and HAZ partnerships
also varied, depending on the local context.
Nationally, the publication of the NHS Plan (DoH 2000a) signalled that all peGs were
to become PC'Is by April 2004. This indicated further organisational change at a pace
greater than anticipated. peGs were forced to consider their status in a new world of
peTs. In rural sites with a larger number of peGs, some smaller organisations had to
face the possibility of merger with larger peGs in preparation for peT status. Thus, the
autonomy and resources of some peGs came under direct threat. Indeed, it became a
question of survival.
The threat of reducing the number of peGs locally and the insecurity surrounding such
changes in organisational boundaries, led some peG eEOs to push their own
organisational interests first. This created a climate where organisations did not wish to
co-operate. Some actors became more inward-looking and competitive in attitude,
acting out their own personal agendas with the HA. As one MH Trust Director noted
"For survival of your mortgage, you start doing the dirty on other people or
not sharing, or holding onto [things]."
Key individuals such as peG eEOs were reported to lack the leadership, confidence
and management experience to rise above such uncertainty. Thus, these peGs were
distracted from the partnership agenda.
"People have got their eyes on the ball of who's going to be in what peT,
who's going to align with who and it's major local politics going on, and I
just think that until they've got the peGs reconfigured and they've got the
boundaries, people are too busy worrying about that and all the
organisational change and applying for jobs and stuff to really focus on the
real health improvement." Head, HP
At a local level, the large number of organisational boundaries, particularly in rural
areas, increased the likelihood that the strategic agenda would not address local issues,
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thereby discouraging some peGs, like Des, from getting involved in HImP
partnerships.
To sum up, peGs were trying to establish themselves in a rapidly changing
environment in which some organisations had an uncertain future. They sought to
increase their representation on health partnerships and influence over policy after being
unable to get involved in the first year, despite lack of resource and organisation
capacity. At the same time, they sought to increase their share of financial resources, but
this was resisted by HAs, which seemed to be protecting their autonomy. Some peGs
threatened by merger appeared to withdraw from partnership, focusing on protecting
their organisations' survival.
5.3.3 Other small resource-based statutory and non-statutory organisations
A gamut of other small resource-based organisations were involved in HlmP and HAZ
partnership. These included ClfCs, Race Equality Councils (RECs) and others. Some of
these organisations had been involved in the previous joint planning structures and HFA
partnerships. They were moderately involved at the strategic level in HImP partnerships
(less so in HAZ partnerships) but were less involved at the programme group level.
They faced similar resource constraints to the voluntary sector although their funding
base was more stable.
CHCs, like other small resource-based organisations, did not have enough
organisational capacity to put representatives onto as many of the HlmP groups as they
would have liked.
The large size of partnerships and the short timescale imposed by central government
made it difficult to find sufficient representatives. Furthermore, CHCs were also asked
to attend meetings about PCGs, stretching resources further. It was a 'huge amount' for
which there were no extra resources.
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Nevertheless, CHCs were generally keen to be involved in the HImP and to influence
health strategy, even though the work was beyond their remit of monitoring health
services. Although CHC CEOs tended to express a wider, systems view of health,
involvement in HImPs was left to the interests of members. As a result, local CHCs
were forced to co-operate with one another to ensure their sector was properly
represented across the HImP.
Although engagement with the HImP or HAZ partnerships did not hold out an
opportunity to increase financial resources directly (as CHC funding is centrally set and
they do not commission or provide services), it did offer the opportunity to influence
service development. It also offered another route to represent the public's view and
increase the CHC's profile to those outside the NHS.
In sum, small resource-based organisations appeared to be involved in health
partnership in order to further their resource interests, be it to maintain or increase
access to new resources or to stabilise existing resources. The greater uncertainty
surrounding organisational resources, the more self-interested and resource-seeking the
behaviour. Where there was slightly greater stability, the presence of a broader health
perspective appeared to increase an organisation's tolerance to the costs of involvement.
5.4 Asymmetric relations and control over resources
How did the HA (and LA) as large resource-based organisations behave towards these
smaller resource-based organisations? RDT hypothesises that in asymmetrical relations,
the larger organisations will resist interaction which threatens their interests (resources
or autonomy). Indeed, they may actively seek to maintain or extend their influence over
resource-dependent organisations. Crucial to influence or power in relationships is the
control over critical resources (Oliver 1990; Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2000). Did
relations in HImP and HAZ partnerships show signs of an asymmetrical relationship?
The next section explores the influence of the voluntary and other small, resource-based
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organisations on the larger statutory organisations, in particular over their policy and
resources, both of which have the potential to undermine organisational interests.
As noted already, the statutory sector was not only mandated to work in partnership but
also under direction to involve the voluntary sector and other organisations with an
interest in health. Small resource-based organisations were also pushing to increase
their access to resources. But what was the nature of relations between small and large
resource based organisations? Was the voluntary sector able to exert influence over HA
and LA resources such as policy and finance? And if so, was this influence due to the
asymmetry of resource bases? The next section addresses these questions, using
primarily the voluntary sector as the example.
5.4.1 Increased influence of the voluntary sector?
Interviewees from all sites and sectors noted that voluntary sector involvement in health
partnerships (both HImP and HAl) did bring perceived access to, and increased
influence over the health agenda in HImP and HAZ partnerships (Sullivan, Judge et al.
2004). However, this influence was perceived to be only slightly more than the sector's
influence under previous partnership arrangements. Influence was strongest in the care
groups established under the joint planning systems which had opened up membership
to the voluntary sector.
Small resource-based organisations reported that their input into HImP strategies, for
example, was fairly minimal, particularly in the first year. This was in part a result of
the tight central timetable imposed on sites. Although many groups were consulted on
the draft first round HlmP strategy they were unable to influence its overall direction
because they had not been involved in its development from the beginning. This was
true even for voluntary sector organisations involved in existing JPGs.
Although interviewees reported their engagement in the process improved in the second
and third years of the HImP, there were still reservations about the degree of
involvement and influence over health policy.
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Influence over policy - voluntary sector trying to influence policy and allocation
Many in the voluntary sector felt that statutory agencies assumed a top-down approach
to involving the voluntary sector without a commitment to including them in decision-
making. They complained that they were 'not listened to' or their views were 'ignored'.
The general lack of influence over policy in health partnership - although some
interviewees claimed that it was too early to tell - undermined relationships between the
two sectors. Consequently, the voluntary sector in general felt a degree of distrust and
marginalisation, and perceived that statutory sector engagement with this sector was
insincere and 'tokenistic'. Indeed, some suspected the statutory sector only wanted to
involve them because government guidance stipulated their inclusion.
"There is a bit of a sense of consultation sometimes happening because
there's an obligation to consult, but the decisions have already been made."
Director, VS
The statutory sector, for its part, recognised that the voluntary sector felt excluded,
lacked sufficient voice and was not equal in influence. However, no sites were seeking
to remedy this through developing a strategic approach to involvement. Even where the
voluntary sector was reported to have had more impact, the statutory sector still
recognised that there were limits to voluntary sector influence. Giving the voluntary
sector a voice did not mean 'anything goes'. Their wishes were tempered by
organisational and managerial constraints on the statutory sector.
"[The voluntary sector would] come to meetings, they'd said what they
thought older people needed, what they thought the main priorities were,
and in all instances that wasn't necessarily reflected in the final document.
And I think this is an issue of, in part, an unrealistic expectation on behalf of
people in terms of the extent to which their contribution really could be
actually reflected in the final document." HlmP Co-ordinator
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5.4.2 Influence over resources
RDT argues that in asymmetrical relations, organisations seek to influence resource
exchange in their own interests. For the voluntary sector this would not only mean
securing access to finance but also influencing policy and service development towards
their perspective.
However, of the few organisations which reported having an influence over policy, even
fewer reported that their influence extended to resource allocation. This was because
resources were allocated in the SaFF, HP or remaining Joint Planning Groups (JPGs),
all of which were at the margins of the HlmP partnership structures.
The lack of a budget in HlmP partnerships, coupled with the structure, served to
undermine the voluntary sector influence over resources, whether it was allocation of
joint finance or mainstream statutory budgets. This frustrated some in the voluntary
sector who saw themselves as being excluded from 'the real meeting' where resource
decisions about core funding were taken. Some in the voluntary sector only started to
become aware of this over time.
"When does the voluntary sector get invited to those SaFF meetings, to
argue for the mainstreaming of their funding? [... ] what do you mean
mainstreaming? [... ] the definition of the mainstream is were you at the
SaFF meeting? No. Well you're not bloody mainstream." Director, VS
Thus, the voluntary sector was in effect participating in tokenism (Arnstein 1969) or
non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz 1963), as senior staff within the HA and SS
were dealing with resource issues outside the HlmP structure and agenda. This de facto
exclusion by statutory agencies of the voluntary sector from forums where decisions on
mainstream resources were being made in effect amounted to an exercise of the second
dimension of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974).
A few voluntary sector groups did report some influence over resource allocation,
through being involved in writing local strategy (i.e. on older people and carers) or
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commissioning, mainly through involvement in established JPGs. In general, however,
there was weak involvement of the voluntary sector in joint commissioning/planning
groups and therefore little influence over resource allocation. Indeed, in one site
voluntary sector groups that had received funding from the HA and SS were
deliberately excluded because they were deemed to have 'vested interests', although this
argument was not applied to SS who were also purchasers and providers. Again, the
voluntary sector appeared to be deliberately kept away from the real action.
Indeed, other actors in small resource-based organisations argued that the new
partnership arrangement had reduced their direct influence over resources, particularly
with the demise of the Joint Care Planning Teams which had JF monies to allocate.
Influence was now more indirect, through development of strategy on the HImP.
In HAZ partnerships - where there was some direct control over resources - the
voluntary sector appeared to have slightly greater influence over the direction of
resources. However, it was generally suspicious of the motives of the statutory sector
which it perceived as trying to direct resources back into its own sector or towards its
own priorities (into existing services or on government priorities such as winter
pressures) rather than those espoused by the voluntary sector. Indeed, in Metrocity, the
voluntary sector challenged the HAZ Board for spending too much of the funds on the
statutory agencies and not enough on their sector [Field notes], although this was
refuted by the HAZ Co-ordinator.
This created a competitive tension between sectors for resources. The reaction of the
voluntary sector to its lack of 'power' over policy and resources was to push for greater
representation on, and links with partnership groups or to take a more aggressive stance
when pushing its view.
Voluntary sector manoeuvring
Where the voluntary sector's advocacy was strong or forthright it tended to make the
statutory sector defensive. The voluntary sector frequently criticised the statutory
agencies for their reliance on the medical model, but some in the statutory sector
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claimed that the voluntary sector's assumptions were unfounded. Indeed, it was argued
by some statutory sector interviewees that the social model promoted by the voluntary
sector also contained elements of the medical model, such as patronage.
Paradoxically, the overt expression of sectional interests by the voluntary sector in an
effort to influence the agenda appeared to block or hinder the sector's influence, turning
other people off. But the voluntary sector often felt disposed to push its position because
of its perceived lack of power or influence.
"[S]omebody once referred to [our representative] as being a bit like a
Rottweiler, but she has to be because she has to defend the position of the
voluntary sector. She has to keep on letting them know that the voluntary
sector is there." Director, VS
This could impact on group dynamics and lead to poor attendance or withdrawal of
individuals or partners from the group or impasse.
Why did the voluntary sector appear to wield so little influence in health partnership
over policy and resources? This is considered next.
Influences over policy and resource al/ocation
The resources that partner organisations could command or bring to the partnership
table appeared to be a significant factor in reflecting the degree of influence an
organisation could bring to bear on the partnership agenda and allocation of resources.
In general, unequal inputs appeared to result in unequal influence, even when the
interactional dynamics were such that all partners had an 'equal voice'. Although the
voluntary sector was, in general, welcomed into the health partnerships, their low
resource base meant their voice was less likely to be 'heard' or taken into account. As
one VS Director put it:
"It's hard to feel equal as partners because we don't have any money really
do we, so you sometimes feel that other partners have all [... ] the weapons
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if you like, because they can make partnership easier for you by the way
they fund you, or more difficult because of how they don't fund you."
In partnerships where the voluntary sector contributed more substantial resources their
influence was greater and could even surpass that of some statutory agencies, especially
when the sector was allowed an equal voice through less partisan chairing. As another
VS Director noted when contrasting voluntary sector influence in the HAZ to that in an
SRB partnership, where the voluntary sector was contributing £2 million towards the
partnership's work and the health authority only £200,000:
"[I]t's much more balanced then in terms of the kind of debate and who
takes part in it. But then we've got quite a different stake in something like
that [... ] so the dynamics are different round the Board."
The national agenda served to reduce the degree of influence of the voluntary sector on
the local agenda in a number of ways, as noted in Chapter 3. Although national
priorities provided an opportunity for some voluntary sector organisations to get
involved and promote their agenda, in practice the policy frameworks pushed down
from the centre were rigid and directive. Thus, the NSF for MH restricted and weakened
the contribution from voluntary organisations. The focus on a small number of national
priorities also marginalized voluntary sector organisations not working on these
priorities Le. physical disability organisations. Meanwhile the large policy agenda and
tight central timetables for implementation 'froze out' the voluntary sector because it
did not have the capacity to respond. The pace of the agenda and the short timetable did
not allow robust relations to form, but on the contrary, made the voluntary sector feel
disempowered and marginalized. Statutory agencies' heavy dependency on government
resources created a strong incentive to comply with the centre's demands to implement
its large and changing policy agenda. The result was HlmP strategies written very much
from a statutory agency point of view. This led many in the sector to question whether
the statutory agencies were serious about allowing it to contribute to local decision-
making, resulting in cynicism and distrust.
250
In sum, despite their lack of organisational resources to fully participate in HImP and
HAZ partnerships, small resource-based organisations were eager to stretch their
capacity to a maximum, almost to the point of jeopardising their financial well-being.
The motivation for such behaviour appeared to be to maintain or secure resources from
organisations on which they were dependent. Organisational turbulence and a resource-
scarce environment seemed to add to their concern about their resource base. Entering
into partnership was also perceived to provide an opportunity for these organisations to
extend their interests and influence over the policy and service development of the large
resource-based organisations on which they were generally dependent. This was
particularly the case for voluntary sector organisations whose involvement in
partnership was voluntary. It also appeared to be reflected in the behaviour of other
small-resource-based organisations, even those which had a duty to participate (PCGs).
However, while the large resource-based organisations appeared keen to involve these
small resource-based organisations, influence over policy was limited and rarely led to
the allocation of resources, except for HAZ monies. Indeed, these organisations reported
their influence over resources as having diminished in the new partnership
arrangements. There was also a general perception that the agenda and resources were
set by the large resource-based organisations and reflected the government's agenda.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the dynamics of horizontal relations between organisations
and individuals in case study sites. It used RDT as a framework to explain the degree of
involvement and the nature of engagement between individuals, organisations and
different sectors.
Part I of this chapter considered the degree of involvement of organisations with a large,
fairly symmetrical resource base, such as the HA, LA departments and NHS trusts in
health partnership. It showed how the factors identified in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 as
influencing costs and benefits combined to produce general patterns of involvement. It
also showed how variations in involvement within sites (Community Services) and
between sites (Dalesville and Greenshire) could also be accounted using Figure 4.1. The
cost-benefit calculations of large resource-based organisations appeared to differ from
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those of small resource-based organisations. For the large organisations, where there
was a mandate or duty to participate in health partnerships (i.e. HImPs), the degree of
involvement appeared to depend on a cost-benefit calculation of the process. Actors
who perceived the process costs as high with respect to the benefits were less likely to
be involved. The presence of additional resources in voluntary partnerships (Le. HAZs),
especially in a resource-scarce environment, could swing the balance, even for actors
who had a very narrow perspective of health and were more sensitive to the costs (i.e.
Trusts). However, engagement with the other partners over core resource allocation in
general appeared to be unchanged. In HImPs, this was largely due to the fact that
partnerships had no resources or direct accountability for budgets. Although
organisations had re-negotiated work boundaries in the areas of commissioning and
provision for some care groups in some study sites, resulting in greater transparency
over resources (financial and informational), large resource-based organisations still had
not relinquished control over core budgets. The degree of symmetry between these large
resource-based organisations appeared to limit the extent of influence or coercion one
organisation could exert over another. Large resource-based organisations, therefore,
appeared happy to engage and negotiate areas of joint work or 'zones of legitimacy' as
long as they did not directly threaten their control or autonomy over core financial
resources. Where the balance in dependency relations was disturbed, a hiatus in
relations developed.
Part 11 examined the levels of engagement of organisations with a small resource base
and asymmetrical resource dependency, such as voluntary organisations, PCGs and
other small statutory (CHCs) organisations. In contrast to the large resource-based
organisations, involvement of small resource-based organisations in health partnership
appeared to be more driven by the presence of a weak and unstable resource base and
asymmetrical resource dependencies. Although conscious of the costs associated with
the process of partnership, small resource-based organisations seemed more willing to
stretch themselves in order to maintain or increase their resources or promote their
interests. However, their weak resource base and their dependency on larger resource-
based organisations such as HAs and LAs for resources appeared to undermine their
ability to exert influence over the health agenda and resource allocation. The large
resource-based organisations, although willing to involve smaller resource-based
252
organisations in health partnerships, were reluctant to lose control over core resources -
in other words their power. However, where resources were less critical, such as
additional HAZ funds, the voluntary sector was able to exert some influence. Generally,
the large resource-based organisations were only willing to adjust their position under
pressure from their asymmetrical vertical dependency relationship - the government.
This was felt by many, particularly in the voluntary sector, who either became
disillusioned with the process or, in response to the perceived lack of influence, tried to
push their view more forcefully, antagonising other partners. Asymmetry of resource
dependency relations and the size of resource base appeared to be important to the
degree and nature of involvement of organisations in health partnership. Overall,
although involvement of the voluntary sector in health partnership increased, its
influence over resources and policy, outside HAZ partnerships, arguably decreased.
With control over resources residing firmly with the large statutory organisations,
partnership as participation did not appear to have been achieved.
While RDT provided a relatively powerful framework to describe the factors that
influenced involvement in partnership and the nature of relations, its determinism did
not address the role of individual actors in managing the process and outcome of
partnership. The next chapter uses Collaboration Theory to gain greater insight into this
aspect of partnership.
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Chapter 6 - Partnership process, joined-up opportunism
and joined-up thinking
6.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the nature of processes and outcomes of HlmP and HAZ
partnerships. It draws on Collaboration Theory to provide a third framework with which
to examine relationships between partners and explain how these relate to different
types of partnership outcome. It seeks to address my third research question: what was
the nature of the process in partnership and how did this relate to the outcomes of
partnership? In so doing, it contributes to an assessment of whether HImP and HAZ
partnerships were partnership as collaboration or partnership as co-ordination.
Collaboration Theory (CT) primarily focuses on the structuring and management of
interaction or process in partnership in order to come up with new approaches to
complex social problems. HImP and HAZ partnerships were very much framed in these
terms - a way of providing innovative solutions to tackle poor health and widening
inequalities. As argued in Chapter 1 in the section on Theoretical Frameworks, CT was
an appropriate theory with which to explore the processes and outcomes of partnership.
CT focuses on the structuring of interaction in partnership. This is achieved through a
process of 'managed' negotiation in which partners recognise that the problem is mutual
and can be resolved collectively. There are two elements to structuring negotiation:
cognitive and social (Schuman 1996). Managing cognitive negotiation involves
problem-solving and consensus-building. Problem-solving requires 'reframing':
participants share appraisals and perceptions of the problem and through negotiation
arrive at a new joint appreciation (Trist 1983). Innovation or radical synergy emerges
from this conflictual process, in which participants' views and assumptions are
challenged, and differences resolved through negotiation (Kickert, Klijn et at. 1997b;
Hoggett 2003). Where this process is absent (information is just exchanged), the
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existing normative order will only be marginally improved, and co-ordination or
incremental synergy will be the outcome (Roberts and Bradley 1991).
Figure 6.1 illustrates the different processual routes to radical and incremental synergy.
However, achieving a new 'negotiated order' requires a re-negotiation of the existing
'social order'. As group members have established ways of working, patterns of
interaction and interdependencies and interests, this requires careful management or
social structuring; otherwise tensions between powerful and less powerful actors may
undermine the process (Eden and Ackerman 2001) and solutions may be imposed or
vetoed.
The key to achieving managed negotiation is a just process. This means communicative
interaction i.e. dialogue, discussion and debate, must be constructive, fair, inclusive,
transparent and equal (Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997b; Taket and White 2000b; Eden and
Ackerman 2001). The use of external facilitators, with expertise in collaborative
management but with no authority or vested interest in the outcome, can be an effective
way to improve performance (Huxham 1996; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001b).
CT assumes actors are willing to engage in partnership, are able to 'reframe' and that
conflict is positive and if managed constructively can lead to creative outcomes. Yet
paradoxically, the differences which enable a group to 'think' in new ways - different
views, perspectives, skills and interests - make it more difficult to negotiate a new
consensus (Lichtenstein, Alexander et al. 1997; Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2000; Turcotte
and Pasquero 2001). Large, diverse groups, together with changing membership and
ambiguous and complex structures, can undermine the interactive process, creating
inertia (Huxham and Vangen 2000a).
Chapter 3 showed how central government command and control mechanisms
influenced the nature of interaction, the process of partnership development and quality
of outcome. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how actors from different departments,
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organisations and sectors tended to have different normative orders with respect to
health and partnership (i.e. different views on their role in improving population health).
The orientation of this order, in conjunction with local context such as the symmetry of
resource dependency relations, was influential on the degree of involvement and nature
of interaction in partnership. Thus, hierarchical relations and horizontal context
appeared to restrict the processual development of partnership. However, the theoretical
frameworks used in these chapters did not casually link interaction to outcome. This
chapter uses C'I' as a normative framework with which to further examine relations and
processes in health partnership whilst seeking to link them to different types of
partnership outcome.
The chapter focuses on respondents' perceptions of group interaction and partnership
outcomes rather than analysing actual group interaction or outcome i.e. whether the
outcome had a positive (health) impact or not (Lichtenstein, Alexander et al. 1997), as
resources were not sufficient to collect and analyse this type of data. Nevertheless, an
analysis of how outcomes are produced is important as it helps address some of the
methodological issues when evaluating partnership: ex post rationalisation of outcomes
(attribution), the aggregation of respondents' views (each with different success criteria)
and the boundaries of evaluation (time, stakeholders, effects) (Kickert, Klijn et al.
1997b; Glendinning 2002; Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004).
The chapter begins with an exploration of the nature of relations in HImP and HAZ
partnerships. It examines the level of communication in and between partnership
groups. It questions the nature of discussion and debate. Was it open and equal in case
study sites? Was there any reported evidence of conflict or consensus? If so, where and
how did it come about? The chapter shows that although there was an increase in
communication between partners in formal and informal settings, and a degree of open,
two-way dialogue between agencies, developing a negotiated consensus through a
process of debate appeared to be ad hoc and sporadic. Decision-making was impeded by
partnership structure, hierarchical constraints (large and directive agenda, timescale and
lack of a co-ordinator) and by local horizontal context (key individuals, group
sizelboundaries, resource dependencies/financial issues, organisational culture/
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professional views outlined above}. Thus, a fundamental process of collaboration
appeared not to have been achieved.
The chapter then focuses on the evidence forjoint appreciation or radical innovation i.e.
a shift in conceptual understanding of the problem. It identifies examples of new
initiatives arising from partnership, and where and how they occurred. It questions
whether incremental or radical synergy was evident. Examples of radical synergy or
'joined-up thinking' seemed few and far between. Where joined-up thinking was
identified, it tended to occur in well-established HImP sub-groups where there was
increased membership and a willingness to be open to new views, or where access to
new information or scope of work had increased. However, incremental synergy or
'joined-up opportunism' was more in evidence, and occurred as a result of increased
links and networking between actors within and outside the formal partnership
structures, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Finally, it concludes that partnership as co-
ordination was the predominant feature of health partnership, rather than the ideal of
partnership as collaboration.
6.2 Communication in partnership
Communication is central to Collaboration Theory. Empirical evidence suggests that it
is an important enabler or block to successful collaboration or partnership (Fasel 2000),
as noted in Chapter 1. Joint appreciation requires a two-way communication between
partners where they are encouraged to exchange information and modify their
perspectives and interests through negotiation.
Communication refers to the channels used by partners to send and receive information,
keep one another informed, and convey opinions to influence the group's actions
(Mattessich and Monsey 1992). It can take place in many forms and places. While much
communication is verbal and face-to-face, these are not the only mechanisms: visual
and textual media such as pictures, documents, letters, telephone and e-mail may also be
used (McKenny, Zack et al. 1992;Nohria and Eccles 1992b). Communication can take
place within the formal environment of a partnership meeting (hereafter termed formal
communication) or in a more informal setting (Mattessich and Monsey 1992) i.e. over
the telephone or a chance meeting while at a partner organisation (informal
communication). It is through this process of interaction that participants reveal to one
another and interpret their roles and identities, their intentions and the meaning of their
actions (Nohria and Eccles 1992b).
This section is concemed with the level and quality of communication in health
partnerships rather than the effectiveness of the media or mechanism used. What was
the nature of communication and how did this relate to the nature of interaction and
process outcomes in case study sites? Communication of partners' views and of their
resource needs should be open and honest, with equality in the process of discussion,
negotiation and decision-making (Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997b). Was this achieved in
health partnerships? This is discussed next.
6.2.1 Increased communication
Communication was widely reported by respondents from all sites and sectors to have
increased significantly since the establishment of HlmP and HAZ partnerships, although
some of the increase was attributed to other concurrent initiatives i.e. ABls.
Respondents reported using a variety of media and mechanisms such as those identified
above (excluding pictures). A number of interviewees remarked on the dramatic
improvement in communication between partners compared to five years earlier.
Improved communication was not just reported between people involved in formal
HImP and HAZ partnerships but also in informal settings, with personal connections
made between individuals and organisations beyond these partnership structures, many
of whom would not have communicated otherwise.
"The leads of the new HImP programme groups are from outside of the
health service. So they're new coming into it, and maybe have not had that
contact with us in the past." Director, CHC
All sites reported an increase in networking or connectivity between people and
organisations at different levels as well as some networking between networks, often
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building on previous relations and links in sites. There was open-door communication,
with individuals from all sectors reporting that they could informally approach their
opposite number in a partner organisation.
"[I] can ring up any member on the partnership and say that we need to talk
or sort this out or there are these issues. So there's that informal level of
working relationship as well." Director, VS
Some interviewees reported a number of 'cold contacts' from LA departments where
there was no previous relationship.
6.2.2 Communicating in the same language?
An important issue central to communication and frequently identified in the empirical
literature is language. Verbal communication can be hindered by use of different
professional or technical terms and acronyms - what Nash calls the jargon of
professions (Nash 1993). The use of different language or jargon, whether in meetings
or documents/papers, can cloud or obfuscate understanding as different words or terms
are used to describe the same issue or problem, or the same word can convey different
meanings to different professional groups. Use of jargon can cause poor communication
and undermine participation by not allowing partners to communicate meaningfully
with one another. Jargon can inhibit, for example, the flow and interchange of different
perspectives and ideas, undermining partnership synergy (Termeer and Koppenjan
1997; Lasker, Weiss et al. 2001). Those not familiar with a certain professional
language may be inadvertently (or deliberately) excluded from discussions during
meetings. As one Director of SS noted:
"[I]t is hellishly confusing, the language is used and misused pretty wilfully,
and for the people who are on the outside of it, it's still incredibly hard to
understand and conceive of."
The use of different languages by different sectors or organisations when describing the
health or social world was mentioned by nearly a quarter of coded interviewees based in
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all sites (13/60). Differences in language used in HAs and LAs (SS and other
departments) were identified as problematic. However, some respondents noted that for
organisations that had been working together for years, such as statutory organisations,
language was less of an issue. For the voluntary sector, however, health jargon could
still be a problem, with poor comprehension limiting an actor's ability to participate. In
HAZ partnerships, it had contributed to a lack of clarity and confusion about funding
streams, criteria and deadlines for money, not helped by the shifting demands of central
government, as noted in Chapter 3.
Although different languages presented a 'challenge' to partnership, it was far from an
insurmountable barrier - jargon could be 'learned quickly'. Three sites mentioned
conscious efforts to improve the language barrier, through 'reader panels' to de-
jargonise pre-consultation documents or by giving examples of how partnerships'
medical priorities might link with the LA agenda.
There was also some work on improving information-sharing between organisations in
most sites through, for example, improved IT links. In Greenshire, where this work was
the most advanced, the HA was working to improve access to NHS Net as well as to
develop a joint database between the HA and SS.
There were also conscious efforts at improving communication between partners by the
partnerships themselves. These included newsletters, specific presentations, educational
seminars and information days (in some sites held monthly), on specific policy areas.
These were organised at different levels within the partnership structure but notably
amongst the higher steering group levels. Most sites had partnership days to review
work (in two sites using external facilitators), special fora to address specific issues or
presentations within meetings.
An increase in formal and informal communication in all sites led to an increase in intra
and inter-organisational awareness amongst partners in HImP or HAZ partnerships, and
of health as a local issue. For example, directors of HAs (aside from DPHs) had become
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increasingly aware of what their health promotion departments were doing in relation to
the health partnership agenda. Increased communication had led to greater
understanding of internal structures and decision-making mechanisms, approaches to
and contents of work, organisational constraints, the types of services provided and the
agenda. It helped individuals appreciate what was driving people in other organisations.
"[G]etting across exactly how other organisations can contribute, not
necessarily by spending more money, but changing what they do and by
increasing their awareness of public health issues [... ] people can see that a
lot more now than they could a few years ago." Manager, HP
Knowing whom to contact, when and where, and talking to a friendly face could make a
difference when tackling 'hard' issues. Better communication and awareness enabled
partners to be clear about each other's roles and responsibilities (i.e. of elected
members), avoiding misunderstanding. In some organisations, this had opened their
eyes as to what could be done in terms of the health and partnership agenda.
Unsurprisingly, in the formal partnership structures, communication was reported to be
better in groups that met more frequently or had worked together previously. Reports on
the quality of communication in HImPIHAZ sub-groups was often more favourable than
in steering groups which tended to meet less often (i.e. bi-monthly or quarterly).
Furthermore, although widely recognised as improved, communication was also
reported to be far from ideal. Partnership had increased communication links but the
number of health and other partnerships, their large size and structures also limited
communication and decision-making. Communication across the large and complex
HImPIHAZ partnership structures (Le. between groups) both laterally and vertically was
reported as weak and ad hoc in all health partnership sites. As one HImP Board member
noted:
"[D]espite attempts to get better linkages, the communication needs to be
improved, as to who's doing what and who's working with who." CEO, LA
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The influence of structure on communication is explored next.
6.2.3 Influence of partnership structure on communication
Government policy did not prescribe the structure of HImP and HAZ partnerships but
allowed for a large degree of flexibility. The combination of national priorities and
guidance and organisational reform coupled with local circumstance and history
resulted in very different partnership structures in each study site, with different
accountability and governance structures, health foci, approaches to voluntary sector
involvement and links with other partnerships (see Appendix N). Indeed, these issues
were the subject of debate and negotiation, which, in some sites, was quite protracted
and time-consuming.
However, analysis revealed some common features. First, there was a plethora of
partnership structures resulting from different government department initiatives and
existing initiatives (see Chapter 1). Second, the broad nature of the issues partnerships
were set up to address coupled with the large number of government priorities resulted
in large health partnership structures with many sub-groups, as noted in Chapter 5.
Theses structures were unevenly developed. Third, the requirement for partnerships to
be inclusive together with the creation of new organisations (Le. PCTs) resulted in large
partnership groups, with a membership of between 15-30, especially in rural areas with
multiple organisational boundaries. Group size is discussed in more detail in the section
on consensus and decision-making later in the chapter.
These features led to 'very complicated', 'dense', 'untidy', 'extremely convoluted' and
'cumbersome' partnership structures, which were difficult to map. Many individuals
reported that they did not understand the structures or how partnerships integrated or
aligned with other organisational systems - for example, how the HlmP and HAZ
partnerships related to each other. In Dalesville, the HAZ Co-ordinator described the
partnership as 'kind of floating about somewhere not really connected to anything',
while in Metrocity, one group member described the complexity of local structures as
like' a Russian novel'.
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"I don't even know what's going on in this structure most of the time and
that's no criticism of individuals, it's a big system and I don't' think enough
time and resource has been put into developing the communication,
structure and strategy." Head, HP
Lack of clarity and confusion about structures hindered communications between
different parts of the partnership. For example, steering group members frequently
complained they were unaware of what was happening in the lower tiers of the
HlmPlHAZ partnerships across all sites.
As one CEO PCG noted when talking about the different tiers in the HlmP partnership:
"[I] feel sufficiently distanced from the process to not understand the
difference, really, between what goes on in those two groups [the HlmP
Board and HImP Programme Group], and thus, where 1 should even seek to
influence." CEO, PCG
Communications were more difficult for organisations that could not field sufficient
staff for the numerous partnership groups, generally small resource-based organisations
(such as the voluntary sector or PCGs). In some instances, lack of capacity created an
additional link in the communications chain, as organisations were forced to rely on
sectoral representatives to feed back, creating distance from what was going on.
Poor communication meant many individuals from all sectors did not fully understand
the accountability and governance mechanisms.
"[I]1's not a clear process, there are no clear lines of accountability. The
bulk of the commissioning is going on over here, and then HAZ is dropping
in some additional funds direct into the providers and other places, that may
or may not be in line with the Joint Investment Plan for older people." CEO,
PCG
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The large partnership structures were also difficult to manage. Sub-groups, for example,
were reported as going off in different directions, making it difficult to maintain a
coherent, collective vision within the partnership. Thus, the lack of clarity generated by
complex structures led to a slower process, inertia in decision-making and a lack of
action. Huxham (2000a) has also noted that ambiguity and complexity in structure can
lead to 'collaborative inertia.'
However, a handful of respondents argued that although there was 'no perfect way' to
structure the partnership; it was inevitably complicated and messy. Health partnership,
nevertheless, represented greater engagement and communication between partners than
previously attained, albeit with duplication, 'holes' and bits that did not work.
Generally across case study sites, increased communication had led to learning about
the structure of social relations, of existing networks and the interests of other
participants (Turcotte and Pasquero 2001), in spite of the obstacles highlighted above.
6.2.4 Quality of interaction
Communication and interaction had improved dramatically between HAs and LAs, in
particular. In several sites, this relationship was considered better than between the LA's
own departments. There was generally a willingness and positive attitude towards
working in partnership, as noted in Chapter 3, unlike relations in the past that had
seemed 'tokenistic'. In partnership groups, communication was generally described by
respondents as 'two-way', a 'dialogue', 'open or honest', and 'sufficiently robust to
discuss dislikes', especially between statutory agencies (HNLAffrust). This was
accompanied by a varying increase in transparency over information and resources in
sites, especially between HA and Trusts but also with some SS departments. The result
was a quality and depth to relations.
The exception was in Dalesville where there was still a 'real lack of understanding'
between the HA and SS about each other's organisational structure and culture, together
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with a lack of communication or transparency over financial resources, in part related to
changing resource dependency patterns (see Chapter 5) but also as a result of key
individuals with forceful personalities dominating relations.
The quality of relations with the voluntary sector was reported as more mixed, with
some groups reporting 'one-way' or 'opaque' communications and the persistence of
patronising attitudes. This was in part related to the late involvement of the sector in
developing the partnerships, strong government steer and frenetic pace in group
agendas, as noted in Chapter 3, but also due to their lack of resource base and the lack
of mainstream resources attached to the HImP, as explained in Chapter 5. Where
communication was reported as good and two-way, the voluntary sector had negotiated
(previous to the advent of the HImP) or were negotiating a Compact which set out
clearly the roles and responsibilities of statutory agencies with the sector (Greenshire
and Middleton).
6.2.5 The limitation offormal communication channels
Informal communication or networking was considered an important adjunct to
communications in formal partnership structures, and was built on the back of stable
partnership and organisational structures. The large number of partnerships and their
large structures provided opportunity for informal contact between individuals and their
organisations. This view was echoed by respondents in a number of partnerships in
three sites. Informal communications were different to the dynamics of communication
in meetings. Indeed, effective partnership was considered by some to operate at these
two levels.
Communicating in formal partnership structures was important in bringing individuals
or organisations together who previously had no relation. The formal structure provided
the framework in which to make decisions and to take action. However, the low
frequency of contact between partners in such formal fora often did not allow sufficient
quality of communication to develop for decision-making. Indeed, there could be a
certain dynamic to formal relations that constrained discussions or exploration of topics
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(see below). The tight timetable and large agenda made for a crowded and busy agenda.
Similarly, some respondents commented about talking in meetings but not being heard.
This was supported by observational work, although as noted above, some partnerships
did create space and time for more structured discussion with the use of facilitated
away-days.
Informal communication or networking could provide a counter weight to
communication in formal relationships. It could allow access to knowledge and
expertise which might otherwise be overlooked. Several respondents reported that
informal communication, some taking place directly after partnership meetings, for
example, had led to the development of innovative project ideas (this is discussed in
more detail later in the section on co-ordination). Communicating in informal situations
was not only perceived as important to building relations and mutual understanding but
also in taking the partnership agenda forward. Informal links helped produce a better,
more informed and cohesive group (Mattessich and Monsey 1992, pp.l3). However,
communicating through informal relations was not sufficient on its own. Formal
structures and therefore formal communications were required not only to provide
management and structure for decision-making but also accountability mechanisms.
Thus, the level and quality of communications between agencies and organisations in
partnership was reported to have increased with the introduction of health partnerships,
especially between statutory agencies (HAs/LAsffrusts) but less so with the voluntary
sector. Communication was generally described as two-way (dialogue), open and
honest, although the voluntary sector felt that communication was more mixed and at
times unequal. Communication in groups developed from previous partnership
arrangements appeared to be strongest. On the other hand communication between
partnership groups was generally described as relatively poor and ad hoc, partly due to
the complex structural arrangements, the large number of groups and their uneven
development, making processes opaque.
CT identifies dialogue, discussion and negotiation as inherent features of the process of
reaching a shared appreciation or consensus. This is essentially a self-conscious process
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which may need facilitating or steering to achieve. Was this understanding held by
respondents? Were they aware of this process and was there any evidence of this
process having been followed? The next section explores the normative views of
respondents in relation to communicative interaction in partnership process. These are
then contrasted with the reported experiences of working in partnership.
6.3 Communicative interaction in the process of partnership - a normative view
Many respondents assumed or talked, explicitly or implicitly, about the need to explore
different partners' points of view in order to find common ground or consensus. Some
expressed a view that it was better to compromise their position than jeopardise
relations. This process required people to be listened to, to be open and flexible -
'constructive talking' or 'hard argument' - so that issues or decisions 'were questioned'
or 'thrashed out'. It required a good chair to ensure all partners had an opportunity to
express their views in a relaxed atmosphere, have a willingness to learn and understand
('open-minded'), show respect and accept difference. Debating an issue was part of the
creative process, the way 'joined-up thinking' was achieved rather than 'joined-up
opportunism' (this is explored in more detail later). It led to innovation rather than just
ad-hoc improvement of co-ordination between policies and programmes. The ability to
'handle' disagreement was considered a test of partnership, an expression of its
robustness in the face of tension. This normative understanding of partnership was
espoused by many interviewees and reflected an idealised, systems-based view of
partnership, closely resembling that presented in Collaboration Theory. How did this
normative view compare to the reality of health partnership? Was there discussion and
debate and, if so, in which sites, and where in the partnership structures? This is
explored next.
6.3.1 Achieving consensus? Mixed views on the partnership process
The reported reality of communicative interrelations in partnership was far from this
ideal. Discussions in HImPs groups and between agencies were described by many as
'frank', 'fairly lively', 'engaging', 'genuine' and 'on-going'. Debate and discussions
were reported on many issues, including the structure of the HImP or partnership (Le.
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HC), the legitimacy of partners, changes in service provision or domain (Coronary
Artery Bypass Graft (CABG), health visitors, community care) or direction of new
services (health promotion) in HAZ, financial issues and over evidence (asthma). While
many respondents reported that there were no major disagreements between partners,
closer analysis of the data identified a range of contentious issues which were not
evenly distributed between sites but showed some common threads. Financial resources
were where there was the largest disagreement, whether over the allocation and
distribution of additional sums or changes to underlying resource dependencies. Issues
identified related to how much was to be allocated, who should receive it, the fairness of
the process, whether some partners were getting more than their fair share, funding, or
concerns about off-loading costs. These were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In two sites
in particular - Dalesville and Metrocity (to a lesser degree) - this led to a complex
picture when trying to achieve consensus between partners in HlmP, HAZ and other
local partnerships. Here, consensus was not always forth-coming or even illusory. Itwas
achieved by keeping more substantive or controversial issues (i.e. resource issues and
dependencies) off the agenda. In some cases, decisions at the board level were
considered a formality as no real alternatives were presented. These two sites are
considered briefly below.
Dalesville - consensus or non decision-making?
In Dalesville, consensus appeared to be illusory for two reasons. Firstly, despite nearly
all respondents reporting that relations in the HAZ and the late-developing HlmP
partnership were courteous, calm and not contentious, many respondents also noted that
there was actually no culture of debate in local partnerships. The apparent harmonious
relations, however, did not mean consensus had been attained or shared appreciation
reached. On the contrary, local partnerships had developed, over the years, an etiquette
of acceptable or polite behaviour. It was a culture in which there was deference to the
HA in health partnerships and to the LA in regeneration partnerships, leaving issues and
decision-making uncontested or unquestioned. It was in part the result of the nature of
relations between the two key individuals, the HA and LA CEOs and the structure of
partnership financing, with accountability and allocations directed through the
respective agencies. This arrangement conveniently allowed both key players to make
decisions without proper consultation or discussion. This culture had been quickly
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replicated in the HAZ, and to a lesser degree the HImP. In the HAZ, it was assisted by
the lack of a decision-making framework for the first ten months which allowed the
HAZ Chair, the HA CEO, to veto or impose decisions without consultation. As a
voluntary sector director who felt excluded by such behaviour put it:
"The meetings themselves are just very, terribly well mannered, so you don't
get any blood on the carpet, which is probably part of the problem. You
know, they will want to sort it out privately somewhere, and agree on what
the approach will be."
Secondly, difficult issues were kept out of the partnership forums (HImP) to be settled
in private, bi-lateral fora by the organisations concerned. In this way the larger, perhaps
more radical agenda was avoided and partnership tended to focus on small, less
controversial issues. A key issue in this respect was related to the criteria for care in the
community between the HA and SS. Settling these issues had major financial
implications for both institutions. It also had potential implications for the care system
at large, but other stakeholders were not included in discussions. The influence of
changing resource dependencies between large resource-based organisations and its
impact on partnership development was discussed in detail in Chapter S. Thus, these
large resource-based agencies skirted around the process of consensus-building by
ensuring that difficult issues were avoided or partners excluded from discussions,
"I'm not sure that [social care funding] was even debated or handled within
a formal partnership structure. It was dealt with at a pretty high level
between the social services directors and the chief executive of the health
authority and others." CEO, peG
Indeed, new partnership structures agreed with the LA after 18 months of negotiation
set up a Health and Social Care Board outside the HlmP structure, deliberately to
exclude a broader section of different interests, but ostensibly to improve group
dynamics.
The partnership was in effect non decision-making as senior staff within the HA and SS
kept key issues off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Lukes 1974).
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Metrocity - a rubber stamping structure
In Metrocity, the process of consensus-building appeared to be undermined by the
structure of the partnership. A number of politicians and officers involved in the HAZ
Board, who were used to taking decisions through the joint committee structures, for
example, expressed this sentiment. Although power was ostensibly located in the higher
tiers of the partnership, the HAl Board, the real decisions were effectively taken out of
the hands of the politicians and community groups and located in the HAl Steering
Group involving key officers who met frequently and had good working relations.
Board members felt they were 'rubber stamping' decisions as key discussion and
debates were held elsewhere. As one member of the HAl Board noted:
"We're not making independent strategic decisions on the basis of
information and options that are put in front of us, as much as some of the
Board would like [... ] in terms of really very strongly setting the policy
agenda and determining the direction in which the HAl goes."
The fairly brisk pace of decision-making added to this sense. The structural and
membership design of the HAZ, and lack of voluntary sector involvement in this
process (as noted in Chapter 3) also undermined how members of the voluntary sector
felt they were able to contribute to debate and decision-making and left some
questioning whether partners were 'singing to the same tune' (different frames of
reference).
In Greenshire, whether consensus was truly reached was also questionable, despite
communications being reported as generally good and relations between partners as
cordial and enthusiastic. As one Trust director commented in a HImP Board meeting,
'we talk but don't listen to one another', questioning how much the partnership was
really engaging in challenging views or debating issues. Talking about whether partners
had achieved common aims or an understanding, a DC CEO noted:
"[T]he health authority non-exec directors and the leading members from
the local authorities [... ] we've actually got them in the same room, and
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done presentations and workshops for them, and again we get all the words
[about common agreement], but then when we try to pick it up and drive it
along, somehow they drift apart again."
Furthermore, the HImP co-ordinator, who was based in the HA, also noted that issues of
finance had been deliberately kept out of the HImP until relations were more robust.
This was a tactical decision that recognised the importance and thorniness of financial
issues between agencies. Nevertheless, it reflected non decision-making.
6.3.2 Really achieving consensus?
Even where respondents noted that there was general agreement or consensus about the
objectives of health partnership, this was often only considered as the first step in a
process of agreements to be negotiated. It was often considered relatively easy to agree
or achieve a consensus about the nature of the problem, the principles, and the desired
'ends', in general terms (Le. improving client benefit). Agreeing a shared vision about
the need to improve health and reduce inequalities was so broad and inclusive that it
was difficult to argue against it.
"The HImP's are like motherhood and apple pie. I mean you can't argue
against it, can you? ..there's nothing you can argue against. The issue isn't
what you say, it's how you achieve it." Director, VS
It was less straightforward, however, setting the direction, deciding which areas should
be a priority and the 'means' by which they would be achieved. It was over this second
step that conflict had arisen in sites and over which some respondents reported having
difficulty resolving. Disagreement had arisen when proposing changes to or
development of new services or projects in a wide array of areas (mental health (MH),
asthma, exercise, prisons, stroke/coronary heart disease (CHD) prevention etc). A
common thread linking these issues was the failure to resolve tensions between different
perspectives, values or attitudes of partners, held by professionals, politicians or
community representatives. Respondents reported different rationales or interests which
were irreconcilable. Inability to find common ground often led to an impasse or a zero-
sum outcome (Le. one party losing out to another) with projects stalling or key partners
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withdrawing their support and suspending their membership. Such failure to achieve
consensus was noted in all sites.
Asthma - a common lack of consensus
For example, in three sites there was conflict between medical professions and the
voluntary sector when considering options for reducing the high levels of asthma in
particular communities. Some in the medical profession (Le. GPs) saw medical
solutions 'for a medical matter' (i.e. improved access and management of asthma
drugs). Others saw solutions in explanations relating to household pollution (dust mites
and smoking). However, the voluntary sector saw the cause as related to external
pollution (car emissions and high volume of traffic) and, therefore, reductions in asthma
lay in wider social solutions.
Failure to see or respect the other partners' perspective or address their concerns led to a
hiatus or tension in relations, 'blocking consensus', even leading to 'blockage of
projects' or withdrawal from the partnership. Commenting on a partnership initiative to
reduce dust mites in housing, an Assistant Director of EH in Greenshire said:
"At the moment we cannot get GP involvement; asthma is a medical matter,
medical matters are only dealt with by GPs. The problem we have is that as
it's a patient-based project we need the medical ethics committee to approve
the project, and they will only approve it if we get GP involvement."
Consensus and National Service Frameworks (NSFs)
For groups working on areas where there was an NSF (Le. MH, CHD), the first stage
and to some degree the second stage of the process of achieving consensus was
essentially by-passed as it had already been agreed by the government (as noted in
Chapter 3). Discussions and debate were more concerned with implementation within
the confines of a narrow framework rather than setting new directions.
Despite these caveats about achieving consensus in HlmP and HAZ partnership,
respondents did report, nevertheless, some lively 'grown up' discussions and debate in
some of the more operational groups, in the lower tiers of partnership.
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Large groups and decision-making
The influence of partnership structure on communication between individuals and
groups and other partnerships was explored earlier. However, in addition to structural
complexity, group size was also an issue across all sites and sectors that impacted on
communication and decision-making, with nearly a third of coded interviewees (19/61)
commenting on this.
As noted in Chapter 1, government guidance stipulated that partnerships should include
a wide range of stakeholders from statutory and non-statutory sector. In general, this
resulted in HImP and HAZ partnerships having large groups (IS-30) (most HImPlHAZ
Boards had around 24 members), particularly in rural areas where there were generally
more stakeholders (PCGs, DCs and Trusts).
However, for a number of interviewees the size of groups was considered far from
optimal for group dynamics. Groups with more than 12 members were considered 'too
big' and 'unwieldy'. The more people involved, the more people who wanted their say,
pulling the group in different directions. This made it difficult to engage in 'nitty gritty'
issues at meetings. It also meant that more relationships had to be built, and made it
more difficult to sustain a coherent and collective vision - 'vital work' when setting up
partnerships. The impact of large group size was to slow down the pace of work,
retarding decision-making and creating frustration. As one Trust Director noted about
large groups:
"That doesn't mean that everybody's involved, just having big groups that
meet together and have got the right label on them to say that they're
inclusive. And I think this is a criticism here, more than other areas, that
we're - we tend to go for the form, rather than the function."
Having large inclusive groups presented a dilemma between achieving wider
representation beyond usual statutory sector partners and keeping the partnership 'action
orientated', 'getting things done' and delivering the agenda. Many interviewees noted
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this tension between inclusiveness (form) and group dynamics (function), particularly
partnership co-ordinators.
"We obviously couldn't have all different voluntary organisations, because
there was the practical issue of you know, masses of people sitting round the
table, and you'd never get anywhere with it." Director, LA
One solution to limiting numbers was to have members that acted as representatives
from their sector.
However, some interviewees took a more cynical view of the motives for this
preference, noting that the arguments for smaller group size were used to restrict their
inclusion. Indeed, the rationale of group efficiency did appear to be used mainly by
statutory agencies to exclude new partners (the voluntary sector and PCGs).
In Dalesville, for example, where the number of LA districts, and therefore partners,
was high, health and social care issues were separated from the HlmP, ostensibly to
keep the numbers down and the partnership more focused, but some felt it was to keep
control over the agenda, as shown in Chapter 5.
An alternative strategy to improve dynamics was for large partnership groups to create
working groups, apportioning the agenda into manageable bits, be it a financial or
policy issue, with groups open to partners who felt they were able to contribute. In this
way, partnership could share the load productively.
Large-sized groups also presented logistical problems around organising meetings and
development days etc which everybody could attend, particularly as key people were
also likely to be involved in other meetings or busy with the large policy agenda. This
could be difficult even in smaller groups:
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"[T]rying to arrange a meeting between six or seven people, all in different
agencies, all with chocka diaries, you know, simply getting a meeting to talk
about an issue, or a project, or you know, it's - even things like that can be
quite difficult." Manager, PCG
The decision-making and development processes were also slowed down by the
problem of logistical co-ordination, especially if not well-managed. The tight timetables
and large agenda also undermined the decision-making process, with issues covered in a
superficial manner as time-scales did not allow sufficient time to fully engage in debate.
However, the presence of a co-ordinator and resources dedicated to supporting the
partnership process could greatly improve the interactive dynamics within the
partnership and with the external world. This was recognised by nearly a third (19/61)
of the coded interviews. Unlike HImPs, HAZ partnerships had funds to resource a co-
ordinator. A dedicated co-ordinator could not only playa positive role in managing the
partnership but also in developing the process. For example, interviewees recognised
the role of a co-ordinator in preventing the partnership becoming a fragmented
collective of activities.
"[I]t wasn't clear to me what the purpose of the HAZ was, or what its aims
were, or what it was doing in terms of the wider health economy. What it
felt like was that they had a massive amount of money that they couldn't
spend, they didn't know what to target it on. Part of that was because there
was no HAZ director or manager in place." CEO, PCG
The co-ordinator could also increase the level of engagement between organisations, by
uniting the different strands of the partnership, developing clearer partnership structures,
making it more obvious as to whom to contact in the partnership. Thus, their presence
could increase transparency (i.e. over information and resources) and, therefore,
ownership of the agenda. It could also provide direction and leadership to the
partnership, influencing its purpose and aims.
"You do need to co-ordinate I think with partnership working, you've got to
have one organisation or one individual who is going to co-ordinate the
whole thing. Without that it can fall to pieces." Manager, HA
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However, it was not just having the position of co-ordinator which made an impact on
partnership, it was also having the right person in the post. Having a key individual (of
sufficient enthusiasm and seniority) who thought about partner relationships and group
dynamics could make a significant difference to progress in achieving the partnership
agenda.
In summary, the reality of achieving consensus or a shared frame of reference through
discussion and negotiation appeared to be less prevalent than the belief that this was a
desirable output of partnership. It did appear to take place in a limited fashion. But in
general, self-interested concerns, particularly around financial matters, tended to get in
the way of relations, as noted in Chapter 5. Some in the voluntary sector felt excluded
or marginalized, due to their weak financial position or their structural position in the
partnership or size of membership. In one sense, consensus was illusory in some sites as
not all stakeholders were involved in resource discussions. Even when there was
agreement on the wider purpose of partnership, there were examples of tensions and
lack of consensus around the specific direction of action, often with partners with strong
views who refused to adjust or compromise their perspective. Here, shared appreciation
did not appear to be attained.
Communication and decision-making were also hampered by the structural features of
partnership, a consequence of national policy and local context that influenced all sites.
Large groups, in particular, presented a challenge to keeping the agenda focused and
decision-making moving. The presence of a dedicated, funded co-ordinator could
greatly enhance the management and process of partnership, and help avoid
collaborative inertia.
Given the apparently limited extent of consensus-building and joint appreciation, what
was the nature of the outcomes of HlmP and HAZ partnerships? Was innovation
evident or were more incremental forms of outcome evident, as Collaboration Theory
would suggestion? These questions are considered next.
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6.4 Achieving synergy or co-ordination
One of the rationales for partnership is the generation of synergy, as expressed in
government policy documents on HAZ and HlmP partnerships, mostly notably through
the use of phrases such as 'joined-up thinking', as noted in Chapter 1. Collaboration
Theory assumes that radical innovation or synergy emerges out of the constructive
exploration of different perspectives held by partners - second order change. The
process is different to achieving incremental innovation or co-ordination, where
participants' perspectives are not fundamentally challenged and the existing normative
order is only refined or marginally improved - first order change (Roberts and Bradley
1991). The production of co-ordination in partnership is therefore easier to achieve, as
the process essentially only requires information exchange, not the resolution of conflict
or the negotiation of a new consensus or order. It is through exchange that awareness of
resources (financial, informational, technical etc) and their use increases, and more
effective deployment can be arranged. The distinction between radical synergy and co-
ordination is rarely made in the literature or in public policy, despite the means of
achieving these outcomes being different.
This section seeks to explore the nature of outcomes in health partnership and whether
their origin derived from first or second order change, and, if so, where and how these
processes occurred. A number of questions were put to interviewees designed to elicit
whether synergy or co-ordination had resulted from HImP or HAZ partnerships. For
example, interviewees were asked directly about whether any new or novel projects or
innovation had occurred as a direct result of the partnership, and where and how they
had come about. Spontaneous comments which seemed to indicate the generation of
synergy were also coded and analysed.
Only a few interviewees made specific reference to the different theoretical outcomes of
partnership. One interviewee implicitly summed up the distinction by using the terms
'joined-up thinking' and 'joined-up opportunism'. a categorisation which on closer
inspection resembled the difference between synergy and co-ordination. These terms,
therefore, were used to frame and explore the data in this section. The process by which
these two outcomes were reached is illustrated in Figure 6.1 on page 256, and is
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explored in greater detail below. First, the difficultly of linking partnership with process
outcomes is examined.
6.4.1 Innovation - a problem of attribution
The vast majority of respondents found it very difficult to attribute outcomes of
partnership (projects and initiatives etc) directly to HImP or HAZ partnerships (Barnes,
Sullivan et al. 2001).
"It's hard for me to say how much of that joined-upness came from what
was the health alliance and how much of it came from other drivers for
change really. I'm not quite sure that it's that black and white." Manager, HP
Several reasons were identified for this. First, there was a plethora of other concurrent
government initiatives, such as regeneration partnerships (see Chapter 3 for details),
which clouded the water of attribution. Some individuals were involved in these and
some projects breached partnership boundaries, for example, by being joint-funded.
Also other policy drivers such as the NSF were forcing change in the system through
promoting different policy perspectives (eg. encouraging the HA and others to take a
more systems-based view or, in the area of older people and MH, pushing prevention,
rehabilitation, crisis intervention) or organisational arrangements (Le. such as including
trusts or users and carers in joint care groups). This led to some innovation by
encouraging organisations to take risks, but changes in perspectives appeared to be
more centrally imposed than locally constructed.
Talking about the areas of drug misuse and MH, one voluntary sector director noted:
"I don't really see much change as a result of the HAZ in those two areas.
As far as I can see, it's some things which were going to be done anyway."
Second, many interviewees claimed that what they were doing was based on what was
already in place. The roots of a project may have been several years in the making,
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originating from before HImP and HAZ partnerships, perhaps based on former
partnership relations between agencies (i.e. HA and SS). Alternatively, a number of
respondents noted that many projects were 'off the shelf'. They had been put together
previously but for some reason i.e. lack of funds, were not implemented. The new
partnership arrangements presented an opportunity to dust off 'shelved' projects or
plans. In HAZ partnerships, the availability of funds made it slightly easier for partners
to re-examine these projects, 're-badging' them in terms of the health inequalities
agenda. HAZ funds acted as a 'catalyst' for this process, 'fast forwarding' them as new
initiatives. It also made it easer to identify projects that were the outcome of HAZ
partnership. This was less the case in HlmP partnerships. Talking about an innovative
palliative care project with the Trust, an Assistant DPH noted:
"To what extent that was really a result of partnership working or it was a
result of just having the money and therefore being able to develop these
things in areas which I happen to know was apriority, I'm not sure."
Finally, as noted in Chapter 4, many respondents thought that it was too early in the
partnership's lifecycle to expect, let alone demonstrate, whether the creation of synergy
had taken place. Relationships, structures and processes were not sufficiently advanced
to achieve this, especially in the newly formed partnership groups (as opposed to those
that had evolved from previous arrangements).
6.4.2 Joined-up thinking - radical innovation or synergy
Nevertheless, a handful of respondents were able to attribute what they considered the
development of new and novel initiatives or joined-up thinking to partnership in three
case study sites. This small number of initiatives (five) (policies and projects) seemed to
demonstrate a shift or change in thinking or frame of reference. Joined-up thinking in
these cases tended to be in the lower tiers of partnership (rather than at the board level)
where many of the members had previously encountered one another from former
partnership arrangements such as the JCC. In some cases, joined-up thinking was
specifically attributed to the enlargement of membership of these groups, as a result of
government policy. New members included Acute Trusts, the voluntary sector and other
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professional groups. This brought in new perspectives and ideas into fairly well
established groups:
"The HImP has certainly encouraged different professions to come together
for the very first time and a different type of networking is now taking
place. The example of the Home Safety Group, we are seeing new solutions
or new thoughts if not solutions to traditional problems being developed
[... ] We are skinning proverbial cat in different ways ... because we are
taking off our professional blinkers and actually recognising that other
people can actually make a valuable contribution." Director, EH
The direction of national policy also helped legitimise different ways of thinking for
some groups. The initial emphasis on health rather than health services allowed some
partnership groups to broaden the scope of their work, opening up new possibilities.
"We've got a new community cardiac rehab programme, provided and led
by the leisure department of the boroughs, which is novel, innovative, you
know, really good stuff." DPH
Revealing how increased scope and membership of the learning disabilities group could
combine to provide a potent combination, one HlmP Co-ordinator said:
"When we gave them encouragement to think about the wider world, they
came up with a stream of very simple but very good ideas, for example, for
people with learning disabilities [and access to primary and secondary
health services]... And because they included now for the first time really
the acute sector, suddenly we opened up some of that world and by
congregating people into PCGs, we [the partnership] provided them with
roots and channels."
As noted in Chapter 4, this appeared to be more common in staff from HAs and LAs
although it was also evident in some staff in Trusts, PCGs and CHCs. However, many
still regarded health in fairly narrow terms. It was difficult, therefore, to attribute this
change in frame of reference wholly to partnership, rather than to deference to
government policy.
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The absence of joined-up thinking was also attributed to the over-zealous control
exerted by central government over partnership, through funding, timing and timescale,
and performance management, as shown in Chapter 3, which restricted innovation and
risk taking. As one DPH noted, this was turning the HImP (and the HAZ) partnerships
into a 'bureaucratic process' with partners looking to 'tick boxes' rather than provide
creative solutions to difficult problems. The nature of relations in partnership was also
influenced by the presence of money, which as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, can
influence the way partners interact. Thus, the presence of joined-up thinking was not
identified by respondents in higher tiers of partnership such as partnership boards.
Neither was it identified in newly established groups where relationships and processes
were still being developed.
6.4.3 Joined-up opportunism - incremental innovation or co-ordination
Projects or initiatives categorised as joined-up opportunism could be considered to have
come about by a fundamentally different process to those identified above. Joined-up
thinking required a shift in perspective or frame of reference by partners, through the
process of debate, discussion and negotiation. Joined-up opportunism, on the other
hand, was more about an exchange of information which led to changes in policies,
services or the development of new projects or initiatives but which also left partners'
perspectives still intact.
"[W]e've come up with things that we've been doing individually that might
be new and fed them into the whole group, rather than the whole group
sitting down and trying to think up a new area." Manager, HA
In contrast to joined-up thinking, respondents sited many more examples of joined-up
opportunism or co-ordination in their partnerships. As one HAZ manager noted:
"Where it looks like joined-up thinking it's generally opportunism, rather
than strategically thinking and if we did that together that would be good but
we'll go and do this and you go and do that [... ] the HAZ isn't making that
happen."
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Joined-up opportunism, then, came about as a direct consequence of new links or
contacts being established between individuals from different departments or agencies
by the creation of a health partnership. These new links allowed exchange of
information or knowledge about services, practices and policies, leading to the
identification of common activities or opportunities for working together.
As one Carers Group Lead noted:
"We've got acute hospital representation on there which is enabling us to
take forward much better admission and discharge procedures. Whereas you
wouldn't have been able to do that in the old joint planning system because
the acute providers would not have actually been within that."
Although joined-up opportunism resulted in adjustments to work practices and in some
cases, the emergence of new initiatives, fundamentally the process of exchange was
benign as partners' perspectives remained the same.
6.4.4 Production of joined-up opportunism <formal and informal communication
Earlier in the chapter, two types of new link or communication channel were identified:
formal links or communication, which took place within partnership meetings, and
informal communication which took place outside this structured environment. This
distinction could be identified in the production of joined-up opportunism, as illustrated
in Figure 6.1.
In some partnerships, joined-up opportunism resulted from the formal partnership
structure which brought together actors who previously had not met. This could occur in
the higher and lower tiers of partnership where new groups were being established. It
could also result from the design of the structure itself. In Greenshire, for example, the
partnership structure was a matrix that linked groups working on disease and
determinants of health and care groups. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, formal
communication links or channels could have their own dynamic, constraining
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discussion or exploration of a topic, and perhaps tending to result in information
exchange rather than genuine debate. In this sense, joined-up opportunism might be
considered as more akin to co-ordination. This is discussed in more detail below under
co-ordination.
Joined-up opportunism was also reported to have occurred outside the formal
partnership structures in more informal circumstances, usually by a process of
serendipity. It was less common than that generated through the formal process and
tended to be located at a local level in the lower tiers of health and regeneration
partnerships. For example, in Greenshire and Dalesville local HImP structures brought
together individuals in the PCG and DC, resulting in several opportunistic initiatives.
Other HAZ sites have noted that informal process have contributed to change (Barnes,
Sullivan et al. 2001).
As one PCG CEO noted when talking about the origins of a new initiative being piloted
locally between community services and the housing department to enable direct
referrals:
"It came out of one of these chats at an [health] alliance meeting. It wasn't
part of the formal agenda, but because the parties happened to be there we
talked about it. In the meantime, I acted as a broker between the two
[agencies]."
The informal production of joined-up opportunism is an outcome not commonly
recognised in the literature on collaboration, because, with a few exceptions (Turcotte
and Pasquero 2001), the main focus is usually on relatively small, formal partnership
structures, not large, rambling, multi-agency structures like HlmP and HAZ
partnerships.
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6.4.5 Co-ordination
As noted above, the innovative outcomes of health partnerships could be mainly
categorised as joined-up opportunism. However, health partnerships also resulted in co-
ordination which was less innovative. Co-ordination in this sense was more of a pulling
together of information or resources that already existed.
Coordination at this level was fairly profuse in partnerships. Indeed, all sites reported an
increase in linking of strategic and operational plans beyond that seen in years prior to
the HAZ and HImP partnerships. This often involved recognising and signposting other
relevant issues to the HImP strategy such as the Community Safety Strategy and local
consultation strategies. Such co-ordination was facilitated by the employment of a
partnership co-ordinator or secondment to a partner's organisation, both usually
dependent on additional funding. With respect to the integration agenda for health and
social services, there were common reports of improved co-ordination of planning and
operational work. This work was being driven by central government and sharing of
information/data, human and financial resources resulted in reduced duplication and
clearer or redefined roles between agencies and some new services such as rapid
response or crisis prevention teams stemming from the NSF agenda.
However, such co-ordination was far from universal and interviewees from all sites
identified 'gaps' or 'holes'. Although health partnerships were credited in all sites as
putting health on LAs' agenda, for example, the community strategy and Community
Care Plans were still being produced separately, in some cases resulting in a degree of
duplication.
"We haven't succeeded in looking at how HlmP integrates with community
planning processes and all the other plans that they've [LAs] produced."
CEO, DC
As noted in Chapter 3, this was not helped by the abundance of new policy initiatives.
Co-ordination was not only lacking between the HA and LA working on the health
agenda but also between LAs and between LA departments (i.e. SS and education).
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Many LAs were still not joined-up corporately, with departments or units still working
in isolation. Work on regeneration, for example, was mixed, with examples mentioned
of good and bad co-ordination with the HA on health. In one case, the lack of LA co-
ordination on regeneration undermined a partnership bid to get resources.
Mainstream resources for the health agenda were not co-ordinated through a single
strategy or budget, as discussed in Chapter 5, apart from some co-ordination of
additional monies on specific projects in both HAZ sites.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the nature of relations and key processes of collaboration in order
to achieve partnership's distinguishing advantage - radical synergy. Previous chapters
suggested that requisite processes for collaboration were not developed; central control
measures exerted by the government coupled with local contextual factors strongly
influenced the nature of interaction between actors, undermining the processual
development of partnership. Collaboration Theory was used as a framework to explore
further the nature and level of communication between partners and whether dialogue
was in evidence, the degree of reported consensus between partners, and the nature and
location of partnership outcomes.
It revealed an increase in formal and informal communications between partners,
greater than prior to the partnerships' existence. Informal communications were
considered an essential adjunct to the functioning of partnership, helping to improve
understanding of each other and build relationships outside the stilted dynamics of a
formal group.
Nevertheless, the large formal structure, a consequence of national policy and local
context, also made communication between actors and groups in the partnerships
problematic. The quality of relations was generally described as two-way, open and
honest, although the voluntary sector's experience was more mixed and at times
opaque. However, despite broad recognition of the need to engage in honest and open
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discussion, only a few partnership groups reported a lively and on-going dialogue and
debate. Where present, it was in well-established groups in the lower tiers of
partnership. Reaching consensus was hampered by the large change agenda, the broad
nature of the task and the lack of time of participants. Although consensus appeared to
have been reached in sites, closer analysis suggested this was illusory, as certain issues
such as financial resources had been kept off the agenda. Even where consensus was
reported on the aims of partnership, there was often a lack of consensus over the means
and mechanisms of delivery. Decision-making in all sites was also hampered by the
large size of partnership groups, again a consequence of national policy and local
context. There was some evidence that membership was manipulated, with group size
reduced to improve dynamics in some instances. Attributing outcomes directly to one
partnership was difficult, due to multiple changes in the system.
Reports of joined-up thinking or radical synergy were few and far between and did not
appear to be systematically produced in any study site. As CT suggests, synergy seems
to have been generated in partnership groups where there was a possibility of altering an
established frame of reference. In the case study sites this appeared to be in the low tiers
of partnership in long established groups, where government policy had resulted in
increased membership and/or increased freedom to extend the boundaries or scope of
work. Here, there appeared to be good relations built on open communications and
balanced debate.
However, in newly created groups, relationships were not sufficiently developed at the
time of study for the necessary processes to yield synergy. Progress was hindered by
central government control as well as by local circumstance, particularly by partnership
structure and personalities. Thus, having debate and achieving consensus at the higher
tiers of partnership, in particular, was more difficult to achieve. There were no reports
of synergetic outcomes.
By contrast, however, many examples of joined-up opportunism or co-ordination were
identified. This occurred at all tiers of partnership, even outside the formal structure. As
the generation of co-ordination was less process-dependent, essentially based on the
287
exchange of information rather than changes in frames of reference, it was easier for
joined-up opportunism to occur even where communications and personal relationships
were not as strong.
Despite increased communication and connectivity, achieving radical synergy in large
partnership structures within two to three years of their development appeared difficult.
Essential processes required to achieve collaboration were undermined by the national
and local context. As large, multi-party collaboratives working on broad health policy
domains, HImP and HAZ partnerships appeared to achieve partnership as co-ordination
rather than partnership as collaboration.
The next chapter draws together the findings from this and the previous three chapters
to discuss the theoretical and policy implications.
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Chapter 7 - Discussion and conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This study has focused on strategic health partnerships set up by New Labour in 1997 to
encourage closer working and integration between local agencies, to improve delivery
and quality of health and social care, and to address poor population health and health
inequalities. HlmP and HAZ partnerships had ambitions to involve the voluntary sector
in decision-making, thereby strengthening local accountability and democratic
participation. These were key themes in the Third Way philosophy which underpinned
public sector reforms. Embedded within the government's model of partnership were
three concepts of partnership: partnership as co-ordination, collaboration and
participation. The development of strategic health partnerships was accompanied by
other reforms which embodied other modes of co-ordination, most notably hierarchy,
with new infrastructure and the application of indirect control measures to drive
partnership's performance. Elements of the former internal market were also retained.
This study has sought to understand the nature of strategic health partnerships and the
factors that influenced their development, functioning, the behaviour and interaction of
partners, and the impact of these factors on the outcomes of partnership. In this way, the
study was part formative and part evaluatory, gauging the degree to which the
government's ambitions for partnership were achieved.
No other studies of partnership have systematically unpacked the influence of
government hierarchy. And yet this study found that central command and control
mechanisms were an important influence. Indirect control measures undermined the
development, functioning and outcome of partnership. This was not due to the inherent
nature of the controls but rather to their structuring and interaction with multiple and
shifting commands. In addition, horizontal relations were affected by local context
(structural, political, cultural & professional), which in tum, influenced how actors
interpreted the costs and benefits of partnership. Two significant factors shaped actors'
perceptions: professional perspective and the nature of dependency relations. A key
finding was that these factors differentially affected the behaviour and influence of large
and small resource-based organisations. Despite sensitivity to the process costs of
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partnership, large resource-based organisations such as HAs and LAs were willing to
get involved but appeared reluctant to give up control over financial resources,
preferring to co-ordinate activity in 'zones of legitimacy' - areas of work which did not
threaten existing resource dependency relations. Small resource-based organisations,
such as those from the voluntary sector, appeared eager to engage in large partnership
structures, despite their limited capacity to do so. However, their weak and unstable
resource base also appeared to undermine their power to influence decisions on policy
and resource allocation. As a consequence, partnership as participation was weak,
although marginally stronger in HAZ partnerships, where the availability of additional
resources not only supported their involvement but also posed less of a threat to existing
resource allocation or dependency patterns of statutory agencies.
HImP and HAZ partnerships primarily showed the characteristics of partnership as co-
ordination. Exchange of information and resources led to some joining up of local
policy and to some opportunistic development of new initiatives. This also occurred as a
result of the wider network of relations resulting from the plethora of government-
sponsored area-based initiatives, a finding not reported elsewhere. Evidence of
partnership as collaboration, on the other hand, was rare. The development of radical
innovations was reported only in a few instances and in the lower tiers of partnership, in
well-established groups with an expanded remit or membership.
The study was unique in developing a framework built around three theoretical
perspectives to evaluate health partnership, each focusing on one or more aspects of
partnership, linking the policy context with interaction at the meso level and process
and outcomes at the micro level. It also clarified the concept of partnership. Other
research on HAZ and HImP partnerships (Judge, Barnes et al. 1999; Barnes, Sullivan et
al. 2001; Cole 2003; Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004) has failed to do this, making it
impossible to make the distinction between different types of outcomes and the different
processes required to achieve them. The study therefore makes a significant contribution
to the literature on health partnership.
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The remainder of this chapter gives a brief overview of the thesis and the research
questions, followed by a more detailed discussion of the findings with reference to the
theoretical perspectives. It then focuses on the broader policy context in which
partnerships were created and the implications for policy. The strengths and weaknesses
of the study are then considered and, finally, future avenues for research are discussed.
7.2 Overview and focus of thesis
This thesis was based on a comparative case study of HImP and HAZ partnerships in
four English district HAs. As no single, generally accepted theory of partnership could
be identified in the literature, I used different theoretical perspectives from different
academic disciplines to study partnership. Three were selected which were key to
understanding the context of partnership, the factors driving interaction and behaviour
and the management of relations. Each theory also focused on a different aspect of
partnership in a complementary way and was able to accommodate one or more notions
of partnership projected by the government and its Third Way (see Section 1.2 and 1.3
in Chapter 1).
The governance framework was used to conceptualise the reforms to public services in
terms of market, hierarchy and networks. This perspective provided an analytical
framework with which to understand the wider policy context as well as to explore the
influence of government hierarchy on partnership, particularly the raft of indirect
control measures (i.e. targets) introduced to drive and direct its performance.
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) provided a theoretical framework to analyse and
understand the influences on relationships between local partners. This was not only
useful for identifying the factors that lead organisations to enter into partnership but also
for understanding how partners behave and interact. The symmetry of resource
dependency relations is crucial to an actor's influence over resource exchange. Since
strategic health partnerships were established to influence policy and resource
allocation, this theoretical perspective facilitated an assessment of partnership as
participation.
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Finally, Collaboration Theory (CT) provided a normative framework against which the
quality of interactive processes in partnership could be benchmarked and the nature of
outcomes assessed. By analysing the factors which influence interaction in partnership
as well as the origin of different types of outcome, this perspective allowed an
assessment of partnership as co-ordination or collaboration.
Studies using these theoretical perspectives were reviewed although the evidence
relating specifically to health partnerships was generally thin and of varying
methodological quality. In addition, the empirical literature on health partnerships in the
UK was reviewed. The literature highlighted a number of assumptions and issues
relating to: the national and local context in which partnerships operate; the
management of interaction between partners; and the structuring of the content of the
problem-solving process. These were used to scrutinise the government's approach to
partnership and identified three broad areas for enquiry.
First, there was the tension between the indirect control mechanisms imposed by central
government to direct and steer partnership and the autonomy required by local
partnerships to develop and implement their own programmes in response to local
health problems.
Second, there were contradictory assumptions about the nature of local actors, their
motivation or willingness to get involved in partnership, and their ability to influence
others in partnership. Despite financial incentives for HAZ partnerships and the removal
of some legal barriers to resource exchange, the government assumed that actors would
be willing to get involved in partnership, particularly the voluntary sector. To encourage
involvement, the government promoted a whole systems perspective and social model
of health. Theory indicated that this approach which plays both on self-interest and a
degree of altruism might be too simplistic. The structure of the environment at macro
and meso levels is highly influential on the behaviour and interaction of local actors,
whether through the structure of capitalism and the groups and interests it favours (Le.
the medical profession) or the size and structure of resource dependencies and the
availability of resources. Nevertheless, the government assumed that partners,
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particularly the voluntary sector, would be able to influence decision-making on policy
and resource allocation (expressed in its model of partnership as participation), despite
evidence to suggest that their motivations, resource base and the nature of their
dependency relations were very different.
Third, there was an assumption in policy documents that partnership would lead to
innovation, synergy or 'added value', but without being clear whether these outcomes
were different or recognising that management of partnership might lead to different
outcomes. The theoretical literature distinguishes between radical and incremental
innovation/synergy, suggesting very different processes of production. Producing
radical innovation - assumed as the most appropriate process outcome for tackling
entrenched social problems - requires participants to reframe their ways of thinking
(partnership as collaboration). This involves the negotiation of conflicting perspectives
and interests and subsequent consensus-building, and is facilitated by conducting these
processes in a just and fair manner. Although the government model of partnership
emphasised consensus, the key processual attribute - conflict - was overlooked.
These three avenues of enquiry were used to generate four research questions, the
findings of which were presented in Chapter 3, 4,5 & 6.
7.3 Summary and discussion of the findings
This section presents a summary of the findings and discusses their theoretical
implications.
7.3.1 Central control, local autonomy conundrum
Chapter 3 focused on the impact of vertical command and control mechanisms of
central government on the development, functioning and outcome of health partnership,
exploring the tension between them. The command mechanisms were the means by
which the government articulated and implemented its large-scale reform of the public
sector. Commands created new decentralised organisational forms (Le. PCOffs) as well
as encouraging and mandating strategic health partnerships. Accompanying policies
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promoted a social model of health and a systems-based perspective. These resonated
strongly with the population perspective of health held by many public health and health
promotion professionals. Data showed that this policy atmosphere provided impetus for
forming local strategic health partnerships, and helped move health improvement from a
marginal to a mainstream issue. However, the large number of policy commands also
placed a large resource burden on statutory organisations. Furthermore, government
policy was not as 'joined up' as its rhetoric, with persisting departmentalism resulting in
policy incoherence. This led to confusion and duplication, and detracted resources away
from building and developing partnerships. The focus of commands also shifted as the
hierarchical goals of achieving health improvement were substituted for more health
service-orientated goals. It was in this context that the control mechanisms were
introduced to drive partnership, based on performance management of output and
behavioural targets and standards linked to incentives and sanctions. In practice, the
application of performance management was heavily applied and also lacked
consistency across the public sector. The shifting policy emphasis towards achieving
health service goals was more suited to performance management, and increasing
pressure on the government to show delivery of its agenda resulted in an increasingly
heavy application of the tool. This drew organisational resources away from developing
partnership. While financial incentives seemed to encourage local organisations to form
partnerships, changes to funding arrangements (size, timeline and rules), together with
draconian sanctions for non-compliance, perversely influenced the nature and quality of
partnership outcomes away from health improvement and inequalities reduction.
The case studies showed that health partnerships developed in an environment of
multiple, incoherent and shifting command and control mechanisms, which interacted
with one another in positive and negative ways, ultimately undermining the original
goals for partnership. This negative influence, however, was due more to the magnitude
and changing orientation of the command and control mechanisms than to the inherent
property of the tools themselves. Thus, the ambitiousness and pace of government
reforms placed organisational resources at a premium. The shifting focus placed further
constraints on resources as local statutory organisations tried to respond.
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Discussion
Sub-optimisation as a tool of hierarchical control can be undermined by ambiguity in
measuring behaviour and outputs, or subverted by goal displacement or bureaucratic
behaviour, as noted in Chapter 1. The findings of this study show that the use of indirect
control measures was effective in directing the focus of partnerships, but on health
improvement their impact was weakened in part by their ambiguity. The government's
shift in policy towards health services, and the accompanying promulgation of health
service targets, with their emphasis on hard process outputs (Le. waiting times), were
instrumental in this. Health service targets were easier to measure and more
immediately attributable to the work of partner organisations. By contrast, achieving
health improvement targets was more difficult to achieve and demonstrate. The result
was a greater emphasis on health service activity with health improvement targets
becoming de facto a secondary priority, an observation reported in other sites
(Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002). There was also a degree of goal displacement as the
rules and structure of incentives were changed, with the result that partnerships sought
to satisfy the system rather than their original raison d'etre. The restructuring of
incentives and sanctions attached to additional monies added to goal displacement as
partnerships were more concerned with spending funding than the quality of the
initiatives being developed. The use of indirect control mechanisms paradoxically
seemed to limit local success, a finding reported in other HlmP and HAZ partnerships
(Exworthy, Berney et al. 2002; Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004).
The assumption behind the use of performance management and audit is that benefit
reaped from the use of these tools is greater than the cost of imposing such a system (i.e.
the collection and analysis of data, the writing and submission of reports) - an
assumption that has rarely been evaluated (Power 1997). The transaction costs
associated with performance managing additional funds were found to be high.
Furthermore, the level of performance management increased dramatically over the
study period as more and more targets were introduced by the government. The ability
to bear this information/monitoring burden was weakened by the other demands being
placed on organisations, which were also drawing precious resources away from the
important task of developing partnership relations and local programmes of action. The
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(cost) effectiveness of indirect control mechanisms in this environment needs to be
questioned.
Nonetheless, indirect control mechanisms were successful in steering behaviour and
action in local partnerships. It was the lack of emphasis placed on health improvement
service and the perceived lack of sanctions for non-delivery that resulted in greater
efforts being placed on health service delivery than on the health partnership agenda.
Re-adjusting this balance together with the use of 'harder', intermediate health targets
may have resulted in greater progress.
7.3.2 Understanding the local dynamics ofpartnership
Chapters 4 and 5 used RDT to examine the factors influencing the formation and
maintenance of relations as well as the nature of interaction in partnership. Actors
appeared to be aware of the costs and benefits of partnership and made a calculative
assessment of inter-organisational interaction, a positive assessment then affecting the
degree of involvement. The immediate costs of establishing and developing partnership
were widely recognised as involving human, administrative and financial resources.
Benefits included access to additional funds as well as less tangible, more long-term
remuneration such as improved inter-organisational relations (informational) or a better
understanding of health issues. There were a number of different factors that appeared
to shape their assessment of the costs and benefits of interaction. These related to
national policy, local structures and boundaries, local politics and organisational culture
and professional training. How they were weighted in actors' calculative assessments
appeared to be contingent on their professional perspective. In particular, actors with a
broad population health perspective appeared to be more tolerant of the costs and
optimistic of the benefits than those with a narrower bio-medical view, who understood
health in terms of curing illness in individuals rather than promoting activities to
improve health in the population. For those with a bio-medical view, health partnership
was perceived as less relevant to their work; marginal benefits were foreshadowed by
high transaction costs. Different models of health were allied to different views on
where work on health improvement belonged (i.e. its domain): in the NHS or as a multi-
agency activity. The resource environment in which the costs and benefits were
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weighed up also appeared to be influential, reducing tolerance to the cost of partnership
while sharpening focus on the proffered benefits.
Two other factors were shown to be influential on organisations' involvement in health
partnership as well as the nature of relations within partnerships: resource base and
symmetry of resource dependencies. Together with the factors influencing costs and
benefits, these provided a fairly good explanation of the different degrees of
organisational involvement in HImP and HAZ partnerships within and between sites.
The nature of involvement in partnership and behaviour of large resource-based
organisations with fairly symmetrical resource dependencies appeared to differ from
that of smaller organisations with asymmetrical relations. For large organisations with a
mandate to participate in health partnership, the degree of involvement appeared to be
sensitive to an actor's cost-benefit calculation of the process of partnership. The
availability of additional resources in a resource-scarce environment was a sufficient
incentive to swing the balance in favour of being involved, even for actors who had a
very narrow perspective of health and were more sensitive to process costs (Trusts).
However, the degree of influence over resource allocation did not appear to change,
with organisations appearing reticent to relinquishing control over core budgets. In one
site where there was an attempt to change the underlying resource dependency
relationship, relations broke down, creating an atmosphere of low trust between the
agencies concerned. Combined with a personality clash between key individuals, the
result was an IS-month hiatus in the development of the HImP.
By contrast, involvement in health partnership of small resource-based organisations
such as the voluntary sector (but also PCGs, CHCs etc) with asymmetrical resource
dependency relations appeared to be driven more by the presence of a weak and
unstable resource base. Although aware of the costs associated with the process of
partnership, these organisations seemed more willing to bear the costs in order to
maintain or increase their access to financial resources or to promote their interests. The
asymmetry of resource dependency relations also appeared to influence the nature of
relations. The limited access to alternative resources and their heavy dependency on
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larger organisations reduced smaller, dependent organisations' ability to exert influence
or control over resources within the relationship. Large resource-based organisations
seemed reluctant to lose control over core resources or to rectify this situation by
strengthening small organisations. That said, where resources were less critical (i.e.
additional monies), there was greater willingness to share control or power. The more
influential voluntary organisations were the more established ones that had developed
Compacts setting out the rules of engagement around funding and activity. Developing
such Compacts appeared to strengthen the voluntary sector's influence as large
resource-based organisations were more dependent on the sector (Le. through care
provision).
Discussion
The findings of Chapters 4 and 5 appeared to support the general assertions of RDT.
Actors assess how inter-organisational relations will impact on their interests, be they
financial, political or informational, and manoeuvre to increase resources, reduce
uncertainty and, to a degree, preserve autonomy. The costs and benefits of inter-
organisational relations appeared to be influenced by a range of contextual factors.
Others have identified similar factors - structural, procedural, financial, professional
and relational (eg. status and legitimacy) - which influence how actors interpret the
value of partnership (Hardy, Turrel et al. 1992). Challis (1988) separates these into
structural and behavioural factors and categorises them as either primary or secondary
co-ordinative environments. The driving force in this model is the secondary co-
ordinative environment, which relates to actors' interpretation of partnership in terms of
administrative costs, resources and domain. In this study the perceptions of the costs
and benefits of partnership were moulded by ideology, in particular the differing
professional perspectives on health, Le. the bio-medical model or the broader public
health perspective. This was a significant influence on how actors saw the domain of
health improvement, Le. whether they perceived health improvement as within the remit
of their organisation and therefore of interest. Officers with a narrow bio-medical view
tended to see health improvement as either a public healthlhealth promotion or NHS
issue, depending on their location. Benson (1975) identifies professional perspective
and domain as independent variables which influence network co-ordination. In this
study, however, these two factors appeared dependent on one another - ideology
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influencing perceptions of domain. While this view concurs with Challis's (1988)
collaborative model, it goes further in recognising the role of professional ideology on
actors' perception of their interdependence on organisations either for resources or in
dealing with a social problem. In this study actors holding a bio-medical view were also
less likely to recognise their dependence on other organisations in dealing with health
improvement. It supports Logsdon's (1991) findings that recognising interests and
interdependence are two essential prerequisites for partnership. The study reaffirms the
significance of professional ideology in partnership, particularly as to how they
influence these two dimensions. Professions are based on a division of labour and
specialisation. Professional ideology often aligns with demarcation of territory, which,
in turn, creates interdependencies on others (Logsdon 1991). Historically, different
health and social care professions have been accorded different social status and power,
derived from the control over, and privileging of certain types of knowledge (Hudson
2003). They have also been afforded different levels of discretion and accountability in
their work - a consequence of the complexity and the lack of predictability in their work
(Hudson 2002). These three elements - world view, status and autonomy - have a
significant influence on how different professionals perceive their interests and
interdependence. Encouraging different professions to work in health partnership will
require re-negotiation of work domains, in order to establish new but clear boundaries
(Rushmer and Pallis 2002). This will require education and socialisation but in an area
where there is high societal value attached to medial knowledge, there may be
considerable resistance (Hudson 2003).
This study's findings also concur with Challis's (1988) conclusion that large to medium
size organisations with a steady resource base and in symmetrical relations are best
placed to collaborate, but that such organisations in a resource-scarce environment may
be less willing to take risks, co-operating on areas of work which do not fundamentally
upset underlying resource dependency relationships, what Scharpf (1978) calls 'zones
of legitimacy'. Regardless of the overarching rationale for partnership, greater
integration proved threatening to some partners (Lowndes and Sullivan 2004).
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This study points to the nature of a partner's dependency relations as a significant factor
in its ability to exert influence. The asymmetrical dependency of the voluntary sector on
large statutory organisations (HA and SS) appeared to undermine its influence. In a
resource-scarce environment, the larger more powerful organisations appeared to exert
their dominance over less powerful organisations (Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2000). The
voluntary sector's lack of influence in HAZ sites has been noted elsewhere, although
credited to its lack of capacity (Sullivan, Judge et al. 2004). However, a few established
voluntary organisations did appear to exert greater influence through developing
Compacts with larger statutory organisations. By increasing statutory agencies'
dependency on them, they were able to transform their relationship towards mutual
dependence (Scharpf 1978). Although conscious of the loss of autonomy this might
entail, it did not appear to deter the voluntary organisations from using this tactical
manoeuvre to access a more stable flow of resources. This finding is supported by
Oliver's (1991) research and appeared to contradict some elements of ROT.
Chapters 4 & 5 also identified the role of key individuals in developing partnership.
Although the behaviour of all actors was dependent on how they interpreted the
relevance and value of partnership, which, in turn, was dependent on their perspective
on health, key individuals had specific attributes relating to their position or abilities
which gave them undue influence on all elements of partnership.
Their importance has been recognised by other researchers, particularly around the
management of the agenda, building relations and driving partnership forward. Where
they hold perspectives congruent with the notion of partnership and champion the cause,
these tacticians (Challis, Fuller et al. 1988), reticulists (Webb 1991) boundary spanners
(Williams 2002) or social entrepreneurs (De Leeuw 1999) as they have been called,
work horizontally across organisations. To operate effectively they also require
legitimacy, a participatory style and a range of political skills which are different from
traditional hierarchical, managerial approaches (Huxham and Vangen 2000b; Hudson
2003). Unlike Challis, I have not recognised key individuals in my primary co-
ordinative environment as their influence is more concerned with the 'how to do' rather
than 'what factor influenced' partnership. Nevertheless, the role of key individuals does
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raise some pertinent issues relating to how they should be developed and retained, given
their pivotal role, the base of their legitimacy (Hudson 2003), and the different skills
required in different types of partnership (strategic or operational) or phases of their
development (Williams 2002).
In general, RDT provided a relatively powerful framework for explaining the factors
which influence the degree of involvement in partnership and the nature of relations,
but, as noted at the end of in Chapter 5, it does not account for actors actively managing
the partnership process nor recognise that this might influence the nature of outcomes.
7.3.3 Managing partnership and assumptions about innovation
Chapter 6 focused further on the process and outcomes of partnerships and attempted to
link the two using CT. It also identified other influential aspects of the national and
local environment as well as providing a richer understanding of interaction in
partnership. The chapter examined whether the key process characteristics required for
collaboration were present. Analysis of interaction showed that the level of formal and
informal communication between organisations had increased as a result of partnership
but that communications between groups within the larger partnership structure were
not very strong. The presence of a dedicated facilitator in groups appeared to improve
communication and advance programme development. Although the quality of relations
was generally described as open, honest and two-way, only a few groups reported a
lively and on-going dialogue and debate. Achieving a real consensus in partnership was
undermined by the lack of time, the broad focus of the agenda, and the large size of
partnership groups, resulting from the large and ambitious national agenda and local
context. Even where consensus appeared to have been achieved, financial resources
were kept off the agenda. Attributing outcomes directly to the partnership was also
difficult, with most groups using or developing previous work or ideas. Indeed, reports
of radical innovation or 'joined up thinking' were very few; where it did occur was in
established groups in the lower tiers of partnership (rather than in the board or steering
groups), which had expanded their size or scope of work in response to government
policy. In this environment, reframing seemed more likely. This contrasted with newly
formed groups, which did not have sufficiently developed relationships to undergo the
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necessary processes to achieve such an outcome. In these groups, co-ordination through
a process of information and resource exchange (instead of reframing) was the outcome.
Co-ordination or 'joined up opportunism' was also reported as a result of the increased
level of informal inter-agency encounters resulting from the proliferation of area-based
initiatives - a finding not known to have been reported elsewhere.
Discussion
Such radical innovation is more likely to emerge when negotiations are undertaken in an
atmosphere which is open, fair and critical but not judgemental. Although the study
identified some characteristics of procedural justice (Eden and Huxham 2001),
conflictual dialogue, which arises in the renegotiation of social relations or the framing
of perspectives (Hoggett 2003), was not evident. Lack of conflict may not be surprising
when critical or core resources were not on the table. The real interests of partners were
not at stake. Furthermore, the results revealed that national and local context appeared
to undermine the process for achieving radical innovation. The large number of
government priorities resulted in large, 'complex' partnership structures (Matka, Barnes
et al. 2002) with many sub-groups, making it more difficult to communicate and
develop a coherent vision and programme, particularly in rural areas where the large
number of organisational boundaries made for very large partnership groups. Indeed,
large groups can also obscure decision-making, reducing voluntary sector participation
(Lowndes and Sullivan 2004). The role of partnership structure on the process of
interaction is little studied. Huxham (2000a) reports that large diverse groups coupled
with changing membership and ambiguous and complex structures can undermine the
management of interaction and the achievement of collaborative advantage (radical
innovation), as was found in this study. Although ambiguity can help achieve consensus
over general objectives in partnerships with a broad policy agenda, it can also limit the
nature of their outcomes (Turcotte and Pasquero 2001). Ambiguity often precludes
conflict, an essential ingredient to the reframing of perspectives and adjustment of
interests. On the other hand, Turcotte's (2001) paradox - that increasing group
diversity, the very thing that leads to radical innovation, makes achieving this outcome
more difficult - was confirmed in the upper echelons of partnership, where relations
were new. It was less the case in the more established groups which had expanded their
membership. This suggests that the pre-invested social capital in groups may have been
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sufficiently robust to cope with conflict resulting from a small expansion in group size
and remit. In terms of facilitating and managing processes and relations in (large)
groups, the presence of a facilitator/co-ordinator appeared to ensure that co-ordination
was more likely to be achieved. There did not appear to be any correlation with radical
innovation, perhaps an indication of the time and skills required to generate this
outcome.
The generation of 'additional' co-ordination outside the formal partnership structures
could be attributed to an increase in 'structural embeddedness' of partnership members
in localities - in other words, the extent to which actors' mutual contacts are connected
to one another through a third party (Granovetter 1992). The more embedded in local
networks, the more an actor knows about all of the other players and the more likely to
share values, assumptions and understandings (Hudson 2003). This may be conducive
to information flow but may also constrain information or behaviour which seeks to
challenge the status quo. It suggests that local networks' development might have an
optimal level of embeddedness for generating co-ordination, since social control,
particularly in dense networks, is likely to curb radical innovation.
Balance of theoretical perspectives
RDT has taken a prominent role in the findings of this thesis. Although to some extent
this was on account of its usefulness in explaining the factors which influence the
degree of organisational involvement in partnership, it would be wrong to diminish the
accounts of partnership provided by the other two theories. The influence of hierarchy,
for example, was probably the most significant factor on partnership's development.
While RDT is capable of incorporating notions of vertical dependency into its
explanatory framework, it takes a relatively crude approach. Using a framework based
on hierarchy enabled greater conceptual clarity when exploring relations between
central government and local actors. Similarly, Cf provided a means to scrutinise the
nature of relations far more closely than RDT. Indeed, both hierarchy and Cf provided
insights that would not have been possible by using RDT alone. For example, C'I called
into question reports of consensus which had not arisen through a process of managed
conflict. In addition, CT also provided a framework to link process to different types of
outcome. This was beyond the scope of RDT. On reflection, the theoretical balance in
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this thesis is probably more a reflection of the focus and type of data collection rather
than the significance of each theory in understanding partnership.
7.3.4 Partnership as co-ordination, collaboration and participation
Given the findings above, an attempt was made to further classify the outcomes of
HImP and HAZ partnerships as co-ordination, collaboration or participation, or all
three.
Partnership as co-ordination in the public sector can be conceptualised as local
organisations working together towards a joint outcome (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1)
through exchanging information and resources. In this way, services are better co-
ordinated and duplication reduced, improving efficiency. The creation of large strategic
health partnership structures certainly resulted in increased communication and
information exchange between agencies, moving health issues up the agenda and
resulting in more awareness of other organisations' activities and functions. This led to
some joining up of policy at a local level, and to some opportunistic development of
new initiatives. The organisational reforms and profusion of other area-based
partnerships created a network of local relations which added to serendipitous
encounters and led to the development of some additional opportunistic initiatives
above and beyond those produced by the formal structures. Incremental innovation,
therefore, was the most common outcome of partnership. But even achieving this
outcome was undermined by the shifting and heavily applied indirect control
mechanisms of government. Under external pressure and deadlines, local partnerships
resorted to previously shelved initiatives. Outcomes were also sensitive to the human
and financial resources that could be obtained or allocated to the partnership process - a
process which in tum was dependent on the national and local context.
The government's model of partnership emphasised the involvement of a wide range of
stakeholders, which was considered key to generating innovative responses to difficult
and complex social problems. This model echoed CT, which stresses the involvement of
key stakeholders, the reframing of perspectives to develop a shared appreciation of the
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problem and the development of radically innovative solutions. However, this study
found partnership as collaboration was far less in evidence than partnership as co-
ordination, for the reasons explained above. Achieving collaboration, according to CT,
is also dependent on the management of conflicting perspectives and interests, from
which new insights and ideas arise. Conflict is harnessed to provide creative solutions
which are then taken forward through negotiating consensus. However, Chapter 5
showed how the characteristics of the local context can create conflict, through the
actions or behaviour (personality) of key individuals as well as changes to underlying
resource dependency relationships. Other sources of conflict commonly identified in
partnership are those relating to policies, objectives, priorities, structures and procedures
(Markwell 1998). Rather than a positive force, conflict precluded the development of
partnership. This finding re-emphasises the point that conflict per se is not a source of
innovation. It can be viewed as having negative as well as positive consequences for
groups, depending on an individual's value system (Buchanan and Huczynski 1997).
However, it is the skilful management of conflict that gives rise to creativity and change
(Markwell 1998).
New Labour also advocated partnership as a way to increase participative democracy
and restore local accountability (Sullivan, Barnes et al. 2004). The involvement of the
voluntary sector as an equal and influential partner in local decision-making on policy
and resource allocation was central to this notion of partnership as participation. The
findings suggested that participation was not really achieved. Although the voluntary
sector was fairly active and involved in HAZ partnerships, this only related to additional
monies. When it came to increased voluntary sector involvement in more strategic
decisions such as allocations of core or mainstream resources, their influence or power
did not appear to have significantly changed. In some instances, the evolving and rather
large partnership structures shut out the voluntary sector as their interests or boundaries
did not fit with national priorities or local concerns. It was also undermined by the weak
link between the HlmP strategy and SaFF and JIP groups (Carlisle, Shickle et al. 2004).
Lack of strategic support for the sector weakened its position and capacity to engage
and appeared to make it cynical about its involvement. Again, government commands
appeared to undermine participation with the statutory agencies moving in to promote
the government's large, shifting agenda. This resulted in overload and heavily directed
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meetings, leaving voluntary sector members questioning their contribution. Similar
factors were identified in a study of statutory engagement with communities as well as
in other HAZ partnerships (Matka, Barnes et al. 2002; Pickin, Popay et al. 2002).
Participation in this sense was more akin to tokenism - what Arnstein (1969) calls
placation or consultation. The voluntary sector was only marginally more involved and
influential in partnership than prior to the establishment of HImPs. Power differentials
remained, with the lack of knowledge, support and resources making it difficult for the
sector to be an equal player (Matka, Barnes et a1.2002).
The government reforms, therefore, appeared to result in partnership as co-ordination
rather than partnership as collaboration or participation. The orientation of this finding
is perhaps not surprising as participation is central to creating partnership as
collaboration. It is not only the presence of alternative perspective or points of view in
partnership but the power of the voluntary sector to influence that is crucial to
generating radical innovation. Part of the reluctance of statutory organisations to open
up to voluntary sector participation was related to the latter's perceived lack of
legitimacy (Sullivan, Barnes et al. 2004). Discursive legitimacy - the ability to speak
legitimately for issues and other organisations - is an important source of power in
partnership (Phillips, Lawrence et a1.2000). However, legitimacy is usually determined
by the statutory officers that convene partnership (Gray 1989), and in this study at least,
was related in part to the extent to which voluntary organisations/groups were
considered representative of their sector. Yet whether anyone actor can represent one
homogenised sector perspective is questionable. Furthermore, ensunng
representativeness through elections depends on having a well developed infrastructure,
which, in turn, given the nature of resource dependencies, is likely to depend on the
largesse of the statutory agencies. This is likely to re-enforce the statutory sector's
power. The ability of the voluntary sector to get heard also depends on the knowledge,
confidence and negotiating skills of representatives, which will depend to some extent
on access to resources (Lowndes and Sullivan 2004). These issues present significant
challenges to involving more excluded and marginal groups in partnership, let alone
achieving 'conflict dialogue' required for radical innovation once they are engaged.
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7.4 Implications for policy
This study was undertaken when HImP and HAZ partnerships (second wave) were still
in their second/third year. The shape of the NHS and of strategic health partnerships has
changed significantly since the data in this study was collected, as noted in Section 1.5.3
in Chapter 1. HAs have now been replaced by PCTs, which are now the devolved
organisational face of local health purchasing and providing.
The requirement to have a HImP partnership and produce a strategy has ceased.
Although HAZ partnerships remain, their future depends on whether government
honours its commitment to fund them.
Following the publication of the Wanless reports (2002), emphasis has swung back
towards the public health agenda, culminating in the publication of Choosing Health
(DoH 2004a). The use of partnership as a means to improve population health, reduce
inequalities and increase integration between services has continued to be stressed in
government policy documents and guidance egothe creation of children's centres in the
children's NSF (DoH 2004b).
However, strategic work on health improvement and inequalities now falls within the
remit of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). LSPs provide a single overarching co-
ordination framework within which other, more specific local partnerships can operate
(DETR 2000b). Unlike HImP and HAZ partnerships, they are primarily LA-led and
involve a wide range of stakeholders, including all council departments, in producing
the Community Strategy (CS). However the division of responsibilities between the LA
and LSPs remains unclear (Atkinson 2004). Initially established in the 20% of most
deprived neighbourhoods, LSPs are now widespread.
The emphasis on devolving power to the voluntary sector, local
communities/neighbourhoods and patients/consumers in order to increase
responsiveness of local services and accountability has continued, in what has become
the 'New Localism' (Atkinson 2004). Section 11 of the Health and Social Care Act
307
(2001), for example, requires PCTs to consult and involve the voluntary sector in the
planning and commissioning of services, while the 'Expert Patient' programme places
greater emphasis on patients with chronic long-term conditions being involved in
decisions concerning their treatment (DoH 200Ig). Nationally, an agreement between
the NHS and the voluntary sector has set up the National Strategic Partnership Forum to
advise ministers on partnership (DoH 2004c). Guidance for LSPs also re-iterates the
need to involve the voluntary and private sectors 'to agree a holistic approach to solving
problems with a common vision, agreed objectives, pooled expertise and agreed
priorities for the allocation of resources' (DETR 2000b). Partnership as co-ordination,
participation and collaboration is still very much evident in the policy agenda.
The emphasis on hierarchy has also continued unabated. The use of indirect controls
persists strongly, although the number of targets has been rationalised and reduced.
PCTs are required to produce a Local Development Plan (LOP) which sets out how it
will achieve national priorities and targets within a three-year timeframe. PCTs report to
the newly created Strategic Health Authorities (StHA). LAs are required to report on
progress in achieving national 'floor targets' and the development of Local Public
Service Agreements (LPSAs) in documents such as Community Strategy (University of
Warwick, Liverpool John Moores University et al. 2004a). Thus, performance
indicators and targets remain firmly embedded as a means of controlling indirectly NHS
and LA activity.
Markets as a mode of co-ordination in the NHS have also continued to be developed.
Payment by Results (PbR) (DoH 2002c) together with initiatives such as 'Patient
Choice' will see the development of a new 'internal market' (DoH 2004d; Greener
2004). Patients, in conjunction with their GPs, will drive change through choosing their
preferred hospital for treatment. With money following the patient and prices set
centrally, the aim is to establish a competitive acute sector market to drive up quality
and performance.
Key elements of government policy have persisted if not been extended since this
research was undertaken. Nevertheless, the structure and membership of strategic health
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partnerships have been in constant flux as new organisations have been created and
policy developed. LSPs are now entering their third year, and are therefore at a similar
stage in their development to the health partnerships in this study. The results of this
study are therefore still relevant to the prevailing policy environment.
What are the policy lessons of this study? If it is assumed that health partnership is a
'good thing', how should government support it? This is discussed next.
Achieving partnership is not a straightforward process of placing different agencies or
organisations in a room and expecting them to work together effectively to tackle
difficult social problems. It is resource-intensive and needs an appropriately structured
national environment to encourage and develop the local context and management skills
in order to get the most out of partnership and avoid collaborative inertia. How might
this be encouraged?
National context
The relationship between national government and local agencies (central-local
relations) was a significant influence on partnership, affecting the structure, nature and
process of interaction and the types of partnership outcome. The structuring of central-
local relations therefore needs careful consideration. In this study, the large change
agenda used limited organisational resources and diluted focus and efforts directed
towards developing partnerships. Ensuring greater coherence in policy (in terms of
content and timing) emanating from different government departments would reduce
confusion and duplication when implementing policy.
The continued policy emphasis on partnership is to be welcomed in providing
continuity and encouragement. This has resulted in the proliferation of partnerships
(Jones and Stewart 2004), which, while increasing opportunities for informal co-
ordination, has introduced new complexities in terms of organisational roles and
governance. Although LSPs now provide a mechanism for co-ordinating these
partnerships, the government needs to clarify the division of responsibilities between
the LA and LSP, particularly with regard to developing and implementing the CS
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(Atkinson 2004), if further fragmentation and partnership 'silos' are to be avoided
(Skelcher 2004).
The NHS has been beset by continuous revolution over the past 20 years (Webster
2002). As a consequence, organisational structures, boundaries and staff have been in
constant flux. This has made it very difficult for actors socially skilled in partnership
(Le. tacticians), let alone regular actors, to form stable inter-organisational relationships
and develop and consolidate local knowledge (Jones, Thomas et al. 2004). Indeed, the
constant fracturing of organisations has involved major staff changes, increasing the
risk of 'boundary spanner' loss (Williams 2002). Furthermore, re-negotiation of
relationships and structures delays the production of any potential benefits. Any future
government reforms will need to be mindful of the impact of restructuring and change
on partnership.
Performance management
Performance management of a partnership is more complex and difficult than that of an
organisation (University of Warwick, Liverpool John Moores University et al. 2004a).
In this study, performance management was successful in directing activity but its
heavy-handed application and shifting orientation served to undermine partnerships,
impacting on the interaction, process, quality and focus of outputs. It resulted in a 'top
down' focus on health service activities, emphasising modernisation rather than the
health inequalities agenda. A more stable and moderate application of performance
management which recognises that change is a long-term process (Lawson, Mackenzie
et al. 2002; Matka, Barnes et al. 2002) may have less negative consequences for
partnership. Indeed, if strong sanctions were applied to CEDs for not delivering on
meaningful health inequalities targets (rather than 'hard' health service targets) and if
the reporting demands of the centre were not so resource-consuming, its impact on
directing activity and delivering desired outcomes might be significant. Performance
management is likely to be more effective if it is 'joined up' on health inequalities, for
example through the LSP structures. This would help to align organisational priorities
and agendas (University of Warwick, Liverpool John Moores University et al. 2004a).
In this study, the use of different indicators by different government departments, for
example, created duplication and was a disincentive to cross-partnership working.
310
Performance management systems were also at very different stages of development
across sites. Currently, StHAs have responsibility for performance management ofNHS
organisations and HAZ partnerships while several other government units or
departments are responsible for monitoring delivery in local government. Developing
performance management systems takes time and resource and progress will develop on
local circumstance and history. A more considered approach to performance
management could have a significant impact on local delivery around health
inequalities.
Structuring incentives and sanctions
The government used incentives and sanctions to direct and steer local actors'
behaviour. It also promoted a social model of health and a systems perspective. In so
doing, its approach was a tacit recognition that local actors were both 'knaves'
(primarily motivated by self-interest) and 'knights' (responding with chivalrous intent
towards the government's commands) (Le Grand 1997). Structuring policy around
knaves to entice them into desired action (or deter certain behaviours), while leaving
knights to act with honourable intentions, was reminiscent of the planned bargaining
framework advocated by Challis (1988).
In this study the use of incentives and sanctions appeared effective in encouraging local
actors to enter into partnership, even those with a narrow bio-medical view (i.e. actors
from Acute Trusts). Fear of financial sanctions, however. resulted in a needs-led or
'bottom up' local prioritisation process being pushed aside in order to satisfy the
centre's demand for spending the money and establishing projects. Further, the
attractive pull of funds was also a distraction to participants in partnership, who became
overly concerned with the process and fairness of fund disbursement.
Given these findings. the government should continue to be mindful of the factors that
influence self-interest when developing policy. These may be social, managerial,
political etc, but as was shown in Chapter 5, they also include financial/resource
dependency issues.
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Through national policy the government is able to influence directly resource allocation
and flow in the environment, and therefore resource dependencies, resource base and
resource scarcity. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the undoing of
previous policies on partnership (Webb 1991; Nocon 1994). In this study, resource
scarcity appeared to make many organisations more introverted and less willing to
engage in partnership or take risks when involved.
The government's increased emphasis on markets to improve treatment quality, through
initiatives such as PbR, may be detrimental to working in health partnerships.
Increasing competition between hospital trusts is likely to reinforce self-interested,
inward-looking behaviour as actors focus on their own delivery and guard health and
financial information in order to protect their interests.
A key factor affecting the involvement of actors from large resource-based
organisations in symmetrical relations was the cost of engaging in partnership,
particularly in a resource-scarce environment. Reducing the burden of process or
transaction costs through ring-fenced funding may be one way of enhancing
involvement.
Incentives, for example, did not appear sufficient for HAs and SS to share or pool
budgets; pressure on resources in a resource-scarce environment and symmetry and size
of resource base appeared to make these organisations reluctant to jeopardise
established relationships. Changing the nature and increasing the size of incentives and
sanctions may provide the necessary means to overcome this reluctance. One illustration
of this is the Community Care Act (2003). Introduced in 2004, it imposed compensatory
financial payments to local hospitals on SS departments that delay discharge. It also
recognised (resource) interdependencies and provided additional resources to LAs to
enable them to build up convalescence and other support services and to develop
smooth patient pathways in advance, thereby paving the way for increasing integration
and co-ordination of discharge and intermediate care services (Glendinning and
Coleman 2003). Similar approaches may encourage greater innovation and integration
between PCTs and SS. However, success will also depend on the government creating
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domain consensus through clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities across the
health and social care divide (Bridgen 2003).
Strong central control over funding, through the use of ring-fencing, and restricted local
delegation of funds helped keep decisions over core resources out of the partnership
forum. Having small, delegated, ring-fenced budgets for partnership groups, might help
get 'quick wins', improving voluntary sector involvement and influence (University of
Warwick, Liverpool John Moores University et al. 2004b).
Encouraging small resource-based organisations
In small resource-based organisations increasing resource stability appeared more
prominent in the voluntary sector's (and PCGs') calculations than process costs.
Although a weak and unstable resource base appeared to encourage involvement in
health partnership, it also limited small resource-based organisations' capacity to
participate, and crucially, their capacity to influence local policy and resource
allocation.
Voluntary sector involvement
Improving the stability and capacity of the voluntary sector (regarding finance,
administration and policy) could make an important contribution to achieving
partnership as collaboration and participation. This has been recognised in other
research on health partnerships, including LSPs (Unwin and Westland 2000; Matka,
Barnes et al. 2002; Pickin, Popay et al. 2002; University of Warwick, Liverpool John
Moores University et al. 2004b). Promoting the negotiation of local Compacts could
increase mutual dependency and reduce financial instability, strengthening the sector's
influence in decision-making. This, of course, would depend on the degree of resource
control assigned to partnership groups (University of Warwick, Liverpool John Moores
University et al. 2004b).
In this respect, the recently developed national agreement between the government and
the voluntary sector is a positive first step towards encouraging the use of local
Compacts (DoH 2004c). These will need to be negotiated locally and pay careful
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attention to issues of autonomy as presently a large proportion of voluntary sector
resources come from the statutory sector. While increasing the voluntary sector's power
and influence through reducing the asymmetry of resource dependency, there is also a
risk of loss of independence. This may have implications for achieving partnership as
collaboration, by limiting the sector's scope, flexibility and willingness to present an
alternative, antagonistic perspective and therefore its effectiveness (Unwin and
Westland 2000). Local Compacts, therefore, will need to sit within a broader local
strategy to develop the voluntary sector (Pickin, Popay et al. 2002), one which has
senior support behind it, commitment of resources and recognition of the need to
engage the sector at a strategic level and enable it to contribute to the delivery of local
priorities (Laverack and Labonte 2000). A survey of HAs in 2000 suggested that only
40% had allocated funds to develop voluntary sector involvement (Shepherd 2000).
Besides recognising long-term funding, such a strategy will need to pay attention to
process costs, as these are still an important consideration when involving the sector.
Availability of travel, administrative and other expenses can help reduce this burden,
particularly when involving users/carers and communities. However, nearly a third of
NHS Trusts do not have policies on such costs (Ryan and Bamber 2002). A strategy
would also need to be mindful that developing Compacts with key voluntary
organisations may marginalise smaller voluntary groups and organisations which have
not established such strong links with statutory agencies. Certainly findings from this
and other case studies note that only a small percentage of potential voluntary
organisations are engaged in partnership (Matka, Barnes et al. 2002). Special
consideration would also need to be given to community involvement, whose
engagement and capacity was found to be particularly weak. LSPs, for example, might
use public relations and snowballing techniques as well as dedicated outreach teams to
access excluded communities (University of Warwick, Liverpool John Moores
University et al. 2004b).
The voluntary sector is far from homogenous in terms of interests and capacity, and a
strategy would need to recognise this. The key issue is for statutory agencies to be clear
about how and why they are involving voluntary organisations, users/carers and
community groups so that they can engage them in a variety of ways in an appropriate
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manner (Wilcox 1994). The voluntary sector is more likely to get involved if they can
see it to be in their interests (Atkinson 2004).
A strategy would also need to recognise that building voluntary sector capacity to
strengthen its participation is not solely an external activity. Statutory organisations also
need to review their own structures, policies, resource allocation, information and
training provision (Lawson, Mackenzie et al. 2002) so that engaging the voluntary
sector becomes a routine way of doing things (NHS Executive, The Institute of Health
Services Management et at. 1998). This will also require self-evaluation of the approach
adopted (Laverack and Labonte 2000; Atkinson 2004). Without a strategic approach to
voluntary sector involvement, there is a grave risk of 'consultation fatigue' (Unwin and
Westland 2000; Lawson, Mackenzie et al. 2002), and of efforts being viewed as
tokenistic.
Other issues
So far the discussion has focused on the premise that actors are primarily self-interested.
However, the study also indicates that the boundaries of self-interest are shaped by an
actor's world view. This often reflects their professional perspective, training or
workplace practice. Promoting a world view which recognises the value of health
partnership and the interdependence of organisations to improve it (such as the broad
systems perspective of health) may help shift boundaries i.e. through increasing
tolerances towards short-term process costs. A permanent shift in perspectives will
require changes to the training of different professional groups working in the health
service and local authorities whose work has the potential to impact on health and
inequalities. With moves towards practice-based commissioning afoot, efforts will need
to include primary care practitioners, particularly GPs, who mainly perceive public
health improvement as opportunistic health promotion based around individuals and
clinic-based services (Peckham, Taylor et al. 2004). Given the differential status and
accountability structures of professional groups (Hudson 2002), government leadership
inevitably will be required to drive change. Any shift will also need to clarify roles and
responsibilities so as not to inadvertently blur boundaries and weaken domain consensus
(Rushmer and Pallis 2002; Bridgen 2003). Efforts would also need to be supported by
other national policies which value individuals and organisations that work in
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partnership through, for example, rapid promotion in career structures (Challis, Fuller et
al. 1988) to ensure behavioural change becomes institutionally embedded.
This study also raised a number of issues relating to the process and outcomes of
partnership. Partnership is a resource-intensive and time-consuming process.
Participating in and managing large multi-tiered partnerships requires a significant
investment of organisational resources (staff, administrative and time) as well as
specific management skills, particularly in rural areas where partnerships tend to be
large. Investment in the management and administration of partnership, whether
nationally or locally, appeared to advance the development of partnership significantly
within the study sites. Indeed, radical innovation appeared to occur in groups where
there had been considerable prior investment. Developing the functional capacity of
partnerships has also been linked to their sustainability (Knight, Smith et a1. 2001).
Although the government now recognises the role of having 'delivery managers' in
LSPs (Bright 2005), it is still relying on 'marginal resourcing'- piggy-backing on the
existing workload of managers (Cropper 1996). The government needs to provide
flexible mainstream resources to support the capacity of partnership, particularly in an
environment where most additional resources are ring-fenced, without re-enforcing the
idea of partnership as an add-on. As argued already, government needs to promote
partnership as a modus operandi, providing support and guidance to ensure that it
becomes embedded at a local level through, for example, changes to job descriptions.
Government will also need to consider how to structure policy to increase the likelihood
of radical innovation. One of the difficulties of large, multi-stakeholder roundtables is
achieving consensus, as a larger number of conflicting perspectives need to be
reconciled. However, it is from conflict that radical innovation flows. Although keeping
the focus of the health agenda broad can facilitate sign-up to an ambiguous statement of
intent, building consensus and commitment to a programme of action is more difficult
(Turcotte and Pasquero 2001). Reducing the number of partners through, for example
making smaller and, where possible, coterminous boundaries, may facilitate the
achievement of consensus. Allowing greater scope for local partnerships to identify
their own local health inequalities priorities may appeal more to local interests and
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increase commitment. However, both these measures could potentially create other
tensions such as the need to accommodate both local and strategic needs in rural areas; a
tighter, more local policy focus could reduce the scope of potential innovative solutions.
This is not an easy conundrum to solve and ultimately it may require the government to
tone down its expectation of partnership.
7.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the study
At the time of writing there are few theoretically-based studies on health and welfare
partnership per se in the UK; most were empirically-based studies. Of these, however,
few employed methodologies appropriate for the study of such a complex social
phenomenon as partnership. RDT was one area where there were more theoretically
based-studies, but most in this area used quantitative methods, many with poorly
validated research tools. The exception was a study by Challis (1988). Although this
study sheds significant light on the process of partnership, RDT does not recognise the
importance of managing cognitive and social processes in partnership to achieve desired
outcomes. Rather, interaction between organisations is 'determined' by uncertainty and
by the structure of resources and the environment. Indeed, this is one of the criticisms of
RDT and the policy network literature.
Much of the research on CT, on the other hand, is based on Action Research (Huxham
and Vangen 2000a; Eden and Huxham 2001) and derived from the reflections of
researchers following their active interventions in partnership (Ferlie 200 I; Meyer
2001). Like its founding theory, Negotiated Order Theory (Strauss, Schatzman et al.
1963; Gray 1989), the focus of CT tends to be on managing the interaction of actors to
reach agreement rather than on understanding the wider constraints which influence an
individual's behaviour. Institutionalised behaviour and external conditions such as
resource environment and dependency relations are less open to manipulation, and their
effect tends to be marginalised in this approach.
This study sought to combine the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches, seeking
to understand how structure influences action and interaction and vice versa. The need
to understand the 'duality of structure' to understand social processes in networks is
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advocated by Marsh (1998) and has its roots in Giddens's structuration theory (Hatch
1997a). Likewise, the approach taken in this study was to use these two theoretical
perspectives within the governance framework. In this way, the study placed different
emphasis on structure and action at different analytical levels (micro, meso, macro),
rather than simply trying to develop one single theory of partnership. The framework
developed integrates an understanding of what can be done to promote partnership with
how it can be managed (Hudson 2003).
Furthermore, using a multiple case study approach, connected to theory, is considered a
sign of a well conducted organisational study, particularly when the method is explicit
and the researcher independent (Ferlie 2001). Cross-site comparisons enable the
development and testing out of theories while multiple cases increase the empirical base
and strengthen claims of generaiisability. In this study, the use of four sites allowed
comparisons on several dimensions (HAZJnon-HAZ, rural/urban). Contrasting
differential progress, approaches and issues also facilitated theoretical development.
Undertaking the study with less sites, particularly Dalesville, could have limited insight
and theory development, particularly with regard to RDT.
Using different theoretical lenses has the advantage of shining a light on the grain and
contours of partnership not seen before. Although different perspectives were stronger
in explaining different aspects of partnership, I did not specifically seek to find the best
overall fit or meld the different theoretical perspectives together to derive a new
explanatory framework. This is because the different theoretical perspectives are based
on different, often contradictory assumptions. For example, RDT assumes actors are
self-interested while a systems approach on which sub-optimisation and CT are founded
holds a more altruistic view of human nature. Similarly, inter-organisational conflict is
held in a negative light in RDT while C'f sees it as a creative force which, if managed
properly, can lead to radical innovative solutions. Morgan (1986) has shown how
different theoretical perspectives based on different metaphors shape our understanding
of organisations in different ways, i.e. machines, brains or political systems. Hatch
(1997a) argues for the use of different theoretical perspectives when analysing
organisations. She takes a post-modem stance, arguing that no theory can reveal the
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'truth' as there are no universal criteria to do so. However, different theories or
perspectives reveal different kinds of truth claims, benefiting different constituencies.
Adopting a relativist position is helpful when seeking to understand complex social
interaction such as partnership; the different theoretical lenses provide a more holistic
image but never one that is wholly clear. Indeed, contradictions or weaknesses of
different perspectives can be highlighted by this approach. Similarly, Ferlie (2001)
argues that organisational research is good at theorising intermediate processes but
weak on understanding group dynamics or the influence of incentives on social action.
Organisational studies, therefore, need to draw on complementary theories from other
disciplines. Only one other study by De Leeuw (1998) has used more than one
theoretical perspective to explore and understand strategic health partnerships.
This study is unique in using multiple theoretical perspectives to specifically evaluate
HImP and HAZ partnerships. (Indeed, only a few studies have used any theoretical
perspectives at all to study HImP and HAZ partnerships). Doing so allowed different
aspects of partnership (interaction between context, mechanism and outcome) to be
studied in-depth. The systems model of control in hierarchy enabled the focus on
indirect control mechanisms to be sharpened, while RDT focused on the antecedent
conditions (national and local) for partnership as well as some aspects of interaction
(power-dependency relations). RDT also provided a theoretical link between the micro
level of group interaction, power dependency relations at the meso level and the wider
political economy (macro level). However, RDT's deterministic perspective did not
capture all the aspects of interaction, particularly those relating to the active
management of problem-solving and group relations. CT enabled a closer inspection of
these interactional elements, particularly around conflict, negotiation and consensus,
and how these link to different types of partnership outcome. This approach gave
valuable insights into the formation, development and outcome of partnership, which
few other studies to-date have explored. These include a close examination of: the
impact of central government command and control (Le. performance management)
mechanisms on partnership structure, interaction, process and outcome; the symmetry
of resource dependency and its impact on interaction; and the formation of radical
innovation in health partnership. Other theoretical frameworks proposed for the
evaluation of partnership are either overly dependent on RDT (Hudson 1987) and the
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incumbent weaknesses discussed above, or combine exchange and systems theories but
do not reveal how each perspective relates to different levels of analysis (micro, meso,
macro) (Loxley 1997) (see Appendix 0). More recently, Hudson (2003) has combined
Benson's political economy framework with insights from network management but not
explicitly for use as a theoretical framework. Other evaluative frameworks distinguish
between process outcomes and health outcomes (Gillies, 1998), but few, if any, make a
distinction between radical and incremental outcomes (eg. Glendinning (2002) and
Sullivan (2004».
In sum, the methodology used in this study has developed a umque evaluative
framework for studying health partnership. This used multiple theoretical perspectives
to analyse partnership at the macro, meso and micro level, linking context with process
and process to outcome. Moreover, each theory has provided new insights or deepened
theoretical understanding, contributing uniquely to the literature on partnership in three
areas. First, it has unpacked the command and control systems of government hierarchy
and their influence on different aspects of partnership. Second, it has highlighted the
difference between large and small resource-based organisations and their behaviour in
strategic health partnership. Third, it has identified the differing influence of formal and
informal structures on the generation of joined up thinking and opportunism. As far as
the author is aware, these have not been identified or discussed elsewhere. Indeed, very
few studies have used a theoretical framework to analyse HlmP, HAZ or other health
partnerships. Finally, the study has provided greater conceptual clarity on partnership's
different dimensions and outcomes, particularly the production of innovation. Others
studies on HImP and HAZ partnerships have not done this.
Weaknesses of this study
In any research, its strengths can also be its weaknesses. A criticism often levelled at the
use of multiple theoretical perspectives in organisational studies is that no one theory is
given preference over another. As no theory (and therefore theories) can represent the
'truth', the point of view is relative to the stance or position from which the theory is
conceived and on which it is focused. How can theory be advanced?
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A post-modernist (and a symbolic-interpretivist) would argue that knowledge cannot be
tested in the real world because the real world is constructed from our experiences,
ideas and statements (Le. theories) about the world. The multiple perspective approach,
therefore, provides for diverse possibilities for constructing the world and understanding
each other's construction of the world (Hatch 1997a). In this way, the study did not
attempt to generate a grand theory of partnership; rather it was a formative study,
seeking to understand the complex, social phenomenon of partnership, using theories
constructed in different worlds. This study allowed the 'testing' and refinement of each
perspective within its respective world. However, the competing and contradictory
assumptions of these different worlds can lead to contradictions and paradoxes that in
tum can be a source of inspiration or insight.
CT could be considered to be under-represented in this study, used as a normative
framework with which to benchmark interaction rather than to develop theory on
managing process. Certainly more data and resources dedicated to this area would have
allowed a closer inspection of interaction and the management of cognitive and social
processes and tighter linkage to partnership outcomes. Given that collaborative inertia is
often the main outcome reported in partnerships, a better understanding of the link
between process and outcomes would have been beneficial. The study would have
clearly benefited from a more thoroughgoing use of CT.
This study was undertaken throughout the second year of HlmPs and HAZs, when both
types of partnership were still in their formative stage. Their degree of development
varied considerably across sites as well as within sites; some sub-groups were already
established while other groups consisted of entirely new members. Given the time
necessary to develop productive partnerships, the study was undertaken very early on in
their life cycle. Although fieldwork was undertaken throughout the year, representing a
truncated slice of time, this was a relatively inadequate period to study partnership. A
more ideal scenario would have been to follow the development of partnership in fewer
sites over several years. This would have enabled a closer and more rigorous study of
the impact of performance management or the resource negotiations surrounding the
SaFF and JIPs than was possible. It would have also enabled the claims of different
321
actors to have been explored and tested. That said, other studies of HAZs (and HlmPs)
recorded some of the same empirical findings as this study. Clearly, the data collection
was rich enough for the generation of insights and for the development of different
theoretical perspectives. These will need to be substantiated in future studies.
Finally, theoretical and methodological ideals have to be balanced by practical realities
such as the resources available, gaining access to sites etc. This study was no exception.
Having four case studies facilitated cross-site comparison, but was at the cost of
collecting more data from fewer sites. Thus, breadth in case studies limited the time and
resources for collecting and analysing interviews, particularly observational and
documentary data around the process and outcome of partnership.
7.6 Future areas for research
This study raises a number of questions about partnership and future avenues for
research.
Using three theoretical perspectives allows a clearer conceptual analysis of context,
process and outcome of partnership. Although this study focused on all three of these
elements, most of the emphasis was on the context and process. Less emphasis was on
outcome, partly because of resource limitations. Placing more emphasis on
understanding interaction and outcome and how these link to process and context may
well have provided more robust findings than was possible in this study. For example, it
was not able to examine power relations beyond that of authority and control over
critical resources. Success in partnership is, in part, dependent on the dispersion of
power (Westley and Vredenburg 1997). A third axis of power influential on partnership
and not explored in this thesis was discourse (Lawrence, Phillips et al. 1999). Analysing
discourse has been used to study the process and outcomes of local regeneration
partnerships (Cloke, Milbourne et al. 2000). However, this approach would require a
greater focus on the textual content of meetings and on supporting documentary
materials. This was beyond the means of this study.
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A further area to strengthen would be around the implementation or 'structuring' of
innovative ideas emerging from negotiations, an area not considered in this study but
crucial to the impact of partnership. Gray (1989) argues that successful implementation
depends on institutionalisation of partnership arrangements in the early stages of
partnership. Phillips (2000) has used ideas from institutional theory to develop a
framework for exploring implementation which could be used in conjunction with those
used in this study.
In terms of the theoretical perspectives employed in this study, the jury is still out on
whether indirect control mechanisms such as targets and performance management can
foment the development of partnership and, therefore, more action on health
inequalities. With the relentless pursuit of public sector modernisation, with its
intensification of performance management, there is continued scope to investigate its
influence on the functioning and outcomes of LSPs and other partnership arrangements.
Similarly, this study supports the supposition from RDT that in a situation of resource
scarcity, large resource-based organisations such as HAs and SS may limit areas of
work so as not to upset the underlying dependency relationship. This raises questions
about the way in which greater resource exchange and integration between SS and PCTs
should be encouraged. Challis (1988) argues that operating in a less resource-restricting
environment may well be more conducive to collaboration as the risk of failure is more
bearable. Another approach suggested by RDT might be the use of targeted incentives
around the development of integrated projects. Either way these questions are for
empirical investigation.
With respect to Collaboration Theory, this study has raised questions about the
production of radical innovation, a fairly elusive outcome in this study. Collaboration
Theory was used as a framework to guide analysis; however, a more detailed
exploration of its production is warranted, particularly in large, formal, multi-agency
partnerships where this issue is poorly understood. This would require a more in-depth
study of processes and conditions involved in its production and would need to be
linked to the nature of the problem domain.
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The current policy environment provides some opportunity to explore these issues with
respect to health partnerships, with LSPs being the new forums for addressing social
exclusion and health inequalities in deprived local neighbourhoods.
Further studies of health partnership should be of greater duration than one year. This
study suggests that research would benefit from data collection over the complete
lifetime of a partnership, or at least several years.
7.7 Concluding remarks
This study has sought to understand the nature and function of health partnership in
England, focusing on HlmP and HAZ partnerships in four case study sites. Reflecting
the rationale for partnership expressed in the government's Third Way rhetoric and
policy documents, it developed a notion of partnership as co-ordination, collaboration
and partnership. These dimensions were explored using a framework built around three
theoretical perspectives on inter-organisational relations: Governance Theory, Resource
Dependency Theory and Collaboration Theory. The analysis revealed that despite
government promoting partnership as a panacea for tackling health inequalities and
service delivery over market and hierarchical forms of co-ordination, in reality elements
of hierarchy remained strong throughout the reforms. These combined with the large
national reform agenda and local context to undermine the development of partnership
as collaboration as well as partnership as participation. Rather, partnership as co-
ordination was the main outcome of government reform. This raises the question of
whether partnership as collaboration is a chimera, and whether expectations should be
toned down. The analytical framework used to analyse health partnership yielded
valuable insights which other studies on HlmP and HAZ partnerships, due to lack of
theoretical base, did not identify. Furthermore, the causal 'mechanisms' embodied in
the theoretical framework laid a more solid foundation on which to build policy
recommendations. It has also highlighted a number of avenues for future research which
will deepen our understanding of health partnership.
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Appendix A
Summary of interpretive and contextual facilitators of inter-organisational co-
ordination
li~:~~t.:i'm" ..~.>m, •",::~,.,.;';:',:~1FaCllltai&.~ri~"~';~-,\.1:"", ~""J~~~t;:S~'~;tJ;~'~:?~ \"f(A~~M", '", j, '"I" ;*:,'~;,w ·interpretlye~. ';f~, ':l~" ;,"';" ::ltLdli;F,. ,;\:~,..ContextU.J' '~'.~ J,. 'I." ,.:" Cl, .• 'Le.>;'
Perceived need Actual needs/benefits
Rewards outweigh costs Scare resources
Perceived benefits Organisation/environmental norms of
innovation and co-ordination
Positive attitudes Standardisation
Consensus between administrators and Decentralisation
staff
Maintenance of organisational and Professionalism
paradigm identity
Maintenance of organisational/leader-staff Occupational diversity
prestige/power/domains
Cosmopolitan ethos Broad range of services
Group-centred approach to problems Differentiated outputs
Rewards for group-centred Leadership qualities
approach/environmental outreach
Accessibility to other organisations Standardised referrals
Positive evaluations of other Informal contacts/exchange of information and
organisation/staff resources
Similar resources/goals/needs Geographic proximity
Common commitment Boundary permeability/roles
Common Complementary organisational/personnel
deti nitions/ideolog ies/i nterest/a pproaches roles
Agreement in domains/value of co- Similarity of structures/supply
ordination capabilities/needs/services
Perceived partial interdependence Voluntary association membership
Good historical relations Volatility in the political-economic system
Source (Halpert 1982) pp.63
354
Summary of interpretive and contextual inhibitors of inter-organisational co-
ordination
Vested interests Costs outweigh benefits
Perceived threat/competition Bureaucratisation
Source (Halpert 1982) pp.69
Perceived loss of organisational and
programme identity/strategic positions
Centralisation
Perceived loss of organisational lead-staff
prestige/authority/domains
Professionalisation
Lower service effectiveness Specialisation
Client alienation Inadequate internal communication/ tolerance
Inability to serve new clientele Little or no boundary permeability/roles
Differing organisational/leader-professional
socialisation
Infrequent/inadequate external
communication
Differing leadership approaches/authority Structural differences
Disparities in staff training Difference in priorities/resources/
functions/goals/operation/tasks
Inter- and intra-professional differences Unilateral exchange rates
Different priorities/ideologies/
outlooks/goals
Fragmentation of the environment-
federallstatellocallevels of government
Lack of common language Turnover of policy personnel
Internal norms against environmental
outreach
Inadequately trained governmental personnel
Negative evaluations of other
organisations
Government intrusion and disruption
Imperfect knowledge on environment
Poor historical relations/image formation
Perceived sanctions by network members
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Appendix B
Literature search. search strategy and issues
This appendix describes the search strategy used for the literature review in this thesis.
The aim of the review was to identify, draw together and distil the theoretical literature
and empirical evidence on health partnership. Its primary focus was on health or health
care partnerships in the UK. public sector although, where appropriate, it drew on
theoretical and empirical literature on other types of partnership, often based in another
academic disciplines. A detailed account of the process is described below but first I
discuss the use of Systematic Reviews.
Systematic Reviews
In Public Health and Medicine there is a growing emphasis on identifying and
summarising research evidence in a standardised and systematic way. One approach -
the Systematic Review - has become widely recognised, spawning a number of tools
and organisations to further its development and assemble databases of secondary
evidence (i.e. the Cochrane database). Derived from the Evidence Based
MedicinelPractice movement, the Systematic Review seeks to promote a more rigorous,
methodological approach to critically appraising and summarising the literature. A key
characteristic of this approach is the grading of evidence according to the
methodological design of the study under scrutiny, with experimental studies
(particularly Randomised Controlled Trials) accorded greater weight. As such the
approach is firmly rooted in the positivist paradigm.
However, the use of the Systematic Review methodology to evaluate the evidence on
health partnership was not considered appropriate for this study. Roe (1997) has noted a
number of methodological difficulties in adopting such an approach to review evidence
on alliances or partnerships for health promotion. These include: the lack of
international standardisation of terminology relating to partnership (see Section 1.2.1 in
Chapter 1), limiting the ability to search electronic databases systematically; the poor
flexibility of some search facilities as well as incompatibility between different
databases (Roe 1997); and the large number of publications that are not registered on
electronic databases, whether contemporary or those published before 1980 (Mulrow
and Coxman (eds) 1997).
Aside from these practical limitations, a number of issues stem from the fact that this
study is not just interested in the outcome but the motivations of actors and the
process/management of partnership. Studies evaluating process, for example, are likely
to use surveyor case study research strategies or even developmental strategies (such as
Action/Operational Research) in preference to experimental ones (Meyer 2001;
Rosenhead 200 I). Case studies in particular are more about describing and explaining
the process of partnership than quantifying it. They are often formative, using
qualitative data collection methods. However, unlike experimental methods and survey
methods, the criteria for assessing the quality of these studies is highly contested
(Altheide and Johnson 1998), let alone the criteria for combining the findings from
different qualitative studies. Although frameworks for assessing the quality of studies
have been developed (Gerring 2001), ultimately the preferred criteria of the researcher
is likely to depend on his or her theoretical perspective and the focus ofhislher research.
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The inappropriateness of the Systematic Review does not mean that a comprehensive
and systematic search strategy should not be conducted, or that explicit criteria for
judging studies should not be employed. On the contrary, there is a need for indicators
of quality as long as they are not applied in a hierarchical and hegemonic fashion (Ferlie
2001). One such criterion is explicitness of method, of which the literature review is an
integral part. The approach I have taken is outlined below.
Comprehensive literature review
A comprehensive literature review was carried out to review research relating to
partnership and health strategy. The purpose of the review was to identify studies that
had evaluated health and health and social partnership in the UK as well as
methodological approaches to evaluation of health partnerships. This included the
literature on factors influencing partnerships, the management or development of
partnership and normative frameworks for developing partnership. In addition, the
review sought to identify more general theoretical perspectives on partnership working
and policy formation and implementation that have been used in the field of health and
social welfare. The review was therefore multi-disciplinary in nature.
Computerised Bibliographic Searches
Five databases were comprehensively searched to identify articles, studies and reports
for inclusion in the literature review: Medline (1966-2005), Health Star (1988-2005),
HMIC (Health Management Information Consortium), PUBMED (/981-2005) and
BIDS IBSS (international bibliography of the social sciences) (1981-2005).
Given that the terminology relating to partnership is not standardised, a broad search
strategy was used to ensure that a comprehensive range of material relating to
partnership or the process of partnership was identified. A four-stage strategy was
employed.
1. A search for articles that encompass the following health themes was performed:
Health Strategy/Health Policy/Health of the Nation/Our Healthier
Nation/Primary Care Groups/Health Improvement Programmes/
HlmP/HIMP/Health Action Zones/HAZI Healthy Cities/ Health For All/Social
Care/Local Strategic Partnership/LSP
2. A search was performed using the term 'partnership' and other related terms,
used in meaningful permutations, shown below:
Inter/multi/trans
and
Agency/SectoraIIDisciplinary/Projessional/Occupation/Alliances
and
Partnership/CollaborationiCo-ordinationiCo-operationiCooperationl
IntegrationITeamworklJoint working
3. A search for articles relating to the theoretical and practical aspects of assessing
and evaluating partnerships was carried out using the following terms:
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Implementation/Evaluation/Community participation/Effectiveness/
RCT/Indicators/ Process/Outcome/FrameworkITheory
4. Finally, since each stage identified a large amount of material, I decided to focus
the search down into a manageable number of articles by combining the results
of each stage of the search in the following ways: Stages 1 and 2, Stages 2 and 3,
Stages 1 and 3 and Stages 1 and 2 and 3. The results of these combinations were
checked individually for their relevance to the subject matter.
For practical reasons non-English language articles identified were excluded.
Additional 'grey' material was also sought by searching the University of London
library catalogue systems, as well as health management libraries such as at the King's
Fund, using the search terms outlined above. The internet was also used to identify
material on health partnership, particularly unpublished articles or reviews by key
authors or material from government department websites.
Other relevant papers/studies/articles were identified through the BIDS citation database
and through 'snowballing' references in articles, reports or books and hand-searching
key journals.
The literature search was repeated periodically in recognition of the number of studies
on partnership (as a consequence of the government's agenda and reforms) in progress
throughout the research.
All literature was rated and prioritised in terms of its 'relevance' and 'methodological
rigour'.
358
-
~
:::E:
"C
Cca
D-
E
::z:-U)
Q.:ce
Cl)
c
~ca
Q.
s:...ca
Cl)
.s::.
~
:::)
Cl)
uc
Cl)
:s
U I;:.5
~ ...ca.- .s::.'"0 ...
~ e
Cl) s~ e
~
.!
Cl)
.s::....
CS)
c;:
ca:scaa;
U)
Cl):s:s...
U)....
0
U)
CS)
c:sc
I;::
Cl)
.s::....
'0
~
ca
E
E:s
tn....o
Cl)
:isca
I-
u
0
j
.c:(
ccu--->"'":::0-0:INCl) ._..
c: "0N 0 c: c:
~ _ IV• ,~"O t:' c: IV _ 0
>. ..!.. c: C') 0 c: 0 II) - c:-g ~ ~ ~ c: IV._. Cl O.Q CIl IV .c: 0
Ui II) ~.!!! 0 ~ ~ .5 ;: iii .~& ~ 'al
Q) Cl 13 ~ ~ .2: ~ t> ~ .:! 0 e e .:!
II) c: 2 Q) 0 .... ~ <Il III III <Il III 0. IV
II lV·en - 0 III eca; II) >.c.c: 0.>
Z o ::J Ui .5 LL .!!l 0. ...a: UJ ... o IV Q)
"0c:
III
"Enc:
UJ
.!!le;)
00
(.)0._.N
-1.0
M
(I)
Q.
E
J:
'0c:
tU
"Cl
c:
LU
'C
Ccu
'01cw
c0.......
I/)N
~O
cuO
..J~
"0c:
!O
Clc:
UJ
Ill .....
Q)~
C:o
....0
!ONCO~
"C
C
III
Cl
C
LU
>,C:
"CO
::s III
-<I)
III III
<I) ::s.cOI-.E
<I) .s
\0s:
~ \0cii; M.S <I) .0
ill.s e- tu
tu E tu III (I)__ i- t»
E~~-§ IIIt»
::s c: ° (I) c:E ::s > III <I)
"Cc:
tu
Clc:
W
~
a..
E
I J:
"C "Cc: c:III IIIen enc: c:w w
- ~(1)- (I)• (I) 0>
J:(1)(1)0> ....S~E~ Em::l III . (tim3mtii <.n:..

"0
C
t1J
Cl
C
W

~
Cl)
.c
'0
"0
C
ftJ
~
:J:
o:z:
z
b
:J:-
~
.ce
Cl)
c
~
ftJ
C.
.c-'j
.c
~
~
Cl)
uc
Cl)=q::c._
'0c:
III
'Clc:w
E
111_
.c:-.r
.:.'.0
°0Q)Na. ._..
"C
Ccaencw
I- § 11§ 'iii :2
:;:; .Ia e.cO E Q)
1ijEEE i§
Q) 0 .- 0 Cl
::I: cl: ~ os [
"C
C
ra
Cl
C
W
-~.c ..-
ClO
'-0CN::.:::-
Q)
E
E
Q..~~[
CIlOCorao>NW .......
c.:.c
f!.!Q)
~
"0
~
<IIs:
CIJ
~
I/)o I/)
1::=O§ ~
Q)'=
- <II0_
()CIJ
"0
I::
<IIen
I::
w
~~.... I:::::lO-
O ~1/)1ij
Q) I::
'78
"0"01"0 I::
..21"0
.:.!Q)oE~~
~I/)
I"O~Q):::lJ:"OQ), ...
"0
I::
<IIen
I::
W
1::--Q)tO
Q)O>
.... 0>en:..
§~
c: :J
Q)eEO)
CI.loY
~riP
lij~
El/)

.~
'0-
Q.t'O.cC:::;:.2Z
t'O 0'1'"a>ll!0:x: ,:x:
s:
Cl! --._ "Emom
U~
~ ~:::> ::l
II)
Cl Ec_
01'- ~co-0)
11)0) )(0)o~ 00)u_ as~
'0CI_
,!: "0c: (I)
,- (I) "0I!! c: (I)
- >-1/)-s n sE ii: ~
.g§~.s o .J:l
"0c:m
eo
~o
o.~
(1)0
tx:]i
, s=
(I)
ClI/)
I!! 8
::J c:8,~
c:=
(I) m
Clc:.:;:
o.~
:::1'-e-fiom=e00.alo.,m
:3
::J
iii,
> c:
-0.2
(I) I/)
iii':;:s=-oC/)c:
, RI
~ ~
::l ::l
c:_ >.
(I)LO (1)-,:!: 0) ffi~'-0)
~:s "Q)0lQC
(1)_
Q)(")._ (b
~(b
O~
"C.g.
Q)..c:
-(I)
l1I ~e Q)e s
~~
'§o
E Q)
E~o Q)
0(1)
(I)
Q)
:;::
i:3
til
~
..!!!
(ij
c:o
~
Cl)
Q.o
~ ~
:::> :;)
c: ........ =-oC">
~~
(0)
00)
Z~ 0._
~c
~
~
~«ou.
O::I:
0.. ....
,0
U)
ca.:ce
CDc
1::
cuca.
e
cuu
"ii
'(3
o
U)
'0
Ccu
.c...
"ii
CD.c
~
:::l
CDu
c
CD
:3
~
C._
"0c:
ttl
C,
c:
W
c: .......
OOlXOl
OOla.::::.
c:
.2 "C-= c:~ c: CI:I !(!
.!.~_gal~-~
C:CI:I~=CI:I.-
~Ol='&:;(IJ'O~
C:C)OOlOlOQ)
,Cl:lu.o.c: III III
>-
Clo
(.)0.- m ... c:~:g~g
(.)-c:tUo ~.- ...E._.s::. 0m:E-c.e-c 0 3~c:o.oo
:l I o o
III
~ec
m tU.et
E 0me.E .5
Appendix D
Synthesis of framework for the development of partnership
The empirical literature consistently identifies four broad process stages in the
development of partnership development.
1. Assessment of initial position: a necessity to work in partnership should be based
on a need. This need may be perceived differently by different partners and needs to
be reframed in a language that reflects all the partner's culture, interests and values.
Not only will it help the formulation of a shared vision for the partnership but serve
as an incentive to collective action, helping to overcome historical organisational
conflict or independence and bridging the gap to greater interdependence. This will
help develop goal consensus. Mapping of resources and organisational structures,
responsibilities and arrangements will identify what is needed to meet the vision. An
evaluation of how supportive the external environment is towards partnership will
help identify potential difficulties with financial and political support.
2. Creation and consolidation of the partnenhip: the structure and operation or
approach of the partnership needs to be negotiated and agreed upon by all partners
or stakeholders as does the allocation of roles, responsibilities and functions. This
may be facilitated by a group leader. Clear lines of communication, in and outside
the partnership, need to be agreed to prevent frustration and anger through
misunderstanding, as do mechanisms for accountability. This will build up trust and
enable information and resources to be exchanged more easily.
3. Managing the partnership and programme delivery: Trust will be at its lowest
point at this stage and will be indicated by degree of commitment of group
members. Communication will continue to be important. Careful attention to use of
language, which is understood by all partners despite their differing levels of
knowledge and culture, can avoid feelings of separation and frustration amongst
partners. Three levels of awareness will be required: what is the response of
individuals' desired outcome of partners, how are the dynamics of the group and
what is response of individuals in the group to their situation. The process of
managing programme implementation requires partners to have skills in strategic
and political thinking, verbal and non-verbal communication and networking. These
skills can be learned.
4. Evaluation of partnenhip: This is to ensure the partnership is responding to its
environment, meeting local needs. Evaluation needs to assess not only the outcome
of partnership but also the process of partnership and the costs and benefits involved
(tangible and intangible). This is a continuous process which takes place at every
stage of development of the partnership and not only at the end. Who is involved in
the evaluation will depend on the level of participation of those involved in
partnership, but ideally it should include all partners. If the need for partnership has
been fulfilled or political or financial support runs out, the partnerships needs to
consider whether it should disband, keep going or develop the more successful
aspects of the partnership. It should not kept going for its own sake.
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Appendix E
Table showing the characteristics of previous programmes to encourage
partnership in health and health & social care
JCC/JCPTs
Whole systems ../ X X X X
Social model of health ../ X ../ X X
Managing networks ../ X X X X
Exhortation ../ ../ ../ ../
,/
Partnership as ../ X X Still a X X
mainstream. More marginal JCPTs to take
coherent policy activity strategic approach
Relaxation of statutory X X X None
requirements (JCCs no
longer mandatory)
Government funding ../HAZs X X ../JF None
X HlmPs Arrangements for
funding care
changed. but not to
LAs' satisfaction
Use of incentives ../ X X ../JF introduced X
(funding. freedoms and Performance
ftexibilities) management
Use of sanctions ../ X X X X
Policy based on altruistic ../ ../ ../ ../
../
assumptions
Policy based on ../ X X ./ X
pessimistic assumptions (some)
Mandatory local X X X ../ X
structures Voluntary
Cross-governmental ../HAZs ../ (weak) X ./ & X (JASP) X
structures ../PH
Minister
Lack of clarity over roles ../ Guidance Still N/A X Govemment X
and responsibilities clarified unresolved failed to resolve
(domain consensus) differences
between NHS and
LA on care
StrategiC partnerships HlmPs ../ Phase 111- JCPTs X
IV
Voluntary sector ../ ../ ./ ./JCCs (1963) X
involvement Remained
discretionary for
JCPTs
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Appendix F
Table summarising key demographic indicators in each case study site
.!!!r~..~ +0.........':;:~"'? "
',.. . ,2,°: "'~'i'.II'':'''~.:li Middleton .,'
dl~ ""~<=II~' IJ~~
~YI!:1\IUY'lIg
,'j<
, , .: , :.0, 'L
Approx. 198,000 668,000 374,000 301,000
Pooulation size
No. of local 4 8 2 1authorities
Local authority 1CC, 3UC 1CC,6DC, 2BC 1UC
structure 1UC
NHS trusts 1AT 6AT 3AT 1AT
1C&M 1MT 1 C&M 1C&M
PCGs S 7 4 3
CHCs 3 3 1 1
OPCS Area Rural Rural Urban Urban
("I !:a """. 'fiGCluor (mixed urbanI rural) (manufacturina)
Jarman score 49 42 97 87(rank)
Jarman score S 5 10 9(decile rank)
Life Expectancy LA1-73.1 LA1 - 76.3 LA1-73.3 LA1 -74.7
(Male) LA2-74.1 LA2 -76.7 LA2 -73.6
(1999-2001) LA3-75.2 LA3 -76.7
LA4-7S.9 LA4 -77.3
LAS-77.0
LA6 -77.9
LA7 - 78.0
Life Expectancy LA1-78.8 LAS-80.8 LA1 -78.8 LA1 -79.8
(Female) LA2 -79.8 LA2 -80.9 LA2 -80.3
(1999-2001 ) LA3 -79.8 LA3 - 81.3
LA4 -80.2 LA1 - 81.7
LA4 -82.0
LA7 -82.1
LA6 -82.2
General health not 8.7% 7.8% 9.9% 10.0%good1
Unerll~IUV!ner f1 2.7% 2.6% 5.2% 3.9%
Ethnic diversity 1
(% population born 2.2% 4.5% 24.6% 9.1%
outside UK) ..
USing the 2001 Census statistics
Key
CC - County council
UC - Unitary council
BC - Borough council
DC - District council
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Appendix G
Interview schedule
Main template for all interviews (adjusted for each sector)
A. Structure and organisation of local partnerships
1. Could you give me a brief description of the local health partnerships you are
involved in, your role and the other organisations that are involved?
2. How is the (HImPIHAZlHCIHF AlSRB) partnership structured? Why was it set
up this way?
3. How is the partnership governed?
4. Have resources been identified for development of the partnership or its work? If
yes, what are the sources of new money and where is it being directed? How
shared are these resources? How can they be used and who has ultimate control
over how they are used?
S. Does your organisation manage the work of other organisations in the
partnership? If yes, and in what way?
6. How does the partnership inter-link with other health strategy partnerships in
your area? (HImPIHAZlHCIHF AlSRB)
B. Process - the developing the partnership
7. Why did your organisation decide to get involved in the HImPIHCIHAZ
partnership? What was its motivation? (money/finance, kudos, information,
uncertainty) (CHC, voluntary and private sector organisations)
8. Who was the initiator/convenor of the partnership? How did you decide which
organisations to invite/involve in the partnership? (HAllHC)
9. How did the partnership decide how it was going to govern/organise itself and
what it was going to do? How was the division between strategic direction and
management of operational issues decided by the partnership? What were they
influences that came to bear on this process?
10. Has the partnership defined its purpose or does it have a vision about the
direction in which it is going? Has this been useful? Why?
11. How did the partnership decide which areas of health policy it should cover?
How is its scope different to that of other local health partnerships
(HImPIHAZlHCIHF AlSRB)?
12. Have terms of reference been agreed? Have they been useful in the partnership's
work? Have you had to calion them? If yes, when and why?
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13. Which organisations have had the most influence on how the partnership was
structured or has developed? Why?
14. What has been the influence of the central government policy or directive on the
way the partnership has developed? [ask for examples] How much has it
influenced your thinking on partnership?
C. Partnership management
15. How are decisions taken in the partnership?
16. How is the work of the partnership managed? Is there a performance
management framework being used? What influence has the National Framework
for Assessing Performance had?
17. Is the partnership being monitored (or evaluated) in any other way? If yes, how is
this being done? What criterion is being used and how was this decided? What
changes come about from this process? If none, why not?
18. How does accountability work within the partnership work?
(structures/performance management) To whom are partners accountable? How
was this decided? Has there been any conflict in the partnership between
accountability to the partnership and accountability to individual organisations?
If yes, how does this affect the partnership and its work?
19. Has the partnership developed or considered developing any specific plans to
develop the partnership itself? If so, what are they?
D. Voluntary sector participation in partnership
I want to talk about voluntary sector participation in partnerships. By voluntary
sector Imean voluntary organisations, user/carer groups, community groups and
public
20. How was the level or degree of voluntary sector participation decided? What
issues were considered in making the decision? Are you working with any
voluntary organisations or community groups you weren't working with in the
past?
21. What mechanisms are being used to involve the voluntary sector (voluntary
organisations, community groups and public-at-large)? How is the public's view
or voice 'heard' in the partnership?
22. Has the partnership developed or considered developing any specific plans to
improve voluntary sector's participation in the partnership? If so, what are they
and why these approaches?
E. Organisational change to accommodate working in partnership
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23. What does it mean to you (or your organisation) when the government says you
must work in partnership?
24. In what ways has your organisation changed to accommodate working in
partnership? Have any additional structures been set up within existing
organisations to complement the work of the partnership? i.e. to aid policy
development, implementation, evaluation, monitoring.
25. Does your or any other organisations' responsibilities impinge on the partnership
and its work? If yes, how and why? [Le. the need to produce a JIP, SaFF, meet
national targets etc]
26. Do you think there has there been a 'real' change in attitude about what can be
achieved through partnership? Why do you think this is so?
F. Influences on working in partnership (positive and negative)
27. What have been the main difficulties in trying to work with different
organisations on the health agenda?
28. Have any features of your local area (population, economic, geographical)
particularly influenced the development of the partnership or the way it
functions? If yes, which and in what way?
29. Have any features of partner organisations (structural, historical, individuals)
particularly influenced the development of partnership or the way it functions? If
yes, which and in what way?
30. Have any cultural issues between organisations arisen which have impeded or
enhanced the partnership or its work? (medical vs non medical, public vs private)
31. What's been the influence of the duty of partnership (to promote the economic,
social and environmental well-being)?
32. Does the partnership need more resources? If yes, which and why?
33. Has the presence of another health partnership influenced the partnership's
development or work?
O. Nature of relations between partners (interaction)
I now want to talk about how you relate to the other partners. First, your
relationship with organisations before working inpartnership.
34. Was your organisation working with any of the partners in any capacity before
the partnership was formally established? Did that influence your decision to get
involved? (non HA) (Not HC Co-ordinators).
35. When you entered into partnership were you fully aware of the kind of work that
other partner organisations did? And the resources they had available to work on
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strategic health issues? Did this make a difference to your attitude to get involved
in partnership?
36. Does your organisation have aims and objectives which are similar those of other
organisations in the partnership(s)? (not CHC)
37. Do you think there is an understanding in the partnership about the areas of work
each organisation can contribute?
38. To what extent have previous relationships between organisations been important
to the development of the partnership? Why?
I now want to talk about the nature of relationships between partners
39. How do partners communicate with one another? What formaVinformal
mechanisms are used? Le. if you have a problem or issue you want to raise do
you approach members of the partnership informal, for example, by the telephone
or when you meet in other for wait for then next meeting? Have you been
approached informally about an issue?
40. Have there been any instances of poor communication or misunderstanding? If
so, why?
41. How committed to the partnership do you think other partners are? In what way
do they show it?
42. Are or have any of the partners been obstructive or not full filled their obligations
to the partnership? If yes, over what issue and why?
43. Are or have any organisations been reluctant partners (Le. poor attenders at
meetings) or withdrawn from partnership altogether? If yes, who and why?
44. Do you think your organisation will still be working in partnership with your
partners in 2/3 years time? Why?
45. Are the resources that each organisation brings to the partnership made clear?
Has there been any sharing of budgets or sensitive information (financial/patient
data)/disc1osure of self-interest?
46. Is your position/organisation funded (or given any other resource) by another
member of the partnership? If yes, do you think this influences the way you have
behaved in the partnership? How? (HCIHAZlHImP sub groups)
Relationships with other partnerships - Jec. SRBIHC or HAZ.
47. Is your relationship as a member of the HC or HAl partnership different to that
in the HImP? If yes, in what way, and why? (Not HC Co-ordinators. CEOs)
execs]
H. Impact of partnership on the health policy agenda
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I now want to talk about the impact of partnership on the health agenda. First, on
policy development and agenda setting.
48. How have you or your organisation contributed to the local health agenda?
49. How are issues or local needs identified and prioritised within the partnership?
How do they get onto the agenda?
50. Which individuals or organisations have been or are the most influential in
shaping the policy agenda or implementation of policy? If so, how and which
one(s)?
51. How much influence do the voluntary sector (voluntary, user/carer and
community groups and the public), have on the shaping the agenda, either
directly through groups representing their interests or otherwise?
52. Have there been any health issues or policies on the partnership's agenda over
which there has been more contention than others? If yes, which and why? How
have local priorities married with the national ones?
53. Have there been any discrepancies between those needs identified by the
voluntary sector/community and those identified by health professionals? If yes,
how was this resolved?
54. Can you recall an instance where you chose not to raise an issue at a meeting or
where you felt your organisation was excluded from decision-making?
55. How does the health strategy of the HImPIHAZJHAZlSRBs differ or concur with
that of other 'health' partnerships such as the HImPIHAZlHAZJSRBs?
56. Do you think there has there been any duplication of health issues in the HImP
with any other health partnerships? Why?
I. What has been the output of partnership in relation to the health agenda?
I now want 10 talk about the impact of partnership on local health strategy.
57. Has your organisation contributed to the local health strategy in a way which it
wouldn't have done before i.e. when there was no partnershiplHlmP? If yes.
how? Can you give me an example?
58. What impact has working with a wide range of organisation had on the
development of local health strategy and its implementation? Examples?
59. Can you give me an example of 'joined up thinking' or improved co-ordination
within the partnership ... and within the organisation?
60. Have there been any new/novel initiatives that you think would not have
happened or come about if there wasn't a health partnership? Examples?
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J. Influences on the implementation of policy
61. Has your organisation implemented any of the policies set out in the
HImPIHAZJHC?
62. What factors have influenced the implementation of policies developed in
partnership?
63. Have any of the policies developed by the partnership been more difficult to
implement than others? If so, which and why?
K. Meeting the government's health agenda. The benefits of partnership working
64. What do you think you get out of, or have got, out of working in partnership? Is
this the same for all the strategic health partnerships you have been involved in?
What has been to down-side of working in partnership?
65. Have your expectations about what you could achieve through partnership met?
If not, why not? What about other organisations in the partnership?
66. What have been the successes of partnership? What has not worked?
67. What problems have you faced in meeting, or trying to meet, the government's
health agenda through partnership?
68. If you were involved in setting up the partnership again how might you do things
differently? Why?
69. What do you see happening in the partnership over the next year? And over the
next three years?
L. Finally, if there anything else you would like to say about the way partnerships you
are involved in are run, operate or function but we have not covered?
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Appendix H
Table profiling sector and seniority of interviewees
k~:,,~;; ."'. ii1 Greeri~hif; ; <'·MetrOcitY. MiddletonInterviewee profile K Dale~ville Total
HlmP/HAZlHC/HFA Co-ordinators 4 1 5 1 11
Health authority - Senior 2 1 3 0 6
Health authority - Operational 1 0 1 3 5
Health authority (DPH/OHP) 3 2 1 1 7
Health authority (DPH/OHP) 3 2 1 1 7
NHS Trust (Acute) - Senior 0 1 0 1 2
NHS Trust (Community) - Senior 1 1 1 1 4
PCG/PC - Senior 3 2 2 2 9
Local Authority (SS) - Senior 1 1 1 1 4
Local Authority (EnvironmenU 2 3 0 3 8
Housing/Leisure) - Senior
Local Authority (Corporate/SRB) 0 1 3 2 6
Local Authority (Education) 0 0 0 0 0
CHC-Senior 1 1 0 1 3
CHC-Senior 1 1 0 1 3
Voluntary Sector -Senior 3 3 3 2 11
Probation - Senior 0 1 0 1 2
Private Sector 0 0 0 0 0
Total 21 19 20 21 81
Table profiling observation work in case study sites
Observation Oalesville Greenshire Metrooity_ ~Jlidd,Jton' 1T'1otaL"
HlmP/HAZ 1 4 3 2 10
meetings
Review 0 2 1 0 3
days
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Appendix I
Observational proforma for partnenhip meetings
Partnenhip group:
Date:
Venue:
Number of people:
Observations to address:
Who's present? Which sectors?
HA
LA
Trusts Ale
peGs
eHe
Vol
Other
1. Who is the chair? Is it revolving?
2. What's the purpose of the meeting?
3. How are attitudes transmitted?
4. How do people relate to one another?
5. Key issues discussed?
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6. Are differences of opinion expressed, and over what?
7. Who talks? Who doesn't? Who speaks but is not heard?
8. How is the group managed by the chair? What is the influence of the chair?
9. How are decisions taken?
10. Other comments/observations about the group's interaction/decision-making etc
396
Meeting table plan sheet:
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Perceptions of partnership. A documentary analysis
of Health Improvement Programmes
Health Improvement Programmes (HlmPs) are at the heart of the UK government's partnership agenda for the National
Health Service (NHS). This paper assesses the nature of HlmP partnerships in England by analysing 50/99 first-round
HlmP strategies (randomly selected). The documentary analysis quantifies the structures and mechanisms of partnership.
the degree of inter-sectoral participation and the extent of voluntary sector involvement.
Three-quarters of responding health authorities (37/50) appear to have set up formal partnership structures to produce
the HlmP, or are planning to do so. After health authorities, local authorities (47/50) appear to be most involved in
contributing to the HImP, particularly social services departments. Within the NHS 'family', acute and community trusts
(43/50) appear to be the most involved, with Primary Care Groups (PCGs) contributing less (39/40). Community Health
Councils (CHCs) appear to be similarly involved (40/50). The voluntary sector appear to be involved in all but four
HlmPs, mainly through umbrella organisations represented on strategic partnership boards (34/50). User and carer and
community groups appear to participate far less. Lack of endorsement of l-llmPs by partner organisations, poor
delineation of responsibilities and absence of transparency in resource allocation suggest that ownership of. and
commitment to HlmPs may be weak. HlmPs appear to have focused on creating structures rather than developing aspects
of partnership process. If levels of inter-sectoral involvement and voluntary sector participation arc to be maintained or
increased in future, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) will need to develop a strategic approach to partnership.
Puhlic Health (2002) 116, 207-213. doi: 10.1038jsj.ph.1900856
J Elston* and N Fulop
London School at' Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Keywords: Health Improvement Programme; partnership; participation; documentary analysis; Primary Care Trust
Introduction
Partnership is an important feature of New Labour's 'Third
Way' politics. Reference to partnership can be found
consistently in a raft of government policy guidance,
legislation and exhortation. I The White Papers. The New
NHS: Modern, Dependable' and Saving Lives: Our Heal-
thier Nation) both placed partnership at the centre of
government health service reforms. Partnership is now
one of the core principles underpinning the changes in
the NHS and the means by which the national health
strategy is to be delivered locally.":'
A key clement of the government's partnership agenda
in the National Health Service (NHS) is Health Improve-
ment Programmes (HlmPs). These are three-year local
health strategies produced in partnership with a wide
range of stakeholders from within and beyond the health
service, under the stewardship of local health authorities, to
Improve the health of the local population and redress local
.( 'orrcspondcncc: J Elston. Health Services Research Unit,
Department of Public Health and Policy. London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, London we IE 711T. UK.
I·.-mail:julian.elston(a)ishtm.ac.uk
Accepted 25 April 2002
inequalities in health and social care and health provision.
Recent guidance has extended their scope to include
the NHS modernisation agenda. renaming them Health
Improvement and Modernisation Plans (HIMPs).~ With
the creation of Strategic Health Authorities (St liAs) in
April 2002, Primary Care Trusts (Pt.Ts) arc now the lead
organisation for developing the strategy. building on pre-
vious partnership arrangements."
One of the priorities of IlImPs in the first year, aside
from selecting a number of national and local issues and
developing an action plan to tackle them, was to build and
strengthen local partnerships.' To this end, the government
has placed a duty of partnership on NilS Trusts. Primary
Care Groups (PtGs] and local authorities to encourage
their involvement. K.'1
However, partnership is a contested concept. It means
'different things <It different times and in relation to
different groups"!" Since government documentation is
not specific about what partnership is no definition IS
given, and guidance is not prescriptive there is consider-
able flexibility with regard to format and structure. II
This study sought to establish what kinds of IlImP
partnerships were developing in England. particularly the
prevalence of different partnership structures. the degree of
inter-sectoral involvement and the extent of voluntary
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sector participation in first year HlmPs. It forms part of a
wider study to evaluate the role of partnership in the
development and implementation of local health strategy
in England.
There has only been a handful of published studies of
HlrnPs to date (although research is in progress)." These
have taken either a comparative case studyll,13-15 or
survey approach 16 to identify the issues and difficulties
that HIrnPs have experienced during their first year, or they
have analysed the content of HlmP programmes in relation
to specific priority areas, such as coronary heart disease;"?
children's health.lv'? obesity-? or against national gui-
dance-! or a Donabedian-type framework." There has
also been a parliamentary report."
In general, these studies have reported a positive
response to HlrnPs across all sectors and much goodwill
and enthusiasm, especially for working in partnership. 13-16
However, several issues regarding the development of
HImPs have been identified, including: short timescale
and late guidance; poorly defined roles and responsibilities;
lack of clarity regarding accountability and performance;
poor co-ordination of plans and funding streams between
the NHS and local government; resource constraints; wide
variation in preparedness of organisations; difficulties in
involving stakeholders within and beyond the NHS; lack of
organisational and community capacity to sustain wider
participation in the process; the tension between local and
national priorities; different understandings of what health
improvement means; and uncertainty over how to measure
progress in improving health."
However, these studies were based on small numbers of
HImPs (between five and seven), with mixed selection
criteria, and a limited degree of participation from statutory
organisations and the voluntary sector. Generalising the
findings of these studies to other HImPs in England is
therefore questionable. Studies analysing the content of
HImPs, on the other hand, have not adequately addressed
partnership working or inter-sectoral participation.
Since it is through partnership that local HlmPs are
shaped and delivered, understanding the extent and nature
of partnership working in HlmPs across England will be
crucial ifHImPs are to achieve their aims.? This study uses
documentary analysis to build on previous work, providing
a broader picture of HlmP partnership development in
England and a baseline by which to chart future progress.
However, it is worth noting the limitations of this metho-
dology. First, it is important to recognise that the policies,
procedures and structures outlined in the HlmP may not be
a 'true' reflection-" of local partnership or practice, or
indicate that the policies contained within it are being
implemented." It is also a document produced for external
consumption." Consequently, its contents are likely to be
shaped by what each of the constituent partners perceive to
be important or expected. This will be influenced by
differing social, political and economic pressures acting
at both local and national levels." Further, the priorities of
researchers and those of the HImP partnership may not
Public Health
concur;" what is interesting to the researcher may not be
mentioned in the HlrnP. Nevertheless, the production of
HlmP strategies is integral to partnership work and their
contents are declarations of intent and a public commitment
to certain values and objectives."
Methods
A random sample of 50 of the 99 health authorities in
England was selected for the survey and checked for
representativeness, based on Jarman Underprivileged
Area Score, ONS Area Classifications, local authority
type and other health partnerships.
This sample size was considered to be sufficiently
representative for analysing documents and interpreting
the results. A copy of the first round HlmP was requested
for the period 1999/2000. Follow-up telephone calls to the
Directors of Public Health for non-responding authoritie
ensured a 100% response rate.
The analysis of the HImP documents involved a five-
stage process.Fr" Central to this approach was the devel-
opment of the analytic tool, a pro forma which addressed a
series of questions to the text based on a conceptual model
of partnership. Although no widely agreed definition of
partnership was identifiable in the literature, a number of
common activities or characteristics of partnership are
described. The conceptual model used in this study wa
based around these, and essentially views partnership a
both a form of organisation (structure) and a method of
working (process).29 Structure can be conceptualised a
form and membership, while two key aspects of process can
be considered as participation (of relevant stakeholders, 0
especially the voluntary sector) and interaction. Interaction
concerns the quality and dynamic of relations between
partners. Given the difficulty of gauging the degree of
interaction from the text, several proxy indicators were
developed to assess this concept. These were based on
questions around shared or equal ownership, clear roles and
responsibilities," and organisational commitment32,33 all
identified in the literature as essential elements of partner-
ship working.
Details regarding local demography, local authority
structures and the presence of other local health partner-
ships were also recorded.
Results
Of the 50 HlmP documents received, 39 were final ver-
sions, 9 were draft HImPs and 2 were early consultati e
documents for second round HImPs (but clearly based on
first-round documents). Four documents were joint HlmPI
Health Action Zone (HAZ) strategies and just over half (271
50) were three-year strategies. The sample also represented
just under half of those health authorities with a HAZ (161
34). As health authorities were at different stage in
eveloping HlmP strategies and adopted different
eproaches, it was decided to include all documents in
Ie analysis so as to provide a snapshot of partnership at a
oint in time, rather than at a specific stage of document
roduction.
Documents varied considerably in size (between 31 and
.30 pages, average length 81 pages excluding appendices),
lyle (from glossy documents written for a public audience
20/50) to plain, functional documents for internal use
24/50». They had clearly been produced with different
udiences and uses in mind.
Partnership structures and membership
lhe majority of the health authorities (60%, 30/50)
ippeared to have set up new, formally constituted, partner-
hip structures to produce the HImP. Of the 17 HImPs
vithout new structures, 41% (7) were planning to establish
hem in the coming year. One-fifth of all responding HImPs
10/50) appeared to have no plans for new partnership
tructures. However in some of these areas, existing part-
1ership structures or arrangements appeared to be in use.
Despite a lack of information and detail on partnership
,tructure in the documents-only 12/50 HImPs included a
Jiagramrnatic representation of HImP structures-there
appear to be two main forms of partnership: three- and
iwo- (one-third of HImPs appear to have adopted the
latter). Generally, three-tier partnerships appear to have a
'oard or reference group to provide strategic direction,
leering or programme group to 'take a view on how best
o integrate policy and action' and working groups, based
round local priorities or localities or both, to put plans into
ction. In two-tier HlmPs, the functions of the reference
ind programme groups tend to be merged into one tier.
Many of these structures were health authority wide, but
n a number of districts structures were based on local
authority or PCG boundaries. In some cases, there was a
inking structure to co-ordinate programmes between areas.
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There was generally little or no information in HImPs on
who chaired these new structures, where the chair was
based or whether non-executive members of the health
authority were involved. However, in a third of HlmPs (17/
50) the Director of Public Health (DPH) or associate/
assistant DPH appeared to have taken on the lead or co-
ordinating role. Only one health authority chief executive
appeared to have taken on the lead role.
Furthermore, the relationship of other health partner-
ships such as HAZs (16/50) to the HlmP, was not clear in
many documents where these partnerships were present.
For example, the HAZ was seen as the delivery mechanism
for achieving HlmP priorities in half the health authorities
(8/16) but governance arrangements over programme
development and implementation or links between the
two partnerships were only outlined in three documents.
However, there was wide recognition that the relationship
between these partnerships would evolve or become more
integrated in the future.
Few HImPs mentioned the relationship between the
HImP to the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) or Joint
Planning Groups (JPG). In the few that did, their role was
under review or recast as the HImP.
The data showed no association between different struc-
tural arrangements and specific demographic, structural or
partnership characteristics of health authorities.
Contribution to HTmP
Figure 1 shows the frequency of contribution of different
organisational sectors to the HlmP, either directly through
membership of the top tiers of partnership structures (ie not
through working groups) or through other le s f rrnal
mechanisms such as ad hoc editorial group. Many
HItnPs listed contributors but detail on contributors'
roles and responsibilities were often ab ent.
Apart from health authorities, local authoritie appeared
to be most involved in HImPs, with some or all councils
contributing to them in 94% (47/50) of health auth ritie .
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Figure 1 Frequency of contributions to HlmPs by organisational sector.
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58% (29/50) of HImPs did not specify which departments
had been involved. Of those which did, social services
appeared to be the most likely department to contribute
(38%, 19/50), followed by the Chief Executive or corporate
planning office (20%, 10/50) and education (16%, 8/50).
Housing (14%, 7/50), environment (12%, 6/50) and leisure
departments (4% 2/50) appeared least likely to contribute.
Within the NHS 'family', acute and community trusts
appeared to be the most involved in HImPs, contributing in
86% (43/50). peGs or GP representatives from 'shadow'
peGs appeared to have been less involved (78%, 39/50).
PCGs are identified as key partners in planning and devel-
oping HImPs but few documents mentioned PCGs' own
priorities and even fewer included PCGs' Primary Care
Investments Plans. Many HIrnPs recognised the difficulties
and slowness of engaging PCGs, many of which were still
in the formative stages of development, and resolved to
increase their contribution in the second HImP. Community
health councils (CHCs) were well represented, contributing
or observing in 80% of HImPs (40/50).
Other sectors contributing included: local medical or
other representative committees (24%), race and ethnicity
forums/councils (14%), police (14%), probation (12%) and
universities/colleges (12%) and to a lesser degree NHS
regional offices, HAZs, Drug Action Teams, Single Regen-
eration Budget partnerships, Training and Enterprise
Councils and Health and Safety Executive.
Voluntary sector participation
Government guidance stressed the need for HIrnPs to be an
inclusive process with the widest possible local involve-
ment from the outset,7,34 and involving both local service
providers and users and other organisations with an interest
or a contribution to offer."
This study considered the voluntary sector to include
voluntary and users/carer organisations, community groups
and the public. Figure 2 shows that of this group, voluntary
organisations contributed most to HIrnPs (86%, 43/50);
only four did not appear to involve voluntary groups. The
most frequently cited voluntary organisations were
umbrella organisations such as the Voluntary Services
Council (68%, 34/50). To a lesser degree, local branches
of national organisations such as MIND or Age Concern
were often identified as contributing to HIrnPs (26%, 13/
50). A similar number of local voluntary groups (26%, 13/
50) with particular health interests appeared to be engaged.
User and carer organisations appeared to contribute less
to HImPs (48%, 24/50). Community groups appeared to be
the least involved, contributing to less than a third of
HIrnPs (15/50).
Public involvement in HImPs appeared to be of a similar
magnitude (16/50). In most cases the public's view was
solicited through stakeholder events or public conferences.
In a few HImPs, more sophisticated methods were used
such as citizens' panels and surveys. In four health autho-
Public Health
100
901
80
70
! 60-
t 50c
~
"
30'
20
10
oJ-
U.... ICa .. "
------ --==j
32
Voluntacy CommJnliy groups Public inyo","mont
organisations
Volumary .ector
Figure 2 Frequency of contributions to HImPs by voluntary
sector.
rities, the content of the HIrnP was published in the media,
and in two HIrnPs, the eHC took an active role in engaging
the public.
However, only 50% of HIrnPs (25/50) contained a
glossary and even fewer (40%, 20/50) contained an invita-
tion to comment on the contents, leaving doubts as to
whether patients, community groups or members of the
public would understand its content or respond. Only a few
health authorities mentioned producing the HImP in min-
ority languages or in a format accessible to people with
visual impairment. Just over half of HImPs (26/50) con-
tained a strategy to develop or support partnership and only
one-third (16/50) a strategy to support voluntary sector
participation.
Partnership process
A key developmental stage to becoming a successful
collaboration is for partners to agree a vision or purpo e
to their work at the outset.v-" However, only a handful of
HImPs articulated any such statements or indicated they
were under consideration. Indeed, less than half of HJmP
(24/50) were endorsed (with signatures or logos) by th
main organisations that contributed to them, and in the e
documents 58% (14/24) of the endorsements appear to be
different from those who were on the partnership board or
identified in the text as contributing directly to the HImP.
This suggests that in the process of developing the HlmP
many partners did not feel sufficient ownership or commit-
ment to the document to publicly support (or be identified
with) its contents.
Accountability for delivery of the HImP is dependent on
establishing clear roles and responsibilities of partners. But
in a third of HIrnPs (17/50) no clear programme of action
as presented, and in those HImPs that did, the programme
as often far from comprehensive. For example, just over
alf of HImPs (28/50) identified a lead organisation for
ach action point in their programme, only two-thirds of
lImPs (34/50) had set timelines by which to accomplish
aeir commitments and only one in six (8/50) assigned
esources to each element of the programme. Less than a
uarter ofHImPs (12/50) mentioned the possibility of joint
udgets and even less appeared to have co-financed pro-
ects, Only two HImPs- both with HAZ status-expli-
.Itly identified funding for the development of partnership,
ublic participation or community involvement.
Discussion
)ocumentary analysis can provide a useful insight into how
artnersbips are developing. However, it is important to
'ecognise the limitations of this methodology when draw-
ng conclusions (see Introduction). With these in mind, this
tudy indicates that some first-round HImPs are wide
anging in their emphasis on partnership, vary considerably
n structure, membership, and degree of voluntary sector
)articipation. Their differential development appears to be
:ontingent on previous experience of partnership working,
ocal circumstance and how much partnership is recognised
IS key to delivering the national health agenda.
Such variety probably reflects the lack of central gui-
lance on what partnership should be, which leaves con-
Iderable scope for local interpretation and development at
pace commensurate with local circumstances and experi-
.nee. This may be entirely appropriate.
Engagement of key stakeholders is essential if colla-
IOrative activity is to be successful." To this end, govern-
nent guidance on which sectors to involve in HImPs was
elatively explicit (although far less explicit about how to
nvolve these sectors in identifying and prioritising local
ealrh issues). However, these results show that involve-
nent of organisations within and beyond the health sector
us been far from universal. It is encouraging that local
~overnment appears to have contributed to the HlmP in
early all health authority areas, with social services
jepartments most frequently identified as the partner.
.ess encouraging is the apparent lack of inclusion of
ther departments which may have an equal potential to
nfiuence the wider determinants of health, a key element of
he government's strategy for reducing health inequalities.'
Two further concerns, frequently recognised by HImP
iuthors, were that one in seven HImPs appeared not to have
nvolved trusts in developing the programme and an even
greater number failed to engage PCGs. These findings have
'een identified in other studies,II,15,16,22,28particularly the
ack of engagement of PCGs where preoccupation with
)rganisational development, resource pressures and the
push to gain trust status appears to have restricted their
.apacity to participate.13,15,22
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HImPs also appear to have achieved mixed results in
achieving a voluntary sector participation in decision
making, an issue identified in other studies.II,13-16,2I,22
This is notoriously difficult to achieve,'? but particularly
important to accomplish when the purpose of partnership
working is to develop 'user-based' rather than 'producer-
led' services."
While the majority of HImPs appear to have developed
(or are planning to develop) new structures, the focus on
formal working relations appears to have been to the
detriment of important elements of the partnership process;
few HImPs had developed a vision for the partnership;
there was a low level of endorsement of HlmP contents by
partners, poor assignment of responsibilities in action
plans, and a low level of resource commitment.
The critical role of process in ensuring the success of
inter-sectoral collaboration is frequently underestimated.P
As Costongs and Springett note, the effectiveness of
partnership is as much about the process by which the
outcomes are achieved as it is about the outcomes of
partnership."
This documentary analysis raises concern about the level
of inter-sectoral involvement and the degree of engagement
of partners in the process of producing HImPs. While many
health authorities have made great strides in this area, HlmPs
appear to lack a systematic and strategic approach to invol-
ving key stakeholders and developing the partnership.
However, HImPs were produced to a very tight time-
table, with many partnerships still at their earliest stages
when they were required to produce their first report.P This
placed limits on what could be achieved, as recognised in
the documents themselves. The findings of this documen-
tary analysis perhaps reflect this .
Nevertheless, the findings raise concerns and challenges
for PCTs as these organisations become the focus of local
partnership and HIMP production, P Gs were only
required to have one representative from social service
on their Boards. If HIMPs are to improve health (and not
just lead to better integration of health and social care"),
then PCTs will need to involve other local authority
departments which impact on the determinant of health,
something which the majority of first round HImPs failed to
do. PCTs will also need to increase the involvement of
acute trusts. This is strategically important since mo t
health care resources are tied up in acute hospital , and
without their co-operation it will be difficult to redirect
resources into health improvement and away from second-
ary care.!" PCT Boards are heavily populated by general
practitioners, a profession whose culture has not been ne
of collaboration.W" Even with an appropriate attitude,
working in partnership requires communicati n, planning,
and political skillsl" which many individuals in P T may
not possess. Furthermore, P T still face many of 111
organisational constraints which prevented P fr m
being involved in first round HlmP .
Collaboration requires careful attention to b th memb r-
ship and process factors if it i to be ucce ful. S Thi
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needs a strategic approach backed by corporate commit-
ment, particularly when the collaboration involves the
voluntary sector. Such an approach will enable peTs to
address the lack of skills and competencies of staff, the
dominance of professional culture, and the capacity of
partners and peTs to engage."
peTs present an opportunity to build new partnerships
which are more locally focused and sensitive to local needs.
However, failure to tackle the above challenges above may
quickly lead to disenchantment with the process and dis-
engagement of partners, leaving peTs dominating the
agenda in a style reminiscent of past bureaucratic planning
approaches.P
Lessons for the future
• HImPs provide a good focus for partnership working
and can enable the development of positi e relation-
ships between the statutory and non statutory sectors.
• HlmPs need to ensure that stakeholders beyond NHS
trusts and social service departments are involved.
• HlmPs need to actively support the inclusion of the
voluntary sector, particularly community groups.
• HlmPs need to pay attention to the process aspects of
partnership.
• peTs need to take a strategic approach at a corporate
level to ensure that all stakeholders are fully engaged.
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Appendix K
Table showing the mechanisms of mandatory co-ordination used by the New
Labour government
Legislation • White Papers
• Health Act (1999), creating new decentralised organisational
structures (PCGs)
• Local Government Act (200
Circulars • Policy documents
• Health Service Circulars (HSC)/Local Authority Circulars (LAC)
• Directives
Default power • Ministerial intervention for failing organisations
Inspection • Audit with performance graded using traffic lights and then stars
Appellate functions • HAZ bids
Financial measures • Regulating and scrutinising expenditure, particularly with regard to
HAs, PCGs and HAZs
Judicial control • New duty of partnership for NHS and local authorities
• Freedoms and f1exibilities increase statutory remit through pooled
budgets, provision of NHS and Social Services.
• Requirement to have Joint Consultative Committees (JCCS)
rescinded
• Schema developed from Greenwood (1989).
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AppendixM
Table summarising respondents' perceptions/attitudes towards health and
partnership by organisation/sector
.~~,,1: oj. ~1f :"'1$ _: f 'I .~~ (-; ."[.1-- 'i ' , :~ ; . , '"
:(l>i'.'J ' ' -\:._ ~( ~:~. :';,: l~~" •• /ft).,
HA-All Mixed Mixed Depended on department.
HA- Finance Minority Majority Lacked understanding of population perspective and
community involvement.
HA-PH Mixed Mixed Understand population perspective but not very
strong on partnership.
HA-HP Majority Minority Good understanding of social model of health and
experience of community involvement.
LA-SS Majority Minority History of joint working on health. More dir ctly
affected by health. Some experience of partnership
working, particularly with users/carers.
LA-EH Mixed Mixed Some officers/departments interpreted health as
environmental enforcement issue while others had
more of a tradition of working on broader health
issues, including prevention.
LA - Leisure Mixed Mixed Exercise generally understood in terms of Individual
lifestyle although a few examples of a broader
perspective which considers access (I.e. to OP) and
population health.
LA- Housing Mixed Mixed Some officers understood the connection between
housing and health. Many others did not s e the
relevance.
LA - Education Minority Minority Primarily focused on academic achievement. Few
made the link between health and learning.
LA- Members Mixed Mixed Health was generally seen as health service work,
except for those with particular interest in health.
Trusts - Minority Majority Mainly focused on individual and clinical s rvic s
Acute/MH rather than health outcomes or populations. Littl
experience of partnership and generally poor Inks
with SS.
Trusts - Mixed Mixed Although focused on services, officers tend d to
Community have a broader understanding of health, with som
experience of partnership.
PCGs Mixed Mixed View dependent on CE and Board. GPs t nd d to
lack population perspective although eng ged In
some preventionwork (i.e. in GP contract).
CHCs Majority Minority Although focused on health service lssu S, many
officers understood the importance of working on
the wider agenda despite not being in theIr remit.
Others Majority Minority Some individuals understood and welcomed th
(Probation, broader perspective on health and partnership.
REC)
Voluntary Majority Minority Generally understood and welcomed the broader
Sector perspective on health and partnership.
Appendix N
Structure of HImP and HAZ partnerships in each case study site
The following four pages contain the HImP and HAZ partnerships maps for each study
site. These maps give an indication of the size and complexity of partnership structures.
It must be noted that these partnership structures were not static but were evolving in
response to the national agenda and local context. The diagrams represent an
approximate snapshot of the structure over the time of data collection in each study site.
In many cases, the map was developed from an assimilation of partnership diagrams
collected from each study site and information gleaned from interviewees. Most
respondents were familiar with the structure of the partnership groups in their area but
unsure about the wider picture. Similarly, diagrams were often aspirational or
normative, often not reflecting the structures on the ground. A number of partnership
groups were reported as temporary as restructuring was in progress. The diagrams,
therefore, do not provide definitive maps of partnership in each site but give an overall
impression of the partnership structure.
There are two types of line on each diagram. These represent formal and informal
relationships:
Formal accountability link
Informal link (Le.members in
common)
0.
E-:J:
~
:J:
Cl)-.->
til
Cl)-ns
C
r----------------------------------------1 ,
I
- _1_ .....
!~
• I!••ciID.
c
fI)
0-
s:
!
G)
C 111.t= ....:cca ~I0-« ID.LL
:l:-0
:l:
>-
It ~l:l:C!I • .e::: 8-.... .e-
0;,", .~n ~.;U ~i-_ tJ:lD.l:
,
, I, ,
---____ I
-, I
I I
", I
I I
, I
n
I ,
I I I I~ ~ 4J _
~ n It
1----1 I n II ------------+ -----h- -----"-,
, I I
, I
~
, I
I I I
, I I~ ,------------------------r~, I I
~ ... _ ... - - _1- ... __ ...... _ ... _ ...... __ ... ... ... , :
, I
I I ::::::::::::::::~:::: ~------------_---------~J
I I :
I,,L • ~1---11
!
f
il
,.c I I , ,::::i:::::':::::~:::::;~:::-..
D.. I ', 'E ' ', '
:;: I I.... , '
I
Ioz
-----------, ,,,
I,
I,,
11-------
~'I
I
II --------.
\1
I.................. ,
II
II
i------~::::~------~=:========:==:=======~-----------------------~: r----t----., : I
... N i I ! it~;: ~N ti tiUti liti ! i :5 :5 Iii I&.i is IItiS ... N:0 &! &! Ii Ii Ix- e-X If) If)
I
I
I- -------.,
I
tn
C-.-
J:
Q. ~Cl)
E c:1:- caJ: C-
~
«u.
::t:
~ -0
~
::t:
I-e
0~...
CD
:E
11"1
Sf
fI)
Co=e
CiD
J:2
~ !) =15~! fI)hi.:IJ il Q.~1f)8
L E-::E:
I........................ " "., , " ..~
: Cl) ~ ,
~E:;:,= '5 i
;",0'5 cl:
; Cl) to.... 0
:b ~ i ! ji!
!it i :Ni!..,r.!,!~.e o~ I Ii
lJ:",":!
; Q.
I
I
I
I It------
~•. , ' ', " " "'"" ,,1.· ••.. •• ; ; •
I I' •
-------------------:::::~::::::::::::::::~~------------~-----------j
fn J!c. I.-J:r!
CD
€
Clc.
1i
CJ
.!e..
CD
J:...
0
Q.
E-l:
cs
Cl)-"C
"C.-
:E
..
1
I
I ! •
I
I
I
I 0 I
I
I
I
I
1
I
1: J
:I
: I
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
l!'I~
iii El 1-----1~----~
IL Cl I
S:z:
J
PI II j
1
1
1
1
1 I
1 1
1 I
1 1
I 1
I I
I 1
I I
1 1
1 1
1
1
1
I
1
1 I
I I
I 1
1 I
I 1
1 I
I 1
I 1
1 I
1
1
1
~.. 1II
I
- _I
t
:...------r-----~
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
IL _
I
I
I
I
,,,,,,,,,,
r--1
l i
s r- ~j 1)11 D
~~ 2' IC):."~_~O==~~ I- .....~I(!)~-i - =
-i~in E r-1
inQ.t~ E· r-1
~j is - .--- , 1"---'
J::!:.m l! r- ~J I;i"
0) ·Ur r-- ~_
: :: ~ 1.5 J:===____ 1 oJ
::: ft ';:=, ~
, " - ~
iii ~ r-!{ i5fl{~1~
: : : fS ~h'~HH~~~' ='~=J-, ', ' i I
: : ~ :z:: __,
: :..., r- al ll :
:: I __ ,
'" - ,I I I I
'" ----, :
" , I r- I I
" , I
'" i;;_ I'" i· ,:: : -5~ ::: : ,
I I I •
'" - I
" , I
I' , :" ,
: : i '----,, ,
" 2'" -c~
1 lOr!
" :5 -: I!
I I ~·E i
:: ~ Q. :
" U J ,
' ' I
~:~ I
' : : ----,.-----------_.1'1 i i 1' i J j~; h i ----- ~ ------------L:::::::::-_-_:::::::::::-_::~:----------- __ ~,
: ...-
" ...
' , ------------------- C§
I ' _: -----------r--------------~ :
-
r-i 11M
..------ I:
-Jr- ~s 'I )5 l
• .- 1-
1
------,1
.....,
.___
r-1 r- 'I
_J- fir-~ I
,,,
I,
I,,
I,,,
I,,,
I,,
I
I,
•r-···--_····_!...--
~
j
~ i
E
2ou,
.,..
Appendix 0
Loxley's framework for collaboration in health and welfare
Loxley's conceptual framework for collaboration in health and welfare combines
aspects of three theories of social interaction (namely Systems theory, Social Exchange
Theory and Co-operation Theory) with the dimension of power, culture and values and
structure. She argues that difficulties often experienced in collaboration are attributable
to competition for power and resources, the defensiveness of holding on to what is
known, understood and practiced and the impact of an unsupportive environment.
Failure to address all these elements has frustrated attempts to improve attitudes and
relations through inter-professional education. Only through the explicit consideration
of the effect of these elements can partnership become well-founded, effective and
produce sustainable services responsive to need. This requires everyone participating in
collaboration to possess the core skills needed for the development of the partnership
process (Loxley 1997). A diagram of Loxley's framework is shown below.
Social
elements
Culture Independent Accepting risk in Trust and credit
and values and holistic costlbenefit accumulation-----------;--------------+-----------~
Autonomy Sufficient to be Sufficient to be
and sharing competent to provocable
engage and
deliver
Power
Core skills
Assessing
resources
r-
Building
structures
Source: (Loxley 1997)
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Hudson's framework for the analysis of collaboration in social welfare
Hudson's framework for the analysis of collaboration in social welfare also draws on
theoretical perspectives relating to interaction between individual and organisations
(such as resource exchange, network theory and Resource Dependency Theory). He
combines these concepts with insights taken from the empirical literature.
Hudson argues that collaboration must be viewed as an organisational network in a
social welfare setting and analysed in relation to its external environmental (Sanderson
1990). Collaborative activity should be analysed, therefore, at three levels: the socio-
economic level in which it is embedded, the attributes of the interacting organisations,
and the nature of the links between them.
A 'turbulent' environment such as unstable social conditions, a new piece of legislation
or a retrenching economy can affect an organisation's ability to function independently
or create the context for organisational interaction. However, while clearly the
environment is important, it is not sufficient to explain inter-organisational relationships
(Hudson 1987). Here, Hudson takes a comparative properties approach, identifying
attributes or dimensions of interacting groups or organisations in a network. These
constitute a set of conditions that continually shape the pattern of interaction. He
identifies five pre-requisites for the creation of collaborative activity (Hudson 1987;
Sanderson 1990). These are:
• Inter-organisational homogeneity: the degree to which members of a network
exhibit structural and functional similarity. Difference in value systems and
goals can be an obstacle to work.
• Domain consensus: a set of expectations about what an organisation will and
will not do, providing an image of the organisation's role in a larger system,
which in turn serves as a guide for the ordering of action in certain directions.
Consensus requires agreement and compatibility on specific organisational goals
as well as philosophies and reference orientations. Domain consensus is
important to establishing the legitimacy of an organisation and its claim on
resources. Low domain consensus can hinder collaboration but so too can
similarity of domains by promotion of competition.
• Network awareness: organisational interdependency is the most fertile ground
for collaboration but this requires awareness of other organisations as well as the
possibility of matching goals and resources. A positive evaluation of the value of
other organisations' work is important to collaboration and is affected by
historical relations and patterns of accountability and socialisation.
• Organisational exchange: exchange refers to interactions based on reciprocal re-
enforcement i.e. it is perceived that the exchange is in each organisation's
interest. Analysis must focus on power processes. Equality of power is not a pre-
condition for exchange but it is important that neither party is powerless in
relation to the other.
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• Alternative resource sources: the availability of alternative 'outside' sources
will reduce the incentive for an organisation to enter into exchange relations
with other organisations in its network.
Hudson argues that these variables may help explain the degree of collaboration or
conflict in interactions between organisations. He elaborates on the specific nature of
collaborative links and suggests four dimensions for analysis (Hudson 1987; Sanderson
1990):
• Degree of formalisation:
i. Collaboration may be mandated by administrative or legislative sanction.
ii. The existence of an intermediate body to facilitate exchange and co-
ordination. Where there is a high degree of independence or conflict,
interdependence may have to be induced via modification to goals and use of
resources.
• Degree of intensity: the amount of investment an organisation has in its relations
with other organisations in terms of the amount of resources, the frequency of
interaction and the level at which interaction takes place.
• Degree of reciprocity: the degree of symmetry or asymmetry in exchange
transactions between organisations in terms of resources (money, physical
facilities and material, information, client referral and such intangibles as
prestige).
• Degree of standardisation: Standardisation of relation between organisations (in
terms of, for example, units of measurement for resources and procedural
arrangements that affect collaboration).
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List of abbreviations
ADPH Assistant Director of Public Health
BME Black and Ethnic Minority
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CHC Community Health Council
CHD Coronary Heart Disease
CMHS Community Mental Health Services
CRE Council/Commission for Racial Equality
CT Community Trust
DETR Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions
DoH Department of Health
DC District Council
DAT Drug Action Team
DPH Director of Public Health
DSS Director of Social Services
EH Environmental Health
EHO Environmental Health Officer
HAZ Health Action Zone
HC Healthy City
HFA2000 Health For A1l2000
HImP Health Improvement Programme
HIMP Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme
HOTN Health of the Nation
HP Health Promotion
HSCB Health and Social Care Board
JCC Joint Consultative Committee
JCPT Joint Care Planning Team
JF Joint Finance
JlP Joint Investment Programme
LA Local authority
LD Learning Disability
LIFT Local Improvement Finance Trusts
LIT Local Implementation Team
MH Mental Health
NHS National Health Service
NOF New Opportunities Fund
NVQ National Vocational Qualification
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OP Older People
OPDM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PbR Payment by Results
PCC Primary and Continuing Care
PC Primary Care
PCG Primary Care Group
PCIP Primary Care Investment Plan
PCT Primary Care Trust
PH Public Health
PFI Private Finance Initiative
RDT Resource Dependency Theory
REC Race Equality Council
SaFF Service and Financial Framework
SDG Service Development Groups
SS Social Services
VO Voluntary organisation
VS Voluntary Sector
VSC Voluntary Service Councils
WHO World Health Organization
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